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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT 
 
Debasis Bhattacharya 
 
Doctor of Philosophy 
 
Department of Political Science 
 
December 2013 
 
Title: Legislative-Executive Relations and U.S. Foreign Policy: Continuum of Consensus 
and Dissension in Strategic Political Decision Process from 1970 to 2010 
 
 
 
During the last four decades, precisely from the early 1970s, U.S. foreign policy 
has played a dominant role in the U.S. political landscape. The current political discourse 
is predominantly marked by divided government, polarized politics and gridlock. Such a 
contentious political environment has proved to be detrimental for efficient and effective 
policy-making in foreign policy. There are significant factors that profoundly complicate 
the process of decision making and congressional-presidential relations. Partisan and 
ideological differences under the conditions of divided government are dominant in the 
current political process and in turn affect the prospects of legislative-executive 
consensus and dissension. Other factors such as media salience, public opinion, and 
electoral imperatives also complicate the dynamics of legislative-executive relations. In 
an era in which heightened political brinkmanship has enveloped Washington politics, a 
continuum of consensus and dissension between Congress and the president on strategic 
foreign policy issues has virtually become a norm. This dissertation examines the 
dynamics of legislative-executive relations in two high politics U.S. foreign policy issue 
areas of treaty process and war powers. It appears that in contemporary U.S. foreign 
policymaking the trajectory of a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and 
 v 
 
dissension is a new normal and potentially irreversible, as Congress and the president try 
ardently to preserve their respective constitutional prerogatives. 
 
Empirical investigation across these two issue areas demonstrates a new era of a 
resurgent Congress marked by its greater assertive role and acting as a consequential 
player in the foreign policy domain. The passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 
by Congress, overriding a presidential veto, has profound implications in the modern 
political landscape. It was a pivotal moment that permanently transformed the future road 
map of congressional-presidential relations. Since then the U.S. political system has been 
relentlessly experiencing an institutional power struggle in the foreign policy domain. 
Findings suggest that when Congress determines to confront the president and exercise its 
constitutional responsibilities it becomes very difficult for the president to overcome such 
congressional resistance. Interbranch competition has virtually created a consistent 
trajectory of a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension in the foreign 
policy decision-making process. 
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CHAPTER I   
INTRODUCTION: LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE RELATIONS AND U.S. 
FOREIGN POLICY– CONSENSUS AND DISSENSION  
Introduction 
Since the beginning of the 1970s, the U.S. political system witnessed significant 
changes in the realm of legislative-executive relations. A momentous political shift began 
when Congress, in an unprecedented move, successfully passed the War Powers 
Resolution in 1973 by overriding a presidential veto. This event permanently transformed 
the national political landscape and marked a resurgence of congressional power in 
foreign policy sphere.
1
 Such a resurgence of congressional power was quite extraordinary 
especially after it low levels during the Vietnam War and the Watergate affair. A 
resurgent Congress ushered in a new era of legislative-executive relations in which the 
national legislative branch started playing a more dominant role in the foreign policy 
process, with significant political consequences.
2
 Implications of congressional 
resurgence are quite clear with regard to the balance of power between Congress and the 
president. With a more assertive Congress, Washington has witnessed greater levels of 
legislative-executive dissension in determining the direction of foreign policy, while 
presidents have generally attempted to preserve their traditional foreign policy 
dominance.
3
 A consistent pattern of interbranch conflict between a resurgent Congress 
                                                          
1
 Sundquist, James L. 1981; Lindsay, James and Randall Ripley 1993; Meernik, James 1993; Lindsay, 
James 1994. 
 
2
 Mann, Thomas E. 1990. 
3
 Peake, Jeffrey S. 2002. 
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and an uncompromising president has at times proved to be untenable and has created a 
dysfunctional government.
4
 In turn the trajectory of congressional-presidential 
competition has greatly reaffirmed the famous analysis of “invitation to struggle” in the 
foreign policy sphere.
5
 The genesis of legislative-executive competition is largely rooted 
in the inherent constitutional ambiguities which are responsible for creation of a gray area 
or “twilight zone”6 which, in turn, acts as a delicate interface in balancing power between 
the legislative and executive branches across Pennsylvania Avenue. This dissertation cuts 
across the very essence of legislative-executive relations in foreign policy sphere in the 
current political environment of divided government and polarized politics. Since the 
early 1970s, interbranch competition has shown a consistent trajectory of a continuum of 
consensus and dissension in legislative-executive relations. This study investigates and 
analyzes how the principle of “separation of powers” creates political constraints and 
contingencies, which, in turn, often lead to “sharing of powers between separated 
institutions.”7 For that purpose it explores two high profile strategic foreign policy issue 
areas – treaty process and war powers - which constitute the elite club of the “so called 
high politics of foreign policy.”8 The timeline of this investigative study is from 1970 to 
2010 which itself is unprecedented in terms of its reflection of such a continuum of 
legislative-executive consensus and dissension.  
                                                          
4
 Some authors have interpreted a resurgent Congress as an “imperial Congress” and an uncompromising 
president as an “imperial president.” See Jones, Gordon S. and John A. Marini. 1988; Schlesinger, Arthur 
M. 1973. 
 
5
 Corwin, Edward S. 1957. 
6
 Mann, Thomas E. 1990. 
7
 Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. 
8
 Carter, Ralph G. 1986, p. 332. 
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The next section lays out the theoretical foundation of the dissertation and explains 
the framework of continuum of consensus and dissension between the legislative and 
executive branches. The third section maps the problem structure and discusses the 
complexities associated with the current political environment in the United States. In the 
fourth section research questions are highlighted. The fifth section analyzes the 
significance of the issue areas of treaty process and war powers. In the sixth section the 
research hypotheses are discussed. The concluding section sums up the project. 
Theoretical Foundation of the Study 
The theoretical foundation of continuum of consensus and dissension in 
legislative-executive relations portrays a systemic conceptualization of the essence of 
constitutional underpinning about the functional relations between Congress and the 
president. Since the 1970s the trajectory of U.S. political system has been routinely 
experiencing a consistent pattern of legislative-executive consensus and dissension. Such 
pattern consistency of interbranch functional dynamic provides fertile ground for 
investigation on the efficacy of legislative-executive relations especially in the context of 
current political environment which is predominantly marked by divided government and 
polarized politics. When Capitol Hill and the White House converge and work as partners 
in the political process to arrive at a policy decision there is a legislative-executive 
consensus. Conversely, when these two coequal branches diverge and work as rivals the 
outcome is dissension. It is also important to recognize that in addition to interbranch 
level dynamic the theoretical framework of continuum of consensus and dissension also 
relates to intrabranch level, especially Congress, which is a collective bicameral 
institution. In Congress political exigencies and preferences of the legislators can lead to 
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consensus and dissension not only within the U.S. House of Representatives and the U.S. 
Senate individually but also across the two chambers. Intrabranch level complications in 
a collective institution like Congress significantly add to the overall complexities of 
legislative-executive relations.  
The criteria for a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension in 
the realm of treaty ratification process are examined within the constitutional provisions, 
which require the United States Senate’s “advice and consent” by a two-thirds majority 
of all senators present and voting before proposed international treaties can be ratified 
and enter into force.
9
 For war powers politics, the criteria for a continuum of legislative-
executive consensus and dissension are examined within the constitutional framework of 
the War Powers Resolution (1973), which requires “collective judgment” by Congress 
and the president prior to the deployment of U.S. troops into hostilities and military 
operations abroad.
10
 Empirical investigation for the two issue areas broadly corroborates 
the overarching theoretical analysis of a continuum of consensus and dissension between 
Capitol Hill and the executive branch. Conventional wisdom and scholarship assert that 
divided government results in congressional-presidential dissension and gridlock, 
whereas unified government leads to consensus and cooperation.
11
 On the other hand, 
revisionist theory argues that legislative success (or failure) does not necessarily depend 
                                                          
9
 U.S. Constitution Article II, section 2. 
10
 Fisher, Louis. 1995. 
11
 Sundquist, James L. 1980, 1988; Fiorina, Morris P. 1992; Cox, Gary and Samuel Kernell. 1991;  Kelly, 
Sean. 1993; Edwards, George C., III, Andrew Barret, and Jeffrey Peake. 1997; Binder, Sarah. 1999; 
Coleman, John J. 1999; Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher, ed. 2000; Conley, Richard S. 2000, 2003;  
Peake, Jeffrey. 2002. 
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on the presence of unified (or divided) government.
12
 This investigative study constructs 
a bridge between the two schools of thought in order to project a mutually intertwined 
institutional relationship which in turn leads to a continuum of consensus and 
dissension between Congress and the president, regardless of the presence of divided or 
unified government. The concept of a mutually intertwined institutional relationship 
relates to the fact that Congress and the presidency are not only interdependent in a 
symbiotic relationship,
13
 but also functionally locked in a convoluted arrangement 
directly affecting the dynamics of political process and outcome. Analytical consideration 
of intertwined institutional relationship is broader in scope and extent than symbiotic 
relationship because it reflects not only mutual co-optation but also adversarial 
relationships which in turn affect interbranch struggle. As a result, what ultimately 
transpires is a consistent pattern of a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension especially in the making of foreign policy where each branch ardently tries to 
preserve its own constitutional prerogatives. Such a theoretical premise allows for 
making a just and logical interpretation of the concept of “separation of powers” in terms 
of a more powerful and appropriate concept of “separated institutions sharing power.”14 
The theoretical framework of a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension is laid out in Appendix A. In the ultimate analysis Congress and the president 
act as “interdependent parts of an adaptive system” on matters of foreign policy.15 The 
                                                          
12
 Mayhew, David. 1991, 2005; Peterson, Mark. 1990; Jones, Charles O. 1999; Krehbiel, Keith. 1996, 
1998; Brady, David W., and Craig Volden. 2006. 
 
13
 Peterson, Mark. 1990. 
14
 Neustadt, Richard E. 1990. 
15
 Krutz, Glen, and Jeffrey Peake. 2009, p. 10. 
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substantive nature of this study reflects some unique perspectives as explained in the 
following lines:  
1. In this study efforts have been made toward making a comprehensive analysis of 
the contours of legislative-executive consensus and dissension in two strategic high-
politics foreign policy issue areas – treaty process and war powers – under a single study. 
The scope and extent of this study establish unique dimensions in illustrating the complex 
nature of interbranch competition in foreign policy arena. The symmetrical perspective of 
the analysis is worth noting. 
2. The substantive nature of the central thesis of continuum of legislative-executive 
consensus and dissension is unique by itself from the point of view of theoretical 
exploration and empirical observation. Until now, not much work has been done to 
investigate the contingencies of congressional-presidential competition in the foreign 
policy sphere. Therefore, a case can be made here quite strongly for a need to undertake 
such comprehensive research in order to enrich the existing knowledge base. This study 
is a modest step taken in that direction.           
3. The time period from 1970 to 2010 provides this study with unique strategic and 
historical perspective. In the foreign policy sphere, this time period covers the global 
geopolitics of the Cold War and post-Cold War periods for the two issue areas. Also from 
the standpoint of interbranch relations this time period takes into account unique 
perspectives with regard to congressional resurgence and legislative-executive balance of 
power positions.  
4. This study attempts to illustrate the empirical observations of the political 
dynamic in the making of foreign policy when the two coequal branches of the federal 
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government – legislature and executive - participate in the political process 
simultaneously. Such an assessment provides a unique perspective that ultimately 
strengthens the theoretical foundation of this study. In our discipline, adequate work has 
been done to explore the powers and prerogatives of Congress and the president on an 
individual basis. However, studies related to combining the dynamics of the legislative 
and executive branches are relatively fewer in number. Subsequently, a case can be made 
here with conviction that the current political environment of divided government and 
polarized politics has increased the necessity for more scholarly research concerning 
legislative-executive relations. This study is a small step in that direction by making an 
effort to understand the practical feasibility aspects as well as the limitations and 
ambiguities of the constitutional provisions affecting congressional-presidential 
functional prerogatives in foreign policy arena. 
Mapping the Problem Structure 
The research problem relates to the imperatives of strategic political decision-
making under the current environment of divided government, heightened political 
polarization, contentious politics, and higher levels of interbranch competition. In this 
context, it is important to analyze what Congress and the president, “can do and should 
do, how they fulfill their roles and what they actually achieve either singly or together,” 
in an attempt to shape the current political debate.
16
  Moreover, it is high time to revisit 
the efficacy of the concept of “separation of powers” with “checks and balances,” and 
perhaps reinterpret the true intent of the constitutional principles in terms of consensus-
                                                          
16
 Foley, Michael, and John E. Owens. 1996. p. 367. 
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building and power-sharing.
17
 The framers of the U.S. Constitution when they met in 
Philadelphia “sought to strike a balance between these divergent conceptions, in which 
the legislature and the executive would share power. But how precisely the line should be 
drawn is as elusive today as it was then.”18 And it is exactly this elusiveness that persists 
even in the modern-day political landscape and thereby affecting the contours of 
legislative-executive consensus and dissension. These days there is a growing perception 
that the criteria of “checks and balances” should be regarded as a facilitator to prevent 
abuse of power and promote compromise.   
Political outcomes are highly contingent on partisan and institutional 
dimensions.
19
 While partisan models deal with the effect of divided party control between 
Capitol Hill and the White House, institutional models focus on the effect of 
“supermajority rule.”20 The varied partisan compositions in Congress and the executive 
branch create political complications. This ultimately makes it imperative to find 
common ground to build a viable consensus, not only between Congress and the 
president, but also between the U.S. Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. In the 
absence of such common ground, there will be legislative-executive gridlock. Also, there 
can be situations in which intraparty division disrupts the political process of consensus-
building and ultimately results in confrontational politics.
21
 In a situation of intra-party 
                                                          
17
 In the absence of such analytical recalibration there is always a real danger of dysfunctional government.     
18
 Mann, Thomas E. 1990. p. 36. 
19
 Binder, Sarah. 1999. 
20
 Ibid., p. 520. 
21
 The ratification process of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was one such example, 
in which many of the Democratic members of the House of Representatives and the Senate declined to 
comply with their party leader, President Bill Clinton. 
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conflict, there can also be instances of an interparty coalition in the form of a majority 
group that can override the adverse effects of intraparty division. If that happens, it will 
be a classic case of an unconventional bipartisan coalition, based on a broader policy 
perspective.
22
 All such possibilities depend on the political composition of the U.S. 
Senate and the U.S. House of Representatives. In fact, U.S. constitutional design 
necessarily requires political leaders to build consensus, make compromises, and promote 
cooperation not only between and within the two chambers of Congress, but also between 
Congress and the president.
23
 The question is to determine when and at what point of 
time legislative-executive consensus is practically feasible for effective policy-making 
and when it is not. While Congress is a collective institution with a pluralist design, the 
office of the president is a unitary institution. The collective institutional profile of 
Congress creates multiple interests and variable contingencies for coalitions at the 
intrabranch level, therefore “promoting a wide range of collective interests.”24 Partisan 
and ideological differences create political contingencies for coalition-building and/or 
gridlock not only inside Congress, but also between Congress and the president. 
Nonetheless, it is important to recognize that even when volatility in political conditions 
results in a continuum of consensus and dissension in the political process, there is 
always an underlying current of seeking common ground and building consensus for 
tactical purpose at some level, especially in the current political environment when the 
                                                          
22
 Instances are ratification of NAFTA and more recently, the political contingency of raising the debt 
ceiling.   
 
23
 Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher, ed. 2000; Sinclair, Barbara in Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher, 
ed. 2000.   
  
24
 Schickler, Eric. 2001. p. 4. 
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presence of divided government has become a norm. Whether consensus is achievable or 
not by successfully averting the risks of dissension is determined by the complex 
dynamics of the political process currently in place in Washington. 
Research Questions 
Theoretical foundation and problem structure generate following research 
questions:    
1. Is it possible to overcome legislative-executive gridlock under divided 
government? 
  
2. Under conditions of congressional resurgence and divided government, is there 
a greater effort from both White House and Congress to forge consensus? 
 
3. What political conditions facilitate dissension and/or consensus between 
Congress and the president? Are they case specific in their implications or can we draw 
generalizations?  
  
4. What is the impact of divided and/or unified government on consensus and 
dissension in foreign policy? 
  
Selection of Issue Areas 
The two foreign policy issue areas selected in this dissertation are: (1) Treaty 
process which comprises treaty negotiation, advice and consent, and ratification; (2) War 
powers which relates to deployment of troops into hostilities abroad for military 
operations as prescribed by the provisions of the War Powers Resolution (1973).  These 
two issue areas are carefully selected based on their significance in the U.S. foreign 
policy sphere and congressional-presidential competition in making strategic political 
decisions.  
 
 
11 
 
Selection of Issue Area of Treaty Process 
According to the U.S. Constitution the treaty process treaty process is a joint 
institutional responsibility in which Congress and the president are required to share 
power and act as equal partners under the constitutional framework. Even George 
Washington, who presided over the Constitutional Convention, “believed that the 
Constitution intended joint executive-legislative action on treaties.”25 Article II, Section 2 
of the U.S. Constitution empowers the president “by and with the Advice and Consent of 
the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two-thirds of the Senators present concur…….”26 
Also in Federalist No. 75, Alexander Hamilton clearly states: 
The power of making treaties is, plainly, neither the one [legislative] nor 
the other [executive]. It relates neither to the execution of the subsisting 
laws, nor to the enaction of new ones ….. It must indeed be clear to a 
demonstration that the joint possession of the power in question, by the 
President and Senate, would afford a greater prospect of security, than 
the separate possession of it by either of them.
27
 
 
The constitutional provisions, therefore, require the president to seek Senate advice and 
consent not just for treaty approval but also to shape the content of the treaty.
28
  In 
essence, the intent of two-thirds majority in the Senate is to ensure that “treaties must 
reflect a broad national consensus.”29 However, with the resurgence of Congress and 
greater congressional assertiveness treaty process has witnessed a fairly consistent pattern 
                                                          
25
 Fisher, Louis. 1998,  p.183. 
26
 U.S. Constitution (Article II, section 2) as cited in Fisher, Louis 1989. 
27
 Hamilton, Alexander. Federalist No.75. The treaty-making power of the executive. March 26, 1788. 
Available at http://www.constitution.org/fed/federa75.htm 
 
28
 Fisher, Louis.1989. p. 1512. 
 
29
 U.S. Senate official website. Available at 
http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm 
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of legislative-executive consensus and dissension over the last four decades. That makes 
this issue area especially appealing and intriguing for the purpose of scholarly 
investigation.  
The procedural dynamic of the treaty process represents a classic portrait of 
legislative-executive competition in the foreign policy arena. Once the president 
negotiates and signs a treaty with a foreign partner the original treaty document is then 
transmitted to the United States Senate for advice and consent. Thereafter, the Senate 
refers it to the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC herewith) for 
preliminary review and consideration.
30
 In reality, the SFRC acts as a gatekeeper of the 
proposed treaty and determines whether it needs to be reported back to the U.S. Senate or 
not for further legislative consideration.
31
 If the SFRC considers the proposed treaty to be 
significant, it has the power to report the treaty back to the U.S. Senate either favorably 
or unfavorably.
32
 If the SFRC reports the treaty back to the Senate it is then considered 
on the Senate floor for debate and further deliberations, followed by Senate floor voting. 
If the voting outcome is favorable with a two-thirds majority of the senators present 
concurring then the treaty is accepted. Failing to garner two-thirds majority vote would 
automatically lead to rejection of the treaty. The Senate can directly intervene in the 
treaty consent process and restrain the president by the imposition of amendments, 
reservations, understandings, and policy declarations to that treaty’s document of 
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ratification.
33
 Once such modifications are inserted by the Senate, it becomes very 
difficult for the president to reject them.
34
 Because of all such procedural complications 
the president, at the time of negotiating any treaty (Level I), has to be aware of the 
possibilities of favorable Senate response toward treaty approval (Level II).
35
 Any 
subsequent attempt by the president to reinterpret a treaty in direct contradiction of the 
common understanding on which the administration got Senate approval is severely 
reprimanded by the Senate.
36
 In essence the Senate advice and consent process has 
significant consequences in determining the fate of the treaty. Moreover, treaty 
ratification is one of those strategic areas in which Congress tries to vigorously protect its 
foreign policy prerogatives. As a result every step of the treaty process is contentious and 
vulnerable to legislative-executive consensus and dissension.  
Finally, one point deserves some clarification. This is with regard to the 
increasing use of executive agreements by the president over the years. It is argued that 
presidents are more inclined to strategically evade the Senate when the opposition party 
has a majority in the Senate or when the ideological composition in the Senate is not in 
favor of the president.
37
 Such presidential action conforms to the fact that the current 
political environment, especially since the Vietnam War, has become so much more 
contentious in the foreign policy sphere that quite often the administration faces 
insurmountable congressional opposition. Under the conditions of divided government, 
                                                          
33
 Auerswald, David P., and Forrest Maltzman. 2003; Auerswald, David. 2006. 
34
 Auerswald, David P. 2003. 
35
 Putnam, Robert D. 1988. p. 427-60.  
36
 Frye, Alton in Peterson, Paul, ed. 1994. p. 197. 
37
 Moe, Terry, and William Howell. 1999; Krutz, Glen, and Jeffrey Peake. 2009. 
14 
 
the ideological preferences of pivotal institutional players in Congress coupled with 
unfavorable partisan dynamics of congressional law-makers factor into presidential 
decisions to use executive agreements.
38
 Executive agreements expose greater propensity 
of treaty process to the exigencies of interbranch competition. In this context, it is 
important to take into account that evading Congress and resorting to executive 
agreements on a frequent basis loses the popular legitimacy aspect which the nation’s 
founders vigorously wanted to incorporate in the normal treaty process by specifically 
including the provision of “advice and consent” by a two-thirds majority of votes in the 
U.S. Senate.
39
 Some analysts suspect that use of executive agreements vis-à-vis treaties 
does not necessarily support the notion of presidential dominance in the treaty process. 
They argue that presidents cannot evade the U.S. Senate at their own will. Such 
presidential behavior is contingent upon discretion granted by the U.S. Senate to the 
administration from time to time as warranted by swifter diplomatic action.
40
  
Selection of Issue Area of War Powers 
The War Powers Resolution (1973), passed by Congress by overriding a 
presidential veto, is regarded as a major policy intervention which has profound 
implications on legislative-executive power balance with regard to conduct of war. This 
landmark Act symbolizes the resurgence of Congress in terms of heightened levels of 
congressional assertiveness in the foreign policy process.
41
  During the Vietnam War the 
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extent of presidential war powers climbed to such controversial levels, and with 
questionable consequences, that Congress felt compelled to intervene in an 
unprecedented manner by passing the War Powers Resolution in 1973.
42
 The Act was 
intended to “rein in a presidency run amok and to reassert congressional prerogatives 
over foreign policy making.”43 In turn, it has established “parameters for desired 
presidential behavior and subsequent congressional [retaliatory] action. With a few 
exceptions, presidents have significantly limited the duration of foreign interventions to 
conform to the limits set forth in the Act.”44 A more assertive Congress has led to its 
having a greater confrontational position vis-a-vis the president.
45
 The purpose of the 
War Powers Resolution (P.L.93-148) is to ensure sharing of power between Congress and 
the president in any decision-making process which might get U.S. armed forces involved 
in hostilities in a foreign land.
46
  In essence, the constitutional statute calls for “collective 
judgment” by Congress and the president prior to the deployment of U.S. troops into 
hostilities and military operations abroad.
47
  
The War Powers Resolution requires the president to mandatorily report to and 
consult with Congress for every U.S. military intervention into hostilities abroad.
48
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Through this, the Act tends to emphasize interbranch collaboration whenever U.S. troops 
are to be deployed in a foreign land.
49
 In this context, “the resolution was an effort by 
legislators to revitalize and give new meaning to the constitutional power of Congress to 
declare war.”50 The hallmark of this Act is that it contemplates two means of legislative 
control – (i) a deadline of 60 to 90 days on presidential initiatives to use military force 
abroad;
51
 (ii) the use of a concurrent resolution by Congress to require the president to 
withdraw U.S. troops engaged in hostilities in the event of Congress not authorizing any 
extension of the time limit for troop deployment.
52
  Ever since the inception of the Act in 
1973 there has been policy contestation between Congress and the president on troop 
deployment into hostilities abroad. A great deal of congressional-presidential tension 
reflects how and under what conditions the Act has been enforced from time to time. 
Variation in government typology (divided and/or unified) and differential policy 
preferences between Capitol Hill and the White House have often been responsible for 
dissension and consensus when it comes to enforcement of the Act. The overall dynamics 
of legislative-executive interactions regarding troop deployment into hostilities abroad 
significantly helps to map out a continuum of consensus and dissension (See Chapter V 
for “Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart”). In essence the profound implications of 
the War Powers Resolution on U.S. foreign policy have justifiably made it a serious 
policy topic that is logically consistent with the theoretical framework of this dissertation. 
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Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis formulation and testing constitute integral components of the research 
methodology adopted in this study. Such exercise helps to facilitate empirical 
investigation of the efficacy of consensus-building and conflict management in 
legislative-executive relations for the issue areas of treaty process and war powers. Each 
hypothesis incorporates the causal factors (independent variables) that affect the outcome 
(dependent variable) in the form of legislative-executive consensus or dissension. 
Following research hypotheses explain a continuum of legislative-executive consensus 
and dissension in strategic political decision process.  
Issue Area of Treaty Process 
 Hypothesis 1: Divided government facilitates legislative-executive dissension in 
the treaty process, while unified government facilitates consensus. Presence of unified 
government facilitates the United States Senate’s consent and approval to the negotiated 
treaty that is transmitted by the president. In contrast, divided government increases the 
probability of legislative-executive rivalry and political gridlock in the treaty process. As 
a result when divided government is formed, it is increasingly difficult to get the highly 
anticipated consent and approval of the Senate by the requisite two-thirds majority of the 
senators present and voting to the negotiated treaty that is transmitted by the president. 
 Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the treaty process.  Ideological differences between senators and the 
president create significant barriers in arriving at a consensus in the treaty legislation 
process. It is argued that split-party control of the legislative and executive branches 
creates greater partisan and procedural hurdles in the treaty consent process. The 
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ideological distance and partisan conflict between the pivotal institutional players in the 
Senate and the president is important in deciding treaty consensus and/or dissension.     
 Hypothesis 3:  Intraparty disagreement or squabbling results in dissension in 
the treaty process. A high degree of intraparty disagreement on treaty legislation under 
consideration significantly increases the probability of partisan dissension, which can 
derail the political process of treaty consent. In such a situation, it is highly likely that the 
Senate would deny its consent and approval to the proposed treaty document.   
 Hypothesis 4: The effects of intraparty squabbling are mitigated by a 
comparatively greater degree of bipartisanship. There can be situations in which the 
adverse effects of intra-party squabbling or division will be offset by a comparatively 
greater degree of bipartisan consensus. In such a situation, the adverse effects of 
intraparty conflict can be mitigated by formation of a comparatively stronger interparty 
coalition, in which the majority alliance group overrides the effects of intraparty division. 
Such a situation is plausible if there is some kind of unusual political alliance across party 
lines.
53
    
 Hypothesis 5: More extensive debate in Congress facilitates finding common 
ground that increases the propensity of legislative-executive consensus. Extensiveness 
of debate in Congress has major implications in the success of the treaty process. 
Opportunity for extensive debate allows greater time for analysis of the proposed treaty 
legislation. Extensive debate generally facilitates finding common ground and 
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bargaining. The resultant outcome is more likely to be legislative-executive consensus 
which ultimately would lead to Senate consent and approval for the given treaty.
54
  
 Hypothesis 6: High salience and media coverage increase the propensity of 
legislative-executive consensus.  It is argued that a high volume of media attention in the 
form of print and electronic media coverage for significant treaty legislation generally 
puts considerable pressure on Congress and the White House to arrive at a mutually 
acceptable solution. Such political dynamism facilitates greater deliberation in Congress, 
with a potential outcome of legislative-executive consensus.       
 Hypothesis 7: Electoral imperatives on pivotal opposition players in the Senate 
to get reelected in the ensuing elections by incurring favorable public opinion increase 
the propensity of legislative-executive dissension. The electoral pressure on pivotal 
senators from opposing party to get reelected in the next election cycle increases the 
chances of delay in Senate’s consent and approval for treaty legislation. This in turn 
increases legislative-executive dissension. Also if an influential senator from opposing 
party plans for presidential campaign, then legislative-executive dissension is more likely 
to occur.  Efforts to garner favorable public opinion influence congressional voting 
patterns and timing of lawmakers’ position-taking in the treaty consent process. 
Issue Area of the War Powers Resolution and Making of War 
 Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus. Presence of 
divided government significantly increases the probability of congressional-presidential 
dissension and interbranch difference of opinion in the decision-making process, with 
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regard to deploying troops into hostilities abroad. Divided government also facilitates 
intrabranch conflict inside Congress on matters related to war.  
 Hypothesis 2:   Ideological divisions  and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. Deployment of troops into 
hostilities abroad is a sensitive decision, which is influenced by the partisan and 
ideological distance between Capitol Hill and the White House. The greater the degree of 
political polarization based on partisan fault lines and ideological differences, the greater 
are the chances of interbranch dissension. Intrabranch conflict inside Congress is also 
determined by partisan and ideological factors. 
 Hypothesis 3:  Electoral imperatives on opposing congressional leaders  to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension Members of Congress want to get re-elected. Electoral imperatives greatly 
influence congressional lawmakers’ decision process on military deployment. If the 
approval rating of the president is poor, members of Congress are expected to oppose the 
executive branch in going to war. Also presidents  seeking re-election are also greatly 
concerned about electoral fallout arising out of a wrong decision on troop deployment 
into hostilities abroad. 
 Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa.  Public opinion 
significantly drives the decision process regarding conduct of war. Members of Congress 
and presidents seek favorable public opinion on the conduct of war for the purpose of 
political legitimacy for their decisions. (Stated as the hypothesis)   
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 Hypothesis 5:  Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. . Members of Congress belonging to 
the opposition party are skeptical about the legitimacy of the president’s decision on 
military deployment into hostilities abroad. As a result, they tend to oppose any 
presidential initiative with regard to deployment of troops abroad because of fear of 
losing their public standing in their own constituencies. Conversely, congressional 
lawmakers belonging to the president’s own party intend to support the White House 
decision on war in expectation of bolstering favorable public opinion in their own 
constituencies, if the president’s approval rating is high.  
 Hypothesis 6:  Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. The 
amount of media coverage and media bias significantly influence the dynamics of the 
decision-making process on military operations abroad.  Opposition members of 
Congress try to use media power to criticize the president’s decision on military 
intervention abroad. In turn, they try to shape the national conversation in their favor. 
This result in congressional-presidential dissension. However, the president, by virtue of 
his unique capability to garner media attention and use a “bully pulpit,” attempts to 
generate sufficient popular support in favor of his decision.  
 Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war.  Once troops are 
deployed into hostilities abroad, the duration of war becomes a major factor in the 
decision-making process to invoke the War Powers Resolution. In the event of prolonged 
military conflict with no probable resolution in sight, members of Congress initiate 
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legislative process to invoke the War Powers Resolution in order to restrain the president. 
In the event of shorter duration of war Congress remains vigilant and rebukes the 
president for not consulting the legislative branch at the time of troop deployment.  
Conclusion and Significance of the Study 
The political process of making foreign policy focuses on the constitutional 
principles with regard to balance of power between the legislative and executive 
branches. While Article I of the U.S. Constitution covers the powers and responsibilities 
of Congress, Article II does the same for the president. The constitutional provisions lay 
out the blueprint as to how the legislative and executive branches should jointly function. 
Over the last forty years, from 1970 to 2010, changes in the U.S. political environment 
have provided a perfect opportunity to take a fresh look at the contours of legislative-
executive relations. Exploration of legislative-executive relations becomes particularly 
important under the current circumstances, which are characterized by divided 
government and polarized politics. Such analysis in turn helps in mapping the trajectory 
of the strategic political decision-making process and policy outcome. This dissertation 
project makes an effort to examine the interbranch political dynamic in the foreign policy 
sphere. The time period from 1970 to 2010 portrays significant changes in global 
geopolitics, as well as in U.S. domestic politics. In the international arena while the world 
has experienced a transition from the Cold War to the post-Cold War era, in U.S. 
domestic politics there has been a resurgence of Congress in the foreign policy sphere 
with the legislation of the War Power Resolution in 1973. In recent decades, both 
Congress and the president have vigorously tried to preserve their respective foreign 
policy prerogatives. In this study, two of the most contentious foreign policy issue areas – 
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treaty process and war powers - have been investigated with an aim at mapping the 
trajectory of legislative-executive relations.  
The academic contribution and significance of this dissertation to the discipline 
relates to the theoretical framework of the continuum of consensus and dissension in 
legislative-executive relations. The analysis is theoretically rich and innovative because 
it specifically pays attention to the dynamics of political factors which are responsible for 
consensus and dissension between the two branches in the same political time. Also, the 
dissertation is unique in terms of its exploration and recognition of the existence of such a 
continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension with regard to two high-
profile foreign policy issue areas – treaty process and war powers – within the ambit of a 
single study. Constitutional provisions necessarily require Congress and the president 
work together in the political process for these two issue areas.
55
 In that endeavor this 
study attempts to make an integrative analysis of the theoretical framework and the 
empirical evidence as part of mapping the trajectory of legislative-executive relations. 
The empirical investigation in this study strengthens the theoretical framework of this 
study.    
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CHAPTER II 
THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
This chapter explores the various factors which influence the dynamics of the 
continuum of consensus and dissension in policymaking, especially treaty powers and 
war powers. Such factors are as outlined: (1) Divided and unified government; (2) Degree 
of partisanship between Congress and the presidency; (3) Ideological dimensions in 
congressional-presidential relations and policymaking; (4) Public opinion and 
constituency preference; (5) Electoral concerns of the members of Congress and the 
president seeking re-election; (6) Role of media; and (7) Extensiveness of debate in 
Congress. This chapter aims at developing the theoretical framework by exploring the 
existing literature. Such theoretical work fits in the broader dimensions of empirical 
investigation in subsequent chapters. The overall endeavor is to correlate empirical and 
theoretical investigation into a compact model, in which the findings from the empirical 
work would bolster the theoretical premises. It is expected that theoretical explanation of 
the work done so far will provide the necessary base.  This will be significantly 
strengthened by empirical investigation in validating the overarching theoretical 
framework of the continuum of consensus and dissension under the mutually integrative 
institutional system. 
Divided and Unified Government – Policy Process and Outcome 
Formation of divided and/or unified government is a critical factor affecting 
legislative-executive relations at the national level. Such political arrangement in 
Washington has substantial influence on how other explanatory factors will spin off in 
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foreign and domestic policy decisions. Divided government exists when there is split 
party control of legislative and executive branches. In contrast, unified government is 
formed when legislative and executive branches are controlled by the same party.
56
 Split 
party control of one or both chambers of Congress and the White House also represents 
divided government.
57
 In essence, government typology – divided or unified - reflects its 
partisan and ideological arrangement in the political composition on Capitol Hill and the 
White House. Such political complications play a critical role in determining foreign 
policy decisions. Overall, the criterion of divided and/or unified government is expected 
to have diverse ramifications on foreign policy outcomes. It substantially complicates the 
political process of decision making, especially for the “high politics of foreign policy” 
issues such as treaty politics and war power politics.
58
 Based on the government 
typology, legislative-executive relations experience significant political bumps. In turn, 
foreign policy outcomes reflect the continuum of consensus and dissension between 
Capitol Hill and the White House.  
Conventional scholarship suggests that divided government results in gridlock or 
dissension and unified government causes cooperation or consensus. On the other hand, 
revisionist theory suggests that the presence of divided and/or unified government does 
not matter in delineating legislative success. However, there are notable exceptions to this 
holistic proposition.  For instance, when there was a long era of a solidly Democratic 
South, Southern Democrats made viable and stable coalitions with Northern Republicans 
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on a wide range of policy issues. More recently, successful passage of the North 
American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in Congress was made possible by unusual 
and unexpected bipartisan alliance. But such exceptions are rare in normal politics. They 
are generally based on unconventional and regional political alignments. This study 
attempts to construct a paradigmatic bridge between conventional scholarship and 
revisionist theory. In essence, this study suggests that even though divided government 
enhances the chances of political gridlock, there can be dissension in the presence of 
unified government too. More specifically, this exploratory study argues that empirical 
investigation provides good evidence of a continuum of consensus and dissension in 
legislative and executive foreign policy decisions, regardless of specific government 
typology. The trajectory of political arrangement over the last four decades shows that 
divided government has prevailed in U.S. politics more often.
59
 The majority of divided 
government tends to make this study more exploratory in nature in explaining the 
implications of rifts between the legislative and the executive branch on U.S. foreign 
policy. The following literature helps better analyze the concepts. 
While arguing that unified government is the central factor for effective 
governance and legislation, James Sundquist blames the growing phenomenon of party 
disintegration for the increasing trend of the formation of divided government.
60
 He 
argues that party disintegration has led to non-formation of unified government in recent 
years, therefore resulting in formation of divided government. Sundquist further states, 
“At such times [divided government], the normal tendency of the U.S. system toward 
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deadlock becomes irresistible. Harmonious collaboration, barring national crisis, is out of 
the question. The president and Congress are compelled to quarrel.”61 Elsewhere, in 
another seminal scholarly work, Sundquist clearly affirms the conventional view when he 
states, 
For coherent and timely policies to be adopted and carried out -in short, 
for government to work effectively, as the established theory held - the 
president, the Senate, and the House must come into agreement. When the 
same party controls all three of these power centers, the incentive to reach 
such agreement is powerful despite the inevitable institutional rivalries 
and jealousies. The party does serve as the bridge or the web, in the 
metaphors of political science. But in divided government, it is not merely 
the separated institutions of government that must overcome their built-in 
rivalries but the opposing parties themselves. And that is bound to be a 
difficult, arduous process, characterized by conflict, delay, and indecision, 
and leading frequently to deadlock, inadequate and ineffective policies, or 
no policies at all.
62
 
  
In essence, Sundquist (1980, 1988-9) concludes that when there is divided government 
conflict, bickering, tension, and stalemate are inevitable, even in the foreign policy 
domain. Cox and Kernell argue that when legislative and executive authorities are 
unified, there is cooperation in policymaking. They assert that divided party control leads 
to conflict and gridlock.
63
 Conley argues that in a situation of divided government, 
congressional and presidential agendas are generally incompatible, resulting in political 
gridlock.
64
 Binder argues that existence of unified government provides for better 
prospects of successful legislation. She asserts that divided government results in 
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different policy preferences and electoral mandates leading to institutional rivalry 
between Congress and the president.
65
 Cooper states that formation of divided 
government reinforces polarization of parties and increased resistance of Congress to 
presidential initiatives.
66
 In a related vein, Krutz and Peake state that congressional-
presidential cooperation is significantly diminished and legislative gridlock enhanced 
when divided government exists.
67
 Coleman argues that while unified government 
produces political incentives for greater cooperation by reducing partisan gaps in 
policymaking, divided government reinforces inter-branch  rivalry, enhances partisan 
standoffs, and makes significant policy enactments difficult.
68
 According to Thurber, 
“unified and divided party governments” have the most important impact on 
congressional-presidential relations. He states that divided government is “a major 
electoral base impediment to legislative-executive cooperation.”69 The effect of 
legislative-executive conflict has been experienced significantly since the 1980s. Since 
that time, there has been resurgence of partisan voting under the conditions of divided 
party government.
70
 Carter argues that divided government enhances ideological fault 
lines between the Hill and the White House on issues of foreign and trade policy matters. 
The obvious implication is congressional-presidential gridlock.
71
 Edwards, Barrett, and 
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Peake state that divided government prohibits successful enactments of important 
legislations. This is primarily because presidents oppose and block important legislations 
under the conditions of divided government.
72
 Such an assertion is corroborated by 
Howell et al., who state that periods of divided government reduce the production of 
landmark legislation by 30%, as compared to periods of unified government.
73
 Kelly 
challenges Mayhew’s (1991) argument and states that passage of significant legislation is 
greater in the presence of unified government than under split party control.
74
 While 
making a case that the dynamics of legislative-executive conflict does not vary much 
between foreign and domestic policy, Peake shows in his empirical study that when 
government is divided, legislative-executive cooperation diminishes substantially and 
gridlock is the likely outcome. He further states, “When government is divided presidents 
are forced to oppose a greater number of foreign policy bills initiated by Congress.”75 In a 
related vein, Destler states that divided government generates conflict and proves to be 
detrimental in matters of foreign policy.
76
 Lohmann and O’Halloran claim that on foreign 
policy matters, especially trade policy, divided government increases the chances of 
congressional-presidential conflict.
77
  
On the other side of the debate, one of the most important proponents of the 
revisionist claim is David Mayhew. He asserts that the existence of divided or unified 
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government does not matter, since a nearly identical amount of major new legislation is 
passed under these conditions, based on his investigation. Mayhew’s empirical analysis 
for the period 1946-1990 shows that significant legislative enactments were just as 
frequent, regardless of whether there was divided government or unified government. 
Such findings of empirical investigation made Mayhew argue that the ability of Congress 
and the president to reach agreements reflects little difference between the existence of 
divided or unified government.
78
 Along these lines, Peterson’s assertion of “tandem-
institutions” perspective is important.  Peterson argues that the symbiotic relationship 
between Congress and the president is necessary for policymaking, irrespective of 
divided or unified control of government.
79
 Fiorina in his empirical research did not find 
support to claim about significant differences between periods of divided and unified 
governments on matters of legislative productivity, dynamics of policy deliberations, 
inter-branch conflict, and even presidents’ ability to deal with matters of foreign affairs.80 
Jones makes a case that Congress and presidents have worked together and achieved 
major policy breakthroughs from time to time across different partisan configurations. By 
elaborating the dynamics of partisanship, bipartisanship, co-partisanship, and cross-
partisanship, Jones’ analysis broadly supports the revisionist argument.81 In a landmark 
study that strongly supports the revisionist view, Krehbiel asserts that political gridlock 
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can take place whether there is unified or divided government.
82
 He argues that because 
of the supermajority procedure ingrained in U.S. political system, gridlock is equally 
likely in divided and unified government. This point is particularly relevant for the 
Senate’s treaty consent, which requires approval by a two-thirds majority of the senators 
present and voting.
83
 Krehbiel also states that as the status quo equilibrium moves toward 
median preferences, both unified and divided governments are likely to break gridlock.
84
 
Brady and Volden in their study state that legislative-executive gridlock does not occur 
because of divided government or partisan politics. Instead, gridlock occurs because it is 
an instrumental part of the government system, ingrained into the political institutions 
and maintained by the preferences of the political actors.
85
      
The upshot of theoretical exploration regarding divided government is that 
scholars have tried from time to time to accurately analyze political ramifications of 
divided and unified governments on legislative-executive consensus and/or gridlock. 
Scholarly research so far does not unequivocally favor one argument over the other. 
Empirical investigation in this study shows that consensus and dissension in foreign 
policy can occur regardless of divided or unified government. The form of government is 
a conditional factor which influences other factors and complicates the political process.
86
  
Supporters of the conventional argument on foreign policy assert that legislative-
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executive gridlock has been on the rise during divided government since the end of the 
Vietnam War and with the simultaneous resurgence of Congress.
87
 Scott and Carter go 
one step further by suggesting that divided government considerably affected levels of 
congressional activism and assertiveness in the foreign policy arena since World War 
II.
88
  In the treaty process, when there is the presence of divided government with the 
opposition party in control of the U.S. Senate, there is generally confrontational politics 
between the Senate and the president. When the government is divided, the Chairman of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC hereafter), the president, and the treaty 
pivot (i.e. the senator who is positioned to eventually cast the critical two-thirds vote in 
the Senate) are the pivotal institutional players determining the fate of the treaty.
89
 Based 
on conventional understanding of the effects of partisanship on foreign policy during 
divided government, it is generally observed that the SFRC Chairman tends to block and 
frustrate presidential treaty-making efforts.
90
 Congressional oversight of treaty-making 
also increases during the presence of divided government.
91
 There is evidence that 
divided government diminishes the president’s ability to liberalize trade at the time of 
negotiating trade-related treaties.
92
 DaLaet and Scott argue that the implications of 
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divided government are more pronounced for arms control treaties because of heightened 
partisanship.
93
 However, proponents of revisionist argument on foreign policy claim that 
congressional-executive cooperation or gridlock does not necessarily depend on divided 
or unified government. Auerswald and Maltzman show an insignificant probability of 
divided government on the imposition of reservations in the treaty ratification process. To 
what extent such reservations are imposed to the underlying treaty also depend on the 
ideological preferences of the pivotal players in the Senate, who are at the forefront in the 
senatorial advice and consent process regardless of the presence of divided and unified 
governments.
94
 The pivotal senatorial players in the treaty approval process are the SFRC 
Chairman and the treaty pivot.
95
 The ideological preference of the pivotal institutional 
players triumphs, regardless of divided or unified government. Such analysis gains 
traction especially in the context of the supermajority required for treaty consent in the 
U.S. Senate.
96
 Another point to keep in mind is the type of treaty under consideration. 
Treaty characteristics often drive the treaty consent process, regardless of whether 
divided or unified government is in existence. For instance, bilateral treaties are more 
likely to draw reservations as compared to multilateral treaties. This is because senators 
realize that it is easier to negotiate with one other country than when a larger number of 
countries is involved.
97
 Also, treaties belonging to “high politics” (i.e. sovereignty and 
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security issues) are more likely to draw reservations and delay in consent than treaties 
belonging to “low politics” (i.e. economic, legal, or normative issues) regardless of 
divided or unified government.
98
 Mann argues that divided government provides greater 
opportunity for legislative-executive collaboration and better bargaining possibilities 
between the two co-equal branches in foreign policy decisions.
99
 Such functional 
characterization may be considered particularly important for the treaty process, because 
the Senate and the president are constitutionally equal partners in this particular policy 
arena. Gibson in her empirical study shows that defense issues are more affected by 
“unified partisan advantage” and “unified majority advantage” that the president enjoys 
and not merely by the incidence of divided (or unified) government.  Her study also 
shows that in policy areas of trade, foreign aid, and agriculture, congressional support 
largely remains unaffected by divided government.
100
 In essence, theoretical foundation 
on treaty consent and ratification process of historically significant international treaties 
reflects a combination of elements of both conventional and revisionist arguments in 
determining the outcome of the political process. Empirical investigation performed in 
this study bolsters such a theoretical premise by showing that consensus and dissension in 
matters of significant international treaties occurs in a continuum, regardless of divided 
and unified government. The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SALT II (Carter 
Administration) and the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA (Clinton 
Administration) witnessed unified government. However, SALT II failed in the 
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ratification process, whereas NAFTA was successful. On the other hand the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces INF Treaty (Reagan Administration) and the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty CTBT (Clinton Administration) experienced divided government with 
variation in process outcomes. While the INF Treaty was ratified, CTBT failed in the 
ratification process. The reason for such variation in policy decisions is ingrained in the 
procedure and complexity of the political process, regardless of divided and unified 
government. The varying processes of treaty consent in the case studies analyzed suggest 
multifaceted political dynamics that overwhelmingly bolsters the theoretical framework 
of a continuum of consensus and dissension. 
For war powers (based on the provisions of the War Powers Resolution 1973), the 
theoretical foundation overwhelmingly supports the conventional argument that divided 
government is responsible for legislative-executive conflict in the political process. Such 
interpretation by and large holds true when Congress acted to invoke the War Powers 
Resolution. For instance, during the Lebanon Multinational Force intervention (1982-84), 
when Congress successfully invoked the War Powers Resolution in its full intent, there 
was the presence of divided government. At that time, both the chambers of Congress 
were controlled by the Democrats, while there was a Republican President in the White 
House. The Lebanon intervention can be regarded as a classic case to assert that divided 
government creates conditions for confrontational politics between Congress and the 
president over foreign policy. Along these lines Meernik asserts that when government 
power is divided, Congress is more likely to restrict the president in deploying troops into 
prolonged military interventions.  The presence of divided government has made 
invitation to struggle over foreign policy a dominant feature across Pennsylvania Avenue. 
36 
 
Meernik further asserts that when military conflict is protracted and government is 
divided, Congress is more likely to take legislative action in order to invoke the War 
Powers Resolution.
101
 In a similar tone, Howell and Pevehouse argue that in periods of 
divided government when the executive branch confronts strong partisan opposition, 
Congress consistently constrains presidential war powers.
102
 Thus divided government 
makes it harder [for both Congress and the president] to make decisions on new [foreign] 
policy commitments.
103
 Brule asserts that conditions of divided government and 
“cohesive opposition” reduce the probability of use of force by presidents by 33 
percent.
104
 Rockman argues that divided government has resulted in sharp divisions 
between Capitol Hill and the White House on matters of foreign policy. He further argues 
that during periods of prolonged military engagement, [congressional] support or 
opposition [to the president] tends to cleave along partisan lines.
105
  In essence, when 
government is divided, presidents feel more constrained in their choices to use force 
because of the greater likelihood of confrontational politics with Congress on war 
powers.
106
 Scott and Carter in a separate study state that during divided government, 
foreign policy entrepreneurship in Congress remains at the forefront, particularly on 
matters of military and security issues. Their findings confirm that divided government 
has been the root cause of 80% of congressional-presidential dissension since 1970, and 
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about 80% of such dissension was related to strategic security issues such as arms 
control, war powers, military operations, and defense strategy.
107
 Such analysis is similar 
to the study conducted by Prins and Marshall who show that between the post-Vietnam 
War era (1973-89) and the post-Cold War era (1990-98), when divided government was 
the dominant feature, bipartisan congressional support to of the president dropped from 
an already low level of 26% to less than 20% after 1989 on foreign and defense policy 
votes.
108
 Foreign and defense policy issues largely include military and security matters.  
Along these lines, Howell and Pevehouse state that “presidents exercise major force 
[deployment of troops] roughly 45% more often during periods of unified government 
than during periods of divided government.”109 Such findings reiterate the argument of 
Fleisher et al. (2000) regarding decrease in presidential success on foreign and defense 
policy during the presence of divided government because of rising opposition voting in 
Congress.
110
 Empirical evidence in this study corroborates this theoretical foundation. 
This study shows that in the single case of the Lebanon deployment (1982-84), in which 
Congress invoked the WPR in letter and intent, and in other controversial military 
interventions, including Grenada (1983), Libya (1986), Bosnia- Herzegovina (1995), and 
Kosovo (1999), in which Congress came close to invoking the WPR by passing 
resolution in one of the chambers and rebuking the president, there was the existence of 
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divided government with deep partisan fault lines.
111
 Empirical findings in this study 
bolster the overall theoretical framework of a continuum of consensus and dissension in 
the political process of the conduct of war.   
Partisan Difference in Policymaking between Congress and the President 
 Increase in partisanship between Capitol Hill and the White House in U.S. foreign 
policy has become a common phenomenon following the Vietnam War. Since the early 
1970s, there has been a significant surge in terms of congressional activism in the making 
of U.S. foreign and defense policy.
112
 The resurgence of Congress has had an 
earthshaking effect in the realm of foreign policy, where the concept of “Politics stops at 
water’s edge” has virtually been overtaken by the idea of politics that continue “past the 
water’s edge.”113 In the current era of a divided legislative-executive political 
environment, foreign policy has become as partisan and contentious as domestic 
policy.
114
 This is because the political landscape in Washington at the present time has 
greatly overshadowed the “two presidencies” thesis of Wildavsky (1966). In today’s 
perspective, foreign and domestic policy domains have become largely indistinguishable 
in terms of partisan conflict.
115
 Sundquist argues that currently “politicians dispute 
foreign with the same intensity that they debate domestic policy, both within and between 
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the parties.”116 Over the last few decades, particularly starting from the 1980s, political 
parties have become increasingly polarized, leading to heightened levels of partisan 
voting on policy issues.
117
 There is a perceptible trend of increased party line voting in 
Congress (House as well as Senate) in the 1980s and 1990s, thereby making coalition 
building a difficult task.
118
 Such a trend continues in the first decade of the 21
st
 century as 
well. Over the years, Congress and the executive branch have become much more 
partisan in terms of their political composition and respective policy positions.
119
 This 
higher degree of party differences has significantly increased the partisan gap, which 
contributes to policy gridlock. Binder points out that intense party polarization have 
proved to be counterproductive for effective policymaking.
120
 When party leaders hold 
widely different opinions on issues of foreign policy, much as domestic policy, they tend 
to vote strictly along party lines in Congress.
121
 Heightened partisan conflict between the 
Hill and the White House has enabled Congress to assert its foreign policy preferences 
over those of the president more aggressively.
122
 Inter-branch partisan conflict and 
cleavages in foreign policy have become dominant at several stages of the policymaking 
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process.
123
 In reality, political dynamics on the floor of each chamber of Congress, 
committee level activities (such as SFRC, Senate Arms Services Committee, other related 
House Committees, etc.), affirmation or rejection of presidential positions by legislators, 
actions and comments of the party spokespersons, and various consultations between the 
important members of Congress and the president in foreign policy arena are all largely 
influenced by partisan dimensions.
124
 In essence, lack of trust between the legislative 
branch and the executive branch at every level of policymaking because of growing 
partisan divide has denied the president a free ride in foreign policy from Congress.
125
 
Not surprisingly, treaty process and war powers, which constitute the high politics of 
foreign policy, are not immune to the effects of partisan fault lines.  
In the treaty process, partisan differences significantly influence the political 
dynamics, with variations in decision outcome. Treaty politics is one of those areas in 
which Congress tries to vigorously protect its foreign policy prerogatives, especially in 
the current political environment of party polarization.  Also, it is one of those issue areas 
in which Congress is mandated to participate, based on the constitutional requirement of 
“advice and consent” by a two-thirds majority of the Senate vote.126 It is argued that 
majority party leaders from the opposite side of the aisle more often are less likely to 
defer to the minority administrations.
127
 Here the conventional understanding is that when 
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the president garners support from more co-partisans in the Senate, his policies including 
treaties, are less likely to face partisan obstacles.
128
 As legislators play a strategic role in 
setting policy priorities, particularly at the committee level, their partisan preferences 
become critically important in the overall political process.
129
 Such a proposition gains 
traction particularly in a treaty consent process, in which the SFRC chairman is an 
important gatekeeper, allowing treaties to move from the committee level to the floor of 
the Senate for further deliberation. In the current environment of polarized politics, when 
the SFRC chairman and the president are opposing partisans, the treaty process becomes 
overly complicated. Partisan conflict between the SFRC chairman, the president, and the 
treaty pivot (i.e. the particular senator deciding the crucial two-thirds vote on the Senate 
floor) is critical in determining the fate of the treaty.
130
 This development gains traction 
particularly when there is evidence that committee process both in the House and the 
Senate has become more partisan over time, starting with the 91
st
 Congress (1969-70).
131
 
Moreover, such increase in partisanship has spilled over to the staged floor 
proceedings.
132
    
Another dynamic aspect of the treaty process relates to the procedural tactics by 
which the Senate alters the original treaty by imposing amendments, reservations, 
understandings, and policy declarations to that treaty’s document of ratification.133 Such 
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legislative procedures are influenced by partisan preferences, especially when Senate 
consent by a two-thirds vote of the senators present is a mandatory constitutional 
requirement.
134
 In this regard, important examples include the congressional-presidential 
stalemate over the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), the Senate’s imposition 
of amendments and a common understanding clause with respect to the Intermediate-
range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, and the Senate’s rejection of the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty (CTBT).
135
 The two-thirds majority requirement for treaty consent in the 
Senate provides real bargaining power to the opposition party leaders, who can flex their 
partisan muscle and determine the fate of the treaty to a considerable extent. Defenders of 
the two-thirds majority contend that the standard for the Senate’s treaty consent should 
justifiably be severe and likewise bipartisan because treaties have generational 
consequences. They are binding for all future administrations, regardless of their party 
affiliations.
136
  The opposing argument is that such a supermajority requirement for treaty 
consent can render the country incapable to act on any issue that is divisive and 
vulnerable to partisan dimensions.
137
  
Whatever might be the case, partisan conflict between the Senate’s and a 
president’s priorities can deny the requisite two-thirds majority vote in the Senate and 
prove to be a significant hurdle in the treaty consent process.
138
 Even after a treaty moves 
from the SFRC to the floor of the Senate, it may still languish and be delayed 
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indefinitely. At this stage, the partisan preference of the treaty pivot is critically 
important.
139
 If the treaty pivot belongs to the opposition party, then the partisan 
dimension is expected to be the clearest contributor to treaty gridlock.
140
 DaLaet and 
Scott suggest that on arms control treaties on weapons of mass destruction, partisanship 
has become a critical factor in the post-Vietnam and post-Cold War years.
141
 This is more 
glaringly observable among conservatives, for whom partisan calculations trump policy 
preferences on their support to an arms control treaty when a president of their own party 
proposes it. However, when a president from the opposite party proposes such a treaty, 
conservatives align their partisan calculations with policy preference and oppose such a 
treaty proposal. This is in sharp contrast to liberals, for whom policy preferences are 
always more important than partisan dimensions for arms control treaty support, 
regardless of the political affiliation of the president.
142
 
On war process and conduct of war, scholars argue that partisan composition in 
Congress considerably influences the president’s initiative to use military force. Howell 
and Pevehouse assert that presidents are inclined to use military force abroad with greater 
frequency as their party’s share in Congress increases.143 Conversely, with increase in 
share of the opposition party in Congress there is less incentive for presidents to enter 
into military operations abroad. Such a proposition fits into the argument of the War 
Powers Resolution, in order to explain the theoretical framework of the continuum of 
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consensus and dissension on military interventions abroad. Rohde specifically argues that 
split decisions along partisan lines in Congress can be critical in a president getting 
authorization to use military force.
144
 For instance, when Congress voted on authorizing 
use of force in Iraq during the Persian Gulf War (1990-91), then Republican President 
George H.W. Bush was able to garner the requisite majority vote in the Democratic- 
controlled House of Representatives, mainly because of intra-party split voting in the 
House Democratic caucus.
145
 Such occasions present an opening for the president to 
accumulate the required vote from members of the opposition party in Congress in 
getting majority support for an order to deploy troops abroad.
146
 Hence, intra-party 
squabbling is a critical factor in complicating the political process, because sometimes 
presidents are opposed by factions of their own party.
147
  Notwithstanding such intra-
partisan disagreement on policy matters, the overwhelming support or rejection along 
partisan dimensions is critically important.
148
 Howell and Pevehouse mention that 
historically during times of international crisis, when hard decisions had to be made 
regarding deployment of troops into hostilities abroad, members of the president’s party 
consistently fell behind the decision of the Commander in Chief, whereas dissenting 
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voices came disproportionately from the opposition party.
149
 Thus the president’s 
discretion to use military force abroad depends on the size and partisan unity of the 
members of his/her own party in Congress vis-à-vis the opposition party.
150
 To 
complicate the matter, Lindsay points out that Congress flexes its partisan muscle once 
again and intends to take appropriate legislative action if the president’s decision to 
deploy troops becomes unpopular with the public and loses legitimacy.
151
 During such 
moments, Congress becomes active if the existing military deployment is limited, cost of 
pulling the troops back is small, and when the administration vacillates in its military 
decisions. Such actions relate to legislative steps taken to invoke the War Powers 
Resolution. Thus we can see that political dynamics dictated by partisan composition at 
the time of decision making and subsequently during the conduct of the war creates solid 
grounds for potential conflict between Congress and the executive branch. If and when 
such inter-branch collision course seems imminent (as the selected cases show), there is 
validity of the theoretical framework of the continuum of consensus and dissension in the 
political process of the conduct of war. In their study, Carter and Scott argue that foreign 
policy has become increasingly partisan in the recent decades, especially after the Cold 
War. Almost three-fourths of foreign policy entrepreneurs belong to the opposition party. 
They tend to flex their partisan muscles more often - about 80% of the time – on strategic 
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military-security issues that include military operations and war powers.
152
 From the 
legislative perspective to invoke the War Powers Resolution and restrain the executive 
from using force, partisan polarization over time has greatly affected the continuum of 
consensus and dissension in the two chambers of Congress. Because the political parties 
have become more internally cohesive and externally divergent in recent years, partisan 
dimensions affect every stage of legislative process and procedural components.
 153
  Such 
political implications in turn are manifested by variation in the outcome of legislative 
action in the House and the Senate while attempting to invoke the War Powers 
Resolution. Over time, politics of war making has become more contentious on partisan 
dimensions between Capitol Hill and the White House. The so-called bipartisan 
consensus of the Cold War era has disappeared. 
Ideological Dimensions and Congressional-Presidential Relations  
Ideological dispositions of the members of Congress and the president 
significantly affect the dynamics of policymaking, especially in the current era of inter-
branch competition in Washington. Several previous studies have consistently claimed 
that after the Vietnam War, foreign policy issues have become ideologically divisive as 
domestic policy.
154
 Since the 1970s, there has been a steady increase of ideological 
alignment and polarization of the congressional parties.
155
 Ideology is generally regarded 
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as a dominant factor for political conflict in congressional voting behavior.
156
 In turn it 
has directly affected the dynamics of consensus and dissension in the political process of 
policymaking between Congress and the president.  In essence, ideological disposition 
goes beyond standard partisan lines because it directly centers on the internal belief 
system, conscience, and personal conviction of politicians.
157
 Kingdon suggests that 
ideology and party are the top two most important factors affecting the political 
predispositions of members of Congress. When a decision is made by the executive, the 
coalition that forms in the legislature represents different ideological predispositions of 
the members.
158
 A presidential decision represents a point along the “partisan-ideological 
spectrum.” The partisan and ideological predispositions of members of Congress show 
their relationship to that of the presidential position. In such a situation, “the coalition that 
forms reflects choices made by members [of Congress] with different partisan and 
ideological predispositions that vary not only in content (Democrat versus Republican, 
liberal versus conservative) but also in strength (mainstream predispositions versus cross-
pressured predispositions).”159 Binder states that ideological diversity has the greatest 
influence on policy gridlock between Congress and the White House.
160
  Poole and 
Rosenthal have explored 200 years of the congressional roll-call voting pattern. They 
argue that over 80% of voting decisions made by members of Congress are attributed to a 
consistent and predictable ideological makeup ranging from ultra-liberalism to ultra-
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conservatism.
161
 In the foreign policy arena, ideology has shown consistency of liberal-
conservative continuity in terms of congressional voting during and after the Cold War. 
In this context, conservatives have by and large provided greatest support to Republican 
presidents and liberals to Democratic presidents.
162
 Such a trend has greatly contributed 
to the continuum of consensus and dissension between Congress and the President on 
foreign policy.        
With respect to politics of treaty consent, ideological distance along the liberal-
conservative continuum is a dominant factor in the treaty consent process. Traditionally, 
conservatives have shown greater distrust to international treaties and agreements than 
their liberal counterparts. This has adversely affected the ratification debate in the 
Senate.
163
 The ideological distance between the pivotal institutional players, especially 
the SFRC chairman and the president, is of paramount importance in deciding the fate of 
the treaty. SFRC may prove to be a major roadblock in treaty approval process because 
the committee’s chairman is an “important gatekeeper on treaties” and needs to “advocate 
for its adoption.”164  Traditionally, a conservative SFRC chairman (such as Jesse Helms) 
has a greater propensity to oppose and block certain treaties on principle, whenever a 
liberal president would submit the treaty to the Senate for consent.
165
 This is because 
“conservatives have traditionally had a greater distrust for international agreements than 
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their more liberal colleagues” leading to the expectation that “[treaty] ratification 
reservations will be more likely when the Senate is tilted toward the conservative side of 
the ideological spectrum.”166 In their study, DaLaet and Scott argue that both during and 
after the Cold War era, ideology had a statistically significant relationship with the 
congressional vote on arms control treaties. They found that there is a greater propensity 
for conservatives than liberals to vote against arms control treaties in the Senate.
167
 An 
ideological dimension in Senate voting for arms control treaty ratification is also 
supported by Wayman in his study on treaty ratification.
168
 While exploring the Senate’s 
role in arms control treaties, Wayman argues that ideological conflict dominates the 
voting pattern of senators, reflecting the trend that hawks generally support strong 
defense, whereas doves support reduced spending on defense-related policy issues. 
McCormick and Black state that ideological explanation in the Senate voting process is 
particularly a decisive factor in determining the fate of foreign policy matters such as 
international treaties. These authors argue that “Senators make their policy choices on the 
basis of some internalized set of political values and beliefs about the world.”169 They 
also portray the political spectrum of senators in foreign policymaking based on a 
continuum from “conservative” to “liberal.”170 Such ideological dimensions of individual 
senators are crucial in garnering a two-thirds majority vote in the Senate for a proposed 
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treaty. Bernstein and Anthony, in their celebrated study, also argue that ideological 
dispositions play a pivotal role in “determining Senator’s position on national 
security/war and peace issues.”171  These authors also draw a liberal-conservative 
continuum in their study of the Senate’s role in the ABM treaty ratification process. Thus 
it is generally evident that while a highly conservative SFRC chairman (e.g. Senator 
Helms) is likely to contribute to gridlock in the treaty consent process, a more liberal 
SFRC chairman (e.g. Senator Fulbright) will show a greater propensity to support treaty 
making.
172
 Ideological dimensions between the SFRC and the White House thus have a 
tremendous potential to create a continuum of consensus and dissension in the treaty 
consent process. Moreover, once the SFRC transmits any treaty to the floor of the Senate, 
the “ideological spatial difference” between the president and the senator located at the 
treaty pivot is significant. Clearly “if the treaty pivot is an ideologue, however, getting 
floor support for the president’s treaty should prove more difficult, as that individual’s 
preferences must be satisfied and are likely far from the president’s own preferences.”173  
On matters related to use of force, ideological dimensions have been playing a 
dominant role in the process and outcome of policymaking.
174
 Importantly, on the issue 
area of war powers, liberal-conservative ideology on congressional voting has gone 
through changes over the last fifty years. From the 1960s and more prominently after the 
Vietnam War, conservatives have been primary supporters of military intervention 
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abroad as compared to liberals.
175
 This trend is observable across the board in Congress 
as well as the White House. After Vietnam, with congressional resurgence and 
presidential pre-eminence losing steam to an extent, two major political parties went on 
to an ideological collision course on important foreign policy issues such as war powers 
of Congress and the executive, among others.
176
 McCormick and Wittkopf, in their study, 
explored “ideological-gap,” meaning “the difference in average presidential support of 
conservatives and liberals by party” for eight successive administrations, starting with 
President Lyndon Johnson. They found that such an ideological gap was quite large for 
national security (which includes military intervention abroad) and the foreign relations 
component in the House and the Senate vis-à-vis the president. These authors specifically 
stated that ideology was a particularly strong predictor of national security and foreign 
relations voting in the Senate.
177
 LeoGrande and Brenner state that the deep ideological 
divisions that are prevalent in Congress and the current debating trend on sensitive 
foreign policy issues such as use of military force have more or less become a norm. 
These authors also argue that with Congress under Democratic control and the White 
House being occupied by a Republican president more often since the 1970s, national 
security policy difference based on ideological perspectives has intensified.
178
 The 
widening ideological gap has also been a common phenomenon within the committees 
such as the Senate and House Foreign Relations Committee and Armed Services 
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Committee, with the Democratic and Republican members becoming more and more 
polarized ideologically. Such development has reduced the chances of making 
compromise on use of force and other national security matters.
179
 Burgin states that 
lawmakers in Congress are overwhelmingly guided by their ideological preferences while 
participating in roll-call votes on matters of military intervention.
180
 In related lines, 
Lindsay makes a point that on matters of strategic defense and national security, the 
ideological disposition of members of Congress is critical.
181
  This was clearly the case at 
the time of congressional authorization to the administration for Gulf War I (1991), when 
members in Congress cast their votes based on their personal beliefs rather than what 
their party demanded (particularly for the Democrats).
182
 The same argument holds true 
when Congress adopted legislation to attempt to invoke WPR. However, with liberals 
supporting Democratic presidents more and conservatives supporting Republican 
presidents more, ideological polarization has accentuated over time. Such a trend has 
contributed significantly to the continuum of consensus and dissension between Congress 
and the White House on military intervention. 
Public Opinion and Constituency Preferences 
Public opinion has been a critical factor influencing congressional voting behavior 
and policy process.
183
 Over the last few decades, with tremendous changes occurring in 
the global arena and the interrelation between elements of foreign and domestic policy, 
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public opinion and constituency preferences have increasingly become dominant in 
foreign policy determination. Politicians give due importance to the fact that “collective 
public opinion is highly differentiated, patterned, coherent, consistent, and reflective of 
values that endure over long periods of time and seem to be deeply held.”184 It is also 
important to note here that collective public opinion concerning foreign policy is not only 
differentiated and structured, but also quite stable.
185
 Analysts argue that because the 
public has a definite opinion about the direction of U.S. foreign policy, similar to 
domestic policy, such opinion can be consequential in the policy process.
186
 Cox and 
Duffin state that over the years, two schools of thought have emerged since the Vietnam 
War in explaining the implications of public opinion and constituency pressure on foreign 
policymaking. They argue while one premise shows that public pressure has hastened 
foreign policy initiatives in terms of deliberate congressional approval for presidential 
initiatives such as the Panama Canal Treaty and NAFTA, the other premise identifies 
significant congressional obstacles such as in the Iran-Contra case and presidential retreat 
by pulling troops from Somalia (1992-93).
187
  With the current political environment 
being highly contentious, presidents often rally public opinion to advance their own 
agenda and block initiatives from their political adversaries in Congress.
188
 On the other 
hand, Congress uses legislative instruments such as extensive hearings at the 
subcommittee and committee levels, larger and more contentious debates, and also 
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judicious use of the media to voice its arguments in order to sway public opinion in its 
own favor. Such action on the part of Congress enhances its capability to apply pressure 
and influence presidential decision-making to a considerable extent.
189
 Lindsay states that 
“the glare of public spotlight” is often a powerful weapon that Congress possesses to 
force the President to change his/her course of action.
190
 In a different study, Page and 
Shapiro state, “When the public has definite opinions, when those opinions change by 
large amounts, and when the changes endure over time, the political system will more 
often respond to the public’s preference.”191 These authors found that public opinion 
changed the direction of about 62% of U.S. foreign policy decisions. Along similar lines, 
Bartels states that public opinion and constituency preference act as powerful factors to 
influence congressional voting on strategic defense policy matters such as President 
Reagan’s defense buildup.192 As Congress is a constitutionally empowered equal foreign 
policy player, a recent study states that public opinion, group pressure, constituency 
preference, and the rise of “message politics” make Congress “an active partner and 
effective obstacle to presidential ambitions when it chooses to do so.”193  
With regard to the issue area of treaty process, constituency interest and 
preference play a dominant role in determining not only congressional voting patterns, 
but also the timing of lawmakers’ position taking. This was clearly the case for the 
NAFTA approval process, which witnessed an unconventional cross-party coalition in 
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Congress.
194
 The stronger constituency pressure on legislators’ positions in Congress 
reflects the effect of NAFTA on Democratic Party constituents and the growing regional 
divide among the Republican Party on issues related to free trade.
195
 In fact, in many of 
the contentious trade policy issues like NAFTA, in which foreign and domestic policy 
implications converge considerably, the influence of constituency preference and 
ideological overtones intertwine in the decision process.
196
  Along similar lines, Gibson 
states that constituency pressure is critical in motivating individual members of Congress 
to oppose (or support) foreign policy initiatives of the executive branch.
197
 Such analysis 
was upheld by comparing and contrasting the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC, 
1997) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT, 1999). These two treaties faced 
similar Senate composition, with Sen. Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) as chairman of the SFRC 
and Bill Clinton as the president. However, while the former received Senate approval, 
the later was rejected. This was possible because in the case of CWC, powerful 
constituency pressure motivated the lawmakers to support the treaty in the Senate.
198
 
Ostensibly such constituency pressure was absent during the CTBT consideration 
process. In stark contrast to the CWC case, during the treaty consideration process in the 
Senate for CTBT, there was intense procedural infighting, which resulted in devising 
“formal message agendas” comprising “issues, proposals, and policy symbols” that 
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legislators believed would resonate for their party among constituents to generate public 
opinion opposing such a treaty.
199
 Senate consideration of the Intermediate-Range 
Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF, 1988) was another glaring instance when public opinion was 
a powerful component in treaty approval. Sigelman argues that strong public confidence 
in favor of a hard-liner Republican President Reagan, who took a specific policy position 
against the untrustworthy Soviets, triumphed in having the treaty validated by a 
Democrat-controlled Senate.
200
       
On matters related to war powers, there is a positive correlation reflecting causal 
influences of public opinion on foreign policymaking. Starting in the Vietnam War era, 
public perception has been a major deciding factor both on Capitol Hill and the White 
House regarding level of troop deployment and the pace of troop withdrawal.
201
 For 
instance, in the case of MNF in Lebanon, President Reagan had to pull out troops in 
March 1984, long before the expiration of the 18-month time limit authorized by 
Congress, because of lack of public support for the operation.
202
 In a similar vein, 
Meernik argues that in the event the president decides to order a major military 
intervention, the way Congress reacts to constrain the president’s military plan depends 
much on the level of public support and/or opposition.
203
 As public opinion plays a 
deciding role in congressional opposition and/or support to a president’s military 
intervention abroad, members of Congress can also express their dissent by influencing 
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public opinion against a president’s decision.204 In such situations, members of Congress 
use media to generate public opinion against use of force and underscore the risks 
involved, as may have been argued by the president while deploying troops abroad.
205
 
Thus, public opinion plays a critical role in determining the manner in which Congress 
reacts to a presidential military endeavor. Congressional support and/or opposition is 
likely to be influenced heavily by public perception and thereby will force the president 
to change his military plan. Constituency preference acts differently for members of 
Congress and the president. While members of Congress are more concerned about the 
public opinion in their respective congressional constituencies, the president has to be 
concerned about the national constituency. In general, if the president has a high public 
approval rating which can bolster the election prospects of members of Congress of his 
own party in their respective constituencies, then the president’s plan for use of force gets 
a green light from members of his own party, because of their vested interest in the 
president’s success. Conversely, members of Congress who are in the opposition party 
will oppose the president’s military operations.206  Hence, there is a partisan and 
ideological flavor in this interpretation. Bartels asserts that constituency opinion has a 
significant effect on patterns of roll call votes of members of Congress across the 
spectrum of defense policy decisions, which ostensibly includes military operations 
abroad. He specifically emphasizes “the very considerable scope of congressional 
responsiveness to variations in relevant district opinion” on matters related to defense 
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policy.
207
 Hence, there is consistency of members’ voting patterns and policy position 
based on their respective constituency preferences, which may at times differ from 
national public opinion, on matters related to military operations abroad.  
Electoral Imperatives – Context in Perspective 
Electoral incentives are fundamental aspects for members of Congress and the 
president seeking a second term in office. Heightened electoral competition in recent 
years has complicated the political process, especially in Congress, which consists of a 
total of 535 legislators. Mayhew in his seminal work argues that the primary goal of 
congressmen is to get re-elected. He states that the electoral goal “has to be the proximate 
goal of everyone, the goal that must be achieved over and over if other ends are to be 
entertained.”208 As single-minded re-election seekers, legislators endeavor to pursue their 
“congressional career” and in turn promote their policy goals.209 It is the re-election quest 
that drives the policy preference and position taking for not only members of Congress, 
but also the president who runs for a second term. Fenno makes a coherent argument by 
linking policymaking and electoral incentives for members of Congress. He asserts that 
congressmen’s primary goals comprise not only getting re-elected, but also achieving 
influence within Congress and making good public policy.
210
 Along similar lines, Arnold 
states that members of Congress weigh various policy alternatives and take legislative 
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action based on their calculations on electoral incentives.
211
 Electoral imperatives are also 
interconnected with constituency pressure for politicians because it is the constituency 
which often tells lawmakers what to do and what not to do.
212
 Binder states that electoral 
interests not only reinforce institutional rivalries between Capitol Hill and the White 
House, but also determine policy preferences of the members of the two primary political 
parties.
213
 At times, lawmakers prefer to disagree more than compromise on specific 
policy issues, if such action results in increasing their electoral benefits in the next 
election cycle.
214
 Fiorina asserts that whatever legislative action lawmakers take in 
Congress, their final goal is to secure political support, campaign resources, and electoral 
rewards.
215
 Such analysis also proves appropriate for the president who is seeking re-
election. Over the last 40 years, the distinction between the political dynamics between 
foreign and domestic policy has gotten increasingly blurred. At the same time, electoral 
competition has increased exponentially. In such a political environment, electoral 
context greatly determines the basic contours of congressional-presidential relations in 
foreign and domestic policy spheres.
216
 There is a constant tension to relate respective 
policy positions taken by legislators and the president to electoral prospects.
217
 The 
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continuum of consensus and dissension in high politics foreign policy issues is all the 
more explicit in the current political perspective attributed to volatile electoral forces.  
On matters related to treaties, electoral forces help to map out the continuum of 
coalitions, conflict, and conflict resolution. During the treaty consent process, treaty 
approval gets delayed in the SFRC, as well as in floor-level deliberations in the Senate. 
Such procedural delays are because of the conflict in the ideological policy preferences of 
pivotal senators and can be significantly connected to electoral prospects in their 
respective states.
218
 Electoral pressures raise congressional-presidential competition to 
resolve urgent foreign policy issues.
219
 For instance, in the congressional approval 
process for NAFTA, the dynamics of stiff opposition and an unconventional cross-party 
coalition in Congress backing President Clinton’s efforts can be largely connected to the 
electoral incentives in states and districts.
220
 It is generally perceived that the ratification 
provisions which require Senate advice and consent by a two-thirds majority empower 
the Senate to examine any treaty submitted by the president.  In electoral context, 
Auerswald makes an important argument when he states: 
The advice and consent process helps alleviate the electoral disincentives 
associated with questioning the president’s foreign policy priorities. 
Senators can cloak their (perhaps contrary) actions in constitutional 
rhetoric. They can and do frequently argue that dissecting a treaty, and by 
extension the president’s foreign policy goals, are mandated by the 
constitution. As a result, there may be fewer electoral disincentives 
associated with the advice and consent process than with foreign affairs 
legislation. When given the opportunity by the president’s submission of 
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treaties, then, ratification documents are an attractive tool for Senate 
policy making.
221
    
Because of such constitutional empowerment and greater electoral incentives, the Senate 
can directly intervene in the treaty process by attaching amendments, reservations, 
understandings, and policy declarations to the treaty’s original document as part of 
ratification. Once such modifications are inserted by the Senate, it becomes very difficult 
for the president to reject them.
222
 In turn, the political dynamic of the treaty ratification 
process on major international treaties is arguably contentious when the scope of 
continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension is predictably high.  It is 
precisely because of such reasons that the president responds to electoral pressures at the 
time of negotiating treaties. In cases of major arms control and security treaties, electoral 
incentives are the strongest.
223
 Greater congressional reaction and scrutiny of the contents 
of the treaty provide the electorate an opportunity to judge the value of the treaty. Such 
action enables the Senate to add reservations, in order to modify the treaty and make it 
more acceptable to the electorate.
224
  Also in recent years, with the inclusion of greater 
number of newly elected legislators in Congress, the criterion of heightened electoral 
competition has gained traction. The direct implications are explicit when junior 
members, who are generally apprehensive of their re-election prospects, are less inclined 
to support fast-track agreements. For instance, newly elected Democrats in 1992 and 
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1994 were particularly fearful about electoral retaliation and expressed concerns about 
free trade in the aftermath of NAFTA.
225
  
With regard to WPR, it is empirically observed that Congress faces an electoral 
dilemma while making decisions on matters related to military intervention. Members of 
Congress want to avoid any kind of electoral disincentives by not getting into blame-
game politics in the event of a foreign policy disaster particularly related to military 
intervention.   But prudent application of the Act minimizes such electoral disincentives 
to confront the president by legitimizing domestic institutional opposition to [unjustified] 
use of force.
226
 In fact, congressional support or opposition to a presidential initiative to 
use force may depend entirely upon the expectations of Congress members as to how 
presidents will affect future congressional elections as a result of the intended military 
intervention.
227
 Since all members of Congress want to get re-elected in the future
228
, 
electoral calculations dominate the decision-making process in Congress on sensitive 
foreign policy issues related to use of force, lest there should be electoral repercussions 
because of not supporting (or opposing) the president in the conduct of war.
229
 Mann 
argues that one of the principal reasons for congressional behavior vis-à-vis presidents on 
issues related to foreign policy lies in the exigencies of electoral politics.
230
 In a similar 
vein, Deese asserts that electoral developments in tandem with partisan politics have 
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taken center stage on matters related to foreign policy, more so on the conduct of war, in 
making a decision to support or oppose the president.
231
 It is therefore critical to notice 
that in congressional decisions to oppose a war by either invoking or passing resolution in 
any single chamber or filing suit against the administration’s military intervention, 
electoral concerns of members of Congress remain a crucial factor affecting the decision 
and outcome. 
Role of Media – Policy Implications 
Over the last forty years, the media have played an increasingly strategic role in 
shaping the decision-making process on matters of both foreign and domestic policy. 
Ever increasing coverage by the press, 24 hour cable news channels, and high-speed 
global communications have had a major influence on how policymakers position 
themselves on specific policy initiatives in war zones, trade negotiations, etc. 
Policymakers across Pennsylvania Avenue have recognized the increasingly sensitive 
role that media power plays in policy process and outcome. Because media greatly 
influence mobilization of public opinion, politicians in the policy process try to optimally 
use and take advantage of media coverage in order to shape a favorable image of their 
policy positions, either in terms of generating domestic support or communicating 
directly with foreign countries.
232
 Undoubtedly media attention greatly influences the 
scope and nature of legislative-executive interactions in policymaking in Washington. 
Edwards and Wood argue that while in the foreign policy sphere, the White House is 
more reactive in dealing with Capitol Hill, as a result of the magnitude of media coverage 
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in domestic policy, media attention generates a more interactive relationship between the 
legislature and the executive branches of government.
233
 As a result, in each of the policy 
spheres, the nature and extent of media coverage can prove to be a powerful factor in 
shaping the momentum of congressional-presidential consensus and dissension in policy 
process and outcome. Not surprisingly, each of the branches pays attention to media 
power and events in determining its action plan in dealing with an unfolding situation.
234
 
At the same time, the ideological bias of the media is a dominant factor in shaping the 
story line. Media and press coverage focus some stories more than others because they fit 
their narrative style more conveniently.
235
 Iyenger argues that the manner in which an 
unfolding story is narrated affects public opinion about policy options and preferred 
outcomes.
236
 Barrett also states that there is a general tendency to cover foreign policy 
matters more than their domestic counterparts because of such narrative preference. 
Along similar lines, Barbaras and Jerit argue that the volume, extent, and prominence of 
news media coverage of issues increase the policy-specific knowledge of the public. 
These authors state, “policy-specific information may influence a person's evaluation of 
elected officials as well as the significance people attribute to particular social and 
political problems. Not only do these considerations influence vote choice, but they also 
color a person's disposition towards government (e.g., trust).”237 Because of such direct 
interconnection between media attention and electoral consequences, often 
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congressional-presidential relations in policymaking become highly contentious. Media 
coverage helps in examining the extent of inter-branch behavior by focusing on the 
degree of consensus (or dissension) within Congress, vulnerability of the president, the 
type of issue that is being covered, the degree of congressional and presidential 
leadership, and the degree of congressional-presidential rivalry in the policy process for 
the issue under consideration.
238
 Baumgartner and Jones argue that the relationship 
between media attention and the congressional agenda is complex. It also influences the 
presidential agenda and thereby greatly affects policy process and consequences.
239
 In the 
current period, the foreign policy sphere has particularly felt the effects of an exponential 
expansion of media influence. The presence of 24-hour television cable network channels 
has enabled television cameras to get into remote destinations in the world and draw 
attention to the political drama at home because of the unfolding events in the global 
arena. Bennett asserts that media power in foreign policy domain can influence policy 
process in three ways: “(1) the production of news images by journalists and political 
actors; (2) the effects of those news images on patterns of public opinion and 
participation; and (3) the policy effects resulting directly from the news coverage and 
indirectly from the impact of the news on opinion and participation.”240  
In the treaty consent process, media attention plays a prominent role in 
determining the contours of continuum of consensus and dissension between Congress 
and the president. The extent of media attention is reflected in media coverage by print 
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newspapers like the New York Times, Washington Post, etc., popular cable television 
network coverage such as CNN, CBS, NBC, Fox News, etc., occasionally various late-
night talk shows, and others.
241
 In general, when international agreements are more 
salient in the media, the executive branch is inclined to complete them as treaties.
242
  This 
is because treaties are legally binding to the parties, can be enforced, and look more 
legitimate with the approval of Congress. Media attention can make treaty or agreement 
consent process extremely contentious. For instance, the media’s attention to NAFTA, 
because of Ross Perot’s opposition to it and the negativity he aroused in the mind of the 
public, greatly influenced the political dynamics in Congress. Such media salience in turn 
forced President Clinton to revisit negotiations with Mexico and make various 
concessions to the members of Congress in order to get the treaty passed.
 243
  Along 
similar lines, for major arms control treaties, Deibel argues that in the case of the Senate 
rejection of CTBT, the grassroots activists, right-wing media, and conservative 
Republican members of Congress “spared no effort to convince their constituencies that 
the CTBT posed a major threat to America’s security and sovereignty…They wanted us 
[liberal Democratic members of Congress] in the end zone, spiking the ball on something 
that belonged to Bill Clinton.”244 Analysts such as Krepon and Caldwell suggest that the 
executive branch needs to have a well-planned strategy to counter such anti-treaty 
campaigns triggered by media bias. They argue that “Without strenuous efforts by the 
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executive branch, critics can establish the terms of debate, particularly through 
sophisticated media campaigns that drive up negative perceptions of the treaty in 
question.”245 For instance, in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) consent process, 
the Clinton administration took an aggressive media management strategy. High-level 
administration officials such as Secretary of State Madeleine Albright, Secretary of 
Defense William Cohen, and National Security Adviser Samuel Berger appeared 
regularly on radio and television to promote the CWC.
246
 The non-consideration of the 
Senate for SALT II in contrast to the success of the INF Treaty consent process is largely 
attributed to a viable media strategy.       
With regard to war politics and use of force, the effect of media salience has been 
explicit in channelizing the political process. Media coverage can either enhance or 
curtail a president’s capability on matters of war powers.247 The contours of 
congressional-presidential consensus and dissension become all the more visible when 
members of Congress decide to oppose the president on a proposed use of force. Media 
coverage generally reports stories on a regular basis about legislators’ views on such use 
of force, especially when there is a possibility of conflict between Congress and the 
president and when the policy outcome is in doubt.
248
 Members of Congress “at the front 
end of a prospective military venture” tend to influence presidential decision-making 
indirectly by “staging events that become focal points of media attention,” thereby 
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shaping the direction of national conversations.
249
 In this context, media can potentially 
play an effective role as a political check on a president’s military ventures by raising 
questions and regularly reporting issues on war powers consistent with the War Powers 
Resolution.
250
 On the other hand, the White House can marshal the instruments of 
strategic public diplomacy by optimally using a wide range of media apparatus, such as 
presidential press conferences, daily press briefing by the press secretary, television 
interviews, and image management.
251
 For instance, “the Persian Gulf War demonstrated 
the ability of an administration to steer a policy course through months of public scrutiny 
and to use sophisticated news management techniques to turn saturation coverage by 
hundreds of news organizations into a public relations bonus.”252 Such judicious media 
management exerts great influence on public opinion and can thereby generate massive 
public support for presidential military ventures and bolster that president’s political 
standing in Washington.
253
 Also, as mentioned earlier, the political orientation of the 
media often shape national conservation based on ideological lines. Such analysis is all 
the more important when there is a general tendency for the media to engage in extensive 
coverage, if a proposed military intervention has potential to generate intense debate 
among influential government officials on Capitol Hill and in the White House.
254
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Because of this, media coverage of the congressional-presidential tug of war on use of 
military force becomes strategic in deciding the course of events. Thus media coverage 
and its strategic role can influence the dynamics of congressional-presidential politics in 
the domain of war powers – at times enhancing and at other times curtailing the 
advantage of either of the co-equal branches. 
Extensiveness of Debate in Congress – Policy Process and Consequences 
Congress uses debate proceedings extensively to engage in deliberations while 
considering various policy prescriptions. Lengthy debate proceedings in committees and 
on the floor of either of the chambers in Congress can further complicate the political 
process. Such practice can also lead to full analysis of the pros and cons of policy specific 
issues. Profound ideological-gap and partisan polarization at the inter-branch and intra-
branch level in Washington greatly contribute to lengthy debate proceedings and policy 
gridlock.
255
 In high politics foreign policy issue areas such as treaty process, lengthy 
debates in Congress can create political impediments in the treaty ratification process, 
particularly with regard to arms control treaties.
256
 The Senate uses the debate 
proceedings to delay and often derail presidential efforts to get the treaty approved. This 
was clearly the case with respect to the non-approval of SALT II (1979).
257
 At the same 
time, inadequate debate in the Senate because of partisan, ideological, and procedural 
hindrances led to the rejection of CTBT (1999) in the Senate.
258
 But adequate caution 
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should be sounded in generalizing the relationship between duration of debate and treaty 
ratification outcome.
259
 For instance, the Chemical Weapons Convention CWC (1997), 
which witnessed good substantive debate, was ultimately successful in getting Senate 
approval.
260
 Also, by stretching the duration of debate proceedings, the Senate can 
directly intervene in the treaty process by attaching amendments, reservations, 
understandings, and policy declarations to the treaty’s original document as part of 
ratification. Once such modifications are inserted by the Senate, it becomes very difficult 
for the president to reject them.
261
 During the lengthy debate proceedings for the 
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces INF Treaty (1988), the Senate imposed the term 
“common understanding” which “defined to include the text of the treaty, the provisions 
of the resolution of ratification, and the authoritative representations provided by the 
president and his representatives to the Senate. Any interpretation that differed with the 
common understanding would require joint action by Congress and the president either 
by treaty or by statue.”262 Even though President Reagan sent a letter to the Senate 
expressing some concern about the amendment, finally he had to agree with the terms 
and conditions of the amendment that the Senate included as part of the INF Treaty 
approval. It appears that partisan and ideological barriers contribute significantly to 
debate complications and delay in the treaty consent process. With regard to military 
interventions, the dynamics of debate in the House of Representatives as well as the 
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Senate also are primarily affected by partisan and ideological factors. Complicated debate 
generally contributes to the legislative initiative undertaken in Congress in order to 
invoke the War Powers Resolution.
263
 However, in the war process too, no clear-cut 
causality between debate duration and resolution (to invoke the Act) outcome can be 
inferred. Partisan and ideological dimensions influence the dynamics of debate in each of 
the chambers. Such factors often contribute to the demise of a resolution passed in one 
chamber when the other chamber refuses to consider it (with the exception of the 
Lebanon MNF case, in which the Act was invoked in letter and spirit in full provision). 
Concluding Remarks 
In this chapter efforts have been made to explore the various strategic factors 
which are largely responsible to define the contours of legislative-executive consensus 
and dissension in policy making especially with regard to the issue areas of treaty consent 
and war powers. Such factors have profound implications in policy process in the context 
of separated institutions sharing power.
264
 The dynamics of these variables contribute 
greatly in complicating the policy process resulting in variation in outcome. In an era of 
resurgent Congress and invigorating presidency high politics foreign policy issue areas 
such as treaty process and war powers experience far reaching multi-dimensional 
political ramifications because of these salient factors. The contentiousness and outcome 
of the political process are greatly reflected by the continuum of consensus and 
dissension between Capitol Hill and the White House.  It is also important to keep 
cognizance that in foreign policy sphere international politics and escalatory events 
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abroad add to the political dynamic of the policy process at home.
265
 For instance such 
escalatory international events can be in the form of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979 that hardened the conservative base-line in the U.S. Senate resulting in 
the demise of Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II).
266
 Simultaneous news of 
Soviet troop buildup in Cuba and Soviet Union’s unabated stockpiling of armaments in 
the thick of Cold War complicated the domestic political situation considerably and 
further diminished the prospects of SALT II ratification.
267
 In case of Multinational Force 
(MNF) intervention in Lebanon (1982-84) the terrorist attack in Beirut that killed 241 
U.S. Marines hastened the timeline of withdrawal of American troops.
268
 From time to 
time such sporadic yet escalatory international events complicate the political process and 
add to the dynamics of continuum of consensus and dissension between the Hill and the 
executive branch in Washington. Finally, one point needs attention. That is the case of 
increasing use of executive agreements by the president over the years. It is argued that 
presidents are more inclined to strategically evade the Senate when opposition party 
outnumbers in the Senate or when the ideological composition in the Senate is not in 
favor of the President.
269
 Such presidential action conforms to the fact that the current 
political environment, especially since Vietnam, has become so much contentious in 
foreign policy sphere that quite often the administration faces insurmountable 
congressional opposition. The ideological preferences of pivotal institutional players in 
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Congress, particularly SFRC chairman, as well as unfavorable partisan polarization 
weigh in presidential decisions to use executive agreements.
270
 Also evading Congress 
and resorting to executive agreements on a frequent basis loses the popular legitimacy 
aspect which the Framers wanted to incorporate in treaty process by specifically 
including the provision of “advice and consent” by two-thirds majority of votes 
concurred in the U.S. Senate.
271
 Some analysts suspect that use of executive agreements 
vis-à-vis treaties does not necessarily support the notion of presidential dominance in 
treaty process. They argue that presidents cannot evade the U.S. Senate rampantly at their 
own will. Such behavior is contingent upon discretion granted by the U.S. Senate to the 
president from time to time as warranted by swifter diplomatic action.
272
  
From the theoretical exploration undertaken in this chapter it is evident that all the 
factors discussed play a significant role in tandem and reinforce each other. Such 
exploration gains traction when for the majority of the time period 1970-2010 there has 
been the presence of divided government, partisan and ideological polarization in 
Washington. Also the theoretical exploration undertaken in this chapter brings some 
unique perspective in examining the contours of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension in two critical high politics foreign policy issue areas – treaty process and war 
powers – under a single study.   
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CHAPTER III 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND PLANNING  
Overview 
The methodological approach of this study is inductive. In this dissertation a 
qualitative research design is adopted with features of strong interpretivism for making 
deductive analysis of the theoretical concept. The structural features of this project based 
on the essential characteristic features of the issue areas of treaty consent process and war 
powers logically fit into inductive approach for empirical investigation. Expectation is 
that such research design would facilitate empirical investigation of the selected case 
studies, test validity of the stated research hypotheses, and strengthen the overall 
theoretical foundational argument of continuum of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension in foreign policy domain as part of theory advancement In consideration of 
historical and contextual nature of the research topic, the plan of research is designed to 
conduct case study analysis as part of empirical investigation. In this study, small-N 
research design is adopted for the two issue areas. My assessment is that small sample 
size of empirical cases selected based on strictly scientific selection criteria would 
facilitate examination of fairly deterministic pattern of causal mechanism between each 
independent variable and the dependent variable. Moreover, attributes such as rich 
qualitative evidence-sifting, accuracy of process tracing, absence of perfect 
multicollinearity, fine-grained and contextually sensitive analysis has made it imperative 
to adopt small-N methodology which is also logically consistent and scientifically more 
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appropriate for this project.
273
 Expectation is that when small-N methodology is applied 
here it would significantly strengthen the accuracy of process-tracing in explaining the 
causality between independent and dependent variables with more precision, and thereby 
reduce the problems of indeterminacy.
274
 Simultaneously such research approach would 
substantially increase the internal validity of the study.
275
 The intertemporal dimension of 
the project covering a period from 1970 to 2010 makes it possible for the proposed 
research design to justly analyze the theoretical framework of continuum of consensus 
and dissension in legislative-executive relations. Here it is also important to take into 
account that efforts have been made to incorporate objective case selection criteria so as 
to reduce selection bias and structural inefficiency in research design.  
In this section, the structural design of the research is described. The second 
section contains discussion of research plan and data collection. The third section 
provides a detailed description of the case selection criteria for the treaty process. In the 
fourth section, the case selection criteria for war powers has been explained. The chapter 
ends with a short conclusion.  
Research Plan and Data Collection 
This project is heavily grounded on primary and secondary research planning.  As 
the research design is aimed at an optimal mix of qualitative and interpretive elements for 
getting a better analytical insight of the empirical evidence, collection of data from 
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primary and secondary sources is considered to be vital in the process of analyzing the 
dynamics of congressional-presidential relations for treaty consent and war powers.  
Primary research has been an integral component of this project. It includes 
exploration of government documents such as Congressional Records which extensively 
provide full deliberations in Congress.  Here following items are examined: (i) Floor 
debates in the United States Senate and the United States House of Representatives; (ii) 
Congressional hearings in various major committees and sub-committees of the House 
and the Senate such as Foreign Relations, Armed Services, Intelligence, etc.; (iii) 
Congressional documents such as official reports of various high-profile congressional 
committees and subcommittees, messages and press conferences of the House Speaker, 
the Senate Majority Leader, and other prominent members of Congress; (iv) Records of 
roll-call votes in Congress, mainly obtained from various Congressional Records; (v) 
Excerpts of presidential conferences as obtained from the office of the White House press 
secretary and duly compiled; (vi) Public papers of various presidents; (vii) Daily press 
briefing by the White House press secretary; and (vii) State of the Union addresses of 
various presidents.  Data collected from all these material sources constitute the most 
authentic and comprehensive elements of empirical evidence for making qualitative 
analysis. In particular, efforts have been made to adequately cover congressional 
deliberations at the subcommittee, committee, and actual floor levels and from various 
Congressional Records, in order to make an optimal assessment of all relevant facets of 
prevailing political arguments. I found congressional deliberations to be extremely 
important for assessing and getting a better perspective of the policy positions of pivotal 
congressional lawmakers on both sides of the aisle. 
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 Apart from regular congressional deliberations, testimonies provided as part of 
the congressional hearings by various cabinet secretaries; high-level civilian officials on 
behalf of the administration and the State Department; top military officials from the 
Department of Defense; experts from nongovernment organizations, think tanks, research 
institutions, bureaucratic agencies and independent foreign policy experts are important 
documents for data collection, assessment, and empirical research. They provide 
evidence from the standpoint of congressional oversight. Finally, various volumes of 
Congressional Information Service (CIS) are useful congressional resources for data 
collection and empirical analysis.  I found all these primary sources significant in 
strengthening the scope and content of empirical investigation. All these materials helped 
me immensely in connecting the dots, getting a better perspective and making an 
objective analysis of the empirical evidence. 
Secondary research which constitutes the other major component of this project 
has been useful in analysis and synthesis of the empirical findings. The first and foremost 
aspect of secondary research is the existing literature used to explain the theoretical 
foundation. Various issues of Congressional Research Service (CRS) and Congressional 
Quarterly Weekly Reports (CQ Weekly) have been useful in getting a better perspective 
of the issue areas. I found the CRS Reports of Richard F. Grimmett especially helpful in 
collecting data for empirical research on the issue area of war powers.  
The second aspect of secondary research has been in the context of exploring the 
dynamic role of media. Here, news clippings from various high-profile national dailies 
such as the New York Times, Washington Post, Los Angeles Times, etc. are reviewed as 
part of a larger qualitative analysis to ascertain the role of media coverage in influencing 
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the policy positions of politicians in Washington. I used Lexis-Nexis online resources to 
collect evidence from the newspaper clippings. I found news articles by Susan F. Rasky 
and Martin Tolchin of the New York Times, and Helen Dewar and Robert G. Kaiser of the 
Washington Post very helpful for empirical research. Media attention in the form of 
extensiveness of newspaper coverage has been especially important in case selection 
methodology for the issue area of treaty process. For that purpose I used coverage by the 
New York Times as an indicator of media attention. The New York Times Index has been 
used as the standard of measurement for ascertaining the degree of media attention in the 
process of case selection of major international treaties. This has been done on the basis 
of quantitative analysis of the number of editorials, front-page coverage, news articles, 
and opinion articles in the New York Times as part of media salience.
276
 Apart from 
newspaper coverage, survey of electronic media in 24-hour national cable television 
networks such as CNN, ABC, NBC, Fox News, CBS, etc., has been instrumental to 
expand data collection and integrative analyses of facts and figures for each of the issue 
areas.  
The third aspect of secondary research deals with examining public opinion for 
the cases considered in treaty process and war powers. This is done by survey of media 
publicity and public opinion from popular poll sites such as Gallup, Roper, and other 
electronic and newsprint media sources.  Survey data collected from such secondary 
material sources has proved to be immensely important in doing qualitative analysis of 
public perception of the empirical cases under consideration across the issue areas and 
making logical interpretations. 
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Case Selection – Treaty Consent and Ratification 
This dissertation project selects four treaty/agreement cases which are classified 
as major international treaties and agreements. They are as follows: (1) Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty - (SALT II) - 1979; (2) Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty 
(INF) - 1988; (3) North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) – 1993; (4) 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) - 1999. Table 4.1 classifies these four treaty 
cases based on legislative-executive political arrangement and government typology. 
Treaty case selection is done in two phases. The first phase identifies definitive objective 
criteria for the purpose of filtering the prospective cases from a pool of major 
international treaties/agreements.
277
 Here careful consideration is given to define the 
parameters of the individual objective criterion. Based on such logic five different 
objective criteria have been identified as explained below. In the second phase the 
selected treaties/agreements are evaluated in terms of the research hypotheses that are 
stated in the first chapter. The second phase aims at examining the variations in the 
relationship between the independent and dependent variables for the individual cases 
selected. The second phase validates the first phase and strengthens the theoretical 
framework of case selection process.  
Phase 1: The various objective criteria for treaty case selection are: (1) Salience 
of issue areas; (2) Major international treaties that were politically significant in terms of 
their ramifications on U.S. foreign policy since the second World War
278
; (3) Media 
attention (in terms of media coverage in the New York Times) that the treaties/agreements 
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generated during the specific core time period (1979-99) of case selection
279
; (4) 
Significant treaty legislation made during the core time period (1979-99) based on the 
dynamics of legislative-executive politics; and (5) The strategic significance of the 
specific core time period (1979-99) itself in the realm of international politics directly 
affecting U.S. foreign policy as well. Such objectivity in case selection criteria has 
significantly reduced the possibility of any selection bias. The various case selection 
criteria are explained below in detail: 
1. Salient Issue Area: The four cases selected for this study, namely the Strategic 
Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II), Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty, 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
(CTBT), belong to two very important issues, the so called elite club of high politics
280
 in 
U.S. foreign policy – (i) arms control; and (ii) trade and economic relations. Importantly 
during the Cold War period the most strategic foreign policy issue area has traditionally 
been the one dealing with arms control.
281
 Apart from arms control other potentially 
important issues are trade relations, environmental regulation, United Nations sponsored 
treaties, and human rights. Such strategic issues traditionally have had profound influence 
in determining the magnitude of contentiousness of legislative-executive relations in 
treaty-making. Based on the statistics on media attention it can be ascertained that treaties 
related to arms control and trade relations constitute the top 5 rankings for the core time 
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period (1979-99) that is the focal point of this study.
282
 Among the cases selected SALT 
II, INF, and CTBT relate to arms control whereas NAFTA belongs to trade and economic 
relations.  
2. Major International Treaties: The scope and extent of this study is confined to 
major international treaties signed by the United States during the time period of 1950 to 
2010. Major international treaties, for the purpose of this study, are those which are 
strategic and profoundly consequential from U.S. foreign policy perspective.
283
 In turn 
they also have significant ramifications on the dynamics of global geopolitics as well as 
U.S. domestic politics. This study has confined its sample population to major 
international treaties only.  In compliance with this selection criterion the four cases 
considered in this project relate to the highest level of media attention and geopolitical 
consequences.
284
 They are also regarded as important foreign policy legislation.  
Appendix B contains a comprehensive list of major international treaties signed by the 
United States during the period of 1950 to 2010.   
3. Media Attention: A major determining criterion for international treaty and 
agreement first phase of case selection has been media attention. In this study the four 
treaty cases selected on the basis of highest extent of media attention occur during the 
time period from 1979 to 1999. For the purpose of media attention journalistic coverage 
in The New York Times has been surveyed. The New York Times is selected as a source of 
media attention because of its high reputation and widespread circulation. Specific case 
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selection criteria with regard to media attention are: (1) Total number of times a 
treaty/agreement is mentioned in any newspaper document type for the time period of 
1979 to 1999; (2) Total number of front-page stories associated with a treaty/agreement 
for the same time period; and (3) Total number of editorial articles associated with a 
treaty/agreement during the same time period. Appendix C contains detailed statistical 
analysis of media attention with respect to 52 major international treaties/agreements for 
the time period of 1979 to 1999. Based on the specifics outlined hereby regarding media 
attention selection criteria Appendix C shows that out of the top five treaties that 
generated the highest amount of media attention, four are those that have been selected in 
this study – the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Treaty (SALT II), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), and the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty.  The four treaties in this study are 
ranked in descending order as follows: (1) NAFTA (Total: 2193; Front-page: 292; 
Editorial Article: 165); (2) SALT II (Total: 1164; Front-page: 75; Editorial Article: 150); 
(3) CTBT (Total: 545; Front-page: 81; Editorial Article: 57); (4) INF (Total: 497; Front-
page: 65; Editorial Article: 56).
285
 Other treaties/agreements were not selected because 
they did not attract the requisite media attention to be regarded as a filtering factor in 
order to examine the complexities of legislative-executive relations in the treaty process. 
Such ranking dimension stated hereby based on the criterion of media attention in the 
New York Times justifies that the four treaties selected in this study are extremely 
significant foreign policy initiatives that have had profound implications in shaping the 
dynamics of legislative-executive relations in the overall treaty process.  
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4. Significant Treaty Legislation: One major objective criterion for case selection is 
the consideration of significant treaty legislation. I argue that each of the four 
treaties/agreements selected are significant piece of legislation not only from a U.S. 
foreign policy perspective, but also from the vantage point of studying the complexities 
of institutional politics with regard to Congress and the president as illustrated in phase 2 
of the treaty case selection process. Such methodological approach gains traction when 
selected cases relate to the highest category of media attention rating.
286
  
From methodological standpoint in this study a treaty or agreement is considered 
significant not only on the basis of whether the particular treaty was consequential from 
U.S. foreign policy perspective but also as to how the dynamics of unified and divided 
government structures affected the degree of contentiousness of legislative-executive 
relations irrespective of the treaty outcome (i.e. approval or rejection), and also 
irrespective of whether the given congressional term was considered to be significant in 
terms of legislative accomplishments or setting new precedents. Here the idea is that 
significant treaty legislation can be approved (or rejected) by Congress irrespective of 
whether the particular congressional term associated with such a treaty consent process 
was deemed to be significant or not.
287
 This is where case selection model adopted here 
can be compared with that of Mayhew’s model.288 In this study, I consider 
treaties/agreements to be significant if they had far-reaching ramifications on U.S. 
foreign policy irrespective of whether the particular congressional term was deemed to be 
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significant/productive or not. On the other hand, David Mayhew’s study considers a 
significant congressional term to be a major factor for determining significant legislation. 
My assessment is that the methodological basis of the case selection model used in this 
study is structurally stronger in its approach to identify the complex dimensions of 
legislative-executive relations as illustrated in phase 2 of the treaty selection process.  
5. Strategic Significance of time period 1979-99: The core time period (1979-99), 
during which all four treaties were selected, is generally regarded as one of the most 
momentous periods in the realm of global geopolitics influencing U.S. foreign policy and 
domestic politics. This period witnessed the peak of bipolar Cold War tension between 
the United States and the Soviet Union followed by the collapse of the Soviet Union and 
the Eastern Bloc countries, and finally emergence of the post-Cold War period with a 
multilateral geopolitical environment in which the United States is the single dominant 
power with a group of emerging countries coming up at a faster pace. On the domestic 
front in the post-Vietnam War era especially since the mid-1970s long-standing 
congressional-presidential foreign policy consensus was replaced by unprecedented level 
of contentious politics between the two coequal branches. Thus mid-1970s can be 
regarded as a turning point to usher in a new era of political dynamics in legislative-
executive relations especially on matters of treaty consent by the U.S. Senate. Moreover, 
the trend of growing congressional assertiveness in the political process of arms control 
and national security was distinctively visible since 1977 when the Senate and House 
Foreign Relations and Arms Services Committees increased their oversight 
significantly.
289
 From methodological standpoint all these factors make the core time 
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period of 1979-99 politically unprecedented and strategically compelling for exploring 
treaty consent and ratification process.  
Phase 2: The second phase evaluates each of the selected treaties/agreements in 
terms of the research hypotheses already stated in the first chapter. For each case study 
variations in the relationship between independent and dependent variables are explored 
in this phase. 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SALT II : During the 96
th
 Congress (1979-
81) there was the presence of unified government and even then SALT II was rejected. 
Because of the controversial nature of SALT II and its strategic implications the treaty 
sparked an enormous amount of political debate in the U.S. Congress. There was a great 
deal of apprehension in Washington about ramifications of the treaty on U.S. national 
security. Importantly, the United States Senate was unanimous in its opposition to the 
proposed treaty. Even President Carter, in his role as the leader of the ruling Democratic 
Party in a unified government setting, was unable to generate enough political capital in 
his favor inside his own party in order to get the treaty ratified by Congress. In turn the 
treaty was not approved by the U.S. Senate in a unified government setting.
290
 SALT II 
also represented significant intra-party cleavage inside the Democratic Party. Such intra-
party squabble was largely responsible for a rare ideological intersection between the 
moderates and conservatives in the Senate. As a consequence ideological distance 
between the U.S. Senate and the president widened that ultimately sealed the fate of 
SALT II. Extensive congressional debate proved to solidify such a rare ideological 
consensus in the Senate even simultaneously exacerbating legislative-executive 
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dissension. While there was strong bipartisan consensus inside the U.S. Senate to block 
SALT II there was intra-party dissension between the Democratic Senate and Carter 
White House. Such political dynamic created tension in legislative-executive relations 
and established a precedent at the interbranch level. In the end there was no consensus at 
the legislative-executive level. Also treaty consent process for SALT II generated a lot of 
media attention. Extensive media coverage of congressional debate and unfolding 
international developments influenced the dynamics of Senate proceedings and position 
taking of influential lawmakers. International events such as Soviet brigade build-up in 
Cuba, Iranian hostage crisis, and Soviet invasion profoundly affected public opinion and 
electoral imperatives for not only the congressional lawmakers but also the incumbent 
President Carter and his formidable GOP presidential challenger Ronald Reagan. All 
such considerations enhance the significance of SALT II treaty consent process and 
demonstrate the variation in dependent variable and test the stated research hypotheses. 
The case study sets a rare precedent in understanding the poor working relations between 
Capitol Hill and the White House.
291
 The controversial nature of salient issue area 
reflected in a major international treaty like SALT II led to unprecedented media 
attention.
292
 The exigencies of domestic politics as stated above in turn made SALT II 
significant treaty legislation ever considered by the U.S. Senate. For all such reasons as 
stated in phases 1 and 2 of case selection process, SALT II is considered to be promising 
for empirical investigation.   
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North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA): With regard to the North 
American Free Trade Agreement during 103
rd
 Congress (1993-95) there was the presence 
of unified government. Even though NAFTA legislation was approved by Congress in a 
unified government setting the highly contentious decision-making process was the 
hallmark of legislative-executive dynamics. The primary reason for the passage of 
NAFTA was a surprisingly rare non-conventional bipartisan consensus. The complexity 
of intraparty dissension inside the ruling Democratic Party in tandem with cross-partisan 
consensus between the Republican Party and the conservative Democrats in both 
chambers of Congress was somewhat unprecedented. Eventually legislative-executive 
consensus was reached and NAFTA was successful in getting congressional blessings.
293
 
In reality despite the presence of unified government structure NAFTA reflected stellar 
dynamics of complex partisan and intra-party maneuvering that in turn was responsible 
for rare ideological intersection in the Beltway. In such a situation legislative-executive 
consensus was by no means an easy accomplishment. Contentious debate in Congress 
extensively facilitated investigation of NAFTA pros and cons. Senate and House 
deliberations played major role in forging non-conventional bipartisan consensus that was 
further reinforced by delicate ideological intersection. Such dynamics in the NAFTA 
decision-making process directly address the research hypotheses stated in the first 
chapter. Also the case is significant from the standpoint of receiving highest level of 
media attention.
294
 The pattern of media coverage was more sympathetic toward 
highlighting the merits of trade legislation and that in turn had positive effect on the 
                                                          
293
 Contrast can be made between  the 103
rd
 Congress (1993-95) and the 96
th
 Congress (1979-81), both of 
which experienced unified government structure with diverse political outcomes in treaty legislation. 
 
294
 See Appendix C for a comparative analysis vis-à-vis other international treaties/agreements. 
88 
 
decision-making process. Moreover, ups and downs in public opinion based on regional 
dimensions of constituent preferences made decision-making process even more 
contentious especially in the House of Representatives. Because of such reasons NAFTA 
is considered as an appropriate case study to investigate variation in the dependent 
variable. Finally purely from the standpoint of theory advancement, the fact that NAFTA 
dominated the proceedings of a politically sensitive 103
rd
 Congress (1993-95) reinforces 
the strategic nature of the case study and generates curiosity for a detailed empirical 
analysis.
295
  
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF): Senate consent process with 
regard to the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces treaty occurred during the 100
th
 
Congress (1987-89) when divided government was formed in Washington. Despite the 
presence of divided government the outcome of legislative-executive consensus treaty 
approval is in contradiction to the prediction of the concerned research hypothesis. Such 
variations in the relationship between independent and dependent variables warrant 
empirical investigation in the first place. Second, INF approval process was marked by 
not only strong bipartisan consensus but also rare intraparty cohesion especially among 
Democrats who controlled the Senate. Ideological intersection on high politics issue like 
arms control was critically important during the decision-making process. Importantly, 
extensive debate in the Senate during INF consent process facilitated finding common 
grounds between Democratic and GOP lawmakers and forging rare cross-partisan 
consensus for treaty approval in the backdrop of divided government setting. Media 
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coverage was extensive
296
 and broadly supportive of the merits of the treaty put forward 
by the hardline Reagan administration during hey days of Cold War. Because President 
Reagan enjoyed favorable job approval rating on the issue of dealing with the Soviet 
Union public opinion was also very much in favor of the treaty. Favorable public opinion 
played a vital role in the formation of ideological intersection and eventually strong 
bipartisan consensus. From methodological standpoint point all such political dynamics 
relate to the research hypotheses and make INF treaty a compelling case to investigate 
variation in the dependent variable. All these considerations in turn make INF treaty 
landmark foreign policy legislation during the 100
th 
Congress (1987-89) that was 
eventually rated as a significant congressional term for its momentous legislative 
accomplishments and setting a precedent for bipartisanship in a divided government.
297
  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT): Senate consideration of CTBT 
occurred in divided government setting during the 106
th
 Congress (1999-2001). The 
hallmark of the political process was unprecedented levels of partisan animosity and 
ideological divisions between the Republicans who controlled the Senate and the 
Democrats.  The treaty was finally rejected by the U.S. Senate. The severity of partisan 
conflict at the legislative-executive level dominated the decision-making process all 
through. In fact, Senate rejection of CTBT in 1999 created history in 80 years since the 
Treaty of Versailles in 1919. The dynamics of divided government and polarized politics 
which were all encompassing during CTBT consent process help analyze the variation 
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between independent and dependent variables as stated in the research hypotheses. Lack 
of congressional debate because of partisan politics widened the policy gap between the 
two parties and denied any opportunity to reach a viable compromise, unlike INF treaty 
consent process. At the same time CTBT generated a high level of media attention.
298
 
Extensive media coverage had ideological overtone that in turn aggravated dissension in 
the Beltway. Unstable nature of public opinion coupled with the imperatives of upcoming 
presidential election in 2000 precipitated legislative-executive dissension. Incidentally, 
the 106
th
 Congress (1999-2001) was famous because of intense political gridlock at the 
interbranch level in Washington.
299
 For all these reasons CTBT is regarded as significant 
case study that warrants empirical investigation to test the research hypotheses stated in 
the first chapter.    
Case Selection – War Powers 
The objective criteria in case selection for the issue area of war powers relate to 
three aspects: (1) Congress initiating and passing legislation to fully invoke the War 
Powers Resolution and compel the president to withdraw troops from abroad;
300
 (2) At 
least one of the chambers in Congress initiating and passing legislation to invoke the War 
Powers Resolution
301
; and (3) Congress unanimously authorizing the president to use 
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force in hostilities abroad by passing legislation.
302
 For the purpose of this dissertation all 
that matters is legislative action taken and legislation passed by Congress to invoke the 
War Powers Resolution so as to curtail presidential military endeavors. Such well-defined 
case selection criteria have prevented selection bias from happening. Here it is important 
to recognize that Congress can also use other non-legislative methods to restrain the 
president from deploying troops abroad. For example Congress can generate public 
opinion against any kind of military intervention, use media power wisely to pressurize 
the president not to deploy troops, and publicly rebuke the president for dragging the 
country into an unnecessary and protracted military conflict.
303
 From methodological 
vantage point such non-legislative congressional procedures do not qualify for case 
selection. Based on the prescribed selection process only a restricted number of war 
powers cases meet the necessary standard requirement for empirical analysis. Such 
relevant cases are mentioned in Figure 5.1 which displays the consensus-dissension 
continuum chart. Because of the historical and contextual nature of the limited number of 
relevant cases small-N technique is adopted in this study. Expectation is that such 
research approach would appropriately facilitate qualitative analysis in order to arrive at 
logical deduction with reasonable precision. 
Based on the stated selection criteria the following war powers case studies are 
considered in this project: (A) Multinational Force in Lebanon 1982-84. This is the only 
case in which the War Powers Resolution was fully invoked in letter and intent; (B) 
Grenada 1983, Libya 1986, Somalia 1992-94, Haiti 1993-94, Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995, 
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and Kosovo 1999. These cases represent partial invocation of the War Powers 
Resolution; (C) 1st Gulf War 1990-91, and Iraq War 2003. These cases represent wars 
which got congressional authorization. Generally speaking all war powers cases 
demonstrate variation in causal relationship between independent and dependent 
variables and facilitate hypotheses testing. Here it is important to recognize that during 
the decision-making process for each military intervention there were turning-point 
moments that illustrate continuous variations in outcome at different stages of the policy 
process. Such intermittent outcome variations contributed in shaping the final decision 
outcome. Chapter V conducts detailed investigation to analyze all such variations and 
relates individual interventions to the stated research hypotheses. From methodological 
standpoint the War Powers Resolution case studies are classified into three categories as 
illustrated in the “Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart” (Figure 5.1). The extreme 
ends of the continuum bar in Figure 5.1 represent dissension case study (Lebanon-MNF) 
and consensus case studies (Iraq I and II). The central portion of the continuum bar 
represents the so-called middle range cases that represent flickers of consensus and 
dissension. In such cases at least one branch of Congress initiated legislative action to 
invoke the War Powers Resolution. The related case studies are Grenada, Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, Somalia and Haiti.  
During Lebanon-MNF intervention presence of divided government resulted in 
legislative-executive dissension and Congress invoked the War Powers Resolution. 
Partisan animosity and ideological differences were at the highest level and had 
significant effect on dissension. Electoral imperatives for reelection motivated opposition 
Democratic lawmakers in Congress to challenge President Reagan’s Lebanon policy and 
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exacerbate interbranch dissension. Divided public opinion all through the Lebanon 
intervention kept the Capitol and White House on collision course. In early January 1984 
with drastic fall in public opinion congressional-presidential dissension worsened and 
troops were pulled out almost immediately thereafter. While media coverage was more 
sympathetic to congressional opposition for prolonged military intervention in Lebanon it 
was equally critical of the administration’s extensive plans. Such media dynamics, 
especially after the Beirut bombing incident, further intensified legislative-executive 
dissension so much so that the troops were pulled out much earlier than expected. 
Prolonged duration of the war coupled with deteriorating ground conditions also 
aggravated interbranch dissension. Therefore, one can assess that Lebanon-MNF military 
intervention demonstrates causal inference and generally conforms to the predictions as 
stated in the research hypotheses. Lebanon-MNF intervention is attributed as a dissension 
case in this study.  
As for the consensus case studies (Iraq I and II) variations in final outcome are 
explicitly observed at the time of testing the validity of research hypotheses. For each of 
the two case studies we find that even with the presence of divided government in 
Washington legislative-executive consensus was reached on the issue of military 
intervention. In the Iraq I case study there was broad bipartisan support and ideological 
intersection leading to legislative-executive consensus despite split party control on 
Capitol Hill. In Iraq II case study there was intra-party split inside the Democratic Party, 
especially in the House of Representatives, and that was well exploited by the Bush 43 
administration to reach a rare viable congressional-presidential consensus. For both Iraq I 
and II interventions midterm electoral imperatives and favorable public opinion for 
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military action resulted in forging viable legislative-executive consensus despite the 
presence of divided government. Opposition members of Congress were more 
cooperative in finding common ground with regard to military action. Extensive media 
coverage supportive of military intervention mobilized public support and influenced 
congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle to authorize military action. For each of 
Iraq I and II case study during authorization debate in Congress duration of war was not 
much of a concern because both Bush 41 and 43 administrations assured congressional 
leaders that military action would be for a short period of time.    
With regard to the middle-range case studies where at least one branch of 
Congress contemplated legislative action to invoke the War Powers Resolution variation 
in causal inference is observed. Such variations in decision outcome reflect flickers of 
consensus and dissension in the decision-making process. Consensus–Dissension 
Continuum Chart (Figure 5.1) identifies such cases as middle range cases. Each case 
study in this group too demonstrates turning-point moments representing variations in 
outcome at different stages of the decision-making process as part of shaping the final 
process outcome. Chapter 5 illustrates extensively how for all the case studies - Grenada, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, Somalia and Haiti – final decision outcome is 
significantly influenced by independent variables like divided/unified government, 
partisanship, ideology, electoral imperatives, public opinion, media, and duration of war. 
Table 3.1 below displays synoptic review of variations in final outcome to analyze causal 
inference as stated in the research hypotheses for the individual case studies in this group. 
Flickers of consensus and dissension in final decision outcome and intermediate turning-
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point moments throughout the decision-making process are observed for the middle-
range case studies.   
    Table 3.1:  Synoptic Review of Causal Inference for Middle-Range Case Studies 
Hypotheses 
↓ 
Grenada 
(DG) 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
(D/U/D G) 
Kosovo 
(DG) 
Libya 
(DG) 
Somalia 
(UG) 
Haiti 
(UG) 
Divided/ 
Unified Gov. 
Dissension Dissension Dissension Dissension Consensus Consensus 
Ideology- 
Partisan 
Dissension Dissension Dissension Dissension Dissension Dissension 
Electoral 
Imperatives 
Not 
Applicable 
Dissension Not 
Significant 
Not 
Applicable 
Not 
significant 
Dissension 
Public 
Opinion 
Dissension Consensus Dissension Consensus Dissension Consensus 
Opposition 
Members of 
Congress 
Dissension Dissension Dissension Dissension Dissension Dissension 
Media 
Coverage 
Consensus Consensus Consensus Dissension Dissension Dissension 
Duration of 
War 
Not 
Applicable 
Consensus Dissension Not 
significant 
Dissension Consensus 
 
In addition to the precise objective criteria for war powers case selection as stated 
earlier a couple of supplementary reasons are also considered in the overall selection 
mechanism. First, whether case studies selected do adequately demonstrate the manner in 
which presidents adjust their military policy positions in order to accommodate 
congressional preferences and prerogatives.
304
 Such policy adjustments by presidents 
reflect the practical feasibility aspects of getting congressional authorization or reprimand 
for the use of force abroad. For instance, here the degree and robustness of congressional 
opposition or support are considered while keeping in mind the overall objective criterion 
of legislative action taken. Second, whether case studies selected do adequately 
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demonstrate contours of legislative-executive relations as a result of legislative action 
taken by Congress to compel the president to pull out troops from abroad. For instance, 
here the main consideration has been with regard to the middle-range cases in the 
continuum chart, in which only one of the chambers of Congress was successful in 
passing resolution based on the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.
305
 In such 
analysis, adequate care has been taken to analyze the influence of such congressional 
action on making the president actually withdraw troops from abroad. These middle-
range cases – Grenada (1983), Libya (1986), Somalia (1992-94), Haiti (1993-94), 
Bosnia-Herzegovina (1995), Kosovo (1999) – represent partial invoking of the War 
Powers Resolution. In such cases, flickers of consensus and dissension are distinctively 
explicit from empirical investigation in chapter V. 
My overall assessment is that consistency in consensus-dissension pattern at the 
interbranch level reflects the appropriateness of the methodological perspective adopted 
in this project. I argue that small-N research design applied for a limited number of cases 
in war powers facilitates an optimal level of process tracing and significantly increase the 
accuracy of causality analysis. The issue area of war powers, much in similar to treaty 
consent and ratification, is extremely dynamic in which independent variables reinforce 
in unique dimensions. Here each individual case represents unique features of causal 
mechanism. From a methodological point of view the characteristics of causality between 
independent and dependent variables for each individual case can be meaningfully 
analyzed in a small-N setting. Also such research design has proved to be instrumental in 
analyzing variations in outcome for the cases under consideration especially when 
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divided government was present in all the instances with the exception of the Iraq War in 
2003. The question is if divided government was present during most of the cases why 
were there variations in outcome as reflected by the continuum chart? Complex 
dimensions of the small number of individual cases can be better explored by adopting 
small-N research design as a result of superiority of process tracing which in turn 
facilitates meaningful analysis of causal mechanism. My overall impression is that small-
N research technique has significantly increased the precision of empirical investigation 
for war powers cases. Such approach has enriched the substantive analysis of individual 
cases, increased internal validity of cases, and ultimately facilitated deduction of more 
accurate logic of inference.
306
 Such a conclusion gains traction when the continuum chart 
conforms to the consistency of the pattern of intertemporal consensus and dissension at 
the legislative-executive level for the issue area of war powers.  
Finally, methodological discussion for war powers cases is never complete 
without analyzing the historical and contextual nature of the War Powers Resolution 
which is ultimately the driving force for this issue area. When Congress passed the War 
Powers Resolution in 1973 by overriding a presidential veto that incident itself 
exemplified unprecedented level of congressional-presidential dissension. In the 
aftermath of successful passage of the Act congressional-presidential relations in war 
powers were destined to witness a bumpy ride. In general once the troops are already 
being deployed presidents approach Congress to seek authorization to extend military 
operation.
307
 Remarkably, only once, in the case of the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
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Resolution (1982-84), Congress invoked the War Powers Resolution in letter and intent. 
In that incident, Congress authorized a time limit of 18 months to the president for 
deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon.
308
 On other occasions such as Grenada (1983), 
Libya (1986), Somalia (1992-94), Bosnia- Herzegovina (1995), and Kosovo (1999), 
Congress took legislative action by passing a resolution in one of the chambers (usually 
the House of Representatives), in an apparent bid to invoke the Act in some form or 
another.
309
 On the other side of the continuum, there were occasions in which Congress 
authorized the president to use force in compliance with WPR.  Prominent instances are 
the Persian Gulf War in 1990-91 and in the Iraq War in 2002-03. Variations in process 
and outcome are depicted by the consensus-dissension continuum chart.
310
  
Concluding Remarks 
Overall, the research design adopted in this study contains elements of mixed 
methodology while attempting to increase the possibility of making a viable connection 
between theoretical perspectives and empirical findings. Here it is important to explain 
how independent variables such as ideological differences and electoral imperatives are 
assessed in this study.  
Ideology: While conducting empirical investigation ideology is assessed based on 
the degree of variations (or intersection) between liberal Democrats and conservative 
Republicans in the two branches of Congress in Level I analysis and subsequently 
between Capitol Hill and the White House in Level II analysis. Each case study across 
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the two issue areas – treaty process and war powers – identifies ideological predisposition 
of congressional leaders who in turn had considerable influence in not only determining 
parliamentary procedure in Congress but also garnering support among like-minded 
members of Congress in either adopting or blocking legislations. For instance case study 
analysis identifies specific leadership roles in Congress such as House Speaker, Senate 
Majority Leader, Chairmen of the Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services 
Committee, Senate Minority Leader, House Majority and Minority Leaders, etc. in 
assessing ideological predisposition and subsequently assessing their implications in 
determining final outcome of the decision-making process. 
Electoral Imperatives: The significance of elections can never be underestimated 
in U.S. politics. Subsequently in this study electoral imperatives have been assessed 
based on legitimate concerns of congressional leaders facing elections with special focus 
on pivotal opposition players, presidents running for their second term, and potential 
presidential challengers. Also proximity of next election cycle, extent to which a 
congressional seat is safe for incumbent members, variations in public opinion are also 
considered in assessing electoral imperatives. 
On the whole the research design in this study predominantly engages itself in 
qualitative analysis with an interpretive approach. It is also supplemented by quantitative 
elements in data collection. Small-N technique as adopted here for treaty process and war 
powers has provided a strong base for qualitative analysis. In the final analysis the overall 
research methodology and planning have been facilitative to conduct inductive analysis 
and make deductive logic of inference. The overall goal is to synthesize the empirical 
findings with the theoretical framework in order to make positive interpretation of the 
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systematic pattern of legislative-executive relations which in turn broadly reflects a 
continuum of consensus and dissension across the two foreign policy issue areas.    
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CHAPTER IV 
TREATY MAKING, ADVICE AND CONSENT, AND RATIFICATION 
Introduction 
Treaty process is one of the key foreign policy issues in which the joint 
institutional responsibility of Congress and the president is mandated constitutionally. In 
turn, it reflects power sharing between the two coequal branches. There is a common 
perception that the executive branch somehow retains greater power as compared to the 
legislative branch on matters of foreign policy. However, from a constitutional 
standpoint, both Congress and the president are entrusted with coequal power and 
responsibilities. The implications of joint institutional responsibilities are apparent in the 
treaty process. Article II, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution states that “all treaties must 
receive Senate advice and consent from a two-thirds majority of all senators present and 
voting before treaties can be ratified and enter into force.”311  
In the contemporary sense, the “Advice and Consent” process is the critical point 
of congressional-presidential contestation. The Senate gives advice and consent as part of 
this legislative body’s constitutional authority to grant approval to the treaty ratification 
document. Only after obtaining Senate’s such approval can the president proceed and 
ratify the treaty document. It is also important to recognize that the constitutional 
provision of “Advice and Consent” implies “that the Senate will have an opportunity to 
shape the content of a treaty.”312  Hence, the intent of the framers of the Constitution was 
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clearly to make the Senate an equal partner in the treaty process. The cases presented in 
this chapter corroborate a similar political dynamic.  
With the resurgence of Congress and greater congressional assertiveness over the 
last four decades, the treaty process has witnessed a consistent pattern of legislative-
executive competition. In contemporary Washington, the politics of treaty-making 
congressional-presidential consensus and dissension are ongoing phenomena, as each of 
the coequal branches passionately strives to preserve its foreign policy prerogatives. Over 
the years, presidents have repeatedly struggled to obtain congressional consent to a 
negotiated treaty. The case studies presented in this chapter conform to such a political 
reality. The cases in general are consistent with the argument that with the “Advice and 
Consent” provision, the Constitution basically empowers “the Senate to initiate a related 
and parallel policy process that the president no longer controls.” In such a situation, 
“Rather than confronting the Senate with a take-it-or-leave-it dilemma, submitting a 
treaty for advice and consent begins a process in which the president gets confronted with 
his own take-it-or-leave-it policy dilemma.”313 As the cases present, the Senate uses the 
treaty ratification document as an effective tool for shaping the direction of strategic 
foreign policy. Here the president has no other choice but to anxiously wait for the 
Senate’s consent. The cases explored in this chapter also comply with the assertion that 
the Senate can directly intervene in strategic foreign policy-making by imposing 
amendments, reservations, common understandings, and policy declarations to the treaty 
ratification document.
314
 In strategic foreign policy decisions when the president requires 
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congressional assent, the ability of the Senate members “to withhold their consent [to the 
treaty ratification document] gives them leverage over strategic policy.”315 As a matter of 
fact, “if the president wants the treaty he must accept each and every additional 
ratification provision passed by the Senate.”316 The formation of divided government and 
polarized politics in recent years has further complicated the treaty process. The case 
studies analyzed in this chapter attempt to illustrate all such political realities with regard 
to the constitutional boundaries that Congress and the president are required to maintain. 
The general assessment from the overall case analysis is that in the treaty ratification 
process, both Congress and the president are institutionally intertwined as coequal 
partners who are continuously navigating through the politics of consensus and 
dissension. Neither Capitol Hill nor the president has absolute power to dominate the 
treaty process.   
One point deserves some clarifications here. This is with regard to the increasing 
use of executive agreements by the president in recent years. It is argued that presidents 
are more inclined to strategically evade the Senate when the opposition party has a 
majority in the Senate or when the ideological composition in the Senate is not in favor of 
the president.
317
 Executive agreements expose the treaty process to the exigencies of 
interbranch contestation. Evading Congress and frequently resorting to executive 
agreements loses an aspect of popular legitimacy, which the nation’s founders vigorously 
wanted to maintain in the normal treaty process by specifically including the provision of 
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“Advice and Consent” by a two-thirds majority of votes in the Senate.318 Also, the scope, 
extent, influence and international recognition of major treaties are vastly superior. Even 
presidents prefer the route of treaty consent by Congress for all major multilateral deals. 
Resorting to executive agreements is a last resort, when the president is convinced of a 
sure defeat when seeking congressional authorization. Some analysts suspect that use of 
executive agreements vis-à-vis treaties does not necessarily support the notion of 
presidential dominance in the treaty process. They argue that presidents cannot evade the 
U.S. Senate at their own will. Such presidential behavior is contingent upon discretion 
granted by the U.S. Senate to the administration from time to time, as warranted by 
swifter diplomatic action.
319
  
The following four sections represent a detailed empirical analysis of case studies: 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) 1979; Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces 
Treaty (INF) 1988; North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1993; and 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1999.  
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II)  
Background:  The Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) was negotiated 
when the relationship between the United States and the Soviet Union was constantly 
evolving but extremely volatile during the Cold War. The basic purpose of SALT II was 
to reduce and limit the quantity of strategic nuclear weapons between the U.S. and the 
erstwhile U.S.S.R. From the point of view of the United States, the treaty was designed to 
serve and protect its strategic national security and foreign policy concerns during the 
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peak of the Cold War.
320
 This treaty was completed in June 1979, after seven years of 
negotiations between the two countries.  The completed version of the SALT II Treaty 
was signed by then-U.S. President Jimmy Carter and Communist Party of Soviet Union 
(CPSU) General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev in Vienna on June 18, 1979. President Carter 
submitted the treaty to the United States Senate on June 22 for advice and consent.
321
   
The SALT II Treaty was a potential step toward reduction of nuclear arms 
possession by the United States and the Soviet Union. The treaty addressed issues of 
defense and national security for both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. during the zenith of the 
Cold War period. Naturally the strategic implications arising out of SALT II sparked an 
enormous amount of political debate in the U.S. Congress and the larger sociopolitical 
diaspora. It was rated as one of the most controversial arms control treaties in its scope 
and extent. There was a great deal of apprehension among Washington politicians about 
ramifications of the treaty on U.S. national security. Importantly, the United States Senate 
was unanimous in its opposition to the proposed treaty. Even President Carter, in his role 
as the leader of the ruling Democratic Party in a unified government setup, was unable to 
generate enough political capital in his favor inside his own party in order to get the 
treaty ratified by Congress. In turn, SALT II was a classic case of treaty rejection by the 
U.S. Senate in a unified government political arrangement. The following hypotheses 
make a detailed analysis of the political dynamic continuum of legislative-executive 
consensus and dissension during the ratification process of SALT II.  
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Hypothesis 1: Unified government facilitates consensus in the treaty-making 
process, while divided government does not. The consent and ratification process for the 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) was one of the rare occasions in which, 
despite the presence of unified government, there was no consensus between the U.S. 
Congress and the president on the implications of the potentially sensitive arms control 
treaty.
322
 The provisions of the SALT II legislation, “consisting of a Treaty and a 
Protocol thereto,” were intended to impose “quantitative and qualitative” restrictions on 
the strategic nuclear weapons program of both the United States and the erstwhile Soviet 
Union.
323
 The sensitive nature of these provisions was responsible for the treaty receiving 
a “cool Senate reception” in the first place.324 There were differences of perception 
between the Capitol Hill and White House on the ramifications of the proposed treaty 
provisions on the strategic geopolitical balance between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.  This 
resulted in intense interbranch struggle in which the legislative and executive branches 
vigorously tried to preserve their respective foreign-policy prerogatives. The bipartisan 
consensus among congressional lawmakers in the U.S. Senate was sufficiently strong and 
cohesive to provide a tough political challenge to the Carter Administration. In the end 
President Carter was unable to overcome the strong resistance from the Capitol despite 
the presence of unified government under the control of the Democratic Party. He 
withdrew the treaty from Senate’s further consideration. The political process in turn 
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portrayed a continuum of consensus and dissension, both at the intrabranch and 
interbranch levels.  
Broadly speaking, arguments and counter-arguments with regard to the provisions 
of SALT II were ideologically polarizing and instrumental in fomenting congressional-
presidential dissension. Importantly, centrist Democratic members of the U.S. Senate 
were more apprehensive about the treaty and generally accepted the arguments made by 
their conservative Republican colleagues. . They argued that the treaty would fail to 
check the nuclear arms race and advocated for even lower limits and actual reductions of 
the number of nuclear arsenals by both the U.S. and the U.S.S.R.
325
  They also believed 
that the treaty would allow the Soviet Union to maintain strategic superiority over the 
United States, because the Soviet force, with large and land-based ballistic missiles, 
would be able to carry far greater numbers of warheads, even within the equal limits on 
delivery vehicles, than U.S. ballistic missiles.
326
 They also claimed that with such a 
strategic arms advantage, the Soviet Union would be able to target all U.S. land-based 
ICBMs in a first strike, which would create a window of vulnerability for the United 
States.
327
 On the other hand, the president accepted the position of the treaty’s supporters, 
who argued that “the Soviet advantage in large MIRVed ICBMs10 was more than offset 
by the U.S. advantage in SLBM (submarine-launched ballistic missiles) warheads, which 
could not be destroyed in a first strike and could retaliate against Soviet targets, and the 
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U.S. advantage in heavy bombers.”328 The Carter administration claimed that rejection of 
the SALT II Treaty would lead to complete collapse of the SALT process including 
reversal of SALT I interim agreement and most importantly the Anti-ballistic Missile 
(ABM) Agreement.
329
 Such divergent interpretations of the pros and cons of SALT II 
created fertile ground for congressional-presidential contests over the treaty ratification 
process. Importantly, the initial orientation toward negotiating SALT II started with a 
flavor of bipartisanship, when 25 senators, including 10 members of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee, were appointed advisers to the SALT Delegation in Geneva.
330
 
However, political dissention between Congress and the administration quickly started 
growing because of the embedded sensitivity attached to the provisions of the treaty.  In 
the course of the negotiations of SALT II (1972-79), “problems of verification, non-
circumvention, and qualitative arms control, that is, restraints on technological 
modernization, all grew prominent in legislative discussions of the impending 
agreement.”331 In due course of time, SALT II experienced strong congressional 
resistance on a bipartisan basis, despite unified government being in place. The dynamics 
of intrabranch consensus and interbranch dissension was evident. 
There was a powerful faction inside the ruling Democratic Party under the 
stewardship of Senator Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), Chairman of the Senate Arms 
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Control Subcommittee, which vigorously opposed SALT II.  Jackson “vowed to fight in 
the Senate to send the Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) back to the bargaining 
table, with instructions to U.S. negotiators to seek an equal agreement that cuts the size of 
the Soviet Union's missile arsenal.”332 Other congressional lawmakers who supported 
Jackson wanted modifications in the treaty. Such opposing political factions inside the 
ruling Democratic Party represented intraparty squabble that in turn led to contentious 
ratification process and strong congressional opposition to the executive branch’s treaty 
endeavor. The prominent officials who represented the administration and backed SALT 
II in the hearings of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) and the Senate 
Armed Services Committee were Cyrus R. Vance (Secretary of State), Harold Brown 
(Secretary of Defense), Ralph Earl II (Chairman, U.S. Delegation to the Strategic Arms 
Limitation Talks), and General David C. Jones (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff).
333
 With 
the legislative-executive differences already exposed, there was apprehension in the 
SFRC, especially about the viability of verification and noncircumvention provisions of 
the treaty.  As a consequence, the SFRC failed to garner unanimous support for the 
passage of the treaty to the U.S. Senate. However, by a narrow margin of 9 to 6, the 
SFRC finally approved the treaty and sent it to the U.S. Senate for its consideration, 
subject to 20 reservations, understandings, and declarations.
334
 The SFRC also made it 
clear that in the light of the reservations already placed, the treaty would not qualify for 
any unilateral action by the president. Such clarifications were strongly upheld by 
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Senator Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), who was the ranking member of SFRC, and Charles Percy 
(R-IL), and later on were supported by Senator Frank Church (D-ID), who was the 
chairman of the SFRC.
335
 This shows that there was bipartisan consensus among the 
Senate Democrats and Republicans on many of the concerns that the SFRC had 
identified. In response, Secretary of State Cyrus R. Vance assured the committee that the 
“President already has stated that the Protocol will not be extended without coming back 
to the Senate for consultation with the Senate.”336 More specifically, the following lines 
will narrate a couple of specimens showing credible apprehensions by some members of 
the SFRC on the contentious issues of verification and noncircumvention: 
i) Noncircumvention provision (Article XII of the treaty): Several witnesses of the 
hearings and some prominent members of the SFRC were left unpersuaded that the 
administration had made a compelling case concerning noncircumvention provision. The 
committee on a bipartisan basis, including prominent members from both sides of the 
aisle such as Senators Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), Paul Sarbanes 
(D-MD) and Richard Stone (D-FL) felt that the administration needed to do more on the 
crucial issue in order to reassure the allies about the efficacy of Article XII and to 
strengthen the position of the United States in this regard.
337
 These senators made their 
concern very clear to the secretary of state, the secretary of defense, and the chairman of 
the Joint Chiefs of Staff.   
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ii) Verification provision (Article XV of the treaty): While expressing the 
committee’s extreme concern about the highly sensitive verification provision, Senator 
Paul Sarbanes (D-MD) grilled Secretary of Defense Harold Brown while assessing the 
effectiveness of the provision.
338
 Yet another contentious area generating political 
controversy in the SFRC was the issue of a potential strategic military imbalance arising 
out of SALT II. The committee on a bipartisan basis expressed deep concern about the 
momentum in the Soviet missile development program, even within the limits of SALT 
II. The committee perceived that the U.S.S.R. would substantially improve and be 
potentially in an advantageous position in relative capability of missile development 
against the U.S. forces well into the 1980s.
339
 Prominent members of the committee, 
including Senators Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), John Glenn (D-OH), George McGovern (D-
S.D.) and Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), and former Secretary of State Henry Kissinger 
expressed heightened apprehension about the implications of SALT II on U.S. ICBM 
vulnerability. At one time, Secretary of Defense Harold Brown also agreed to the 
perceived concern of the bipartisan group of Senators when he said, “This [vulnerability 
of U.S. ICBM] is the most serious problem we face, probably in terms of threats to our 
strategic forces and certainly in terms of perceptions of equivalence.”340 All such 
bipartisan concerns from the SFRC provided strong obstacles to the administration in 
creating adequate support for SALT II in its ratification process. The administration 
seemed to be weak in convincing Congress on the credibility factor of SALT II, despite 
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the presence of unified government. As a consequence, political fault lines between 
Capitol Hill and the White House continued to grow deeper, thereby significantly 
reducing the possibility of successful treaty ratification. Likewise, all other provisions 
were examined by the SFRC, which ultimately imposed 20 binding reservations on 
SALT II.  
In the Senate Armed Services Committee during hearing procedures, senators on 
a bipartisan basis expressed concerns about the implications of SALT II on the U.S.-
U.S.S.R. balance of power. Even though the secretaries of state and defense, along with 
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, presented the case for SALT II, they were 
subjected to substantial bipartisan scrutiny, particularly from Senators Henry Jackson (D-
Wash.), Sam Nunn (D-GA), James Exon (D-NE), John Tower (R-TX), and John Warner 
(R-VA).
341
 Senators Jackson and Tower, irrespective of party lines, were very critical on 
the verification and monitoring provisions of the Soviet MX and SS-19 missile systems 
and the backfire bomber issue.
342
 In an exchange with Secretary of Defense Harold 
Brown, Senator Tower openly stated, “Mr. Secretary [Harold Brown], the ratification 
process in the Senate is not simple. Many Senators have concerns about the treaty, and 
several have established conditions for their support of the treaty.”343 Senator Sam Nunn 
(D-GA), a highly respected senator in the Democratic Party, expressed deep concerns 
about the credibility and efficacy of the theater nuclear force (TNF) modernization issue 
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with the European allies because of SALT II. He even expressed his reluctance to vote in 
favor of SALT II approval because of such serious concerns. Senator Nunn’s 
dissatisfaction was clearly reflected in his following exchange with the Secretary of 
Defense:  
I see a very dangerous situation here because the ante is going up; TNF 
(theater nuclear force) has now been put in the SALT II pot by our 
administration and some of the Europeans. I think the Europeans are now 
backing out of that. I think they see the danger and I hope that before it 
goes too far this administration would re-examine its own position on that. 
I may end up voting for SALT II, I may not, but it won’t be on the basis 
one way or the other of some [deleted] parliament…..I think we still have 
a dilemma. I certainly will not use that [voting for SALT II] until we 
resolve that question [TNF modernization]……344 
 
Apart from concern on TNF modernization issue, Senator Nunn, a highly respected 
military expert by himself in the Democratic Party, also expressed serious reservations 
about President Carter’s defense budget proposals. He even said, “I'm tying my vote on 
SALT to what we do in defense [spending over the next few years] and to presidential 
leadership on national defense.” 345Such remarks from a pivotal player in the U.S. Senate 
provide a great deal of insight about the ongoing dilemma among the senators across 
party affiliations on various controversial issues of SALT II during the high-profile 
Senate committee hearings. Most of the senators on a bipartisan basis perceived that the 
United States would be less powerful compared to the Soviet Union if SALT II were 
ratified. The Senate was unanimous in its opposition to the president on the treaty. 
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 The Senate Intelligence Committee, along with the Foreign Services and the 
Armed Services Committees, actively participated in examining the provisions of SALT 
II. Here, Senator John Glenn (D-OH) was particularly apprehensive about the treaty’s 
verification provisions. His reluctance along with that of other intelligence committee 
members to endorse the agreement proved to be a serious obstacle to the administration 
in the treaty ratification process. Glenn and others wanted to ensure that the proposed 
treaty deal met the required benchmark as far as monitoring and verification issues were 
concerned.
346
 
The hearing procedures and discussions in powerful Senate committees provided 
compelling evidence that there was significant bipartisan concern in the U.S. Senate 
about the credibility and efficacy of SALT II on U.S. national security. It simultaneously 
exposed the high degree of dissension between Capitol Hill and the White House on this 
strategic foreign policy issue. Influential members of the Senate Democratic Caucus such 
as Senators Henry Jackson (D-WA), George McGovern (D-S.D.), Frank Church (D-ID), 
Sam Nunn (D-GA), Mark Hatfield (R-OR), William Proxmire (D-WI), John Glenn (D-
OH), and Paul Sarbanes (D-MD), along with their Republican counterparts in the U.S. 
Senate such as Senators Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), John Tower (R-
TX), Jake Garn (R-UT), and John Warner (R-VA) expressed their serious concerns over 
SALT II, especially with regard to the efficacy of its provisions on arms control and 
consequent balance of power between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. These pivotal senators 
made it clear to the president that they would “reserve the right to vote against any 
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proposal [SALT II] that does not fundamentally curb the arms race.”347 Even the Senate 
Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.) and the Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker 
(R-TN) were not sure about their voting prospects. Thus, there was a bipartisan 
consensus in the U.S. Senate expressing reservations on SALT II even as early as June 
1979. Such senatorial opposition was only to intensify in due course of time during the 
ratification process. Controversy about the long-term ramifications of the treaty in 
Congress significantly diminished President Carter’s political capital and power to 
persuade. As an urgent damage control measure, the president made a failed bid to 
convince the congressional lawmakers about the strengths of the treaty by this message to 
the joint session of Congress: 
The SALT II Treaty reduces the danger of nuclear war. For the first time, 
it places equal ceilings on the strategic arsenals on both sides, ending a 
previous numerical imbalance in favor of the Soviet Union. SALT II 
preserves our options to build our forces we need to maintain that strategic 
balance. The treaty enhances our own ability to monitor what the Soviet 
Union is doing. And it leads directly to the next step in more effectively 
controlling nuclear weapons……The MX missile which has been so 
highly publicized is permitted under SALT II; yet its verifiable mobile 
development system will enhance stability as it deprives an attacker of the 
confidence that a successful first strike could be launched against the 
United States ICBM’s…….348 
 
There were sharp reactions to the president’s message from the U.S. Senate. Senator 
Howard H. Baker Jr. (R-TN), the Minority Leader in the Senate, claimed that SALT II 
“has no chance of being passed without amendment.” Other senators on a bipartisan basis 
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echoed their intentions to make alterations in the proposed treaty.
349
 Senator George 
McGovern (D-S.D.), a senior member of the Democratic Party, expressed deep concern 
at the administration’s controversial decision to develop a new MX super-missile and to 
push for SALT II at the same time. McGovern expressed fear that President Carter would 
“destroy hopes for real arms reductions” in the future by building big new weapons 
now.
350
 Such divergent political dynamics between the Senate and the president reflected 
the fact that bipartisan consensus among congressional lawmakers was profound and 
stable. The continuum of intrabranch consensus in Congress and interbranch dissension 
was solid, thereby further reducing the political space for any compromise. The inability 
of the administration to steer clear of the dark clouds of congressional resistance was 
further worsened by the strong voice of opposition from the Republican presidential 
candidate Ronald Reagan, who asserted that “the stalled SALT II Treaty is fatally flawed 
because it gives undue benefits to the Soviets and legitimizes, instead of reduces, nuclear 
weapons.”351 Such powerful rhetoric from Reagan diminished the prospects in favor of 
the treaty. The administration started showing weakness in front of strong congressional 
pressure. Even the Washington Post once commented, “Key members of the Carter 
administration acknowledge privately that they have lost the momentum.”352 For the 
administration, there was no respite in sight.  
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In addition to the strong congressional resistance, a crucial international event in 
the form of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan on December 27, 1979 came as a massive 
blow to topple the SALT II ratification process. Global geopolitics associated with such a 
Soviet move hardened the conservative baseline in Congress.
353
 Moreover, news of 
Soviet troop buildup in nearby Cuba, the Soviet Union’s unabated stockpiling of 
armaments, and the Iranian hostage crisis further complicated the situation beyond repair 
and ultimately sealed the fate of the treaty.
354
 In the end, President Carter was forced to 
withdraw the treaty from the consideration of the U.S. Senate.
355
 
The overall analysis in the ratification process of SALT II makes it evident that 
the presence of unified government is not a sufficient condition for consensus between 
Congress and the president. In this case, the continuum of legislative-executive consensus 
and dissension was uniquely embedded in the congressional (dis)approval process. As a 
mark of departure from the normal tenets of unified government, during the ratification 
process of SALT II, moderate and conservative members of the U.S. Senate aligned to 
form a powerful coalition against the executive branch in order to alter the deal.
356
 There 
was definitive yet unconventional ideological intersection between moderate Democrats 
and conservative Republicans in the Senate, which was formidable enough to garner 
bipartisan consensus to block the treaty. In fact it further intensified in the wake of the 
precipitating international event of sudden Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. The effect of 
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resultant bipartisan consensus in the U.S. Senate was strong enough to create 
congressional-presidential dissension and reverse the prospects of ratification for SALT 
II. Because of the unique nature of the continuum of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension in the decision-making process culminated by extra-ordinary international 
events in the end there was legislative-executive dissension. Therefore, the hypothesis 
stating that unified government facilitates consensus and vice versa does not hold true for 
the ratification process of SALT II. Unwillingness between the Democratic-controlled 
Capitol Hill and the Carter White House to seek common ground resulted in the demise 
of the treaty to a considerable extent, apart from the escalatory international events which 
further complicated the contentious domestic politics. The unique outcome of legislative-
executive relations in the case of SALT II is a constant reminder of the inherent 
complexities of the treaty consent process in U.S. politics.   
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the treaty process. The ideological and partisan composition of the United 
States Senate posed unique challenges to the Carter Administration during the SALT II 
debate. In the 1978 midterm elections, 20 new senators were elected – 11 Republicans 
and 9 Democrats.
357
 The liberal-conservative continuum of these senators was significant 
in determining the fate of the treaty. This diverse group of senators reflected a conflict as 
well as rare intersection of ideological dimensions during the SALT II debate. A mixed 
bag of pro-treaty liberal antiwar sentiments and anti-treaty conservative pro-military 
orientation was discernible in the Senate. Constant conflict and intersection of ideological 
preferences reflected consensus-dissension continuum that eventually helped to 
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strengthen the conservative cause because of evolving international events such as Soviet 
brigade build-up in Cuba, Iranian hostage crisis, and Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. As a 
consequence toward the end of the 1970s the Senate as an institution changed from being 
the most dovish to the most hawkish political body. This shift in ideological preference in 
the Senate had major implications on the SALT II consent process.
358
 The formation of a 
liberal-conservative continuum across partisan fault lines at different stages of the treaty 
debate was a representation of diverse preferences in the Senate. The resultant dynamics 
experienced complications in the treaty consent process, especially when the Senate was 
divided among strong liberal supporters of the treaty, a mixed-bag of irreconcilable 
opponents, liberal critics, and an undecided block leaning toward opposing the treaty 
comprising conservative Republicans and liberal Democrats.
359
 Some of the strong liberal 
supporters were Senators Alan Cranston (D-CA), John Culver (D-IA), Gary Hart (D-CO), 
and Joseph Biden (D-DE).
360
 Prominent among the so-called mixed-bag of irreconcilable 
opponents were Senators Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Jacob Javits (R-N.Y.), John Tower (R-
TX), Jake Garn (R-UT), Henry Jackson (D-WA) and John Warner (R-VA). Influential 
among liberal critics were Senators George McGovern (D-S.D.), Frank Church (D-ID) 
and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, William Proxmire (D-WI), 
John Glenn (D-OH), and Paul Sarbanes (D-MD).
361
 The undecided block was 
strategically significant in the decision-making process.  Prominent among the undecided 
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regardless of party affiliation were Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.), 
Senate Minority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), John Stennis (D-MS) and Chairman of 
the Senate Armed Services Committee, Richard Stone (D-FL), Russell Long (D- LA), 
and S.I. Hayakawa (R-CA).
362
 Throughout the entire decision-making process these 
diverse factions in the Senate were driven by ideological preferences that essentially 
portrayed a continuum of consensus and dissension at various stages of political process 
and eventual clustering into a broad-based anti-SALT II block. As a consequence two 
different sets of political dynamic were evident. On one hand there was an ideological 
dissension between the U.S. Senate and Carter White House with the Senate not in favor 
of SALT II approval despite Carter’s repeated appeal for treaty approval. On the other 
hand there was broad-based ideological consensus (intersection) inside the Senate for 
rejection of the SALT II treaty. From the above analysis conclusions can be drawn that 
the given hypothesis is true at the legislative-executive level while the hypothesis is 
rejected at the intra-Senate level political process.  
Hypothesis 3: Intraparty cleavage causes dissension in treaty process. During 
the SALT II debate, intraparty cleavage inside the Democrat-controlled Congress was a 
determining factor for the failure of the treaty to get Senate consent. From the outset, the 
Democratic Party was a divided camp on substantive issues concerning the long-term 
implications of the treaty. Inside the Democratic Party, prominent senators who opposed 
the treaty were Henry M. Jackson (D-WA), George McGovern (D-S.D.), Mark Hatfield 
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(R-OR), and William Proxmire (D-WI).
363
 The growing intraparty dissension in the 
Democratic Party gained momentum when Senate Majority Leader Robert Byrd (D-
W.V.), Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John Stennis (D-MS), and 
influential Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) largely remained undecided and also raised serious 
concerns with the national security issues of the treaty.
364
 Prominent among the 
Democratic senators who supported the treaty were John Culver (D-IA), Gary Hart (D-
CO), and Joseph R. Biden Jr. (D-DE).
365
  These different factions inside the Democratic 
Party kept it from taking a united stand on the treaty. Remarkably, intraparty squabbles 
inside the controlling party started even in the early days of the treaty ratification process. 
This was evident when Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), the majority whip, reported on 
May 3, 1979 that he had counted 20 senators solidly against ratification, 10 leaning 
against, 40 leaning heavily in favor, 10 possibly in favor, and 20 undecided.
366
 Such data 
conform to the degree of intraparty cleavage inside the Democratic Party, and that was a 
clear indication of a contentious political battle brewing in the U.S. Senate with regard to 
SALT II.  
The Carter Administration’s failure to notice such growing internal dissension 
inside the Democratic Party made the situation worse. Five weeks before the treaty was 
concluded, Senator Henry Jackson (D-WA), who was highly respected in arms control 
circles, issued a press statement in which he expressed his deep anguish by stating, “From 
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what I know of the SALT II Treaty it is substantially unequal and unverifiable. It favors 
the Soviet Union. In its present form it is not in the security interest of the United 
States.”367 Also, Democratic Senators McGovern, and Proxmire wrote to President Carter 
expressing their dissatisfaction while stating, “After considerable thought we have 
concluded that the proposed SALT II Treaty is very difficult, if not impossible, for us to 
support.”368 Senator Sam Nunn criticized a number of provisions of SALT II, including 
“the vulnerability of U.S. land-based missiles, the Soviet Backfire bomber, the 
verification of the agreement, and the effect of the protocol to the agreement.”369 The 
cumulative effect of such growing intraparty dissension inside the majority Democratic 
Party in the U.S. Senate proved to be costly for the administration during the ratification 
process.  
Intraparty cleavage among the Senate Democrats, resulted in a strong bipartisan 
consensus between the dissenting faction of the Democratic Party spearheaded by 
Senators McGovern, Proxmire, Jackson and others, and an overwhelming number of 
Senate Republicans who opposed the treaty.. In turn, the coalition of treaty dissenting 
moderate and conservative members provided a formidable challenge to the 
administration and virtually reversing the prospects of treaty ratification. Intra-
Democratic Party cleavage was largely responsible for eventual dissension between the 
U.S. Senate and Carter White House with regard to the fate of SALT II.
370
 In reality the 
political dynamic inside the Senate reflected a continuum of consensus and dissension at 
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various levels of decision making. For the most part, the administration showed weakness 
and was unable to overcome the strong bipartisan opposition in the Senate. Differential 
preference at the interbranch level further exacerbated the conflict between the 
Democratic Congress and the Democratic White House. A high degree of intraparty 
cleavage defied the normal expectations of unified government and ultimately proved to 
be a determining factor in sealing the fate of SALT II. Thus the ring of political fire 
which started to burn inside the Democratic Party [in the form of intraparty dissension] 
later engulfed the Senate political process [forming an alliance between dissenting 
Democrats and the Republicans] and ultimately took a toll on congressional-presidential 
relations [interbranch dissension] during the ratification process of SALT II. Intraparty 
cleavage among the Democrats was the driving force for a series of subsequent 
adjustments, which in turn replicated a continuum of consensus and dissension at various 
levels of legislative-executive relations during the SALT II ratification process. Based on 
such characteristics of the political process, a conclusion can be drawn that the hypothesis 
stating that “intraparty squabbles lead to conflict and failure in the treaty ratification 
process” holds true for SALT II Treaty. 
Hypothesis 4: Effects of intraparty cleavage are mitigated by a comparatively 
higher degree of bipartisanship. A tactical style to maneuver the trajectory of legislative-
executive relations is to build a strong bipartisan consensus that can ultimately mitigate 
the effects of intraparty cleavage.  During the SALT II treaty debate, there were different 
preferences between different factions inside the Democratic Party which experienced 
intraparty cleavage with regard to the efficacy of the treaty. Intraparty cleavage among 
Senate Democrats had a cascading effect on the larger political process and affected the 
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outcome of the treaty ratification debate. The dissenting faction of the majority 
Democratic Party made an alliance with an overwhelming number of Senate Republicans 
to form a bipartisan coalition in the U.S. Senate. Importantly, the bipartisan coalition so 
formed was strong and stable to constitute a supermajority in the Senate for the 
legislative purpose of blocking the SALT II treaty. As a result, the treaty-endorsing 
faction among the Senate Democrats became marginalized and politically ineffective. 
The discrete effect of intraparty cleavage attributed to the treaty-endorsing faction of 
Senate Democrats was completely mitigated or offset by the formation of a strong 
bipartisan consensus between the treaty-dissenting faction of Senate Democrats and the 
Senate Republicans who opposed SALT II overwhelmingly.  This higher degree of 
bipartisanship, constituting a supermajority of congressional opposition, was ultimately 
critical in sealing the fate of the treaty. In the end, President Carter was compelled to 
withdraw the treaty from the Senate’s consideration because of such acute domestic 
political obstacles and emerging international crises.  
The bipartisan supermajority coalition, despite the presence of unified 
government, took the administration by surprise. It was made plausible by a preference 
convergence of like-minded Democrats and Republicans who opposed the treaty in a way 
that overwhelmingly mitigated the discrete effect of intraparty cleavage of those who 
endorsed the treaty among the Senate Democrats. Because the SALT II treaty process 
witnessed such political maneuvering, which ultimately determined the dynamics of 
legislative-executive relations, it can be inferred that findings support the given 
hypothesis.  
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Hypothesis 5: Greater extensive debate in Congress facilitates finding common 
ground that increases the propensity of legislative-executive consensus. Extensive 
deliberations in Congress normally have major implications on the treaty ratification 
process. Such congressional procedures, where extensive debate occurs, increase the 
potential to seek common ground and build a viable consensus. The general opinion of 
politicians is that greater time devoted for congressional deliberations and hearings helps 
detailed analysis of the legislation from all vantage points, which in turn enhances the 
probability of a successful outcome of the treaty ratification process.
371
 In the case of 
SALT II, extensive hearings in the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senate Armed 
Services Committee, and the Senate Intelligence Committee provided significant 
opportunities for the proponents and opponents to discuss in detail the potential 
implications of the treaty. Such deliberations helped in building a viable bipartisan 
consensus in Congress. The congressional hearings and deliberations were largely 
responsible for identifying various like-minded factions in the Senate for the purpose of 
making an alliance to block the SALT II treaty. A majority of the senators from both 
sides of the aisle unanimously expressed their concerns about the provisions of the treaty 
directly related to national security and strategic defense.  As a result, the political 
propensity to reject the treaty gained momentum in Congress. The extensiveness of the 
Senate hearing procedures and subsequent deliberations reflected the contentious nature 
of the political dynamic that was going on between the supporters and opponents of 
SALT II. However, such deliberations provided viable political space for a strong 
bipartisan consensus between Senate Democrats and Republicans who opposed the 
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treaty. Even when the Carter Administration was compelled to finally withdraw the treaty 
from the Senate’s consideration, the supermajority bipartisan coalition was a potentially 
critical factor determining the ultimate fate of SALT II. Throughout the political process, 
congressional hearings and deliberations were important procedural components in 
reflecting a trajectory of consensus and dissension at the intraparty and bipartisan levels. 
In effect, the supermajority coalition opposing the treaty, comprising a faction of Senate 
Democrats and an overwhelming number of the Republicans, was the outcome of 
congressional hearings and discussions.  
It is evident that extensive nature of congressional debate helped to forge and 
strengthen a rare bipartisan consensus against treaty approval in the Senate.  While doing 
so it also simultaneously exacerbated legislative-executive dissension that eventually 
sealed the fate of SALT II. Throughout the debate proceedings reflections of continuum 
of consensus and dissension were discernible. However, from the standpoint of 
legislative-executive relations extensive debate in Congress proved to be detrimental. 
Therefore, conclusions can be drawn that for SALT II case study extensive debate in 
Congress did not facilitate forging legislative-executive consensus. The hypothesis 
cannot be accepted.  
Hypothesis 6: High media salience and coverage increase the propensity of 
legislative-executive consensus. High media salience generates heightened public 
awareness and shapes public opinion. The magnitude of media coverage, especially in 
high-circulation newspapers like the Washington Post, New York Times, television 
channels, Cable News Network, domestic and international journals, etc. brings proposed 
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treaty legislation into the limelight for politicians as well as for the general public. Such 
increased exposure increases the propensity of reaching legislative-executive consensus.  
In the case of the SALT II treaty, there was heavy publicity about the issue 
because of its strategic significance with regard to national security. The magnitude of 
media coverage and publicity in the New York Times for the SALT II treaty is evident 
from the statistics: (1) Total number of times SALT II was mentioned in any document 
type - 1164 ; (2) Total number of front-page stories - 75; and (3) Total number of 
editorial articles – 150.372 High media attention for the SALT II treaty, in conjunction 
with increased constituency pressure, was greatly responsible for the dynamics of 
intraparty dissension and subsequent bipartisan consensus in Congress in opposition to 
the treaty. Members of Congress strategically used media and news conferences against 
the weak media strategy of the Carter Administration. Until the middle of August 1979, 
the administration was fairly confident of getting congressional approval on SALT II. But 
circumstances changed rapidly thereafter. Media played a prominent role here. On 
August 22, 1979, the National Foreign Assessment Center of the CIA issued an 
intelligence finding about the presence of a Soviet combat brigade in Cuba.
373
 Senator 
Frank Church (D-ID), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC), 
expressed his deep concern with the latest development and wanted the Soviet brigade 
information to be made public. This was the turning point of heightened media activity. 
With a view to using media power strategically, Senator Church called a press conference 
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and informed the public about the brigade episode. This event was reported by all major 
newspapers and television network channels.
374
 This event was followed by a flurry of 
press conferences by senators and administration officials. Members of Congress on both 
sides of the aisle also started linking SALT II Treaty prospects to the Soviet combat 
brigade event. SFRC Chairman Senator Church commented, “There is no likelihood 
whatever that the Senate would approve SALT II as long as Soviet combat troops remain 
in Cuba.”375 The New York Times reported the ranking Republican in the SFRC Senator 
Jacob K. Javits (R-N.Y.) as saying, “The issue of the Soviet troops could have a very 
profound effect whether the treaty [SALT II] could be ratified or not.”376 Other prominent 
senators regardless of party affiliation – Senator Richard Stone (D-FL), Senate Minority 
Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), Senator Russell Long (D-LA), and Senator S.I. Hayakawa 
(R-CA) – used media to express deep concerns on the treaty and linking its prospects to 
the Soviet threat.
377
 Media coverage further intensified as the SALT II debate became 
increasingly heated in the course of time. The New York Times reported a total of 445 
articles just from May 1979 to December 1979.
378 The fallout of heightened media 
attention over the Soviet combat brigade significantly influenced the SALT II treaty 
ratification debate. It led to important senators like Russell Long (D-LA) changing his 
position from a proponent to an opponent of the treaty. The furor resulting from media 
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coverage also reversed the prospects of treaty ratification. Media attention was also 
prominent during the Iranian hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 
December 1979.
379
 All of these international events and accompanying high-intensity 
media exposure widened the treaty policy distance between the Senate members and the 
Carter administration. The heightened media coverage had a negative effect that 
increased the propensity of legislative-executive dissension. Therefore, evidence did not 
support the prediction of the media hypothesis for the SALT II treaty consent process.   
Hypothesis 7: Electoral imperatives imperatives on pivotal opposition players in 
the Senate to get reelected in the ensuing elections by incurring favorable public 
opinion increase the propensity of legislative-executive dissension. Domestic political 
exigencies in different congressional constituencies influenced the electoral prospects of 
some key senators during the SALT II ratification debate. Senator Richard Stone (D-FL), 
a key member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was up for reelection and 
needed to strengthen support from conservatives in his own constituency in Florida. He 
was among the first to raise concerns about the Soviet brigade episode and eventually 
expressed his opposition to the treaty. Likewise Senator Frank Church (D-ID), Chairman 
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, was also running for reelection in a 
traditionally conservative state. He also raised serious concerns about the Soviet brigade 
and directly linked that event to SALT II treaty ratification prospects. Cuba and Soviet 
brigade fiasco were sensitive issues to Senator Church’s constituency in Idaho, a state 
that was turning even more conservative.
380
 With a “growing power of the New Right” 
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sweeping across the country and especially in Idaho, Church became the “target of a 
vicious campaign to prevent his reelection.”381 In 1980 Church was running for his fifth 
term as US Senator. Although Church was a long-time incumbent running for office the 
last years of his fourth term proved to be rocky.  His crusade to get congressional consent 
for the Panama Canal treaties three years ago was considered as a “giveaway” of the 
“American” canal in a conservative and traditionally Republican Idaho as Church was 
seeking reelection for the fifth term.  As a matter of fact “conservative GOP challenger 
Steven Symms and a presumably independent ABC (Anybody But Church) Committee” 
based in the Idaho state capital Boise made “every effort to paint the Democratic 
incumbent as a big-government man associated with most federal programs coming out 
of Washington.” The GOP criticized Church’s every political move from “the economy 
to foreign policy” and viewed them to be “counter to those of his constituents.” The 
situation was so dire that Church was just two points ahead of his opponent in a late 
September Idaho Statesman poll.
382
 Ultimately four-time Senate incumbent Senator 
Frank Church lost in his reelection. Democratic senators like Senator Church were under 
electoral pressure from their respective constituencies to carefully examine the provisions 
of the treaty. Electoral concerns of senators were greatly influenced by public opinion. 
Public opinion surveys conducted by NBC/Associated Press in September 1979 about the 
implications of SALT II on national security influenced senators’ policy preferences. The 
question was asked to 54% of the respondents who had heard or read about SALT II 
(presumably because of high publicity in the media). Public opinion was divided. While 
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38% of the respondents thought that the treaty would strengthen national security, 43% 
thought it would weaken national security and 19% were not sure.
383
 On the question of 
whether the Soviet Union could be trusted as a credible partner with regard to SALT II 
obligations, the September 1979 the NBC/Associated Press survey found that a majority 
comprising 71% of respondents thought that the Soviet Union could not be trusted. 
According to the Gallup poll, there was a consistent pattern of negative shift of public 
opinion with regard to ratification of the SALT II treaty from March to October 1979. 
The Gallup survey, conducted between September 28, 1979 and October 01, 1979 and 
after the presence of Soviet troops in Cuba, reported by the media showed that among the 
“aware group” of the United States public, 24% favored ratification, 26% were opposed, 
and 11% were uncommitted.
384
 Importantly, these figures represented a proportional 
decline in public support since March 1979. In March the ratio in favor of ratification was 
3 to 1; by June it slipped to 5 to 3; and by the end of September, the number in favor fell 
below the number of those who opposed.
385
 Other polls also showed a downward trend in 
public opinion with regard to SALT II. The Harris/ABC survey showed that in May 
1977, public support was about 10 to 1; it slipped to about 6 to 1 in May 1978 and further 
fell to 4 to 1 in May 1979.
386
 The Roper poll showed much lower public support for 
SALT II than the NBC/Associated Press poll or the Harris/ABC survey, but it was 
somewhat comparable to Gallup survey figures. In the Roper poll, public opinion in favor 
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of SALT II declined from 2 to 1 in early 1979 to a roughly even split by mid-1979 to a 
majority opposing the ratification by the end of 1979.
387
 Even President Carter’s pollster, 
Patrick Caddell, found remarkable decline in public opinion in favor of SALT II. Caddell 
urged the administration to take steps to dispel the public’s concern with issues like 
defense and foreign affairs.
388
 All of these public opinion surveys reflected a trend of 
decline in public support for SALT II over time, despite some intermittent fluctuations. 
Members of Congress and the administration, though at times confused, were constantly 
struggling to assess the situation. The overall trend of declining public opinion across the 
country prior to the Senate decision proved to be challenging for Senate Democrats like 
Church who were facing tough reelection battle. On the other hand such declining public 
opinion emboldened the opposition GOP senators and campaign challengers to block 
SALT II.  Therefore, we find that difficult electoral imperatives and declining trend of 
public opinion led to a situation where many moderate Democrats and conservative 
Republicans in the Senate came together to challenge the Carter administration’s position 
on the treaty. Such political dynamic increased the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension.  Conclusions can, therefore, be drawn here that evidence basically supports 
the given hypothesis in the case of the SALT II treaty.  
Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
               Background: The Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was signed 
by U.S. President Ronald Reagan and Soviet Union Communist Party General Secretary 
Mikhail Gorbachev on December 8, 1987 in Washington D.C. This Treaty was a 
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“significant milestone in arms control because it established an intrusive verification 
regime and because it eliminated entire classes of weapons that both sides regarded as 
modern and effective.”389 According to the provisions of the Treaty the United States and 
Soviet Union “agreed to destroy all intermediate-range and shorter-range nuclear-armed 
ballistic missiles and ground-launched cruise missiles.”390  The Treaty would ban all 
ground-launched missiles with ranges of 300-3,300 miles. It would also require that more 
than 800 U.S. missiles and twice that number of Soviet weapons be scrapped.
391
 The 
object and purpose of the INF Treaty was to eliminate all of the intermediate-range and 
shorter-range missiles by the United States and Soviet Union along with launchers and 
support facilities for those missiles over a period of three years.
392
  
The United States Senate began hearings of INF Treaty on January 25, 1988 
amidst expectations of a bipartisan support and early approval. However, while 
sentiments in the Senate was largely favorable toward the efficacy of the Treaty some 
members voiced concern about its long term implications on the U.S.-U.S.S.R. strategic 
military balance, U.S.-NATO political and military cooperation, and future role of 
nuclear weapons on the western alliances.
393
 Importantly the INF was the first arms 
control Treaty to be ratified by Congress since 1972 when the Anti-Ballistic Missile 
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(ABM) Treaty was ratified.
394
 While these concerns loom large in the Senate hearing and 
debate proceedings there were other following complications which need attention too: 
(1) President Reagan’s long-standing skepticism about Soviet motives in arms control 
and other arenas; (2) Public apprehensions in the western world that arms control treaties 
were the best means of achieving elimination of the nuclear weapons; (3) A significant 
proportion of general public did not trust the Soviet Union’s arms control commitments; 
and (4) The executive branch’s testimony was not adequate for the Senate to be 
completely satisfied with all conditionality for the approval of the Treaty.
395
 In the end 
INF Treaty was approved by the Senate on May 27, 1988 after four months of hearings 
and deliberations. The Treaty entered into force on June 1, 1988.
396
 Strategically the 
timing of Senate approval was significant because it was just 2 days prior to Moscow 
visit by President Reagan to hold a summit meeting with Soviet Leader Gorbachev.  
              Hypothesis 1: Unified government facilitates consensus-building in the treaty 
making process, while divided government does not. The Senate gave its consent to the 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty on May 27, 1988 by a resounding 93-5 
vote under the political arrangement of divided government.
397
 During the 100
th
 Congress 
(1987-88), U.S. Congress (inclusive of the House of Representatives and the Senate) was 
controlled by Democrats while the White House was controlled by a Republican 
president. In such a political set up the relatively unanimous approval by Congress of a 
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major arms control treaty like INF was itself regarded an outstanding political event in 
the annals of congressional-presidential relations especially in an era of divided 
government. This landmark Treaty was also regarded as the most significant arms control 
achievement of the Reagan administration, especially after the shocking Iran-Contra 
affairs.
398
 The ratification of INF Treaty was politically significant because of its setting 
up precedence to the overall dynamics of legislative-executive relations in which 
consensus ultimately prevailed over dissension resulting in congressional approval of a 
highly sensitive Treaty having strategic ramifications on national security.  
The INF Treaty hearings started on January 25, 1988 as the Senate Foreign 
Relations, Armed Services and Intelligence Committees began their review almost 
simultaneously. Although there was a lot of political infighting during the four month 
period of Senate consideration of the INF, there had never been real doubt that the Senate 
would ultimately give its consent to the Treaty.
399
 In a way INF Treaty enjoyed sufficient 
amount of goodwill on both sides of the aisle and that was quite remarkable in a divided 
government set up where the probability of legislative-executive dissension is generally 
higher. Nonetheless, there were reservations in the mind of influential senators across the 
political spectrum regarding various provisions of the Treaty when it came for hearing at 
the three powerful Senate committees. In fact the “content of the INF Treaty was a 
microcosm of the way in which fundamental disagreements over arms control 
philosophies were worked out among individuals surrounding Reagan, only to resurface 
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during the ratification debate.”400As a result the Treaty was most likely to witness heated 
debate during the Senate proceedings which in turn would influence the political process 
across the Pennsylvania Avenue. 
Perhaps the most formidable challenge that the INF Treaty initially faced in 
Congress was from Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee and one of Washington’s most influential defense specialists. Nunn had been 
very critical of the administration’s intention to use the fine print of 1972 ABM Treaty to 
reinterpret other arms control treaties inclusive of INF Treaty. In fact, Nunn had warned 
the administration to abandon the rhetoric of reinterpretation. Nunn had repeatedly 
conveyed to the Reagan administration for months that “he might hold the INF hostage to 
make his point on ABM.”401 Such a warning from a pivotal institutional player was 
supposed to come up as a document clause later in the INF ratification process. President 
Reagan expressed his concern on this matter in his diary where he wrote, “A clause 
bearing on futuristic weapons is being used to block ratification.”402 At the same time 
North Carolina Republican Senator Jesse Helms, who was also ranking member of the 
powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, virtually “launched a broad-based assault 
on the [INF] Treaty.”403 It was evident that a number of senators from both sides of the 
aisle were willing to challenge the efficacy of various provisions of the Treaty which 
were vital to the prospects of national security. Despite such reservations and possibilities 
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of heated debate, behind the closed doors, “senators waged a more subtle battle over how 
– and whether – to use the INF debate to influence future defense and arms control 
policies, without going overboard and seeming to jeopardize the Treaty.”404 Empirical 
observations revealed the delicate balancing that the legislative and executive branches 
were gearing for during the future course of congressional ratification debate.   
To facilitate Senate hearings with transparency the Reagan administration 
prepared a compelling line up of top administration officials to make a strong pitch in 
favor of INF Treaty. Secretary of State George P. Shultz would head off to the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee on January 25, 1988. The same day Secretary of Defense 
Frank C. Carlucci would inaugurate the hearings at the Senate Armed Services 
Committee. As part of initiating three pronged pressure on Congress, President Reagan 
pressed for speedy approval of the Treaty at the State of the Union Address on the same 
evening. Clearly mentioning the Treaty the president said, “Our recently signed INF 
treaty is historic, because it reduces nuclear arms and establishes the most stringent 
verification regime in arms control history, including several forms of short-notice, on-
site inspection…..I urge the Senate to give its advice and consent to ratification of this 
landmark agreement [Applause].”405  
The Senate Intelligence Committee hearings began on January 28, 1988.
406
 
During the hearing proceedings the administration’s official strategy would be to apprise 
the committee members that the Treaty was structurally sound and stood on its own 
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merits and, therefore, needed to be approved by the Senate without any strings attached. 
That approach was “endorsed during the hearings by a bipartisan group of liberals and 
centrists including Alan Cranston (D-CA); Paul S. Sarbanes (D-MD); Richard G. Lugar 
(R-IN); and Nancy Landon Kassebaum (R-KS).”407 Thus it was evident that there was a 
favorable wind of bipartisanship consensus already blowing during the congressional 
consent process of the INF Treaty. The Senate and the administration officials took a 
conciliatory tone to the Treaty in general during the ratification debate and in turn 
explicitly indicated a sense of seeking common grounds. Most observers saw the Treaty 
getting the requisite two-thirds majority vote in the final analysis.  
In the run up to the hearings at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee (SFRC) 
hardline conservatives were primarily concerned with the standards for verifying Soviet 
compliance with the requisite provisions of the Treaty.
408
 One of their apprehensions was 
that in case the Soviets resorted to cheating and did not comply with the standards set for 
verification and testing other long-range strategic weapons, then that would be dangerous 
from national security perspective.
409
 Conservative hard-liner Republican senator from 
North Carolina and SFRC ranking member Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) challenged the Treaty’s 
verification provision. He questioned with his customary national security concern that 
the INF Treaty would ultimately leave the Soviets relatively more powerful even with 
compliance if they resorted to cheating by concealing hundreds of missiles that are liable 
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to be eliminated under the strict provisions of the Treaty.
410
 In similar lines reflecting the 
traditional conservative apprehensions that the verification rules would be less stringent 
in case the Soviets violate the provisions and cheat, Senator Dan Quayle (R-IN) proposed 
“Senate resolution would declare that the INF verification agreement will not be accepted 
as a precedent for verifying a strategic-weapons deal.” According to Quayle “This is the 
minimum that can be expected from Senate conservatives, but it may also be the 
maximum they can hope for” since any more intrusive specific verification method could 
bring direct confrontation and political gridlock with the administration.
411
 Thus it was 
relatively explicit that the conservative Republicans, even though they were apprehensive 
about the compliance by the Soviets of the crucial provision related to verification of 
strategic weapons, they were not quite willing to cross the line and create a perpetual 
political stalemate with the Reagan administration. The administration took necessary 
action to cooperate with the Senate to diffuse the interbranch tension. In a letter the 
Secretary of State George Shultz wrote to the senators about the eagerness of the 
administration to work with the Senate to examine the Treaty from all angles.
412
 For that 
purpose the administration “appointed former Senator John Tower (R-TX), who had 
served his last term as chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee, to help guide 
the Treaty through the ratification process…..and to allay the fears of conservatives about 
the verifiability of the INF Treaty and to prevent any crippling amendments or 
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reservations that could force renegotiation of the treaty’s terms.”413  In the end even 
though the ranking member Republican Senator Jesse Helms wanted to bring in some 
amendments to the proposed document to make it more usable in the context of 
verification and compliance, such initiatives were rejected by voice vote by other 
members of the SFRC. Thus it was quite evident that the Senate committees, perhaps the 
Senate in totality, did not want to create any deliberate obstruction in the ratification 
process of INF Treaty. There was a distinct air of bipartisan consensus despite patches of 
internal dissension amongst the conservatives in the Republican Party during the Treaty 
consent process in the Senate.
414
    
In the Senate Armed Services Committee, Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA) who was 
one of the most respectable defense experts in the Senate made it explicit that he would 
not allow the INF Treaty to proceed further without making the Reagan administration 
accountable about its attitude toward 1972 ABM Treaty.
415
 Nunn had written a letter to 
President Reagan on September 01, 1988 expressing his utmost dissatisfaction on 
administration’s propensity to overstep the boundary of the ABM Treaty 1972. This was 
the closest that Nunn would go in confronting the administration. Nunn was critical about 
the Reagan administration’s action about testing some anti-missile weapons thereby 
violating the provisions of ABM Act 1972. As a result he wanted to link INF Treaty 
ratification to the administration’s inclination to stretch ABM Treaty too far and its 
reinterpretation. Although such a measure by an influential senator might be regarded as 
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confrontational, it was not destined to be a perpetual problem to permanently block the 
ratification of INF Treaty. 
On a conciliatory note the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) 
provided a favorable report about the INF Treaty monitoring and verification capabilities. 
In its report to the United States Senate, some of the findings and conclusion of the SSCI 
were as follows: 
The Committee notes that by a combination of National Technical Means 
and on-site inspection, the intelligence community will be able to monitor 
the drawdown and elimination of declared Soviet missiles launchers and 
associated equipment with great certainty….The specific requirements 
imposed by the Treaty, including the bans on production, flight testing and 
storage, will limit the ability of the Soviets to maintain non-deployed 
missiles in a high state of readiness.416  
 
This favorable report from SSCI and later submitted to the SFRC proved to be important 
in quelling the apprehensions of the hardline conservative senators about the 
effectiveness of the verification and monitoring provisions in the INF Treaty. By and 
large, the Foreign Relations panel was satisfied with the findings of SSCI report and that 
was a significant step forward in the ratification process. In fact, the general perception 
was that the landmark INF Treaty enjoyed widespread bipartisan support and was 
scheduled to be overwhelmingly approved by the SFRC.
417
 As part of the conciliatory 
move the Senate committee rejected several proposed amendments to the Treaty which 
were moved in the Foreign Relations panel by the hardline conservative opponents in 
March 1988. Jesse Helms’ proposal to exempt non-nuclear cruise missiles from the INF 
Treaty was rejected, 12 to 3, with only fellow far-right conservatives Frank H. 
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Murkowski (R-AK) and Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) voting in favor. Helms’ other proposals 
to ban short-range Soviet SCUD B missiles and flight-testing of intermediate-range 
strategic weapons were also defeated by the committee with only Helms and Pressler 
voting in favor.
418
 All of these amendments would have required the Reagan 
administration to renegotiate with the Soviet Union. As part of a bigger response to such 
demands of Helms and in an unprecedented move “the amendments were opposed not 
only by all voting Democrats and by centrist Republicans such as Richard G. Lugar (IN), 
Nancy Landon Kassebaum (KS), and Daniel J. Evans (WA), but also by mainstream 
Republicans like Rudy Boschwitz (MN), Paul S. Trible Jr. (VA), and Mitch McConnell 
(KY).
419
 The political dynamic of the Foreign Relations Committee reflected the broad 
sentiment in the Senate in favor of a bipartisan support for the INF Treaty. This proves 
that the propensity to forging bipartisan consensus was able to dispel the adverse 
consequence of internal dissension between the hardline and centrist and/or center-right 
conservatives within the Republican Party in the Foreign Relations panel of the Senate.  
The Senate hearing proceedings in various committees indicate that there was 
no intention among the members to block the INF Treaty on a permanent basis despite 
the presence of divided government. Evidence from the discussion so far shows that from 
the outset there was a general willingness on the part of majority senators from both sides 
of the aisle and the Reagan administration to work out a viable consensus, if possible, for 
treaty approval that would facilitate elimination of short and medium-range nuclear 
missiles on each side of the Atlantic. Nonetheless a few influential senators like Sam 
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Nunn (D-GA) and Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) expressed reservations and apprehensions. In 
response the administration took necessary steps to mitigate such differences. As part of 
that process the Secretary of State George Shultz wrote a letter to the dissenting senators 
about the eagerness of the administration to work with the Senate to examine the treaty 
from all angles. The administration even appointed a former senator John Tower (R-TX), 
who had previously served as chairman of the Senate Arms Services Committee, to allay 
fears of the dissenting senators on the controversial aspect of verifiability of the INF 
treaty.
420
  President Reagan’s acceptance of the “common understanding” condition on 
INF treaty interpretation as imposed by Senate Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.V.) 
and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA) reflects the 
compromising attitude from the administration to reach bipartisan consensus and get the 
treaty approved ahead of the upcoming Moscow Summit.
421
 At the same time the 
political dynamic in the Senate broadly signaled a distinct propensity toward bipartisan 
support for the treaty because of its strategic significance on national security during the 
pinnacle of Cold War era. It was evidential that the INF treaty enjoyed “strong and 
essentially unreserved support from the great preponderance of Senate Democrats and 
from a hefty number of Republicans, including such senior members of the party’s 
mainstream as Minority Whip Alan K. Simpson (R-WY), Ted Stevens (R-AK), and 
Richard G. Lugar (R-IN).”422 Therefore, it is quite evident that there were significant 
efforts among the treaty supporters from the Senate and the White House to iron out 
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differences during the treaty approval process. Such political dynamic was unprecedented 
in a divided government setting.   
However, even though when the spirit of broad bipartisanship under the 
conditions of divided government was in air there was a small caveat that needs attention 
here. While insisting that they were not trying to settle any misgivings on ABM Treaty 
1972, the 1985 experience of Reagan administration’s violating the provision of that 
treaty made Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Sam Nunn (D-GA), and 
Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.V.) skeptical. Consequently, these powerful 
senators demanded assurance from the administration that the interpretation of the INF 
Treaty as presented to the various Senate committees during hearing proceedings was 
authoritative, and thereby foreclosing any future attempt to reinterpret this pact.
423
 For 
that purpose the Senate adopted the amendment - S.AMDT.2305 – filed by Senate 
Majority Leader Byrd stating that no president could later repudiate without Senate 
approval the INF Treaty interpretations as presented by administration officials/aides 
during the Treaty hearings and ratification process.
424
 After complicated parliamentary 
maneuvering, the Senate finally adopted such an amendment to the INF ratification 
resolution by 72-27.
425
 From the standpoint of the final document the amendment as 
“crafted by several members of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, which was led 
by Senator Joseph R. Biden (D-DE), the Biden Condition stipulated that the Constitution 
required that the interpretation of a treaty should derive from the shared understanding 
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between the executive branch and the Senate of the treaty’s text at the time of 
ratification.”426 Thus the approval of the INF Treaty had a constitutional overtone 
attached to it by the Senate and legally binding the Reagan administration to interpret the 
terms of the Treaty “in accordance with the common understanding of the Treaty shared 
by the president and the Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice and consent to 
ratification.”427 The clause related to “common understanding” as included in the terms 
and conditions of the Treaty was “defined to include the text of the Treaty, the provisions 
of the resolution of ratification, and the authoritative representations provided by the 
president and his representatives to the Senate. Any interpretation that differed with the 
common understanding would require joint action by Congress and the president either 
by treaty or by statue.”428 Even though President Reagan disliked such restrictions as 
imposed and even sent a letter to the Senate expressing concern about the amendment, in 
the end he had to agree with the terms and conditions of the amendment imposed by the 
Senate as part of the INF Treaty approval. As the New York Times rightly reported, “Of 
the half dozen conditions the Senate finally adopted as part of its advice and consent to 
the treaty, the one on treaty interpretation was the most significant and by far the most 
hotly contested - and it was a domestic battle. The condition, eventually offered by Mr. 
Byrd, seeks to establish that neither President Reagan nor any future president can 
reinterpret the treaty without the Senate's approval.” 429The final version of the INF 
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Treaty Resolution explicitly mentions the common understanding clause.
430
 After taming 
the administration on prescribed terms and conditions the Senate took credible steps to 
expedite the INF Treaty approval process. In turn the Senate rejected procedural hurdles 
like other amendments filed by Senators Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) and Larry Pressler (R-
S.D.). However, prior to approving the most important arms control achievement of the 
Reagan White House, Senate Democrats claimed victory in the latest round of 
contentious power struggle with the president in the overall process of negotiation and 
interpretation of the Treaty. Nevertheless the approval of INF Treaty by a near 
unanimous margin of 93-5 was a rare showcase of significant bipartisan support in a 
divided government set up. In an unprecedented move, and perhaps because of the 
strategic significance of the Treaty, the Democratic Senate generally remained highly 
cooperative in its efforts to build viable bipartisan consensus during the congressional 
approval process. The strength of such bipartisan support and cooperation can be 
estimated by the fact that out of 5 dissent votes, 4 belonged to Republican Party - 
Senators Jesse Helms of North Carolina, Gordon J. Humphrey of New Hampshire, Steve 
Symms of Idaho and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming - and the remaining 1 belonged to 
Democratic Party - Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina - while two other 
Democratic senators – Joseph Biden of Delaware and John Glenn of Ohio – did not 
vote.
431
   
The overall analysis of congressional approval process of the INF treaty 
apprises the academic community of the consensus-dissension continuum embedded in 
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the treaty consent process. In this case the dynamics of divided government were 
distinctly observable with regard to the “common understanding” clause imposed by the 
Democrat-controlled Senate in the final text of resolution of advice and consent to 
ratification for Treaty Doc. 100-11 as part of exercising constitutional prerogatives under   
Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution. Common understanding condition was also the 
most critical issue for Senate approval. Political willingness on behalf of the Senate 
Democrats and Reagan White House to seek compromise on such a complicated issue 
was a milestone in deciding the fate of the treaty. INF treaty approval process narrates the 
complex trajectory of consensus and dissension that was embedded in the overall treaty 
consent process.  Nonetheless, political willingness and capability to seek compromise 
amidst legislative-executive dissension in a divided government setting were 
unprecedented during the decision-making process. In the end a rare bipartisan consensus 
was reached and the treaty was approved by a near unanimous majority in the Senate. 
Therefore, evidence does not support the prediction of the given hypothesis for INF 
Treaty case study.  
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the treaty process. The dynamics of congressional approval process of the 
INF treaty reflected considerable influence of ideological variance especially between 
hardline conservative wing and the moderate wing within the Republican Party. A 
handful of influential far-right conservatives spearheaded by Senator Jesse Helms (R-
N.C.) and Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) moved some amendments to block the treaty consent 
process. The ideological gap among the conservatives was constantly in play during the 
political process in the Senate. On the other hand there was a strong showcase of 
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bipartisan support for the INF Treaty. Such bipartisan consensus was able to successfully 
navigate the internal ideological conflict within the Republican Party in the form of 
rejecting some of the obstructive amendments which could have jeopardized the 
prospects of the Treaty getting approved. Even in the case of imposing the “Biden 
Condition” which constrained the president to interpret the Treaty based on shared 
understanding between the Senate and the president, some complex parliamentary 
maneuvering was dealt with on a bipartisan basis. Also the relatively speedy Senate 
approval of the INF Treaty in a divided government set up by an overwhelming 93-5 
margin reflected diminished implications of partisan fault lines in the consent process. 
The Senate Democrats and Republicans showed unanimity as far as the strategic 
significance of the INF Treaty was concerned. Also there was broad based ideological 
intersection among Senate Democrats and Republicans on INF Treaty basically because 
of the strategic significance of the nuclear deal. Conclusions can therefore be drawn that 
evidence does not support the predictions of the given hypothesis for the INF Treaty case 
study.  
Hypothesis 3: Intra-party disagreement or squabble results in dissension in the 
treaty process.  In the case of approval process of the INF Treaty there was no significant 
intra-party dissension associated for which analysis can be made. There was near 
unanimity in the support for the Treaty, perhaps because of its strategic significance on 
national security and that the Treaty was negotiated by a hawkish president. The nominal 
and politically insignificant amount of whatever intra-party cleavage was evident in the 
Republican Party particularly with regard to hardline conservative group pioneered by 
Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Larry Pressler (R-S.D.) and Frank H. Murkowski (R-AK) 
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occasionally splitting from the mainstream Republicans. This group filed a few 
amendments without much real political consequence in the Senate ratification debate. 
The other instance of intra-party cleavage was observable in the final roll-call vote 
number that showed the INF Treaty getting approved by a near unanimous margin of 93-
5. The strength of exceptionally strong bipartisan support and cooperation was distinctly 
experienced throughout the congressional approval process in a significant manner.  by 
the fact that out of 5 dissent votes, 4 belonged to Republican Party - Senators Jesse 
Helms of North Carolina, Gordon J. Humphrey of New Hampshire, Steve Symms of 
Idaho and Malcolm Wallop of Wyoming - and the remaining 1 belonged to Democratic 
Party - Senator Ernest F. Hollings of South Carolina - while two other Democratic 
senators – Joseph R. Biden of Delaware and John Glenn of Ohio – did not vote.432 
Overall implications of such degree of intra-party dissension were largely inconsequential 
from the perspective of the outcome of the INF Treaty consent process. Therefore, 
evidence does not support predicted effect of the given hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 4: Effects of intra-party dissension is mitigated by higher degree of 
bipartisanship: During the course of the ratification debate in the Senate there were 
several major obstacles which were imposed by a dissenting faction within the 
Republican Party. Hardline conservatives distanced themselves from the mainstream 
Republicans and moved amendments to block the passage of the INF Treaty. Evidence 
showed that Senate leaders from both sides of the aisle took appropriate action to 
overcome the intra-Republican Party “conservative filibuster against the INF Treaty” in 
an attempt to get the treaty ratified just in time prior to the Reagan-Gorbachev Summit in 
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Moscow on May 30 – June 2, 1988. For that to happen Senate Majority Leader Robert 
Byrd (D-W.V.) and Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) “stood together on the Senate 
floor in an end the conservative filibuster [intra-party cleavage within the Republican 
Party].”433 When the far-right conservative wing sponsored amendments were hanging in 
the Senate in order to block the INF Treaty, in a rare display of strong bipartisanship the 
Minority Leader “chided Republican treaty opponents for the delay and told them that 
they have a duty to their Republican President.”434 Overall, there was strong 
bipartisanship between the two parties on a unanimous basis and that was solely 
responsible to mitigate the effects of intra-party dissension within the Republican Party 
mainly based on ideological differentials. Such a trend was ultimately reflected in the roll 
call vote margin of 93-5 which showcased unprecedented level of bipartisan strength 
enough to mitigate any implications of intra-party dissension from the Senate 
Republicans. Therefore, the given hypothesis is accepted in the case of INF Treaty 
consent process.   
Hypothesis 5: More extensive debate in Congress facilitates finding common 
ground that increases the propensity of legislative-executive consensus. The entire 
Senate ratification debate for the INF Treaty was about four months long. It was rigorous 
and frequently witnessed political infighting. Run up to the Senate deliberation was 
marked by divisions in certain sections of both Democratic and Republican Party. Key 
Democrats like Majority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.V.) and Chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn (D-GA) were apprehensive about the 
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reinterpretation of the INF Treaty, if approved, by the administration without due 
consultation with the Senate.
435
 Despite such reservations these Democrats also showed 
willingness to cooperate if President Reagan accepted the legally binding “common 
understanding” condition as demanded by them. On the GOP side the resistance was 
more intense as a handful of conservative senators like Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Dan 
Quayle (R-IN), Steven Symms (R-ID), Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) were dissatisfied on the 
issue of verification and compliance of the treaty provisions from Soviet Union’s 
perspective.
436
 Notwithstanding such differences in certain sections of both parties,the 
overall sense of the legislative body generally reflected genuine interest to find out 
common grounds, cooperate and compromise regardless of strict party affiliations. This 
study asserts that extensive congressional deliberations along with the administration’s 
willingness to cooperate (as discussed elaborately in hypothesis 1) helped in 
strengthening the spirit of bipartisanship and consensus building in a divided government 
setting. One factor leading to convergence of interest across the aisle was the strategic 
significance of the treaty itself and that it was negotiated by a hawkish administration 
which was essentially very skeptical about Soviet intentions. As a result the rift observed 
sporadically during the Senate debate proceedings between hardline conservative and 
centrist wing of the Republican Party was not consequential as the legislative body was 
determined to go ahead with the approval process anyway. In fact, during the 4 month 
period of Senate consideration of the Treaty approval hardline conservative Republicans 
such as Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), Arlen Specter (R-PA), and 
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Malcolm Wallop (R-WY) pressed for amendments that were rejected by the Senate.
437
 
Those amendments were filed to create restrictions on the administration with regard to 
verification, monitoring and compliance issues of missile testing. Extensive debate 
proceedings were helpful to clarify the implications of these issues at length and 
ultimately dispel such unfounded apprehensions with regard to the efficacy of the deal. 
Longer debate increased the momentum toward forging stable bipartisan consensus 
between the Senate Democrats and Republicans. In such a situation where congressional 
deliberations were useful, the Senate ultimately considered that such would not have a 
positive effect on the ratification of the treaty. Hence they were rejected. However, the 
Senate approved the amendment proposed by Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and Majority 
Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.) intended to impose the provision of “common 
understanding” by a healthy margin of 72-27 vote.438 Lengthy deliberations facilitated the 
Senate to recognize the critical importance of the constitutional intent to bring in the 
legislative and executive branches on the same page for consideration, ratification, and 
implementation of the treaty because of its far-reaching ramifications. Overall, 
conclusion can be drawn that the given hypothesis is true in case of congressional 
approval of the INF Treaty. 
 Hypothesis 6: High salience and media coverage increase the propensity of 
legislative-executive consensus. There was good indication of strong media salience and 
coverage during the INF Treaty approval process. The high amount media attention for 
the Treaty for the full time span from January 1, 1979 to December 31, 1999 is as 
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follows: (1) Total number of times the INF Treaty was mentioned in any document type - 
497; (2) Total number of front-page stories - 65; and (3) Total number of editorial articles 
– 56.439 In addition to the  newspaper coverage, over the seven-year period “from 1981 
through 1987, ABC World News Tonight, NBC Nightly News, and CBS Evening News 
devoted more than 2,000 minutes of total air time to the INF issue.”440 The amount of 
media coverage – both in terms of articles and airtime – devoted to INF showed the 
serious importance of the INF issue during the Cold War era. Over the eight-month 
period prior to the congressional approval the New York Times published 154 news 
documents averaging about 20 news pieces on a monthly basis.
441
 Out of these total news 
documents there were 25 editorials, 15 front-page articles, 95 articles, and 7 letters to 
editor published by the New York Times over the eight-month period.
442
 Such large 
number of news documents bears testimony to the extensive nature of print media 
coverage and further reiterated the strategic significance of INF issue. Initially the New 
York Times covered the INF issue in a somewhat critical manner from 1982 to 1984. 
However, from 1985 onwards the Times apparently shifted its tone and started supporting 
the official INF policy perspectives. The rise in supportive coverage by the Times was 
more pronounced in 1987. Analysts argue, “This trend toward supportive press coverage 
actually reaffirms the notion that the press was pursuing a pro-arms-control agenda. That 
                                                          
439
 See Appendix C. It shows that in terms of media attention the INF Treaty belongs to top five treaties 
during the time period 1979-99. Data collected from the ProQuest Historical Newspapers the New York 
Times (1851–2007). Available at http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu  
 
440
 Genest, Marc A. 1995. p. 29.  
 
441
 ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 – 2007). Available at 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/  
 
442
 See Appendix E. 
  
154 
 
is, the only point when supportive coverage heavily outweighed critical coverage – in a 
ratio of approximately two to one – was in the year the agreement on INF was signed 
[1987].”443  Over the four-month time period from January 1, 1988 to May 31, 1988 
during which the Treaty was under the Senate consideration, the combined number of 
total evening television news coverage on ABC, NBC, and CBS was 75.
444
 That 
constituted one story every two days during the congressional approval process. Over this 
period ABC covered the topic 25 times, NBC 23 times and CBS 27 times. Total time 
range for such evening news coverage was from a minimum of 10 seconds to a maximum 
of 5 minutes 20 seconds. Cable network coverage attained maximum attention in May 
1988 when the number was 44.
445
 This was because of the intensification of the 
ratification debate and eventual roll call vote in the month of May. The overall 
impression was that the network news channels covered the INF Treaty issue from a pro-
arms-control perspective and in conformity to the administration’s official policy on the 
matter especially from 1986 onwards.
446
 In the case of INF Treaty scholars argue that 
media represented public opinion and that “public debate was actually a press debate.”447 
Also the press acted as an effective “communicator” for the treaty and was “particularly 
effective as a lobby pressuring for arms control.”448 Such media salience incentivized the 
                                                          
443
 Genest, Marc A. 1995. p. 77. 
 
444
 Vanderbilt Television News Archive. Available at 
http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu.libproxy.uoregon.edu/tvn-processquery.pl  See Appendix E. 
 
445
 Ibid.; See Appendix E. 
446
 Genest, Marc A. 1995. p. 41.  
447
 Kegley, Charles and Eugene R. Whitkopf, 1987 as cited in Genest, Marc A. 1995. p. 121.  
448
 Genest, Marc A. 1995. p. 126. 
155 
 
Senate to override in a rare strong bipartisan manner some of the obstacles brought up by 
a handful of hardline conservatives in the form of moving amendments in an attempt to 
block the nuclear deal. In the final analysis it can be concluded that the given hypothesis 
is accepted in the case of INF Treaty approval process. 
Hypothesis 7: Electoral imperatives on pivotal opposition players in the Senate 
to get reelected in the ensuing elections by incurring favorable public opinion increase 
the propensity of legislative-executive dissension. Toward the end of 1987 when the INF 
Treaty was signed by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev on December 
8, 1987 in Washington, D.C. public opinion in the United States was highly favorable for 
the nuclear arms control deal. A Gallup survey conducted between December 4 and 7, 
1987 showed that an overwhelming 76 percent of American people approved the Treaty 
while 11 percent opposed the Treaty and 12 percent did not know about it.
449
 Reagan’s 
reputation as the most conservative president of the 20
th
 century and his hardline 
demeanor with Soviet nuclear threat was responsible for high public support for the INF 
Treaty.
450
 According to a voter survey conducted during the second week of January 
1988, “six out of ten Americans (59 percent) believed that an INF Treaty must in the 
national interest if Regan believed it to be a good deal. The poll found a near consensus 
for the INF Treaty, which was supported by 79 percent of Americans and opposed by 
only 17 percent.”451 Also Reagan’s personal popularity among American people in 
general helped the administration to garner substantial support for this strategic nuclear 
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missiles treaty.
452
 Moreover, traditionally there had been consistent rise in public 
approval when major international nuclear missiles treaties like the INF Treaty showed 
promise. This was distinctly evident with the increased public approval on a sustained 
basis following the successful completion of the INF Treaty.
453
 During the Senate hearing 
and debate proceedings which took place from January to May 1988 high public approval 
for the Treaty continued unabated. After the Treaty was signed a Gallup survey 
conducted for the time span January 4 – 11, 1988 found that 77 percent of the American 
people were in favor of the ratification of the INF Treaty.
454
 A CBS News/New York 
Times survey conducted between January 17 and 21, 1988 showed that 67 percent of 
population wanted the U.S. Senate to ratify the INF Treaty.
455
 An NBC/Wall Street 
Journal opinion poll from a sample population of 2392 taken in January 1988 showed that 
an overwhelming 67 percent of the public were in favor of the U.S. Senate ratifying the 
INF Treaty while 20 percent opposed such ratification.
456
 The Washington Post reported 
on December 04, 1987 that in the latest Washington Post/ABC News poll, 52 percent of 
1007 persons interviewed showed support for the INF Treaty as against 8 percent who 
opposed it, while 40 percent did not know enough about the deal to provide an opinion.
457
 
The Washington Post reported on January 30, 1988 that national survey of a sample of 
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1000 registered voters showed an increase in public support since October 1987 for the 
proposed INF Treaty.
458
 In similar lines as a show of support for the INF Treaty, an 
opinion poll conducted by Gordon S. Black Corporation in January 1988 from a sample 
population of 1406 showed that 62 percent of the public would vote for a candidate who 
supported the treaty in the ensuing presidential election.
459
 Based on a national survey 
conducted by Market Opinion Research (MOR) between January 7 and 14, 1988 it was 
observed that 49 percent of the population indicated strong approval for the treaty, 33 
percent indicated approval somewhat, and 18 percent indicated mild or strong 
disapproval.
460
 Altogether about 82 percent of the population surveyed in this project 
expressed strong to moderate amount of support for the INF Treaty. Interestingly a 
whopping 94 percent Americans who had a more favorable view of the Soviet Union 
expressed support for the Treaty with 68 percent declaring strong support as compared to 
67 percent and 30 percent respectively among those who had a relatively unfavorable 
view of the Soviet Union.
461
 Also such opinion favorability continued when it came to 
cutting down long-range nuclear forces of both the United States and the Soviet Union 
into half. In this category an overwhelming 81 percent of the population surveyed 
approved such a move as against 12 percent who expressed disapproval.
462
 In addition to 
the high domestic public approval rating in favor of the INF Treaty, international public 
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opinion was also phenomenally favorable. This was clearly evident when “Members of 
West European parliaments told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee yesterday 
[February 05, 1988] that their countries support the new U.S.-Soviet nuclear arms-
reduction treaty and warned that rejection of the pact would jeopardize NATO and revive 
pressures for unilateral disarmament.”463 It was argued that “A major reason approval is 
likely is the very widespread belief that if the Senate blocks the agreement, public 
opinion in other NATO countries would turn against the United States.”464 For that 
purpose European allies urged the United States to make sure that the Senate approved 
the Treaty. Most significantly West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl endorsed the 
Treaty.
465
  Such high favorability in public opinion for the INF Treaty both in the 
domestic and international spheres put pressure during the congressional approval 
process in the United States Senate. It proved to be a powerful incentive for the pivotal 
institutional players on both sides of the aisle from electoral standpoint to forge viable 
bipartisan coalition and get the Treaty approved.  The combination effect of high public 
approval and electoral imperatives encouraged the Senate to successfully overcome some 
of the procedural obstacles brought up in the form of amendments by the hardline 
conservatives spearheaded by Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), Larry Pressler (R-S.D.), and Gordon 
Humphrey (R-N.H.).
466
 These senators were not in immediate electoral trouble since 
none of them were running for 1988 Senate elections. While Senators Helms and Pressler 
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were up for reelection in 1990, Senator Humphrey did not seek reelection in 1992. Two-
time Republican incumbent from traditionally conservative state of Wyoming, Senator 
Malcolm Wallop who opposed INF Treaty, however faced a tough reelection battle in 
1988. He barely received 50 percent of the vote against his Democratic challenger, State 
Senator John Vinich, and survived narrowly. Although his constituent was not satisfied 
with him because of his low connection to their domestic aspirations, his extreme 
conservative and intellectual position on INF Treaty in a conservative state was able to 
get over the threshold margin.
467
 Republican senator Steve Symms from another 
conservative state of Idaho was not running for reelection that was way away in 1992. 
That means in general the main reason for these handful senators’ opposition to the INF 
Treaty was far-right conservative ideology. They set up a right-wing “Anti-Appeasement 
Alliance” that would fight the trend exemplified by the INF Treaty.” These groups of 
senators as members of the anti-communist alliance considered Reagan’s signing of the 
INF Treaty as “his public embrace of the Soviet leader.”468 Thus the opposition seemed 
to be more ideological in its characterization. However, such opposition by a small group 
of far-right conservative senators was successfully overcome by majority of senators 
present and voting.  
In the end high level of public opinion, both domestically and internationally, was 
the driving force behind successful passage of the Treaty that was eventually passed in 
the Senate by a near unanimous margin of 93-5. Therefore, it can be concluded that 
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evidence supports the given hypothesis largely in the context of high public approval for 
the Treaty.  
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
             Background: The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was signed 
by President George H.W. Bush on December 17, 1992.
469
 In 1991 Congress granted 
“Fast Track” authority to President Bush to negotiate NAFTA with Canada and 
Mexico.
470
 Congressional authorization for a speedy trade deal enabled negotiation and 
ultimately the signing of NAFTA by the outgoing Bush Administration. NAFTA was 
later supported by President Bill Clinton, who in turn submitted the agreement to 
Congress for approval on November 3, 1993.
471
 Although the agreement had a bipartisan 
initiative from the White House point of view, it witnessed one of the most contentious 
political contestations ever to happen in modern legislative-executive relations. Despite 
NAFTA being submitted to Congress by President Clinton under the political structure of 
unified government, it created an insurmountable political dissension inside his own 
Democratic Party. Interestingly, the ratification of the agreement in Congress was finally 
possible with the help of the support of the Republican Party. The United States House of 
Representatives passed the NAFTA bill on November 17, 1993, after a contentious 
debate and a lot of political maneuvering from the White House.
472
 That was followed by 
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passage by the United States Senate on November 20, 1993.
473
 Interestingly, NAFTA had 
the unique distinction of acquiring unconventional and somewhat convoluted alliances at 
the interbranch level – (1) between Capitol Hill and the White House; and (2) between 
the like-minded Democrats and Republicans in Congress despite the presence of a unified 
government political arrangement at the institutional level. The run-up to the 
congressional approval of NAFTA portrayed a continuum of consensus and dissension 
inside Congress, as well as at the congressional-presidential level.  
              Hypothesis 1: Unified government facilitates consensus-building while divided 
government does not. In the case of NAFTA, the agreement was successful in obtaining 
congressional approval after a prolonged debate in both chambers of Congress.
474
 While 
in the U.S. House of Representatives, NAFTA was approved by a margin of 234-200, in 
the U.S. Senate it was approved by a margin of 61-38.
475
 From the bigger political 
perspective, unified government in the 103
rd
 Congress (1993-1994) can be regarded to be 
the causal factor for the approval of NAFTA. But the dynamics of the  political process 
leading to the successful passage of NAFTA reflect a very different story, in which 
unusual political alliances had to be forged and political maneuvering needed to be 
pursued primarily by the effort of the president in order to get congressional approval for 
NAFTA.  President Clinton had to spend a lot of his political clout to help form such 
unconventional bipartisan alliances, in which like-minded Democrats and Republicans 
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came together in building a viable consensus for the successful passage of NAFTA. In 
the end, the House of Representatives approved the North American Free Trade 
Agreement by a comfortable margin of votes and provided President Clinton with a 
highly sought-after victory after a spell of lengthy, contentious debate that “crisscrossed 
party and ideological lines…. A bipartisan coalition of 132 Republicans and 102 
Democrats prevailed over the opposition of 156 Democrats and 43 Republicans, and one 
independent.”476 There was also a regional dimension in the process of building such rare 
political alliances. For that purpose, President Clinton had to find support in the Centrist 
and Sun Belt House districts.
477
 The Senate also witnessed political alliances on such 
regional dimensions that ultimately resulted in the safe passage of NAFTA by a 
comfortable margin of votes.
478
 In the Senate, the bipartisan coalition of 34 Republicans 
and 27 Democrats prevailed over the opposition of 28 Democrats and 10 Republicans.
479
 
Importantly, in every step of the congressional approval process, there was consensus and 
dissension in the House and the Senate. Such political dynamics ultimately influenced 
congressional-presidential relations.  
            From an analytical point of view, NAFTA was uniquely accompanied by unusual 
political conditions, in which the mere presence of unified government was not a 
sufficient causal factor for congressional approval. Partisan and ideological dimensions 
were seriously in play in mapping the contours of consensus and dissension in the 
political process. The urgency of reaching compromise between like-minded Democrats 
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and Republicans ultimately prevailed in mitigating the negative implications of intraparty 
dissension within the majority Democratic Party. The NAFTA approval process in 
Congress qualifies the given hypothesis in a more refined manner. Despite the condition 
of unified government, unusual bipartisan consensus was critically important for success 
in the ratification process. Such unconventional consensus was accomplished by 
crisscrossing partisan and ideological dimensions. This was facilitated by unprecedented 
cooperation between Congress and the president, despite the odds of possible dissension. 
In such a political environment, defection by a group of Democrats was not strong 
enough to block the passage of NAFTA. Even though President Clinton had to face 
opposition within his own party, such as that from House Democratic Majority Leader 
Richard A. Gephardt and House Democratic Majority Whip David E. Bonier and their 
surrogates in the House of Representatives, such action by the dissenting group did not 
deter Clinton from forging a viable bipartisan alliance with the members of the 
Republican Party to effect the safe passage of NAFTA.
480
 Notwithstanding internal 
dissension inside the Democratic Party in the House, there was a solid block of 102 
Democrats who remained loyal to President Clinton. Additionally, Clinton was able to 
garner support from 132 members of the Republican Party members in the House. The 
presence of unified government helped in garnering support from 102 House Democrats. 
Aggressive political maneuvering on the part of President Clinton and House Republican 
Whip Newt Gingrich was instrumental to get more than the magic number of 218 votes 
required for the successful passage of NAFTA in the House of Representatives. In the 
end, NAFTA was successfully passed in the House by a comfortable margin of 234-
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200.
481
 In the Senate, similar political dynamics helped to gain bipartisan support from 
Senate Majority Leader George J. Mitchell (D-ME) and Senate Minority Leader Robert J. 
Dole (R-KS), who assured the administration of the safe passage of NAFTA.
482
 In the 
Senate, the bipartisan coalition of 34 Republicans and 27 Democrats was instrumental in 
getting a convincing margin of 61-38.
483
 Interestingly, the president was more confident 
about the prospects of safe passage of NAFTA in the Senate.  
             The congressional approval process for NAFTA makes it evident that the desired 
effects of unified government to empower the president with adequate political capital 
were not present. The internal dissension within the Democratic Caucus weakened 
President Clinton. In the wake of unexpectedly low support from his own Caucus Clinton 
had to face serious challenges to garner unusual bipartisan support and build a consensus 
crisscrossing ideological and partisan dimensions. In order to secure congressional 
approval of NAFTA the president “expended significant political resources in delivering 
the votes of House Democrats amid the opposition of Democratic House leaders.”484 To 
offset intra-Democratic Party dissension in the House Clinton tried to get some Senate 
members on his side and urged them to announce their pro-NAFTA position in order to 
give cover to the House members from the same respective states.
485
  Thus the president 
had to resort to a lot of political maneuvering to make sure that he was able to accumulate 
just enough support from his own Democratic Caucus and also get an overwhelming 
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number of Republican Party members to forge a viable coalition. Overall the political 
process was highly contentious and reflected a continuum of consensus and dissension 
inside Congress as well as in the legislative-executive domain. In the end NAFTA was 
successful in getting through Congress purely based on a number game. But the 
traditional effects of unified government were not evident. Therefore, conclusion can be 
drawn technically in favor of the given hypothesis with qualification that because 
NAFTA was just able to garner simple majority vote in Congress, it was ultimately 
passed in a unified government setting. However, in reality the expected causal effect of 
unified government was absent throughout the political process. Presence of unified 
government did not provide President Clinton with political advantage to build resources 
from his own Caucus for the passage of NAFTA.   
              Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the treaty process. The congressional approval process for NAFTA shows 
that ideological dimensions were more dominant in the ratification debate. Evidence from 
the previous hypotheses shows that the crux of the ratification debate centered on 
dissension between congressional members who favored free trade and those who 
supported organized labor. Liberal members with strong unionization in their districts 
voted against NAFTA. Also, environmentalists feared that industry backers would take 
full advantage of less stringent pollution regulations in Mexico. The strong influence of 
ideology indicated that conservatives would generally vote in favor of NAFTA regardless 
of party affiliation. As a result, it was evidential that more moderate Democrats joined 
hands with the Republicans and supported NAFTA. This shows that strong ideological 
alignment dominated congressional proceedings. Even President Clinton projecting 
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himself as a New Democrat pitted against organized labor established credibility for him 
as someone who was willing to make compromises beyond traditional party 
affiliations.
486
 Evidence shows that party affiliation did not have discernible influence on 
the NAFTA consent process. This was showcased by strong symbolic bipartisan support 
from Republican and Democratic presidents – Gerald Ford, Jimmy Carter, and George 
H.W. Bush when on September 14, 1993, at a press conference President Clinton was 
accompanied by these former presidents. Lack of party coherence in turn was 
overshadowed by the stronger effects of ideological dimensions. This ultimately helped 
to accomplish an unconventional bipartisan coalition between traditional Republicans and 
moderate Democrats, while the majority of liberal-wing Democrats voted against the 
trade deal. Therefore, the conclusion can be drawn that the given hypothesis applies to 
the NAFTA consent process.           
Hypothesis 3: Intraparty disagreement or squabbling results in dissension in 
the treaty process. The approval process for NAFTA experienced formidable opposition 
inside the Democratic Party. At the forefront of this intraparty cleavage were two 
prominent Democratic congressmen, House Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt and 
Whip David E. Bonior. Their opposition did reflect how intense the internal dissension 
within the House Democratic Caucus was regarding the fallout effect of NAFTA on job 
losses to Mexico and in turn making those congressmen who voted in favor of NATFA 
be held accountable in their respective constituencies.
487
 David Bonier (D-MI), who was 
a pro-labor liberal, had been persistently working for months to round up votes to defeat 
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NAFTA. Richard Gephardt (D-MO) from St. Louis shared the same views and was an 
opponent as well. However, within the powerful top Democratic leadership in the U.S. 
House of Representatives, Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D-WA) supported NAFTA.
488
 
Hence it was evident that there was a significant dissension within the top leadership of 
the Democratic Party in the House. Quite predictably, President Clinton was particularly 
more concerned about the internal dissension within the Democratic Caucus in the U.S. 
House of Representatives. In order to secure congressional approval of NAFTA, he 
“expended significant political resources in delivering the votes of House Democrats 
amid the opposition of Democratic House leaders.”489 To offset such intraparty 
dissension in the House, Clinton tried to get some Senate members on his side and urged 
them to announce their pro-NAFTA position in order to give cover to the House members 
from the same respective states.
490
 Such a political dynamic explains the nature of 
dissension and consensus based on intraparty ideological differences. Additionally, 
similar internal cleavage was observable in the U.S. Senate. As a consequence, the 
political ramifications of intraparty cleavage in the legislative-executive domain were 
imminent.  
The organized labor and environmental communities vehemently opposed the 
proposed NAFTA bill.
491
 Opposition from such powerful special interests further 
intensified intraparty cleavage within the Democratic Party. The rift with organized labor 
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was, in particular, more daunting to cope with. Within the Democratic Party opposition 
came primarily from pro-labor states such as those that are situated along the country’s 
northern border, the industrial Northeast and Midwest, and the inner cities.
492
 These were 
also the states where organized labor opposition was stronger and “centered in the 
industrial unions, such as the Electrical Workers, the Machinists, Auto-Workers, and the 
Amalgamated Clothing Workers – the declining parts of the economy – as well as the 
Teamsters.”493 About 59 percent of congressional lawmakers from the seven Great Lakes 
states ultimately voted against NAFTA.
494
 Importantly, organized labor groups were 
reinforced by the opposition of a “large umbrella organization, the AFL-CIO” that 
demonstrated solidarity in opposing NAFTA.
495
 Organized labor feared loss of jobs and 
lowering of wages and benefits because of NAFTA. In order to keep the channel of 
communication with organized labor open and also to win over the dissenting faction of 
the Democratic Party, Clinton brought in Bill Daley from Chicago to seek compromises 
with them.
496
 This was a tactical political move, well made to control the effects of 
internal dissension.  
Like organized labor, the environmental community opposed NAFTA. Three 
powerful environment and consumer groups the Sierra Club, Friends of the Earth, and 
Public Citizen – were influential in creating an internal rift inside the Democratic 
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Caucus.
497
 In order to satisfy their demands, President Clinton reopened talks with 
Mexico to improve environmental protections and workers’ safeguards. Negotiations 
with Mexico to strengthen environmental safeguards “were intended, in part, to mollify 
Democrats in Congress, many of whom campaigned against NAFTA, arguing that it 
would cost jobs and induce companies to relocate to Mexico to take advantage of looser 
enforcement of environmental laws.”498 Such talks were also intended to dispel the Ross 
Perot effect from any chances of deepening the rift inside the Democratic Party.
499
 
The internal dissension within the Democratic Party divided the votes of 
Democratic lawmakers both in the House and the Senate. In the House, while 102 
Democrats supported NAFTA, 156 Democrats opposed it.
500
 In the Senate, while 27 
Democrats supported NAFTA, 28 Democrats opposed it.
501
 There was also a split within 
the Republican Party on the issue of NAFTA. But that was relatively inconsequential and 
technically less obvious, compared to the split within the Democratic Party. The extent of 
internal dissension within the Democratic Party was potentially significant enough to 
bring NAFTA down. But the administration was fortunate enough to make a viable cross-
partisan political alliance and garner adequate support from the minority Republican 
Party. Had that unconventional bipartisan alliance not occurred, NAFTA would have 
been a failure.   
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Finally, this study states that the given hypothesis is relevant in the case of 
NAFTA, with the slight qualification that an unusually strong, abnormal alliance was 
instrumental in congressional approval for the agreement. However, the dynamics of 
internal dissension, especially within the Democratic Party, followed by the president 
making frantic efforts to forge a unconventional bipartisan alliance in Congress with the 
opposition Republican Party, portray the nature of a continuum of consensus and 
dissension in the political process of NAFTA approval in the midst of intra-party 
cleavage.   
               Hypothesis 4: Effects of intraparty cleavage are mitigated by a comparatively 
higher degree of bipartisanship: The approval of NAFTA was a classic case in which 
the effects of intraparty cleavage within the Democratic Party was mitigated or offset by 
a comparatively higher degree of bipartisanship. Dissension within the Democratic Party 
was a difficult political roadblock to the successful passage of NAFTA in Congress. 
Clinton anticipated the magnitude of the split in his own party, further propelled by stiff 
resistance by powerful organized labor and environmental protection groups against 
NAFTA. This evolving political situation prompted the president to take quick action 
toward forging an unusual alliance with the Republican Party. Such proactive efforts 
made by President Clinton to garner adequate bipartisan support mitigated the potential 
negative implications of internal dissension within the majority Democratic Party. In a 
dramatic turn of events, House Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA), generally a 
confrontationist leader, appealed to House Republicans to support NAFTA. Gingrich, 
who later became Speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives in 1995, claimed, “This 
is a vote for history, larger than politics, larger than reelection, larger than personal 
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ego.”502 Meanwhile, the president, in a quest for stable bipartisan support, continued 
lobbying Congress on a regular basis, calling congressmen one at a time, meeting 
members of Congress in one-on-one sessions, meeting opinion leaders, making deals 
with individuals and groups of House members irrespective of party affiliations, and also 
appealing to the general public to support the agreement.
503
 With a view to building 
viable bipartisan consensus amidst dissension within his own party, President Clinton in 
an unprecedented tactical move recruited a respectable former Republican congressman, 
William Frenzel from Minnesota, to generate support from Republican lawmakers.
504
  
It so happened that even a couple of weeks before the crucial vote scheduled in 
the House, the president was still a dozen votes short. In order to make bipartisan 
consensus successful, the president sprang into action once again in full force. He started 
making phone calls to like-minded congressmen on both sides of the aisle and made 
plenty of deals to win over their vote in favor of NAFTA. Most conspicuous of the deals 
was the one that President Clinton made with Florida Republicans, who in turn extended 
support to NAFTA after getting special deals from the White House regarding greater 
protection for the state’s citrus, sugar, and winter vegetables from cheaper Mexican 
imports.  Consequently, out of 23 Republican congressmen, 13 voted in favor of 
NAFTA.
505
 In order to gain sufficient bipartisan support to successfully mitigate the loss 
from intraparty cleavage within his own Democratic Party, President Clinton also hosted 
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public events together with Nobel Prize-winning economists, with former presidents, and 
with former secretaries of state. Among them, the most significant was the support from 
Henry Kissinger, former Secretary of State and a lifelong Republican, who publicly 
announced, “About once in a generation, this country has an opportunity in foreign policy 
to do something [NAFTA] defining, something that establishes the structure for decades 
to come.”506 Colin Powell, another influential Republican, was invited to the White 
House to meet with President Clinton and endorse NAFTA.
507
 Shortly before the vote, 
President Clinton threw White House dinners for the undecided policymakers.  In order 
to seek alliance with pro-NAFTA business executives, Clinton met with Lee Iacocca, the 
former president of Chrysler.
508
 The alliance with corporate America proved helpful in 
gaining wider support for NAFTA. Proponents of NAFTA were also supported by the 
Chamber of Commerce, the accountant community, trade consultants, etc.
509
  On 
November 9, just eight days before the NAFTA vote in the House, Vice President Al 
Gore debated NAFTA opponent Ross Perot on national television on the popular CNN 
talk show “Larry King Live”. This debate was widely viewed across the political 
spectrum in the United States and helped generate public opinion that ultimately helped 
the administration in getting adequate support for NAFTA.  
           Overall proactive initiatives undertaken by President Clinton to build bipartisan 
support in Congress paid off and resulted in the successful passage of NAFTA. The 
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strength of bipartisanship consensus was significantly greater than the intraparty 
dissension within the Democratic Party. The Republican Party joined hands with Clinton 
in a big way to mitigate the effects of such internal dissension within the Democratic 
Party. In fact, at the time of the vote, the administration was short of 100 or so Democrats 
due to internal defection, and President Clinton was counting on some 120 votes from the 
Republicans to put NAFTA over the top.
510
 It is significant to notice that the NAFTA 
vote, done in a strong bipartisan manner, proved to be a new kind of legislative victory 
for President Clinton and an “apparent discount between Ross Perot and his political 
base.”511 This is evident when House members from Perot’s strongest regional bases 
overwhelmingly supported NAFTA by a 2-1 margin, despite his strong opposition to the 
trade agreement. Reference can be made here about President Clinton’s compliments to 
“an investigative report in the Washington Post about how the administration had made 
several changes in prospective NAFTA rules to satisfy Hispanic legislators.”512 In the 
end, NAFTA was passed by the House (November 17, 1993) by 234-200 and in the 
Senate (November 20, 1993) by 61-38.
513
 Thus it was explicitly observable that “the 
legislation to implement the agreement [NAFTA] could pass only with Republican 
support. This was an example within a single party government of the Democratic 
president working with the House and the Senate Republican leaders to build majority 
support on a major issue. A majority of Democrats in each house opposed the 
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agreement.”514 The pro-NAFTA bipartisan support from both sides of the aisle was 
strong enough to result in NAFTA’s approval in Congress with only 40 percent of 
Democrats supporting President Clinton.
515
 From the analysis it can be inferred that 
congressional approval of NAFTA was ultimately possible because of the unconventional 
bipartisan consensus in Congress. This was essentially possible because President Clinton 
skillfully used his presidential resources and showed leadership in reaching a 
compromise deal with the Republicans in Congress. Efforts on the part of GOP whip in 
the House, Newt Gingrich (R-GA), was also important to unite the pro-NAFTA members 
of the Republican Caucus.  The Senate Republicans also followed similar pattern of 
coalition building to get NAFTA through. The effects of intra-party cleavage on both 
sides, especially in the Democratic Caucus, were successfully mitigated by comparatively 
higher degree of bipartisanship. Because of formation of such nonconventional bipartisan 
coalition in Congress in the wake of prolonged political maneuvering, in the end 
consensus at the congressional-presidential level was also reached. Therefore, conclusion 
can be drawn that evidence supports the given hypothesis in the case of NAFTA. There is 
no better way to confirm such an argument than when President Clinton himself 
expressed apprehension that NAFTA might be turned down by Congress in the end. Such 
concern was clearly portrayed during a conversation with a noted journalist, Taylor 
Branch, in the Truman Balcony of the White House on October 17, 1993, when President 
Clinton said, 
The fate of NAFTA would rest on his [President Clinton] temporary 
alliance with House Republicans plus concerted effort to pick off enough 
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Democrats from their own united leadership. Although the partisan lines 
were blurred, he said, it would come down to a struggle for votes, district 
by district.
516
 
 
 Hypothesis 5: More extensive debate in Congress facilitates finding 
common ground that increases the propensity of legislative-executive consensus. The 
approval process of NAFTA in Congress included extensive debate and hearing 
procedures. It is generally considered that prolonged debate and hearing procedures in 
Congress during the passage of a treaty or agreement represent the significance of the 
legislation debated. From the outset, NAFTA proved to be a challenging and difficult 
legislation to deal with in Congress. A significant split within the Democratic Party, in 
conjunction with stiff opposition by powerful organized labor groups and the 
environmental community, led to a highly contentious NAFTA approval process. The 
House debate procedures were especially marked by heated exchanges in which emotions 
and passions were running high. While powerful congressional leaders comprising House 
Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D-WA), Democratic Caucus Chairman Steny H. Hoyer (D-
MD), Vice Chairman Vic Fazio (D-CA), and Deputy Majority Whip Bill Richardson (D-
NM) supported the trade agreement, Majority Whip David E. Bonior (D-MI) and 
Majority Leader Richard A. Gephardt (D-MO) opposed NAFTA legislation.
517
 From the 
procedural vantage point, extensiveness of debate also led to finding common ground and 
building consensus on a bipartisan basis. Prolonged congressional deliberations helped to 
clarify the positions of the congressional members across party affiliations and in turn to 
explore the prospects of bipartisan support for NAFTA. Extensive debate in turn was 
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responsible for influencing the trajectory of consensus and dissension across party lines 
inside Congress, with ramifications at the congressional-presidential level. The degree of 
bipartisan support was eventually sufficiently strong to overrule a major Senate 
amendment (S.AMDT.1221) proposed by Senator Ted Stevens (R-Alaska). This 
amendment was ruled out of order by the Chair by a vote of 73-26.
518
 
The proponents of NAFTA, including the White House, claimed that the trade bill 
would be pro-growth, pro-jobs, pro-exports and, once approved by Congress, would 
greatly improve the status quo with respect to trade, environmental conditions, labor 
rights, and help in creating and protecting large numbers of American jobs.
519
 This 
characterization was echoed by the speech of House Speaker Thomas S. Foley (D-WA), 
[NAFTA] is for this moment an opportunity to expand our trade, to reach 
out beyond our borders, to continue our leadership, to seize the future, and 
to do so on behalf, first of all our constituents and our citizens, but with 
the knowledge that it will be to the benefit of those neighbors, north and 
south, on both sides of the border.
520
 
 
Another prominent supporter of NAFTA Steny H. Hoyer (D-MD) who was also 
Chairman of the Democratic Caucus commented, 
If NAFTA passes, first the people of the United States stand to gain; 
second, America’s credibility as a world leader, and as a trading partner 
will be enhanced; third, America’s businesses and workers will profit 
from a market not just in Mexico but eventually throughout Latin 
America; fourth, America’s competitiveness will be strengthened….521 
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Importantly, as a mark of bipartisan support, House Minority Leader Newt Gingrich (R-
GA), while rallying House Republicans to support NAFTA, commented, “This is a vote 
for history, larger than politics, larger than reelection, larger than personal ego.”522 
The opponents were of the view that NAFTA would lead to rampant plant 
shutdowns, job loss in the form of job flight from the United States to Mexico, decline of 
wages and labor benefits, relocation of major industrial plants to Mexico, and 
environmental degradation.
523
 This was echoed by House Majority Leader Richard A. 
Gephardt (D- Mo.), 
….we must not expose our workers and our corporations to unfair 
competition; to a wage system where the government sets the wages and 
artificially holds them down. We must not do that.
524
 
 
House Majority Whip David E. Bonier (D-MI) made a passionate appeal to dissenting 
Democrats at the end of the long debate proceedings by asserting, “It will cost jobs. It 
will drive down our standard of living. If we don’t stand up for the working people in this 
country, who is going to?”525 In the Senate, however, there was a higher degree of 
bipartisan consensus between Democrats and Republicans at the completion of 
deliberations and hearings. This was evident when Senate Majority Leader George J. 
Mitchell (D-ME) and Minority Leader Robert J. Dole (R-KS) expressed confidence on 
the successful passage of NAFTA in the Senate.
526
 
                                                          
522
 Washington Post, November 18, 1993, p.A01. 
523
 Brown, Sherrod. 2004. p. 73. 
524
 Congressional Record – House. November 17, 1993. p.29947. 
525
 Washington Post, November 18, 1993, p.A01. 
526
 Ibid. 
 
178 
 
The nature and extent of lengthy debate proceedings in Congress resulted in a 
continuum of consensus and dissension during the NAFTA approval process. Growing 
bipartisan consensus amidst serious intraparty dissension within the majority Democratic 
Party was the consequence of extensive debate proceedings in Congress. Extraneous 
factors such as the Gore-Perot debate on CNN’s “Larry King Live” also helped to 
generate favorable public opinion that had influenced the nature of congressional debate 
and ultimately accomplished rare bipartisan support. For instance, Vice President Gore 
was more articulate in analyzing the advantages of NAFTA and directly challenged Perot 
for his vested interest in opposing the trade bill.
527
 The CNN debate was critical in 
shaping the trajectory of congressional deliberations.  
Evidence from the above discussion shows that extensive debate in Congress 
was responsible for reaching consensus and successful bargaining across party lines and 
that ultimately led to legislative-executive consensus. In that regard the given hypothesis 
is true in the case of NAFTA. However, there was also negative fallout from long 
congressional deliberations as they led to more dissension within the Democratic Party. 
Overall the given hypothesis is true in the case of the NAFTA approval process because 
it was able garner bipartisan support at the legislative-executive level.  
             Hypothesis 6: High salience and media coverage increase the propensity of 
legislative-executive consensus. NAFTA being a controversial and fast-track trade 
agreement, media salience and extent of coverage were critical in influencing the treaty 
approval process in Congress. The level of media attention that NAFTA received 
especially was overwhelming. In fact, NAFTA received the highest amount of media 
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attention in the New York Times for the time period from January 01, 1979 to December 
31, 1999. Media attention numbers are as follows: (1) Total number of times NAFTA 
was mentioned in any document type 2193; (2) Total number of front-page stories - 292; 
and (3) Total number of editorial articles – 165.528 Such a high level of media attention in 
conjunction with constituency pressure influenced NAFTA’s approval process in 
Congress. Such media salience put enormous pressure on members of Congress on both 
sides of the aisle to clearly state their policy positions on such a hot-button issue. The 
high level of media attention, while influencing the congressional approval process, also 
helped members of Congress and the president to seek common ground and henceforth 
enhance the prospects of unconventional bipartisan consensus despite internal dissension 
within the Democratic Party. Media salience was an enabling factor for proponents of 
NAFTA to generate favorable public opinion. In contrast, NAFTA opponents, primarily 
constituting the dissenting faction within the Democratic Party, organized labor, and the 
powerful environmental community had difficulty in convincing the frontline media 
about the negative effects of the issue. By and large, all major newspapers in the country 
editorialized in support of and the desirability of free and open markets as proposed by 
NAFTA.
529
 For instance, while the Washington Post editorials and op-eds were 
supportive of the trade deal by an almost 6 to 1 ratio, the New York Times quoted three 
NAFTA supporters for every one opponent in its news coverage.
530
 The New York Times 
Editorial Notebook dated September 12, 1993, was highly critical of Texan businessman 
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Ross Perot’s assertions about NAFTA’s negative implications published in his latest 
book Save Your Jobs, Save Our Country.
531
 Media coverage started to pick up from 
September 1993 and reached its crescendo in November 1993 because of the CNN debate 
and heightened expectations of congressional voting due to take place in that month. The 
New York Times recorded 180 reports for NAFTA in November out of a total of 467 
news items from January 1, 1993 to November 30, 1979.
532
 As far as cable TV network 
channels were concerned the combined evening news coverage of ABC, CBS, and NBC 
constituted 86 records for the time period from July 01, 1993 to November 25, 1993.
533
 In 
all ABC produced 28 stories, CBS produced 30, while NBC had 28 evening news 
programs.
534
 Television news broadcast with regard to NAFTA increased from a total of 
30 stories in 1992 to 120 stories in 1993.
535
 Particularly, in November 1993 the amount 
of TV coverage was exceptionally high because of the ensuing congressional voting 
scheduled for that month. For the most part, media coverage remained favorable toward 
NAFTA. Mainstream media coverage, both newsprint and electronic, was critical for 
issue salience. Particularly repeated TV coverage on such a contentious issue proved to 
be very effective in increasing issue awareness and issue important for the viewers.
536
 
Members of Congress were mindful of the overall tone of media coverage, and that 
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accordingly influenced congressional deliberations to a considerable extent. One of the 
tipping points of media attention was the highly publicized and widely viewed Gore-
Perot debate on CNN’s “Larry King Live” television show aired on November 9. Perot’s 
vociferous assertions about NAFTA’s devastating impact on American jobs particularly 
amplified media attention.
537
 Perot’s allegations were criticized and virtually dismissed 
by media narratives. The New York Times even commented, “Mr. Gore got the better of 
the evening…..Mr. Perot’s opposition to NAFTA sprang from personal interests.”538 
Favorable media coverage for NAFTA shaped public opinion that had direct bearing on 
congressional deliberations. As much as media salience was instrumental in influencing 
the dynamics of consensus and dissension, its favorable tone allowed the formation of a 
viable yet unconventional bipartisan coalition which was successful in overcoming the 
adverse effects of party-line dissension at various stages of congressional approval 
process. Media analysis confirms the acceptance of the given hypothesis for the case of 
NAFTA.  
              Hypothesis 7: Electoral imperatives on pivotal opposition players in the Senate 
to get reelected in the ensuing elections by incurring favorable public opinion increase 
the propensity of legislative-executive dissension. Electoral imperatives in the minds of 
members of Congress were crucial in making their voting decisions. Democrats who 
were more vulnerable to electoral debacle and felt election insecurity supported President 
Clinton’s coalition efforts.539 House members from districts with high union membership 
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overwhelmingly voted against NAFTA.
540
 Prominent among them were Representatives 
Gephardt (D-MO) and Bonier (D-MI) and their surrogates. They belonged to the 
Midwest and the Sunbelt areas dominated by organized labor unions. Members with large 
Hispanic constituencies regardless of party affiliations supported the Clinton coalition 
and voted in favor of NAFTA.
541
 While taking full advantage of the congressmen’s 
electoral imperatives being in his favor, Clinton “contacted eight Mid-Atlantic 
Republicans who were more sympathetic to his overall agenda and five Florida 
legislators whose districts had large Cuban-American populations.”542    House members 
from Mid-Atlantic States and the Southeast were more likely to vote against NAFTA 
because of electoral concerns. On the other hand, members belonging to districts with a 
high number of white-collar workers and farmers were more likely to support NAFTA.
543
 
Representatives from states with high unemployment rates also voted in favor of NAFTA 
because of electoral incentives. Electorates from such high-unemployment states as 
California, Oregon, Washington, Massachusetts, and New York accepted President 
Clinton’s message that NAFTA was a jobs bill, and hence they were likely to benefit 
from trade with Mexico and Canada.
544
 Another significant factor that influenced the 
congressional approval process for NAFTA was public opinion. In 1991, Gallup polls 
found support for NAFTA at a significantly high level of more than 70%. This figure fell 
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dramatically by the fall of 1992. In September 1992, a Gallup poll showed that only 54% 
of the population favored NAFTA.
545
 At the time of the passage of NAFTA, public 
opinion was virtually evenly split. With regard to the effect of NAFTA on U.S. exports to 
Mexico and job creation too in early November Gallup polls found public opinion to be 
evenly divided.
546
  A preview of other public opinion polls is as follows: (1) In early 
November 1993, a Time/CNN poll found that while 41% of the population supported 
NAFTA, 39% opposed it and 20% were undecided; (2) In early November 1993, ABC 
News found the public evenly divided on the issue of NAFTA, with 42% supporting and 
42% opposing it; (3) In November 1993, a CBS/New York Times poll found 37% in 
favor and 41% against NAFTA.
547
 Mixed response by the public over NAFTA was the 
consequence of a contentious political process in Congress, in conjunction with a high 
level of media attention on the issue. Overall politicians in Washington recognized the 
latent underpinning of public support for NAFTA and in turn explored the prospects of 
forging a rare bipartisan consensus. Such underlying public support for NAFTA became 
stronger immediately in the aftermath of congressional approval of the trade deal. An 
NBC/Wall Street Journal poll found that 53% of Americans said it was a “step in the 
right direction,” and just 33% said it was a “step in the wrong direction.”548 Public 
opinion in conjunction with electoral imperatives was instrumental in achieving a 
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nonconventional bipartisan coalition in Congress. Therefore, a conclusion can be drawn 
in support of the given hypothesis for the case of congressional approval of NAFTA.  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) 
Background: The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) was a major 
international arms control treaty that was signed by President Bill Clinton. This treaty 
was intended to ban underground nuclear weapons testing worldwide. It was a key step 
toward complying with the obligations of Article VI of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT).
549
 The strategic significance of the treaty made it highly controversial in 
Washington because of its direct implications on national security and arms control. 
Partisan conflict between the Democratic White House and the Republican Senate were 
profound, resulting in full-scale legislative-executive contestation. CTBT was signed by 
President Clinton on September 24, 1996.
550
 Clinton submitted the treaty to the United 
States Senate for advice and consent one year later on September 22, 1997.
551
 As a 
classic case portraying conditions of divided government and polarized politics, the treaty 
was expected to encounter a contentious ratification process. In the end, the United States 
Senate rejected CTBT on October 13, 1999, by a vote of 48 to 51 with 1 abstention.
552
 
Analysis of the CTBT ratification process reveals the potential difficulties of finding 
common ground to forge bipartisan consensus, especially in a divided government setup 
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marked by partisan conflict.
553
 Long-term political ramifications of the treaty’s demise 
were far-reaching for arms control. This case reinforces the assertion that constitutional 
provisions allow the treaty process to be a contentious foreign policy issue area, which is 
often marked by a continuum of consensus and dissension in the modern era.     
Hypothesis 1: Unified government facilitates consensus-building in treaty 
consent process, while divided government does not. When the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty was submitted to the United States Senate under the conditions of divided 
government, political tension on partisan lines between the Republican Senate and the 
Democratic White House was at an all-time high. As a result, the clash of titans between 
Congress and the president was almost a certainty. Also, the domestic political 
environment was conducive to partisan conflict. President Clinton was in the last two 
years of his second term, the so-called lame duck session, and the country was bracing 
for a tough presidential election cycle. Republicans were desperate to regain control of 
the White House after eight years. Amidst such political tension, the prospects of finding 
common ground at the congressional-presidential level were exceedingly slim.  
However, there was also an extraordinary situation unique to the political 
environment of the 106
th
 Congress (1999-2001), and that further enhanced political 
complications. In the Senate, where CTBT was expected to come up for advice and 
consent in the due course of time, the year witnessed intensely divisive politics because 
of the Senate trial of President Clinton, following his impeachment by the House of 
Representatives.
554
 The prevailing high level of partisan animosity under the conditions 
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of divided government worsened the dynamics of the already contentious CTBT 
ratification process. The treaty virtually became a pawn of brinksmanship and was 
destined to face serious political challenges in Congress. Once the president transmitted 
CTBT to the Senate for advice and consent, political contestation at the congressional-
presidential level lingered for about two years.
555
 Ultimately, on October 13, 1999, the 
Senate rejected the Treaty on a mostly party-line vote of 48 to 51 with 1 abstention.
556
 
Conditions of divided government dominated the treaty consent process throughout, 
resulting in legislative-executive dissension. Importantly, there was a remarkable amount 
of intraparty consensus within both the political parties. In the run-up to the roll-call vote, 
partisan division and political gamesmanship overshadowed any attempts at interbranch 
cooperation.
557
 The continuum of consensus and dissension in legislative-executive 
relations was overwhelmingly discernible during the treaty consent process.  
From the outset, the CTBT received cold treatment in the Senate. The typology of 
divided government was critical in setting the stage for a contentious political process. 
The treaty was held to be strategically flawed by its opponents. Notwithstanding 
significant differences between the Democratic White House and the Republican Senate, 
in his letter of transmittal President Clinton asked the Senate for speedy consent and 
approval. The letter assured members of the Senate about the long-term merits of the 
treaty as mentioned in the following lines:  
The Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is of singular significance to 
the continuing efforts to stem nuclear proliferation and strengthen global 
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stability. Its conclusion marks the achievement of the highest priority on 
the international arms control and nonproliferation agenda…….I believe 
that the Comprehensive Nuclear Test-Ban Treaty is in the best interest of 
the United States. Its provisions will significantly further our nuclear non-
proliferation and arms control objectives and strengthen international 
security. Therefore, I urge the Senate to give early and favorable 
consideration to the Treaty and its advice and consent to the ratification as 
soon as possible.
558
  
 
In this letter, the president pointed out the various safety and security provisions of CTBT 
with regard to verification and monitoring of nuclear weapons and their sites. He also 
assured the Senate about the effectiveness of the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) 
and provisions of strict enforceability of the treaty in the international community. 
Nevertheless, each one of these features became contentious and a source of heated 
debate in Senate proceedings during the ratification process. A majority of the 
Republican senators were in complete denial of the accuracy of the claims that the 
president made. The differences between Senate Republicans and the president reflected 
the partisan divide across Pennsylvania Avenue. This was evident when Senator Jesse 
Helms (R-N.C.), Chairman of the powerful Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
expressed his reservations about committee consideration of CTBT.
559
 In a letter to 
President Clinton, dated January 21, 1998, Senator Helms categorically stated his 
position: 
Mr. President, let me be clear. I will be prepared to schedule Committee 
consideration of the CTBT only after the Senate has had the opportunity to 
consider and vote on the Kyoto Protocol and the amendments to the ABM 
treaty. When the administration has submitted these treaties, and when the 
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Senate has completed its consideration of them, then and only then, will 
the Foreign Relations Committee consider the CTBT.
560
   
In response to the letter of Senator Helms, President Clinton in his State of the Union 
Address on January 27, 1998 once again asked the Senate to give its consent to the 
treaty.
561
  The battle lines between the Republican Senate and the Democratic White 
House were drawn based on the contours of divided government. Legislative-executive 
dissension got more intense because of a deficit of trust between Senate Republicans and 
the president regarding the controversial provisions of CTBT. Also, the administration 
did a poor job in aggressively lobbying and consulting with pivotal Republican leaders 
about how the treaty would be implemented.
562
 Such “tactical blunders” by President 
Clinton and Senate Democrats to seek common ground put prominent “internationalist” 
Republicans such as Senators John W. Warner of Virginia (Chairman, Senate Armed 
Services Committee), Pete V. Domenici of New Mexico, Richard G. Lugar of Indiana, 
and Ted Stevens of Alaska in the camp of other, isolationist GOP colleagues.
563
 In 
addition, tensions between the Republican Senate and the Clinton White House took an 
unexpected escalation in the wake of Clinton’s impeachment and trial procedures on 
Capitol Hill in the winter of 1998.
564
 Subsequently, the Senate tried in every way to block 
CTBT and deprive President Clinton of attaining a coveted “legacy trip” in ensuring a 
major foreign policy triumph just 15 months before the completion of his second term in 
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office.
565
 Eventually, CTBT became a pawn of political gamesmanship, in which the two 
opposing parties in a divided government setup were fully committed toward intense 
contestation.  
This was also the time when crucial hearings took place in the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee and the Senate Armed Services Committee. Those who testified on 
behalf of the administration before the Senate Armed Services Committee were William 
S. Cohen (Secretary of Defense), Bill Richardson (Secretary of Energy), and General 
Henry H. Shelton (Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff).  Others who testified were James R. 
Schlesinger (former Secretary of Defense), and General John M. Shalikashvili (former 
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff). During the hearings, Senator John Warner (R-Va.), 
Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, expressed his serious concerns about 
the implications of CTBT on U.S. national security. In the opening remarks of the crucial 
hearings on October 6, 1999, in which Secretary Cohen and General Shelton were 
supposed to testify, Senator Warner voiced his concerns and set the stage for contentious 
committee procedures:   
I believe the burden is on the administration in this important treaty to 
prove almost beyond a reasonable doubt that the ratification of this treaty 
is in the National security interests of the United States today, tomorrow, 
and decades hence. This is a tough case. We are being asked to give up 
permanently – our tried and true ability to maintain the safety and 
reliability of our nuclear stockpile, subject to this monitoring system 
largely composed of computers, and to rely, as I say, on our computer 
simulation and modeling capability. That capability, while it is in 
progress, is not present today and it is inconclusive as to how soon it can 
be developed and whether in fact it will be able to be developed to replace 
the accuracy of the data……Simply put, CTBT at this point in time could 
jeopardize our ability to remain a stockpile that is safe……No previous 
president has ever proposed a test ban of zero yield and unlimited 
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duration…..CTBT will not allow us to replace aging or unsafe weapons in 
the future.
566
      
The remarks of Senator Warner, who by and large represented the general perception of 
Senate Republicans, were critical of the treaty provisions. Such comments were 
indicative of a contentious treaty consent process that was expected under the conditions 
of divided government. In return, Senate Democrats, spearheaded by Senator Carl Levin 
(D-Mich.), refuted the claims made by Republican senators when Levin stated,  
The CTBT, if it comes into effect, will increase significantly our ability to 
observe and monitor tests because it will create an international 
monitoring system of 321 monitoring stations in 90 countries…….The 
CTBT would make it harder for nations that already have advanced 
nuclear weapons to improve them…..I cannot understand why, when we 
have already decided to forgo nuclear testing ourselves, we would not 
support a Treaty that places constraints on the ability of other nations to 
engage in such testing…… it is important that this Treaty be ratified, but it 
is also important that it not be defeated.
567
  
 
Such viewpoints of Senate Democrats were supported by Defense Secretary Cohen, 
General Shelton, and General Shalikashvili in their testimonies. In due course of the 
hearing procedure, Secretary Cohen and General Shelton were grilled by Senate 
Republicans such as Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), Jeff Sessions (R-AL), Olympia 
Snowe (R-ME), and James M. Inhofe (R-OK). Senator Thurmond, while asking 
questions of Secretary Cohen, directly accused the administration with his following 
remarks: 
I believe that the CTBT may significantly weaken the National security of 
the United States…….I agree with Chairman Helms568 that the United 
States has more urgent priorities than an unverifiable, ineffective, and 
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undesirable nuclear test ban. The administration’s political calendar is 
dictating the urgent push for ratification
569…….While this Treaty will tie 
our hands, other nations will proceed to test in secret.
570
  
 
While denying Senator Snowe’s (R-ME) criticism of President Clinton’s support for a 
zero-yield CTBT, Senator Levin (D-MI) advocated that a zero-yield CTBT would make 
it harder for other countries to maintain existing stockpiles.
571
 He asserted, “A zero yield 
Test Ban Treaty will make it harder and more expensive for other nations to become 
nuclear states.”572  
           The political dynamics of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was also 
characterized by interbranch competition, thereby further diminishing any prospects of 
political convergence between the president and Senate Republicans. The hearing process 
and subsequent deliberations were highly politicized.
573
 In his opening remarks, 
Chairman Helms (R- N.C.) made it very clear about his intentions of not supporting 
CTBT. He stated that U.S. foreign policy experts were generally against treaty 
ratification. Helms added, 
Four former Directors of Central Intelligence have weighed in against the 
CTBT, including two of President Clinton’s CIA Directors….two former 
chairmen of Joint Chiefs are likewise strongly opposed, and yesterday the 
Senate received a letter signed by six – count them, six – former 
Secretaries of Defense. In any case, perhaps we should be reminded that 
it’s not the Republicans who asked for this vote [CTBT ratification]. It 
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was forced upon us by the President and all 45 Senators on the other side 
of the aisle.
574
  
 
The comments made by Senator Helms were highly political. On one hand, he attempted 
to show evidence of general distaste among retired defense and intelligence officials for 
CTBT. On the other hand, he directly blamed the president for the political impasse that 
had erupted over the issue of CTBT. This classic political overtone was reminiscent of 
the divided government in existence on either side of Pennsylvania Avenue. In return, the 
ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator Joseph Biden (D- 
DE) criticized Helms about his low priority for CTBT.  Biden said,  
I would argue it is the first hearing as well as the final hearing.
575
 And as it 
relates to a clear consensus of the foreign policy community, I would ask, 
rather than take the time now, to enter in the record a list of prominent 
individuals including the present and five former Joint Chiefs of Staff, as 
well as 32 Nobel laureates, et cetera, and so if we can duel on who 
supports what, I am confident that there are more prominent Americans, 
particularly scientists, who support this than oppose it…576  
 
The political rhetoric that characterized heated exchanges between the chairman and the 
ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in the very beginning of the 
CTBT hearings provides for ample evidence of the partisan divide that was witnessed 
during the ratification debate. Political deliberations were reduced to a clash of political 
egotism between the Democratic proponents and Republican opponents.  
Among the key speakers who testified before the Senate Foreign Relations 
Committee were Madeleine K. Albright (Secretary of State) and Caspar W. Weinberger 
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(former Secretary of Defense). While Secretary Albright represented the point of view of 
the Democratic White House, Secretary Weinberger represented the Republican Senate. 
By and large, this was a perfect lineup for dramatizing the prospects of partisan politics in 
an already tension-ridden and divided government setup. As was expected, Secretary 
Weinberger opposed CTBT when he said,  
…the treaty means we would be committing ourselves in perpetuity, 
forever, not to use the most effective means of being able to assure us and 
the world that our stockpile works, and for that reason I would very much 
oppose the treaty, and I would hope the Senate would, too.
577
  
 
Albright, on the other hand, supported the treaty. While welcoming the Secretary of State 
to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, ranking member Biden (D-DE) set the tone 
for a positive appraisal of CTBT, thereby refuting the claims made earlier by Helms and 
Weinberger. Biden said in his statement, 
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is manifestly in the security interests 
of the United States…..Ratification of the test ban treaty is in our national 
security interests because the treaty is going to help reduce the ability of 
nations to join the nuclear club or to field sophisticated nuclear weapons 
they do not now have….The CTBT is in our interest because it will cap 
the nuclear programs of the existing nuclear powers, thus giving our 
military planners greater certainty about the arsenals of possible 
adversaries.
578
 
 
  
Echoing a similar proposition, Albright made a powerful statement in a highly 
convincing manner, thereby making every effort to dismiss the claims of 
Weinberger. Her main arguments were: 
Under the Treaty [CTBT], America would retain a safe and reliable 
nuclear deterrent, but by preventing testing, the treaty will inhibit the 
development of more advanced weapons by other nuclear weapons states 
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and make it harder for countries that do not now have such weapons to 
build them…..We can keep our weapons fully safe and reliable under the 
provisions of the treaty and the special safeguards President Clinton has 
proposed. This view is echoed by our senior military leaders, including 
General Hugh Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, and four of his 
predecessors, and has been supported consistently by the chiefs of all our 
Armed Services…..The CTBT would improve our ability to deter and 
detect clandestine nuclear weapons activity in three ways. First, every 
signatory would be required to accept intrusive monitoring. Second, the 
treaty establishes a comprehensive international verification 
regime…..Third, the treaty would give us the right to call for onsite 
inspections when we have evidence that a test has occurred…..The CTBT 
prohibits all explosive tests, and we would take any sign of cheating very 
seriously….579 
 
Albright’s testimony was very comprehensive, covering the gamut of the provisions of 
CTBT. However, her words did not conform with the critical appraisal made earlier by 
prominent Senate Republicans such as Senator Jesse Helms (Chairman, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee) and Senator John Warner (Chairman, Senate Armed Services 
Committee). Such hearings further exacerbated the already existing political fault line 
between Congress and the president, almost to the crisis point. After the hearing 
procedures were over, Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) said, “Just in the last 
two days, in hearings before the Armed Services Committee and the Foreign Relations 
Committee, it's become apparent that this Treaty is flawed -- should not be ratified, now 
or in the foreseeable future.”580 Such a political development had adverse ramifications 
down the line when the Senate took up CTBT for floor debate and roll-call voting. The 
political gridlock between the Democratic White House and Republican Congress was 
distinctly observable in the Senate debate, when CTBT was ultimately rejected by a 51-
48 margin. The yeas were substantially less than the required number of 67.  
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The political process associated with Senate debate on CTBT and the dramatic 
manner in which the roll-call vote was conducted on the Senate floor was unique. In the 
Senate debate, Republicans reiterated their concern that the treaty would not ensure that 
other nations would comply with its provisions. They also argued that if CTBT were 
ratified, it would be difficult for the United States to ensure the viability of its own 
strategic nuclear stockpile. Senate Republicans utterly rejected the Democrats’ viewpoint 
that failure to ratify CTBT would send a wrong message to other nations interested in 
joining the nuclear club.
581
 Among others, key Republican Senators who took part 
actively in Senate debate were Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS), Jesse Helms 
(R-N.C.)
582
, John Warner (R-VA)
583
, John Kyl (R-AZ), and James Inhofe (R-OK). On the 
Democratic side, the political heavyweights were Senate Minority Leader Tom Daschle 
(D-S.D.), Carl Levin (D-MI)
584
, Joseph Biden (D-DE)
585
, Dianne Feinstein (D-CA), and 
Barbara Boxer (D-CA).  
In the executive session of the Senate debate on CTBT, Daschle pointed out that 
CTBT did not get enough time for consideration. In fact, he brought in on the Senate 
record a comparative chart of the time for consideration of all other major international 
treaties for the period 1972-99.
586
 This concern was echoed by Senator Robert Byrd (D-
W.V.), who expressed dissatisfaction with the inadequate time given by Senate 
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Republicans for the consideration of the CTBT.
587
 In fact, indirectly, Daschle and Byrd 
were criticizing the high level of partisan politics that was rampant in the divided 
government setup of the 106
th
 Congress. This partisan politics on the procedural level 
was also heavily criticized by President Clinton in his news conference on October 14, 
1999.
588
 The Republicans by and large ignored all such criticism. To worsen the politics 
of animosity and extreme rhetoric in the divided government setup in the 106
th
 Congress, 
there was a war of words, especially between Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.). Daschle 
said, “This is a terrible, terrible mistake. If politics don’t stop at the water’s edge, nothing 
does.” Senator Helms considered CTBT as “the most egregious Treaty ever submitted to 
the Senate for advice and consent….a dangerous Treaty” that deserved the Senate’s 
rejection.
589
 
 However, the really problematic issues on which the Senate Republicans and 
Democrats encountered major differences again concerned verification, monitoring, 
enforceability, nuclear stockpile, nonproliferation, and the ultimate implications for 
national security. In his statement, Helms referred to the letter written by Henry 
Kissinger, former Secretary of State, voicing utmost concern about the national security 
implications of CTBT on the United States.
590
 Voicing such concerns, Helms stated, 
The CTBT is a dangerous treaty which, if ratified, would do enormous 
harm to our national security. It will not and cannot accomplish its highly 
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exaggerated stated goal of halting the spread of nuclear 
weapons…..Unable – indeed unwilling even to try to respond to these 
facts, the White House has spitefully argued that Republicans are playing 
politics with the national security of the United States – a spurious charge, 
which is one of the many reasons why the Administration has failed to 
convince Senators who have raised substantive concerns…..We [the 
Senate Republicans] are opposed because the CTBT is unverifiable, and 
because it will endanger the safety and reliability of the U.S. nuclear 
arsenal. Those who support the CTBT have failed to make a compelling 
case, and that, Mr. President, is precisely why the CTBT is headed for 
defeat.
591
 
 
Such rhetorical comments were highly detrimental in seeking compromises on a crucial 
issue like CTBT and further intensified the vitriolic tone of the day’s politics. Politicians 
across party lines did not want to budge an inch from their respective positions, in a 
typical pattern of political gridlock catalyzed further by a divided government set up. To 
counterattack the Republican criticisms, Democrats fired back. Senator Dianne 
Feinstein’s (D-Calif.) comments on the issue clarify this point:  
The treaty [CTBT] is a key element of global non-proliferation 
regime….The CTBT will constrain the development of nuclear 
capabilities by rogue states, as well as the development of more advanced 
weapons by declared nuclear states…..The CTBT will improve the U.S. 
ability to detect and deter nuclear tests…..The CTBT will make the world 
a safer place and safeguard U.S. national security interests…..The treaty’s 
onsite verification provisions will increase our current verification 
capabilities…..With the Stockpile Stewardship Program (SSP) further 
nuclear testing is not necessary to maintain the safety and reliability of the 
U.S. arsenal.
592
  
 
Feinstein’s viewpoints were largely supported by the Democratic Caucus. For instance, 
Senator Carl Levin (D-MI) expressed deep concern about the political brinksmanship that 
was being played on the Senate floor purely on a partisan basis, to take advantage of the 
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divided- government political scenario. He echoed the sentiments of the administration, 
its point men, and other prominent officials who testified in support of the treaty.
593
  
One of the most outspoken opponents of the treaty was Republican Senator John 
Kyl (R-AZ), who severely criticized the CTBT and took away the momentum of the 
debate in favor of the Republican Party.  In his speech, Kyl reiterated the Republican 
Party’s opposition as: 
The inescapable fact about the CTBT is that it is a fatally flawed treaty – it 
jeopardizes this Nation’s nuclear deterrent, it will not contribute to the 
cause of nonproliferation, and it is unverifiable and unenforceable….The 
CTBT is unverifiable, meaning that states who choose to violate the CTBT 
may never be caught, and it is unenforceable, meaning that violators who 
are caught will likely go unpunished.
594
  
 
Kyl also referred to the letter (dated October 13, 1999) that former Secretary of State 
Henry Kissinger wrote to Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman SFRC, expressing his concern 
and disapproval for the CTBT.  GOP Senators Helms and Inhofe expressed their strong 
reservations about President Clinton’s zero-yield provision in CTBT, that is, no testing at 
all for an unlimited duration.
595
 GOP Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), a well-respected 
expert on national security, provided a thoughtful indictment of the CTBT as mentioned 
below: 
The treaty will prevent the United States from ensuring the reliability, 
effectiveness and safety of our nation’s nuclear deterrent; the treaty is 
not verifiable – not only due to our simple technical inability effectively 
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to monitor for tests, but due to lack of agreement on what tests are 
permitted or not permitted in the treaty…..This Treaty simply has no 
teeth.
596
 
  
Heated deliberations between Senate Democrats and Republicans during the hearing 
proceedings at the Senate Armed Services Committee were reflections of intraparty 
consensus in conjunction with a partisan divide, leading to legislative-executive 
dissension under the conditions of divided government. The political climate in the 106
th
 
Congress, in turn, was marked by extreme rhetoric and animosity that was explicit 
throughout the entire CTBT ratification debate. It significantly diminished the chances of 
any compromise. The Senate and the president in this divided government setup kept 
hanging onto their respective positions, which enhanced the political gridlock. Dissension 
in the political process during the CTBT ratification debate was the consequence of the 
presence of divided government. Political passion and partisan politics in the divided 
government set up carried the day. Ideological, procedural, and substantive differences 
between the Republican Congress and the Democratic White House remained at a very 
high level and were further reinforced by the politics of divided government. Even on 
substantive and technical issues, despite the testimonies given by various experts, 
Democrats and Republicans were not able to develop compromises for consensus 
building, primarily because of the polarization of politics in a divided government.  
Political passion was so high that the members of the Senate on both sides of the aisle 
were not even willing to properly accommodate each other’s viewpoints on the merits of 
the arguments and testimonies – a classic situation of political gridlock, primarily 
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fomented by deep cleavages in a situation of divided government politics.
597
 Empirical 
evidence shows that even if there could have been some compromises in a typical 
situation of normal politics, there was no willingness, or perhaps incentive, on the part of 
either the Republican or Democratic Party to reach into any viable consensus in the case 
of ratification of the CTBT.
598
 Very often, it appeared that the various provisions of the 
treaty, along with their hearing testimonies, were debated with political overtones and 
rhetoric that were inflamed by the structural composition of divided government and a 
polarized political environment. The Republican Party did not want to provide an 
opportunity for the Democratic Clinton Administration to claim a “legacy trip,” 
particularly in the presidential election cycle when the Republicans were desperate to 
gain control of the White House.
599
 So it was a virtual political deadlock on every front.  
            With regard to the CTBT case study presence of divided government provided 
enabling institutional environment for partisan animosity to play. Even though divided 
government and partisan animosity are different variables, with overlapping elements, 
evidence from the above investigation shows that formation of divided government 
facilitated partisanship to dominate the proceedings in the Senate. Unlike INF Treaty, 
where implications of partisan politics were minimal despite divided government setting 
as discussed earlier in the chapter, the CTBT case study presents a completely different 
political dynamic in which divided government had a complimentary effect on partisan 
wrangling. A conjectural question may be raised here as to whether similar outcome 
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would have been possible in a unified government setting with same level of partisan 
animosity. On the whole based on the findings from the investigation conclusion can be 
drawn that divided government had credible implications in reaching legislative-
executive dissension. Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted with regard to the CTBT case 
study.  
 Hypothesis 2: Ideological differences and partisan fault lines influence treaty 
consent process.   The Senate ratification process of CTBT bears significant evidence of 
the presence of deep partisan fault lines between the Republican Senate and the 
Democratic White House. The effects of partisan divide resulted in legislative-executive 
dissension and in turn offset all efforts taken toward a conciliatory political process that 
could have opened the door for viable consensus. From the very outset, Senator Jesse 
Helms (R-N.C.), Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made it clear that 
CTBT was not a priority for his committee to consider in the near future.
600
 Also, very 
little time was allotted by the Republican Senate to debate the treaty in a comprehensive 
manner on the Senate floor. Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and another 
influential Democratic Senator, Robert Byrd (D-W.V.), blamed partisan divide for such 
inadequate opportunity for congressional deliberations.
601
 For the purpose of expediting 
Senate consideration of CTBT before the next presidential election, Senate Democrats 
and the president himself kept pressing the Republican Senate for the whole of 1998 and 
most of 1999 to take up consideration of the treaty and to give consent. The Democrats 
miscalculated the tactical move, camouflaged by hyperpartisan dimensions, of Senate 
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Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS). The Senate Democrats thought that Lott did not have 
enough Republican votes to block the successful passage of the treaty, hence he avoided 
taking up the measure despite repeated requests. What the Senate Democrats failed to 
realize was that Lott had already amassed enough Republican votes to reject the treaty. 
Since the spring of 1999, a small group of influential Republican senators, under the 
leadership of John Kyl (R-AZ) and Paul Coverdell (R-GA) had been working to garner 
adequate Republican votes against CTBT.
602
 What Lott was doing was to wait until a 
propitious time for a roll-call vote to take place, and the Senate Democrats inadvertently 
fell into the hyperpartisan trap. Once the Senate Democrats attempted to compel Lott to 
take up the treaty by a margin of 55-45, he was ready to take up the treaty for Senate 
consideration.
603
  In fact, by doing that, Lott totally surprised the Senate Democrats. On 
September 30, 1999, Majority Leader Lott allowed to move forward with an expedited 
action on the treaty and asked unanimous consent that CTBT be discharged from the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee for Senate consideration.
604
 With that action, Senate 
consideration of the CTBT started formally on October 6, 1999, and ultimately ended 
with the rejection of the treaty on October 13, 1999 by a margin of 51 nays, 48 yeas, and 
1 present (Senator Robert Byrd).
605
 Expressing a deep sense of surprise in his press 
conference, President Clinton said:  
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So this whole thing came as a complete surprise to us when we realized 
that we had 8 or 10 days on a subject that we thought they had decided 
in a determined way not to bring up, because Senator Helms had made it 
clear that he didn’t want to bring it up, and he wouldn’t even talk about 
it until he disposed of two other treaties that he said were ahead of it in 
his consideration. We had no earthly idea that it was going to be on the 
Senate calendar.
606
 
  
In addition to the deep partisan dynamics in the treaty consent process, there was also an 
ideological dimension that needs attention here. As part of a serious political 
miscalculation, Senate Democrats and the Clinton Administration had been banking 
throughout on the support of moderate Republicans in the Senate to garner the requisite 
two-thirds majority vote for treaty ratification. Although 24 moderate Republican 
senators out of a total of 62 senators signed a letter written by Senators John W. Warner 
(R-VA) and Daniel P. Moynihan (D-N.Y.) and requested Majority Leader Trent Lott to 
postpone the vote, three conservative GOP senators – Tim Hutchinson (Arkansas), 
Robert C. Smith (New Hampshire), and James M. Inhofe (Oklahoma) – objected to such 
a measure.
607
 But in the final roll-call vote, when CTBT went down by a margin of 51-
48, all 44 Senate Democrats were joined by only four moderate Republican senators  
John H. Chafee (R.I.), James M. Jeffords (VT), Gordon Smith (OR), and Arlen Specter 
(PA).
608
 After the defeat of CTBT, four influential moderate Republican senators – 
Chuck Hagel (NE), John McCain (AZ), John W. Warner (VA), and Thad Cochran (MS) 
– along with 12 other moderate Republicans later in various interviews expressed regret 
regarding their “nay” vote while extending their consent “to continue the seven-year-old 
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U.S. moratorium on nuclear tests.”609 Hence, it was evident that ideological distance 
between the far-right and moderate conservatives within the Republican Party also was in 
play in the final vote count. But overall, the congressional approval process was 
overwhelmingly dominated by hyperpartisan dimensions which created difficult 
parliamentary and procedural obstacles, leading to the ultimate demise of the treaty. In 
the final analysis, it can be inferred that the implications of partisan and ideological 
dimensions in varying intensity determined the contours of consensus and dissension at 
various stages during the CTBT consent process.  
              Hypothesis 3: Intraparty disagreement/cleavage causes dissension in treaty 
consent process. During the CTBT consent process, there was hardly any intraparty 
dissension, except when four Republican senators switched sides at the time of roll-call 
voting. On the contrary, the political process was dominated by partisan politics, 
characterized by a high level of passion and emotions between the Democrats and the 
Republicans. Roll-call voting suggested that the votes were cast mainly on the basis of 
party lines. All Republicans, except for four moderates, John H. Chafee (R.I.), James M. 
Jeffords (VT), Gordon Smith (OR), and Arlen Specter (PA), voted against the treaty.
610
 
Only these four moderate Republican senators switched sides. Hence, there was no 
significant amount of political dissension inside the two political parties. There was 
100% party cohesion among the Senate Democrats and 93% party cohesion among the 
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Senate Republicans.
611
 Hence, it can be concluded that the hypothesis was not 
meaningfully evident in the case of CTBT.  
                Hypothesis 4: Effects of intraparty dissension are mitigated by a 
comparatively higher degree of bipartisanship. In the case of treaty ratification of 
CTBT, there was no evidence of any significant bipartisanship. The treaty was rejected 
completely on partisan lines. Even if there was a very nominal level of intraparty split in 
the Republican Party when four senators defected and voted in favor of the treaty 
alongside the Democratic senators, the resultant bipartisanship was not enough to 
mitigate the dominant effects of partisan divide. This was evident when the Senate 
ultimately rejected CTBT by a margin of 48-51. Hence, the conclusion can be drawn here 
that for the CTBT ratification process, the given hypothesis had no tangible effect.    
                Hypothesis 5: More extensive debate in Congress facilitates finding common 
ground that increases the propensity of legislative-executive consensus. During the 
CTBT consent process, there was insufficient debate time allotted by the Senate 
Republicans. The treaty was always a low priority for the Republican senators, who in 
turn “offered the Democrats only ten hours of Senate debate on the treaty.”612 Senate 
proceedings make it evident that little time was allotted by the Senate Republicans, 
perhaps due to tactical reasons, for Senate consideration of the treaty. Senate Democrats 
such as Minority Leader Tom Daschle (D-S.D.) and Robert Byrd (D-W.V.) blamed the 
controlling Republican Party for that matter.
613
  Whatever amount of hearings and 
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deliberations took place, they generally inflamed the rhetoric and intensity of partisan 
politics. Instead of bridging the gap between the Senate Democrats and Senate 
Republicans, the nominal amount of deliberations were characterized by polarized 
politics. Comments and testimonies were interpreted with political overtones.
614
 The 
contentious issues, such as verification, monitoring, national security, and the stockpile 
stewardship program were interpreted purely from the perspective of partisan politics. 
For instance, on the joint statements by the three Nuclear Weapons Laboratory Directors, 
there were different interpretations made by the senators based on party lines.
615
 While 
the Senate Democrats generally expressed satisfaction with their comments on the 
efficacy of the CTBT on national security, the Senate Republicans were not impressed 
and bore apprehensions.
616
 These specimens of the debate procedures further accentuated 
the political partisanship in a divided government setup during the ratification process of 
the CTBT.  
 From the empirical investigations outlined in the previous hypotheses, this study 
concludes that during the ratification debate of CTBT, the complexities associated 
actually deepened the already existing dissension between the Senate Republicans and 
their Democratic counterparts. Insufficient time for debate proceedings also denied any 
chances for amendments and reservations, which normally help to find some kind of 
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common ground to facilitate consensus building between Congress and the president.
617
 
Hence, it can be concluded that evidence does not support the prediction of the given 
hypothesis.  
              Hypothesis 6: High salience and media coverage increase the propensity of 
legislative-executive consensus. Despite its rejection by the Senate, CTBT was regarded 
a major international treaty of epic proportion. It generated a high level of publicity in the 
media. Media attention in the New York Times for the time period from January 1, 1999 
to December 31, 1999 was substantial. This is evident from the following statistics: (1) 
Total number of times CTBT was mentioned in any document type in the New York 
Times 545; (2) Total number of front-page stories  81; and (3) Total number of editorial 
articles – 57.618  The high level of media attention influenced the treaty consent process in 
the Senate and also revealed the extent of partisan animosity in the political process. 
While the New York Times recorded 127 documents of all types from January 1 to 
December 31, 1999, the Washington Post recorded 134 documents for the same period 
about the treaty.
619
 For each of these major newspapers, the coverage was at the highest 
level in the month of October 1999, because of the ensuing congressional debate and roll-
call voting schedule.
620
 The high level of media coverage shaped the dynamics of 
congressional deliberations to a significant extent. The October 6, 1999 edition of the 
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New York Times reported that 32 Nobel laureates in physics urged the U.S. Senate to 
ratify CTBT, as it was “central to future efforts to halt the spread of nuclear weapons” 
and that United States approval was “imperative” in advancing such global policy.621 In a 
letter to the editor in the New York Times (dated October 9, 1999), former CIA Director 
Stansfield Turner urged the Senate to ratify the treaty, in order to put pressure on other 
countries “to come into force to do the same.”622 Apart from influencing domestic 
politics, media power was successful in generating foreign pressure during the CTBT 
ratification debate. In a major opinion piece in the New York Times (dated October 8, 
1999), three influential heads of government – French President Jacques Chirac, British 
Prime Minister Tony Blair, and German Chancellor Gerhard Schroeder – urged the U.S. 
Senate to approve the treaty.
623
  
               The mainstream media campaign in support of the treaty prompted action from 
Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS). However, such action proved to be a double-
edged sword which would have hardly pleased CTBT supporters, while simultaneously 
satisfying the treaty opponents (mainly the Republican base). This was a classic situation 
of overlapping consensus and dissension in the political process. Lott, while sensing that 
he had sufficient votes to defeat the measure comfortably on the Senate floor, “surprised 
the Democrats by proposing, in a unanimous consent agreement (UCA), for very quick 
scheduling of a floor vote, after the pact was suddenly fast-tracked though Senator 
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Helms’s SFRC with only minimal discussion at the hearings.”624 Such an action plan by 
the Senate Majority Leader started the next round of the media campaign by the 
proponents and opponents of the treaty. Apart from the normal coverage in regular cable 
news channels, television talk shows also became an important forum to put pressure on 
the Senate to ratify CTBT. In a last-ditch effort to save the treaty just three days prior to 
the Senate vote, top Clinton administration officials were “in an all-out effort to persuade 
the Senate to delay this week's vote on a nuclear test ban treaty, warning that its rejection 
would damage U.S. prestige and hinder non-proliferation efforts.”625 For instance, 
Defense Secretary William S. Cohen and General Henry H. Shelton (Chairman, Joint 
Chiefs of Staff) jointly appeared on NBC’s “Meet the Press” on October 10, 1999. The 
same day, Secretary of State Madeleine K. Albright appeared on ABC's “This Week,” 
while Energy Secretary Bill Richardson appeared on “Fox News Sunday.” Senator Jon 
Kyl (R-AZ), an influential opponent of CTBT, also appeared on “Fox News Sunday.”626 
In all such television appearances, the administration officials unanimously pressed the 
Senate to postpone a consent vote, because it was certain that the treaty would fail to get 
a supermajority of 67 votes, should the voting take place on October 13. On the contrary, 
Kyl strongly opposed postponing the Senate vote on the pretext of unnecessary future 
parliamentary maneuvers. Despite the mainstream media’s strong campaign in support of 
the measure, the Senate proceeded with the planned schedule and rejected CTBT.
627
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From the above discussion it can be concluded that evidence does not support the 
prediction of the given hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 7: Electoral imperatives on pivotal opposition players in the 
Senate to get reelected in the ensuing elections by incurring favorable public opinion 
increase the propensity of legislative-executive dissension. Public opinion with regard to 
CTBT was initially slow to register. With the intensification of media coverage toward 
the closing months of debate, opinion polls showed a consistent trend of public approval 
for the treaty. Surprisingly, even then a good percentage of the American people were not 
adequately aware of the CTBT issue. One Gallup poll showed that two-thirds of the 
population only heard about the treaty, and only 25 percent were aware of its defeat in the 
Senate. Overall, only 8 percent of the population closely followed the congressional 
approval proceedings, and another 30 percent somewhat closely.
628
 However, among 
those who were keeping track of the CTBT ratification debate in Congress, a growing 
percentage was in favor of the Senate to ratify the treaty. According to the Gallup poll 
conducted between October 21 and 24, 1999, just about a week after the treaty was 
rejected, 59 percent of respondents said that the Senate should have voted to ratify the 
treaty, as against 29 percent who opposed it.
629
 About 45 days prior to the Senate roll-call 
vote, the New York Times reported on August 30, 1999 that CTBT had an overwhelming 
backing of public opinion, in addition to the support of scientific community, military 
commanders, and arms control groups.
630
 About a month prior to the roll call vote, 
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Senator Byron Dorgan (D-N.D.) and Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA) wrote in USA Today 
that a new bipartisan opinion poll commissioned by the Coalition to Reduce Nuclear 
Dangers found that a whopping 82 percent of the American people wanted the Senate to 
ratify CTBT, as against 14 percent who opposed it.
631
 On October 7, 1999 (about one 
week prior to the roll-call vote) in a press conference, President Clinton mentioned the 
overwhelming public support for the CTBT to put pressure on the Senate to ratify the 
treaty. He said to the Senate members, 
You have heard from Nobel laureates and other experts in nuclear 
weapons. I hope you listen to them. You listen to our military and 
scientific leaders about national missile defense. Listen to them about the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Listen to the religious leaders who say 
it is the right thing to do. Listen to our allies, including nuclear powers 
Britain and France, who say America must continue to lead. And listen to 
the American people who have been for this treaty from the very 
beginning.
632
 
 
The presidential conference depicted a clear picture of a broad spectrum of public support 
among the American people for CTBT. As reiterated by Clinton, evidence showed that 
apart from favorable domestic public opinion, in the international sphere too there was 
high approval for the treaty. For instance, following the defeat of CTBT, the Australia 
reported that despite 80 percent of the American population backing the nuclear deal and 
America’s key European allies, including Britain, France, and Germany, supporting the 
deal, the U.S. Senate did not ratify the treaty.
633
 However, such favorable public opinion 
fell flat in front of the hyperpartisan environment in the Senate. Electoral imperatives 
were also in play. Because of the Clinton impeachment proceedings in Congress and the 
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lack of political capital of the president following this incident, Senate Republicans were 
fully geared up to work against the legacy of the embattled president for electoral benefit 
in the next election cycle. Such election-dominated political exigencies on the part of 
Senate Republicans were constantly in conflict with favorable public opinion throughout 
the treaty consent process. Ultimately, partisan election preferences trumped public 
opinion as far as GOP senators were concerned. 
 Based on the evidence presented above conclusion can be drawn that high 
public opinion did not lead to consensus building. In so far as electoral imperatives were 
concerned, the Republicans were desperate to regain control of the White House in 
ensuing presidential election cycle. Also in the wake of Clinton’s impeachment in the 
House and the prevailing environment of partisan animosity, GOP members in Congress 
looked for every opportunity to oppose presidential endeavors on foreign policy to 
prevent him from building a good legacy. Therefore, it can be inferred that while findings 
on public opinion do not support the prediction of the given hypothesis, electoral 
imperatives basically conforms to the predicted effect.    
Concluding Remarks & Summary of Empirical Findings 
The treaty ratification process directly focuses on an effective power balance 
between Congress and the president within the constitutional principle of institutional 
checks and balances. The treaty process perfectly exemplifies an issue area in which the 
U.S. constitutional design requires political leaders to build consensus in order to avert 
dissension, make compromises, and promote cooperation not only between the two 
houses of Congress, but also between Congress and the president.
634
 Diverse motivational 
                                                          
634
 Bond, Jon R., and Richard Fleisher, ed. 2000. 
213 
 
aspects and policy priorities of pivotal institutional players make the treaty process highly 
contentious and thereby result in a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension. The cases explored in this chapter explain such a political dynamic with 
various hypotheses.  
The conformity/nonconformity of motivational and priority aspects between the 
congressional lawmakers and the president lead to legislative-executive 
consensus/dissension. From the perspective of diverse motivations, the unitary 
institutional nature of the presidency motivates presidents to make foreign policy 
decisions independently. Also, presidents have often tried to expand their powers and 
take unilateral decisions in foreign policymaking because of constitutional ambiguities.
635
 
The matter gets more complex when we look at congressional politics characterized by 
the model of the collective institution. The multimember institutional profile of Congress 
creates multiple interests and different varieties of coalitions, therefore “promoting a 
wide range of collective interests.”636 Congress is a collective institution, and every 
legislator has a motivation to get reelected.
637
 In the absence of a single interest in 
Congress, the complicated dynamics of the intersection of multiple interests drive the 
diverse motivations and policy priorities of congressional lawmakers.
638
 All cases 
discussed in this chapter witness the motivational and policy priority differentials in 
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varied magnitude. The resultant outcome is explicitly seen as a continuum of legislative-
executive consensus and dissension.   
It is evident in this chapter that there is no common thread to reach legislative-
executive consensus in treaty-making and the ratification process. Even though 
theoretically there is a claim that unified government facilitates forging consensus, on 
empirical grounds there is no definite validity to such a claim. The four case studies 
analyzed in this chapter are selected based on unified and divided government 
compositions, under a variety of administrations with different political affiliations. As 
presented in the Table 4.1 we can see that for SALT II (1979), there was unified 
government with a Democratic president (Jimmy Carter) and a Democratic Congress. 
SALT II failed to be ratified. On the contrary, for NAFTA (1993), there was a unified 
government with a Democratic president (Bill Clinton) and a Democratic Congress. 
NAFTA was successfully ratified. As illustrated in the chapter, the political dynamic was 
very different for the two cases, resulting in different outcomes. For the INF Treaty 
(1988), there was divided government, with a Republican president (Ronald Reagan) and 
a Democratic Congress. INF was successfully ratified. In contrast, with CTBT (1999), 
there was divided government, with a Democratic president (Bill Clinton) and a 
Republican Congress. CTBT failed to be ratified. Varied political complexities and 
priorities associated with these two cases led to different outcomes. 
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Table 4.1: Summary of Empirical Findings  
Treaty 
Name 
Year Govt. 
Typology 
Public 
Opinion 
Election Media Ideology Congress and 
Presidency 
Status 
SALT 
II 
Dec 
1979 
Unified 
Govt. 
√ √ x √ Democratic Congress 
Jimmy Carter (D) 
Rejected by 
U.S. Senate 
INF May 
1988 
Divided 
Govt. 
√ √ √ x Democratic Senate 
Ronald Reagan (R) 
Approve by 
U.S. Senate 
NAFT
A 
Nov 
1993 
Unified 
Govt. 
√ √ √ √ Democratic Congress 
Bill Clinton (D) 
Approve by 
U.S. 
Congress 
CTBT Oct 
1999 
Divided 
Govt. 
x √ x √ Republican Senate 
Bill Clinton (D) 
Rejected by 
U.S. Senate 
  
Empirical investigations presented in the Summary of Empirical Findings (Table 
4.1) help to conclude that the independent variables like government typology, ideology, 
media, elections, and public opinion had significant implications on the strategic political 
decision process at the legislative-executive level. Importantly, in the decision-making 
process there were critical moments that shaped future course of political process and 
ultimately influenced final outcome. Nonetheless, each treaty case study had its own 
unique characteristic features that influenced the dynamics of the treaty ratification 
process, based on the prevailing political exigencies. Different political constraints 
complicated various hypotheses explored, resulting in varied outcomes. From all the 
analyses done in this chapter, it also can be concluded that there is no single variable that 
has complete causality in determining the treaty ratification outcome. There are multiple 
factors that act in diverse manners in the ratification process. Summary of empirical 
findings for the four treaty case studies is presented below. 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty SALT II :  Despite the presence of unified 
government SALT II was withdrawn from Senate consideration and ultimately rejected. 
President Carter was unable to generate enough political capital in his favor inside his 
own Democratic Party in order to get the treaty ratified by Congress. Intra-party cleavage 
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inside the ruling Democratic Party in turn was largely responsible for widening the 
ideological distance between the U.S. Senate and the president in determining the fate of 
SALT II. Extensive congressional debate exacerbated legislative-executive dissension. 
Large amount of media coverage on congressional proceedings and other precipitating 
international events also worsened legislative-executive dissension. Electoral imperatives 
of congressional leaders especially for those belonging to the minority GOP along with a 
continuous declining trend in public opinion further increased the propensity of 
legislative-executive dissension. 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF): Despite the presence of 
divided government there was legislative-executive consensus in favor of approval of the 
INF Treaty. There was significant ideological intersection between Senate Democrats and 
Republicans on the issue and intra-party cohesion inside the Democratic Party to support 
the treaty was unprecedented. Extensive debate in the Senate during INF consent process 
facilitated finding common grounds between Democratic and GOP lawmakers. Large 
scale media coverage was broadly supportive of the merits of the treaty and in turn 
considerably helped forging legislative-executive consensus, Favorable electoral 
imperatives and high public opinion also significantly contributed toward legislative-
executive consensus.  
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA):   There was legislative-
executive consensus in a unified government setting. The decision-making process was 
contentious. Ideology was an important factor because traditional conservative 
Republicans and centrist Democrats supported the trade deal while the majority of more 
liberal Democrats voted against the pact. The complexity of intra-party dissension inside 
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the Democratic Party was overridden by the nonconventional bipartisan consensus 
between traditional GOP and conservative Democrats in Congress. Extensive nature of 
Senate and House deliberations played major role in forging non-conventional bipartisan 
alliance. High level of pro-trade media coverage increased the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus. Generally favorable public opinion and positive electoral 
imperatives from NAFTA prospects also helped forge non-conventional bipartisan 
consensus.  
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT):  In a divided government setting there 
was legislative-executive dissension. Heightened levels of partisan animosity and 
ideological divisions between the Senate Republicans and Democrats resulted in 
legislative-executive dissension. Lack of congressional debate further exacerbated 
dissension and denied any opportunity to seek compromises. Extensive media coverage 
had ideological overtone that in turn aggravated legislative-executive dissension and 
denied CTBT approval. Electoral imperatives of opposition GOP senators in the next 
election cycle trumped the implications of treaty favorable public opinion, thereby 
aggravating the degree of legislative-executive dissension during Senate approval process 
of CTBT.    
 Although the hypothesis dealing with unified and/or divided government is the 
primary one, other independent variables act in unique perspective, determining the treaty 
process outcome. Based on the findings, it can be further concluded that there is always a 
grand hypothesis of treaty-making and ratification, unique to a treaty, which takes into 
account a conglomerate of variables whose political context changes very rapidly leading 
to formation of critical moments in the decision process, based on the dynamics of 
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political development in the domestic and international spheres of polity. However, it is 
also important to recognize that although each individual case of treaty-making and 
ratification may have its own situational imperatives or constraints, the broader patterns 
of political process in the constitutional responsibilities of Congress and the president 
remain the same. Finally, it is clearly evident from the findings that treaty ratification in 
an era of divided government and partisan politics traverses through rough political 
terrain, reflecting a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension at 
various stages of the political process. In the end, treaty outcome depends on how the 
political process will unfold in terms of the high-stakes roller-coaster ride that Congress 
and the president are constitutionally mandated to embark on.  
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CHAPTER V 
WAR POWERS RESOLUTION AND U.S. MILITARY INTERVENTION 
Introduction 
The War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), adopted by overriding a presidential 
veto in 1973, is regarded as a major policy intervention which has profound implications 
on legislative-executive prerogatives regarding war powers. As a major turning point in 
U.S. political history, the resolution symbolizes the “resurgence of Congress” in terms of 
heightened levels of congressional assertiveness in the foreign policy arena.
639
 The 
resolution is intended to “rein in a presidency run amok and to reassert congressional 
prerogatives over foreign policy making.”640 In turn it has established strict “parameters 
for desired presidential behavior and subsequent congressional [assertive] action. With a 
few exceptions, presidents have significantly limited the duration of foreign interventions 
to conform to the limits set forth in the Act.”641  
Keeping that in the backdrop, this chapter illustrates the dynamics of 
congressional-presidential relations for nine different U.S. military interventions, when 
Congress took significant legislative actions in order to invoke the War Powers 
Resolution. These cases portray a trajectory of continuum of consensus and dissension 
legislative-executive relations in war powers, as shown in the “Consensus-Dissension 
Continuum Chart” (Figure 5.1). The cases are classified into three categories consistent 
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with the consensus-dissension continuum argument: (1) Legislative-executive 
dissension when the War Powers Resolution was formally invoked (Lebanon MNF – 
1982-84); (2) Flickers of legislative-executive consensus and dissension (Grenada – 
1983; Bosnia-Herzegovina – 1992-95; Kosovo – 1999; Somalia – 1992-94; Haiti – 1993-
95; Libya – 1986); (3) Legislative-executive consensus (Iraq I – 1990-91; Iraq II – 2003). 
During all of these military interventions, Congress initiated legislations in an effort at 
power sharing and collective judgment, as required by the constitutional provisions of the 
War Powers Resolution. In essence, the dynamics of these cases portray the joint 
responsibility of Capitol Hill and the president in war-making decisions. 
Lebanon Multi-National Force (1982-84) 
Background: The War Powers Resolution was put to a really significant test for 
the first time in the case of the Lebanon MNF Intervention from 1982 to 1984. On that 
occasion, the resolution was completely successful in fulfilling its intended constitutional 
goals. This was a period of divided government, when the United States Senate and the 
White House were controlled by the Republican Party with Ronald Reagan as the 
president, whereas the United States House of Representatives was controlled by the 
Democratic Party. The Lebanon MNF episode reflected legislative-executive war powers 
prerogatives in full action, with the resurgent Congress successful at invoking the War 
Powers Resolution and in turn significantly constraining the military powers of the 
president. The significance of the case is that President Reagan, who had the reputation of 
being the most conservative president of the twentieth century, had to be deferential to 
congressional assertiveness when Capitol Hill invoked the War Powers Resolution and 
imposed a time limit of 18 months for troop withdrawal. On September 29, 1983, 
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Congress under the conditions of divided government unanimously passed the 
“Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (MNFLR),” determining unilaterally that the 
requirements of section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operational on 
August 29, 1983.
642
 The MNFLR was the outcome of intense legislative-executive 
confrontation and compromise with regard to continued troop presence in Lebanon. The 
hostilities in Lebanon had already dragged on for a prolonged time period and 
increasingly became an unpopular military venture in domestic politics, especially in the 
wake of the Beirut truck bombing incident in which 241 U.S. Marines were killed on 
October 23, 1983.
643
 The outcome of this case clearly represented the implications of a 
congressional-presidential foreign policy power struggle on the conduct of war, based on 
the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.
644
 The case study exemplifies a situation in 
which Congress took significant action to curtail the president’s power on the conduct of 
war by using institutional prerogatives provided by the War Powers Resolution to 
codetermine policy.
645
   
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making while unified government facilitates consensus. U.S. troop 
deployment in Lebanon was controversial from the very beginning, with Congress and 
the president distancing themselves from each other on the purpose of such a military 
intervention. The Republican Senate and the Democratic House of Representatives in the 
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Capitol were not convinced of the real purpose of troop deployment as claimed by the 
Reagan administration. Historically, the Lebanon MNF intervention from 1982 to 1984 
was the first instance when the duration of the U.S. troop deployment exceeded a 60- to 
90-day time limit, as granted by the War Powers Resolution. As a result, a situation had 
arisen in which the constitutional provisions of Section 4(a)(1) became fully operational.  
This in turn bound the president under statute to seek authorization from Congress for 
further extension of the time limit for the purpose of keeping the Marines on the 
ground.
646
 Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution “triggers the time limitation in 
Section 5(b) that requires the president to terminate the use of forces after 60-90 days 
unless Congress declares war or authorizes such use.”647 Constitutional provisions of the 
1973 Act eventually resulted in intense congressional-presidential contestation on war 
powers under the conditions of divided government. 
 The whole deployment of U.S. Marines in Lebanon was a twofold 
operation.  As for the first dispatch, President Reagan on August 20, 1982, informed the 
nation that he had authorized 800 U.S. Marines to go to Lebanon to take part in the 
Multinational Force (MNF) for peacekeeping and overseeing withdrawal of the Palestine 
Liberation Organization force.
648
 Accordingly, the Marines landed in Beirut on August 
25, 1982, to take part in the first MNF and began supervising the PLO evacuation from 
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the Lebanese capital.
649
 As Congress raised eyebrows regarding this deployment, the 
president withdrew the troops in less than three weeks on September 10, 1982, to avoid 
confrontation with Capitol Hill.
650
 Thereafter, with the assassination of Lebanese 
President Bashir Gemayal on September 16, 1982, and further deterioration of the 
security situation in Lebanon, President Reagan announced on September 21, 1982, that 
U.S. Marines would be redeployed in Lebanon as part of the second Multinational Force. 
This announcement made Congress concerned once again about the final goal of such 
military intervention. Two influential senators – Chairman of the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee Charles Percy (R-IL) and ranking member Clairborne Pell (D-R.I.) 
- wrote on September 24 to the president that such redeployment of troops should be 
reported to Congress under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.
651
 Also, Senate 
Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), and Chairman of House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Clement Zablocki (D-WI) raised the issue of the War Powers Resolution.
652
 
This shows that opposition from Congress was generally based on bipartisan consensus, 
which in turn generated the initial momentum for a perfect storm brewing between 
Capitol Hill and the White House. The situation worsened when the president did not 
comply with the congressional guidelines of citing Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers 
Resolution, which triggers the time clock. As a result, a constitutional crisis was 
imminent, leading to a full-scale congressional-presidential confrontation on war powers 
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for the first time since the passage of the resolution in 1973. Also, there was an added 
component of internal cleavage within the administration that contributed to legislative-
executive dissension. There was a fundamental difference of opinion between Defense 
Secretary Caspar Weinberger and Joint Chiefs on one side and Secretary of State George 
Shultz, special envoy Robert McFarlane, and the National Security Council on the other 
side. Such internal division within the administration was also mirrored in the initial 
ambivalence on Capitol Hill about the mission’s purpose.653 Nonetheless, on September 
29, 1982, U.S. troops reentered Beirut and took control of the Beirut International 
Airport.
654
 President Reagan’s dispatch of a small contingent of U.S. Marines in 1982 as 
part of the MNF for peacekeeping in Lebanon quickly converted into a larger, more 
complex military commitment which ultimately resulted in a “foreign policy dilemma of 
the first order.”655 The root cause of legislative-executive dissension was related to the 
war power prerogatives of Capitol Hill and the administration, based on the provisions of 
the War Powers Resolution. During each of the deployments (i.e. first and second MNF), 
President Reagan submitted reports to Congress as required by the War Powers 
Resolution by writing letters to the House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O’Neill (D-MA) and 
the Senate president pro tempore Senator Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), and he assured them 
that such troops would not be engaged in long or violent conflict.
656
 Reagan wrote to 
congressional leaders, “I want to emphasize that there is no intention or expectation that 
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U.S. Armed Forces will become involved in hostilities….Our agreement with the 
Government of Lebanon expressly rules out any combat responsibilities for the U.S. 
forces.”657 By ruling out the possibilities of troops’ involvement into hostilities in the 
report submitted to Congress, the president avoided citing Section 4(a)(1), which 
specifically triggers a 60- to 90-day time limit for troop deployment and authorization 
from Congress for any further extension of troop presence on the ground, in accordance 
with the provisions of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Instead he cited in the 
report Section 4(a)(2), which only clarified that the troops were equipped for combat and 
hence that the 60- to 90-day time limitation did not apply for such deployment.
658
 
Reagan’s not mentioning Section 4(a)(1) angered members of Congress in a divided 
government, and this added momentum to the already growing congressional-presidential 
dissension. In a powerful article in the Washington Post, Chairman of the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee Clement J. Zablocki (D-WI) wrote that while the situation in Lebanon 
was critical enough for imminent involvement of U.S troops into hostilities, the president 
was ignoring Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution as part of the reporting 
requirement to Congress.
659
 Several Democrats in Congress, such as Representative John 
Seiberling (D-OH) and Senators Carl Levin (D-MI) and Christopher Dodd (D-CT), raised 
the issue that the president should abide by the constitutional provisions of the War 
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Powers Resolution in letter and intent.
660
 Consequences of divided government were 
observable as the congressional-presidential dissension continued to increase.  
As it emerged, the second MNF intervention turned out to be a complex and 
difficult mission that required months.
661
 U.S. Marines faced hostilities, were involved in 
fighting, and suffered casualties. With each passing day, with the situation on the ground 
getting worse and with no end of conflict in sight, Congress expressed more and more 
outrage and rebuked the president. The increased level of congressional resistance created 
serious barriers for the president regarding the conduct of the already controversial 
military intervention. In a significant move reflecting bipartisan consensus, in the Senate 
Foreign Relations Committee 14 out of 17 of its panel members signed a letter asking 
Reagan, in a December 15, 1982, letter to seek congressional authorization before 
sending any more Marines for an extended mission.
662
 The issue of invoking the War 
Powers Resolution in compliance with Section 4(a)(1) flared up again in early 1983. In 
March 1983, five U.S. Marines were injured in a grenade attack.
663
 The situation 
deteriorated further on April 18, 1983, with terrorist bombing at the U.S. Embassy in 
Beirut in which 50 persons were killed.
664
 That was the tipping point when Congress took 
its first significant step toward limiting Reagan’s capability to use U.S. troops in Lebanon 
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by initiating legislative action on the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 98-43).
665
 
The legislation set the first stage of a prolonged period of congressional-presidential 
contestation in a divided government setting and ultimately resulted in invocation of the 
War Powers Resolution. P.L. 98-43 empowered Congress to impose severe restrictions 
on the president’s power toward further Marine deployment in Lebanon, along with an 
authorization for economic and military aid to Lebanon.
666
 The language dealing with the 
issue was a clear representation of such restrictions: 
The president shall obtain statutory authorization from the 
Congress with respect to any substantial expansion in the number or role 
in Lebanon of United States Armed Forces, including any introduction of 
the United States Armed Forces into Lebanon in conjunction with 
agreements provided for the withdrawal of all foreign troops for Lebanon 
and for the creation of a new multinational peace-keeping force in 
Lebanon.” 
“Nothing in this section is intended to modify, limit, or suspend 
any of the standards and procedures prescribed by the War Powers 
Resolution of 1973.
667
  
 
P.L. 98-43 thus made it legally binding for the president to seek permission from 
Congress before sending any more U.S. Marines to Lebanon. Importantly, while there 
was bipartisan consensus in each of the two houses in Congress leading to the passage of 
P.L. 98-43, the act further widened the dimensions of legislative-executive dissension 
across Pennsylvania Avenue.  
The situation on the ground deteriorated in August 1983. On August 28, 1983, the 
Lebanese armed forces and the Druze militia got into heavy fighting, which later spilled 
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into the U.S. military compound. The Marines returned fire.
668
 On August 29, 1983, 
fighting continued and the U.S. Marine positions came under mortar, rocket, and small-
arms fire, which resulted in the death of two Marines while fourteen others were 
injured.
669
 Congress was furious when in his August 30, 1983, report President Reagan 
did not cite Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution even after Marines were 
involved in fighting and were injured and even killed, in an explicit display of heightened 
hostilities on the ground.
670
 In reality, “there was widespread feeling in Congress that the 
president should have reported under Section 4(a)(1) and that Congress should either 
authorize the continued use of the Marines in Lebanon or the Marines should be 
withdrawn.”671 Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Charles H. Percy 
(R-IL) said, “We have people up in helicopters, we’re shooting rockets and artillery – if 
that isn’t imminent hostilities, I don’t know what is.”672 Senate Minority Leader Robert 
C. Byrd (D-WV) commented, “American forces are clearly involved in hostilities within 
the meaning of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.”673 The specter of divided 
government loomed large as congressional leaders warned that renewed fighting in 
Lebanon might “lead to a stiff confrontation between Congress and the Reagan 
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administration.”674 In total, Reagan reported to Congress three times from the beginning 
of the Lebanon MNF mission, but he never admitted “imminent hostilities” or cited 
Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, leading to serious discontentment on 
Capitol Hill.
675
 All of these events contributed to the second and more critical phase of 
dissension between Capitol Hill and the White House in a divided government political 
environment. As Marine casualties increased and military action enlarged in the midst of 
increasing hostilities, several influential members of Congress called for immediate 
invocation of the War Powers Resolution. Capitol Hill took legislative action in earnest 
and introduced resolutions to “start the clock” by reporting under Section 4(a)(1) of the 
War Powers Resolution, which in turn would allow the president a time limit of 60 days 
to get congressional authorization or else withdraw troops immediately.
676
 This was a 
clear indication that while consensus inside Congress was growing, it was also widening 
the contours of congressional-presidential dissension. Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) 
introduced S.J. Res. 159, stating that “the time limit specified in the War Powers 
Resolution had begun on August 31, 1983, and authorizing the forces to remain in 
Lebanon for a period of 120 days after the expiration of the 60-day period.”677 Senate 
Minority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.) introduced S.J. Res. 163, insisting that Section 
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4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution was applicable in the existing, increasingly hostile 
situation in Lebanon, where U.S troops were routinely taking part in fighting.
678
 S.J. Res. 
163 was intended to give Congress legal control over the duration of the stay of Marines 
in Lebanon.
679
 Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN) introduced S.J. Res. 166 in 
which Section 2(b) specifically stated, “The Congress determines that the requirements of 
Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on August 29, 1983.”680 
Such unprecedented congressional action to curtail presidential power to regulate the 
Lebanon MNF intervention created real and significant barriers for the Reagan 
administration. To resolve this legislative-executive impasse and constitutional crisis, 
leaders in Congress and members of the Reagan administration started to negotiate and 
came up with a compromise on September 20, 1983. The negotiations that led to the 
compromise were initiated by House Foreign Affairs Chairman Zablocki and firmly 
backed by House Speaker O’Neill.681 Significantly, the lead here was taken by the House 
of Representatives, controlled by the Democratic Party in an environment of divided 
government. The compromise ensured the invocation of the War Powers Resolution and 
congressional authorization for troop deployment for 18 months with effect from August 
29, 1983,  the date from which Section 4(a)(1) was enforceable and the one which the 
president repeatedly refused to recognize. Thereafter, on September 20, 1983, Zablocki 
introduced in the House H.J. Res. 364, which provided “Statutory authorization under the 
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War Powers Resolution for continued U.S. participation in the multinational 
peacekeeping forces in Lebanon in order to obtain withdrawal of all foreign forces from 
Lebanon.”682 After a lengthy debate, the House of Representatives adopted H.J Res. 364 
by a 270-161 vote on September 28, 1983.
683
 The Senate adopted S.J. Res. 159, as 
amended, on a more party line vote of 54-46 on September 29, 1983.
684
 Passage of the 
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (H.J. Res. 364; S.J. Res. 159, as amended; PL 
98-119) was historic as it invoked the War Powers Resolution and curtailed the 
presidential war powers. It also set the precedent of legislative-executive dissension, 
leading to the president’s concession to the constitutional provisions of the War Powers 
Resolution and congressional authorization for troop deployment into hostilities abroad. 
President Reagan signed the resolution on October 12, 1983.
685
 P.L. 98-119 was 
negotiated to arrive at a compromise between Capitol Hill and the Reagan White House 
to break the prolonged legislative-executive impasse, which created constitutional crisis 
in a setting of divided government. 
However, here it is important to note that the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
Resolution (MNFLR, P.L. 98-119) by itself did not bring an end to the legislative-
executive conflict on the Lebanon mission. A turning point event occurred on October 
23, 1983, when a truck bomb exploded at the Marine headquarters at the Beirut airport, 
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killing 241 U.S. Marines.
686
 Following that incident, Congress became united in stepping 
up pressure on the administration for troop withdrawal as early as possible. Senate 
Democrats, who always considered congressional authorization of an 18-month time 
limit for deployment of U.S. Marines on the ground a “blank check” for the president in 
the first place, increased their efforts and took legislative action to either repeal the 
MNFLR by introducing S.J. Res. 187 or to drastically curtail presidential power on 
Lebanon MNF by introducing S.J. Res. 190.
687
 The Democrat-controlled House of 
Representatives publicly rebuked the president. Two prominent House Democrats, 
Representatives Les Aspin of Wisconsin and Lee H. Hamilton of Indiana, backed by the 
House Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill (D-MA), “warned that they did not view the American 
military commitment in Beirut as open-ended.”688  Heightened levels of congressional 
opposition created significant roadblocks for the president, particularly because of the 
negative tone of media coverage and dwindling public approval of the Lebanon mission. 
Importantly, members of Congress in both the House and the Senate stepped up their 
opposition to the administration’s military policy in Lebanon. Congressional leaders 
belonging to both political parties started to pressure the administration to withdraw 
troops from the ground as fast as possible. This time, the Democratic leadership in the 
House – Speaker O’Neill in particular – who earlier sided with the president and 
significantly helped in getting H.J. Res. 364 passed, expressed deep concern about the 
                                                          
686
 Congressional Research Service, Report Number IB 83154. “Lebanon: The United States and the 
Multinational Force.” 1984. 
 
687
 Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate. “Authorization for U.S. Marines in Lebanon” S. Hrg. 98 
– 528. November 10 and 15, 1983. 
 
688
 New York Times, December 15, 1983, p.1. 
 
233 
 
goal of the mission. O’Neill even supported his Democratic colleagues in the House in a 
big way to initiate legislative action in order to pull back the troops.
689
 The implications 
of divided government on congressional-presidential dissension were seen explicitly, as 
some influential Senate Democrats, backed by House Democrats, initiated legislative 
actions to curtail presidential military powers and force Reagan to pull out the troops 
after the earliest possible time period. Congressional pressure for an immediate 
withdrawal of Marines mounted further with “the release of the House Armed Services 
and Pentagon-sponsored reports on the October 23 bombing of the Marines.”690 Senior 
administration officials too privately acknowledged the severe difficulties of continuing 
with the Lebanon mission, because of the mounting political pressure from Congress.
691
 
In early 1984, even prominent Republican leaders in Congress such as Senate Majority 
Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), Charles Mathias (R-MD), and Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) 
joined the bandwagon of majority Senate and House Democrats, including pivotal players 
House Speaker O’Neill (D-MA) and Senate Minority Leader Byrd (D-WV), calling for 
early withdrawal of the Marines.
692
 Shortly thereafter, with deteriorating conditions on 
the ground and legislative-executive dissension reaching its highest point, the president 
ultimately gave in to the insurmountable congressional pressure and pulled out all troops 
by February 26, 1984, long before the end of the 18-month time extension valid until 
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mid-April 1985, as previously authorized by Congress.
693
 In reality, congressional 
opposition from both sides of the aisle and its potential domestic political costs forced the 
administration to abandon its Lebanon policy at the earliest possible time.
694
 From the 
above analysis conclusions can be drawn that the implications of divided government 
proved to be detrimental and was responsible for legislative-executive dissension. 
Therefore, evidence in the Lebanon-MNF intervention supports the given hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. The passage of MNFLR (P.L. 98-
119) was a reflection of partisan and ideological dimensions in a divided government 
setting. While voting for MNFLR there were considerable elements of partisan and 
ideological dispositions in the pattern of voting inside each chamber. The House of 
Representatives passed H.J. Res. 364 on September 28, 1983, by a vote of 270-161.
695
 In 
the House, where there were 270 Democrats and 165 Republicans,
696
 all but 27 
Republicans supported the bill, while Democrats were evenly divided 130-134 with two 
House Democrats not voting.
697
 The Democrat-controlled House was ultimately 
successful in passing the MNFLR, and especially the contentious 18-month authorization, 
in a bipartisan manner. Almost half of the House Democrats, inspired by House 
Democratic leaders like Speaker O’Neill and Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs 
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Committee Zablocki, joined the House Republicans to reach the magic number of 218 in 
order to pass H.J. Res. 364. Earlier, the House rejected the Democrat-sponsored Long-
Obey Amendment moved by Representatives Clarence D. Long (D-MD) and David R. 
Obey (D-WI), which threatened to cut funding for the Marines in Lebanon and force 
President Reagan to withdraw the troops from the theatre unless he submitted reports to 
Congress under Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, on a party line vote of 
158-272.
698
 The Senate on September 29, 1983, passed S.J. Res. 159 to invoke the War 
Powers Resolution by a more intense partisan vote of 54-46.
699
 Only two Democratic 
Senators – George J. Mitchell (D-ME), and Edward Zorinsky (D-NE) – favored the bill, 
whereas three Republican Senators – Mark O. Hatfield (R-OR), William V. Roth Jr. (R-
DE), and Lowell P. Weicker Jr. (R-CT) – opposed it.700 Importantly, the real dynamics of 
such an unprecedented partisan divide “took place off the floor as Majority Leader 
Howard H. Baker (R-TN) and Vice President George H.W. Bush worked to keep 
Republicans in line and Minority Leader Robert C. Byrd (D-W.V.) urged Democrats to 
unify in opposition.”701 In stark similarity to the rejection of the Long-Obey Amendment 
in the House, the Senate displayed heightened partisan dynamics when Senate Minority 
Leader Byrd sponsored an amendment to S.J. Res. 159, intended to force Reagan to 
withdraw the troops before the end of the year 1983 unless he provided Congress with 
specific reports on war powers. It was defeated by a perfect straight party-line vote of 55-
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45.
702
 The Associated Press reported, “Before the final vote, the Republican-controlled 
Senate rejected repeated efforts by Democrats to rein in Reagan's authority over the 
troops dug in around the Beirut airport since Sept. 28, 1982. Proposals to cut back the 
time limit from 18 months to six months, and to force Reagan to bring home the Marines 
in 60 days unless Congress decided otherwise, also failed on largely party line votes.”703 
Reporting about the House response to the Senate vote, the New York Times commented, 
“In less than 10 minutes the Democratic-controlled House of Representatives, which 
approved a nearly identical version on Wednesday [September 28, 1983] agreed to accept 
the Senate bill….”704 Four hours later, the House accepted minor differences contained in 
the Senate version of the resolution [S.J. Res. 159] by a vote of 253-156, thereby clearing 
the legislative hurdle for the passage of P.L. 98-119.
705
 In the Senate, there were 55 
Republicans and 45 Democrats.
706
 During the congressional debate over S.J. Res.159, the 
Senate Republicans overwhelmingly supported Reagan’s Lebanon policy, while the 
Democrats opposed the mission. Especially with regard to the controversial 18-month 
authorization, during the Senate debate most of the influential Senate Democrats, such as 
Edward Kennedy of Massachusetts, Thomas Eagleton of Missouri, Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee ranking member Clairborne Pell of Rhode Island, and many others 
                                                          
702
 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1983. p. 120. All 55 Republicans and 45 Democrats sided to their 
own party affiliations and the amendment was defeated.  
 
703
 Associated Press. September 30, 1983. 
 
704
 New York Times, September 30, 1983, p. A1. 
 
705
 Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report. October 1, 1983. p. 2015. 
 
706
 United States Senate. Art and History section 
http://www.senate.gov/pagelayout/history/one_item_and_teasers/partydiv.htm 
 
237 
 
labeled it as a “blank check” to the president.707 The liberal-conservative continuum was 
distinctly observable in the interpretation of the Lebanon mission and the role of the 
American military in the global sphere. The conservative Republicans overwhelmingly 
supported the conservative president, while the liberal Democrats were skeptical about 
the purpose of the whole mission. Prominent Democratic Senators such as Sam Nunn of 
Georgia, Paul S. Sarbanes of Maryland, and Joseph R. Biden of Delaware were highly 
critical of the MNFLR (P.L. 98-119), as they argued that the United States was 
committing to military goals which were unrealistic and beyond reach.
708
 A similar 
pattern was observed in the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, where the 
Republicans overwhelmingly supported Reagan’s Lebanon policy during the debate of 
H.J. Res. 364 and later while adopting S.J. Res. 159.  However, there was a split among 
the Democrats, many of whom even tried to block the passage of the bill. Empirical 
findings from the Senate and House debates during September 26-29, 1983, make such 
partisan and ideological dynamics and the consequent consensus-dissension trajectory at 
various levels evident.
709
 Hence, even if technically Congress was successful in passing 
the MNFLR (P.L. 98-119) in a bipartisan manner and invoked the War Powers 
Resolution, yet congressional debate proceedings and the roll call vote patterns in each 
chamber displayed a robust partisan and ideological underpinning. Overall the 
Republican-controlled Senate proceedings showed a much higher degree of partisan 
politics as compared to the Democrat-controlled House, where the House leadership 
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generally was able to whip up a sufficient number of Democrats to pull through the 
required number of votes for the passage of P.L. 98-119.  
In the aftermath of the October 23, 1983, Beirut truck-bomb incident, the partisan 
and ideological dimensions in Congress intensified further. Congressional Democrats 
immediately and publicly rebuked the president, and the media paid attention to this 
reaction.
710
 While the Senate continued to remain in an extremely polarized state, in the 
House the political dynamics quickly changed as the Democratic leadership, particularly 
House Speaker O’Neill became more critical of the administration. Under the new 
circumstances, congressional politics witnessed a tremendous surge of opposition from 
the Democrats in both chambers. Heightened levels of congressional opposition catalyzed 
by partisan politics created considerable hurdles for the Republican administration to 
continue with its stated Lebanon military policy. In Congress, while intraparty consensus 
was coherent among both the Democrats and Republicans, there was growing interparty 
dissension on the Lebanon mission. The overall effect of intensified partisan polarization 
transpired into higher levels of legislative-executive dissension. In the wake of renewed 
interbranch competition, Democrats in Congress introduced a string of new legislations to 
invoke the War Powers Resolution in a more stringent manner so as to curtail presidential 
war powers in a Republican administration, particularly with regard to the 18-month 
authorization aspect as stipulated by P.L. 98-119. Democrats, particularly in the Senate, 
were highly critical about such a time limit, which they generally regarded as a “blank 
check.”711 New bills were introduced by Senate Democrats, with overwhelming support 
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from House Democratic leadership, particularly Speaker O’Neill and Chairman of House 
Foreign Affairs Committee Zablocki. Shortly after the October 23, 1983, Beirut bombing 
incident, in the Senate S.J. Res. 187 was introduced on October 26, 1983, by Senators 
John Melcher (D-MT) and David Pryor (D-AR) in order to repeal the recently enacted 
Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119). Thereafter, S.J. Res. 190 was 
introduced on October 28, 1983, by Senators Thomas F. Eagleton (D-MO), Edward M. 
Kennedy (D-MA), Alan J. Dixon (D-IL), and Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
ranking member Clairborne Pell (D-RI) in order to “reduce the period of the original 
authorization from 18 months [as granted by MNFLR] to 3 months, causing the current 
authorization to expire in mid-January [of 1984].”712 Importantly, in the Republican-
controlled Senate, when S.J. Res. 190 arrived at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 
Chairman Charles Percy (R-IL) and other Republicans “first blocked committee action on 
November 10, and then stalled a November 15 markup of S.J. Res. 190 long enough to 
put the issue over until the 1984 session of Congress.”713 Such incidents were evident of a 
heightened level of partisan politics following the Beirut bombing incident. In the Senate, 
the Democrats also introduced S. Res. 253 on October 26, 1983, to replace the Marines 
by a U.N. or other “neutral” force.714 But the Senate Democrats were unable to force a 
vote on that proposal. With the situation on the ground further deteriorating, with 
incremental casualties of U.S. servicemen following the October 23 bombing and 
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congressional discontent growing exponentially, on December 9, 1983, Representative 
Bill Alexander (D-AR) and chairman of a Lebanon Oversight Committee earlier 
appointed by Speaker O’Neill said “given the lack of progress toward U.S. goals and the 
continued U.S. casualties, the Lebanon compromise [P.L. 98-119] had lost majority 
support in Congress.”715 In the House of Representatives, too, there was a rapid and 
dramatic increase in criticism of Reagan’s handling of the Lebanon mission. Influential 
House members such as Representatives Les Aspin (D-WI) and Lee Hamilton (D-IN), 
who earlier supported Reagan’s military policy in Lebanon, sent a letter to President 
Reagan criticizing his handling of military operations on the ground and illustrating 
growing congressional impatience on the issue.
716
 Significantly, the Washington Post 
reported that House Speaker O’Neill, whose support was a key ingredient in the 
compromise formula allowing U.S. forces to remain in Lebanon for 18 months, said “he 
was supportive of the Hamilton-Aspin letter and hopeful that the president will weigh it 
heavily.”717 Congressional outrage based on partisan dynamics was clearly observable in 
the voice of O’Neill, when he criticized the administration and said, “They have to know 
a message was sent to them that they’re running out of time [time limit authorized by 
Congress in accordance with Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution and as 
implemented in the Lebanon Multinational Force Resolution]. If the diplomatic isn’t 
working, we’d better get the hell out of there. There is no way we want to escalate this 
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war.”718 The ultimate partisan blow to the Reagan administration came in January 1984, 
with a complete reversal in O’Neill’s viewpoint about the mission.719 After meeting with 
his Lebanon monitoring group in the House and reviewing the deteriorating conditions in 
Lebanon, O’Neill was totally convinced about the need for an early withdrawal of troops 
from the theatre. He commented, “I will join with many others in Congress in 
reconsidering congressional authorization for Marine presence in Lebanon.”720 Erosion of 
support from O’Neill created untenable political pressure from Congress on the 
administration’s failure to show speedy and tangible progress on the ground. Thereafter, 
in roughly two months, the administration pulled all the troops out of Lebanon as the 
congressional opposition became untenable, based on the constitutional limits provided 
by the War Powers Resolution. From the above analysis it can be inferred that evidence 
supports the given hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. During the entire process of congressional debate leading up to the passage of 
P.L. 98-119 (or MNFLR), electoral imperatives and constituency pressure loomed large 
in position taking and roll call vote among the members of Congress. Empirical findings 
also provided evidence that the Democrats in Congress were primarily more concerned 
about electoral consequences in their decision process in voicing their opposition to P.L. 
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98-119.
721
 While criticizing the 18-month congressional authorization for troop 
deployment in Lebanon as part of the deal on P.L. 98-119, several liberal Democrats 
expressed their displeasure. For instance, Senator Patrick Leahy (D-VT) commented, “As 
I travel through Vermont, I find, as I said before, my constituents see no justification for 
risking the lives of American young men….If I could say what I wish Congress would 
do, it would be to invoke the War Powers Act without setting the 18-month time 
limit.”722 The same sentiment was largely echoed by Senators James Sasser (D-TN), Dale 
Bumpers (D-AR), and Edward Kennedy (D-MA).
723
 There was also an element of party 
loyalty, especially among the Senate Democrats and Republicans, and also among the 
House Republicans, which had electoral connections.
724
 While Senate Democrats were 
united in opposing P.L. 98-119, Senate Republicans showed allegiance to President 
Reagan, who happened to maintain a steady but moderate public approval. The 
Republicans were inclined to take electoral benefit from the president’s modestly rising 
approval rating from January 1983 until the conclusion of the mission in February 
1984.
725
 In the House proceedings, issues related to the ensuing 1984 election cycle were 
raised. In consideration of electoral consequences, about half of the House Democrats did 
not support the 18-month time limit, as against the overwhelming number of Republicans 
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who supported the president and the deal. In order to alleviate electoral apprehensions of 
the remaining half of the Democrats, and to garner support for the passage of H.J. Res. 
364 as a step toward invoking the War Powers Resolution, Chairman of the House 
Foreign Affairs Committee Zablocki commented, “…this length of time [18-month 
congressional authorization as part of P.L. 98-119 in compliance with Section 5(b) of the 
War Powers Resolution] will carry the authorization for troop involvement past the 1984 
elections, thus insulating the U.S. participation from partisan wrangling and election-year 
politics.”726 From the congressional debates, it appears that there was also an element of 
regional political contingencies (i.e. industrial liberal Northeast and upper Midwest pitted 
against the more conservative Sun Belt political dynamics) having potential electoral 
ramifications in the decision-making process for the individual members of Congress on 
both sides of the aisle. All such electoral imperatives were responsible:  strict partisan 
voting (inter-party dissension) in the Senate and relative bipartisan consensus in the 
House, which in turn resulted in invocation of the War Powers Resolution on the 
administration. In the aftermath of the Beirut bombing, when opposition from Congress 
became untenable and further legislative actions (S.J. Res. 187 and 190) were taken to 
repeal P.L. 98-119 and/or reduce the 18-month time limit to just 3 months, the Reagan 
administration yielded to congressional pressure but kept in consideration the tangible 
electoral ramifications it might confront in the midst of declining public approval, had the 
Marines not withdrawn as demanded by Congress.
727
 In early 1984, even prominent 
Republican leaders in Congress such as Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN), 
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Charles Mathias (R-MD), and Barry Goldwater (R-AZ) called for early withdrawal of the 
Marines, keeping in mind the upcoming election cycle of 1984.
728
 In addition, growing 
congressional discontent and members of Congress hearing their respective 
constituencies’ demand immediate withdrawal of Marines also put insurmountable 
pressure on the Reagan administration, resulting in troops being pulled out of Lebanon 
long before the 18-month time limit as permitted by the Multinational Force in Lebanon 
Resolution (PL 98-119).
729
 From the above analysis it is evident that for the entire period 
of Lebanon-MNF military intervention electoral imperatives acted as a driving force for 
the Democrats in Congress. After the Beirut bombing incident GOP lawmakers too 
overwhelmingly joined hands with their Democratic colleagues to press for early troop 
withdrawal because of growing constituent discontent about the ongoing military mission 
and concerns for re-election in the ensuing fall 1984 election cycle. Such analysis largely 
supports the given hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. For the major part of 
the Lebanon MNF intervention, the Reagan administration witnessed a steady and 
moderate rate of public support nationally.
730
 Throughout the same period of time, 
Reagan’s approval rating also rose moderately. As a result, Republicans in both the 
Senate and the House by and large supported the administration’s Lebanon policy in 
congressional debates and roll call votes. On the other hand, in liberal states which were 
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heavily represented by congressional Democrats, public opinion in general was against 
the military mission. Hence, the Democrats in the Senate in particular and about half of 
them in the House were against the Lebanon MNF policy. Thus, the dynamics of public 
opinion influenced the political process, leading to the passage of the Lebanon 
Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 98-43) in the spring of 1983 and later the Multinational 
Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119) in the fall of 1983, both of which were based 
on the constitutional principles of Section 4(a)(1) and Section 5(b) of the War Powers 
Resolution. In the wake of the Beirut bombing, public support for the Lebanon mission 
even increased. To be more precise, from September 1983 to November 1983, public 
approval of the mission, based on the CBS News/New York Times poll showed a rise 
from 40 percent to 61 percent.
731
 Such an increase in public support enhanced the 
intensity of partisan politics in Congress, with the Senate Democrats sufficiently backed 
by the House Democratic leadership introducing S.J. Res. 187 and 190 to repeal PL 98-
119 and to reduce the 18-month authorization to only 3 months in compliance with 
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Congressional Republicans and the Reagan 
administration opposed such initiatives in the first place. However, with the situation on 
the ground fast deteriorating since December 1983, followed by mounting congressional 
pressure to withdraw troops at the earliest possible time, public opinion with regard to the 
Lebanon mission took a plunge. As the media coverage of congressional resistance 
increased, public sentiment for withdrawal of Marines rose sharply, reaching 61 percent 
by January 1984.
732
 Such a reversal in public opinion put considerable pressure both on 
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the congressional Republicans and the administration. Congress became more united in 
its opposition to further continuance of the mission, in an effort to reduce the time limit 
of troop deployment to comply with Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. In the 
end, in the face of such insurmountable congressional pressure and the potential domestic 
political cost because of falling public support for the mission, the administration 
withdrew troops by the end of February 1984. Therefore, it is evident that sharp fall in 
public opinion following the Beirut bombing increased congressional-presidential 
dissension on the conduct of war. In the end the administration was forced to pull out 
troops much early. Thus evidence by and large supports the given hypothesis.   
Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. For the case study of the Lebanon 
MNF intervention, Democrats in Congress played major role in the decision-making 
process first in the passage of the Lebanon Emergency Assistance Act (P.L. 98-43) in the 
spring of 1983 and later the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119) in 
the fall of 1983. The role of various influential opposition members of Congress was 
primarily responsible for legislative-executive dissension which ultimately resulted in the 
War Powers Resolution invoked. Various legislations, which were introduced in 
Congress to comply with the constitutionality of Section 4(a)(1) and Section 5(b) of the 
War Powers Resolution, were generally attributed to the partisan dimensions of the 
Democratic members of Congress. The given hypothesis goes hand in hand with the 
analysis in hypothesis 2. Findings from the investigation support the given hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. Because 
247 
 
of the prolonged two-tier dimension of the Lebanon MNF intervention, stretching from 
August 1982 to February 1984, media coverage, even though extensive, displayed varied 
dynamics over time. Initially the media coverage was somewhat ambivalent about 
President Reagan’s decision and the purpose of the intervention.733 The success of the 
first MNF and the relatively incident-free beginning of the second MNF was completely 
overshadowed by the catastrophe of the latter mission, which the media covered 
extensively.
734
 Over time, as the mission became more extensive and complicated in 
nature with Marines suffering casualties, the tone of media coverage became relatively 
sympathetic to congressional actions to invoke the War Powers Resolution while 
criticizing the administration’s Lebanon policy.735 In reality, media coverage of 
congressional proceedings to invoke the War Powers Resolution was extensive. This was 
explicitly reflected by the statistical figures from the New York Times, Washington Post, 
and prominent television networks such as ABC, CBS, and NBC. Later, in the post-
Beirut bombing period, the media reflected in detail on the congressional outrage over the 
administration’s Lebanon policy and further legislative actions taken to reduce the so-
called 18-month time “blank check” to 3 months in order to comply with Section 5(b) of 
the War Powers Resolution.
736
 On the other hand, President Reagan judiciously used 
prime time television networks as a powerful tool to go over the heads of congressmen 
and speak directly to the American people, explaining the justification for and legitimacy 
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of the Lebanon mission in an attempt to garner public support during the conduct of the 
intervention.
737
 Reagan addressed the nation on October 27, 1983 in a televised speech 
about the situation in Lebanon.
738
 The speech was effective in reversing a dwindling 
public opinion in the administration’s favor, even though it was short lived.739 Empirical 
analysis provides an impression that the liberal mainstream media’s criticism of a 
hawkish president’s seemingly uncertainty over the Lebanon policy considerably 
influenced the dynamics of congressional-presidential relations. The administration also 
received negative coverage from television network news, ABC, CBS, and NBC.
740
             
From August 1, 1982 (the first MNF deployment took place on August 25), to 
February 29, 1984 (Marines were pulled out on February 26), the New York Times had 
514 documents classified into four categories - 322 articles, 175 front-page articles, 13 
editorials, and 4 letters to editor.
741
 For the same time period, the Washington Post 
reported 433 documents, including 225 articles, 185 front-page articles, 18 editorials, and 
5 letters to editor.
742
 The Times coverage reached its pinnacle in September to October 
1983, when the congressional debate and hearings took place to invoke the War Powers 
Resolution in the form of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119), 
followed by the Beirut bombing incident, and again in February 1984, when 
                                                          
737
 Kernell, Samuel. 1986. 
 
738
 Public Papers of the Presidents, Ronald Reagan. October 27, 1983. p.1517 - 22. 
 
739
 Gilboa, Eytan. 1990. 
 
740
 Smoller, Fred. 1986.  
 
741
 ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009); Available at 
http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
 
742
 Washington Post; Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost historical/results.htm 
 
249 
 
congressional pressure to withdraw troops effective immediately compelled the 
administration to take this drastic action long before the end of the original 18-month 
time limit.
743
 The coverage of the Post represented a similar trend as that in the Times.
744
 
Members of Congress used the New York Times and Washington Post to air their concern 
about the Reagan administration’s Lebanon policy as part of exerting pressure on him to 
submit a report to Congress, citing Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution to start 
the clock for the presence of  troops.  Senator Charles Mathias (R-MD) and a member of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, who later introduced S.J. Res. 159, wrote in an 
editorial desk piece, “I believe that the president should officially notify to the Congress 
that the United States armed forces are now in a situation of imminent hostilities. He 
should make his case to the Congress for maintaining a United States presence in 
Lebanon and seek formal Congressional authorization for his policy.”745 Analysis of the 
New York Times editorial pieces gives a general impression about the tone of media 
coverage, which was mostly critical of the Reagan administration’s decision to send 
Marines into danger in the Middle East without proper policy determination. 
Approximately 60 percent of the New York Times editorials were critical of the 
administration’s handling of the Lebanon military mission. Some of the critical editorial 
pieces were those of Thomas Friedman (December 11, 1983)
746
; Ronald Steel (October 
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30, 1983)
747
; Hedrick Smith (December 11, 1983)
748
; Summary of the major news 
(October 16, 1983)
749
; and Flora Lewis (September 2 and October 25, 1983).
750
 
Immediately following the Beirut bombing incident, a highly critical article in the New 
York Times directly raised issues regarding the purpose of the mission: 
In the 13 months since the marines were sent to the Beirut area, the 
reasons for their presence there have shifted with the situation…. 
[Political] inhibitions have been evident ever since the marines were first 
sent to Lebanon and officials assured Congress they would not be 
involved in life-threatening situations…. What precisely is the mandate for 
the Marines and the other members of the four-nation multinational 
force?
751
    
 
Raising the specter of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, which deals with the 
congressional authorization of the time limit, Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA) and ranking 
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee commented, “It seems to me that we 
ought to go back to the drawing board and say, ‘Mr. President, what are the marines 
doing there and under what terms would they be withdrawn’?....Our forces in Lebanon 
now are not a deterrent, they're hostages.”752 Criticisms of other Members of Congress – 
Senator Alan Cranston (D-CA), Senate Minority Leader Robert Byrd (D-W.V.), Senator 
Donald W. Riegle Jr. (D-MI), Senator Ernest F. Hollings (D-SC), former Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger, and Senator John Glenn (D-OH)  were also reflected by the New 
York Times very vividly. In comparison to the congressional coverage, the coverage of 
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the administration was scarce, which in turn showed definite empathy toward the 
congressional perspective on the issue. Similarly, the Washington Post also displayed a 
critical tone regarding the administration’s policy in its coverage. Prominent among the 
Post coverage were John Goshko’s article (October 28, 1983)753; William Raspberry’s 
OPED piece (October 28, 1983)
754; and Philip Geyclin’s OPED piece (October 11, 
1983).
755
 To add to the unpopularity of the long-drawn-out military mission and the 
administration’s ambiguity on its handling, television network channels also reflected the 
same trend as that of the print media. From August 1, 1982, to February 29, 1984, there 
were 308 programs reported by ABC, CBS, and NBC combined.
756
 ABC aired 95 
programs, CBS presented 114 programs, and NBC brought 99 programs to the 
viewers.
757
 Consistent with newspaper coverage, stories ran by network channels reached 
its peak in September to October 1983, when the congressional debate and hearings took 
place to invoke the War Powers Resolution in the form of the Multinational Force in 
Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-119), followed by the Beirut bombing incident, and again in 
February 1984, when congressional pressure to withdraw troops effective immediately 
compelled the administration to take this drastic action long before the end of the original 
18-month time limit.
758
 The coverage of the television network channels also showed a 
general criticism of the military mission by talking about the difficulties that the U.S. 
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Marines were facing on the ground. Television reporting straight from the war zone also 
influenced the trajectory of congressional-presidential relations regarding the Lebanon 
policy and the constitutional provisions of the War Powers Resolution. From the analysis, 
it can be concluded that the given hypothesis is acceptable when determining the role of 
media coverage influencing the decision-making process of the Lebanon MNF 
intervention. Although extensive media coverage was responsible for continuum of 
legislative-executive consensus and dissension during the decision-making process on the 
conduct of war, media’s general negative tone of the administration’s Lebanon policy 
aggravated dissension between the Capitol and White House in a divided government 
setting. Hence it can be argued that findings do not support the hypothesis.    
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war.  The Lebanon 
MNF intervention was a Congress and the Reagan administration on the matter of 
Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution, which in turn triggered the time clock of 
60 days for troop withdrawal, unless Congress authorizes further extension of  the time 
limit in accordance with the provisions of Section 5(b). The Reagan administration 
repeatedly avoided citing Section 4(a)(1) in its reporting to Congress. This action by the 
administration outraged Congress, and in turn members triggered the provisions of 
Section 4(a)(1) on their own from August 29, 1983, discarding presidential preference 
and implemented Section 5(b) in the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (P.L. 98-
119).
759
 The passage of PL 98-119 on Capitol Hill compelled President Reagan to 
concede to the constitutional provisions of the War Powers Resolution. At the same time, 
                                                          
759
 Fisher, Louis. 1995. 
253 
 
by passing PL 98-119, Congress authorized the administration to have an 18-month time 
limit for deployment of Marines on the ground. Over time, the Lebanon intervention 
became a prolonged mission and grew more complicated, and in turn it was a contentious 
foreign policy issue in the realm of domestic politics. After the Beirut bombing, Congress 
started reassessing the 18-month time limit. Members of Congress, particularly those 
belonging to the Democratic Party, again raised serious concerns about the so-called 
“blank check” time limit and introduced legislations (S.J. Res. 187, 190) to reduce the 
time limit from 18 months to only 3 months. Later, with further deteriorating conditions 
on the ground, congressional leaders unanimously called for immediate withdrawal of the 
Marines, stressing the immediate implementation of Section 5(b) of the War Powers 
Resolution in such a dire situation. When administrative support became untenable in the 
context of the prolonged, complicated nature of the military intervention, the 
administration reacted to congressional pressure and pulled the troops out of Lebanon by 
the end of February 1984, long before the authorized time limit of 18 months from 
deployment.
760
 Apart from legislative actions, negative media coverage of the mission 
and plummeting public opinion about the prolonged intervention, particularly after the 
precipitating event of the Beirut bombing, put enormous pressure on the administration to 
pull the troops out as quickly as possible in accordance with Section 5(b).
761
 Internal 
dissension within the administration also kept growing about the Lebanon-MNF mission, 
and that gave traction to the already difficult relationship between Capitol Hill and the 
White House. In the end, the administration realized the potentially heavy political cost 
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that it might have to pay if the troops were not withdrawn at the earliest opportunity. 
Under heavy pressure, eventually the Reagan administration relented and ordered the 
troops pulled out by the end of February 1984. In conclusion it can be asserted that 
evidence supports the given hypothesis in the case of Lebanon-MNF military 
intervention.  
Grenada Intervention (1983) 
Background: On October 25, 1983, 1,900 U.S. Marines and Army Rangers and 
300 military and police forces from seven Caribbean islands landed in the small island 
nation of Grenada.
762
 On the same day, President Ronald Reagan submitted his report to 
Congress in conformity with the War Powers Resolution, insisting that “the action was in 
response to a request from the Organization of Eastern Caribbean States (OECS) which 
had formed a collective security force to restore order in Grenada, where anarchic 
conditions had developed, and to protect the lives of U.S. citizens.”763 The Reagan 
administration cited the primary reason for such intervention to be the rescue of several 
hundred American students attending medical school in Grenada.
764
 The other reason for 
the use of force in Grenada was the growing political relationship between Cuba and the 
Soviet Union in the Caribbean region, especially with regard to the ongoing construction 
of a 9,800-foot airstrip capable of handling military aircraft.
765
 When Congress responded 
                                                          
762
 Congressional Research Service, Report Number IB 83170. “Grenada: Issues concerning the use of 
U.S. Forces.” 1983. 
 
763
 Congressional Research Service, Report Number 41199. “The War Powers Resolution: After Thirty Six 
Years.” 2010. p. 15. 
 
764
 Mermin, Jonathan. 1999. 
 
765
 Congressional Research Service, Report Number IB 83170. “Grenada: Issues concerning the use of 
U.S. Forces.” 1983. 
255 
 
fast and took legislative action to invoke the War Powers Resolution, the Reagan 
administration assured the Capitol that it had plans to withdraw troops from Grenada by 
December 23, 1983, which was before the expiration date of 60 days from the date of 
intervention.
766
 Eventually, all U.S. combat troops were removed from the island nation 
on December 15, 1983, which was a few days earlier than what the administration earlier 
projected.
767
 Grenada intervention was contemporary with the Lebanon MNF 
intervention and, therefore, divided government was in place in Washington. The United 
States Senate and the White House were controlled by the Republican Party, whereas the 
United States House of Representatives was controlled by the Democratic Party.  
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus. While 
deploying U.S. troops to Grenada, President Reagan did not consult with Congress in 
advance regarding such troop deployment. Also, the president skirted Section 4(a)(1) 
requirements when submitting a report to Congress in conformity with the War Powers 
Resolution.
768
 For these reasons, Congress was outraged, publicly rebuked the president, 
and responded immediately in a decisive manner by initiating legislative action in order 
to invoke the War Powers Resolution by unilaterally imposing the “trigger clause” of 
Section 4(a)(1).
769
 Congress, which was already absorbing the shock of the Beirut 
bombing in Lebanon, this time, took immediate action the day following the landing of 
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the U.S. troops on Grenada. The House of Representatives was the first to act. The 
Chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC) Representative Clement J. 
Zablocki (D-WI) introduced H.J. Res. 402, which stated, “That for purposes of Section 
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, the Congress hereby determines that the requirements 
of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution became operative on October 25, 1983, 
when United States Armed Forces were introduced into Grenada.”770 The purpose of the 
bill was to trigger Section 4(a)(1), which in turn would ensure that U.S. troop presence in 
Grenada would end in 60 days, unless Congress authorized their continued presence in 
accordance with the provisions of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Here it is 
significant to notice that Congress unilaterally imposed Section 4(a)(1), despite the 
president’s refusal to do so. Such congressional action immediately sparked legislative-
executive confrontation in a divided-government setting. The HFAC approved the bill on 
October 27 by a 33-2 vote.
771
 The full House later passed H.J. Res. 402 in a bipartisan 
manner by a margin of 403-23 on November 1, 1983.
772
 The measure was supported in a 
bipartisan manner, including 256 Democrats and 147 Republicans.
773
  In the Senate, 
identical language to H.J. Res. 402 was introduced in the form of an amendment to the 
debt ceiling bill by Senator Gary Hart (D-CO).
774
 The full Senate later adopted such an 
amendment, i.e. Amendment No. 2462, on October 28, 1993, as part of the debt ceiling 
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bill H.J. Res. 308 by a margin of 64-20.
775
 With that move, Congress sent a clear message 
to the Reagan administration, just in three days, that the president’s unilateral action to 
deploy troops in Grenada without consulting with the Capitol was in violation of the 
constitutional provisions of the War Powers Resolution. Swift response from Congress to 
invoke the War Powers Resolution was a clear reflection of the contours of legislative-
executive dissention under a divided-government political configuration. October 28, 
1983, also marked the watershed moment of congressional opposition to the Grenada 
operation, because of the harsh criticism of House Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill (D-MA) 
of the administration’s Grenada policy for the first time.776  The Speaker said, “To be 
perfectly truthful, his [President Reagan] policy scares me. We cannot go the way of 
gunboat diplomacy. His policy is wrong. His policy is frightening.”777 O’Neill even sent a 
bipartisan delegation of House Members to Grenada on a fact-finding mission from 
November 4-7, 1983.
778
 Congressional opposition in the form of prompt legislative 
actions taken to invoke the War Powers Resolution in the days following the Grenada 
intervention clearly displayed the implications of divided government, resulting in 
congressional-presidential dissension in war-making. The initial jolt from Congress 
forced the Reagan administration to hasten its military plans in Grenada and limit it to 
less than 60 days in accordance with the provisions of Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers 
Resolution. In consideration of the dynamics of legislative-executive relations, we may 
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draw conclusions in favor of the given hypothesis for the case of the Grenada 
intervention.  
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. The political posture adopted by 
the two chambers of Congress while taking legislative actions displayed elements of 
partisan and ideological dimensions. Congressional proceedings during the debate and 
roll call provide evidence that the Reagan administration’s decision to send U.S. troops to 
Grenada divided the Democrats in a significant manner, while the Republicans were 
generally steady in their support for the administration.
779
 Even then, the majority of the 
Democrats were critical of the administration while the Republicans supported Reagan in 
his Grenada mission.
780
 Such a distinct rift in relative support between the two political 
parties was also a reflection of the liberal-conservative continuum, because unlike the 
liberals, congressional conservatives were overwhelmingly vocal in extending their 
support to one of the most conservative presidents of the twentieth century. The New 
York Times reported, “Many hawkish supporters [conservative Republicans] greeted the 
news [of the Grenada invasion] with a sense of enthusiasm and relief…But opponents 
[liberal Democrats] of Mr. Reagan derided his ‘cowboy mentality’ in the words of 
Representative Ronald V. Dellums, Democrat of California.”781  While the Democrat-
controlled House was more proactive in initiating legislations to invoke the War Powers 
Resolution, the Republican-controlled Senate showed a relatively cautious approach in 
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the decision-making process. In their deliberations, the Democrats in Congress, in 
particular, had misgivings about the legality of such military intervention in Grenada 
under the provisions of international and American law.
782
 Most of the Democrats in the 
Capitol criticized Reagan because he did not consult with congressional leaders in 
advance before deploying the troops in Grenada, as required by the War Powers 
Resolution.
783
 The ranking member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Senator 
Clairborne Pell (D-R.I.), remarked, “There is a world of difference between being 
consulted and being asked do we think this is wise or not, or being informed, saying we 
are doing this at 5 AM tomorrow.”784 Speaker of the House O’Neill said, “We weren’t 
asked for advice, we were informed what was taking place.”785 Intense partisanship 
among congressional lawmakers was also evident from the fact that the legislations to 
enforce Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution were solely introduced by the 
Democrats in both the Senate (Democratic Senator Gary Hart) and the House 
(Democratic Representative Clement J. Zablocki). Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), the 
ranking member in the Senate Armed Services Committee, told a news conference that 
“official application of the War Powers measure to the [Grenada] conflict was a matter of 
principle.”786  
Partisan dimensions were also reflected in the parliamentary procedural 
discrepancy with regard to legislative activities in the Democrat-controlled House and the 
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Republican-controlled Senate toward invoking the War Powers Resolution’s troop 
withdrawal clock. The House Foreign Affairs Committee voted on October 27, 1983, in 
favor of reporting H.J. Res. 402, asserting that the provisions of Section 4(a)(1) of the 
War Powers Resolution became operative on October 25, 1983, the day when U.S. troops 
landed in Grenada.
787
 The House Committee deliberations displayed partisan and 
ideological conflict. Liberal Democrats said they were “ashamed” of the invasion, while 
conservative Republicans were “proud.”788  The Senate adopted the language of H.J. Res. 
402 on October 28, 1983, as an amendment to an unrelated debt ceiling bill, H.J. Res. 
308, which in turn failed to pass the Senate.
789
 The full House of Representatives later 
voted on H.J. Res. 402 on November 1, 1983.
790
 When H.J. Res. 402 arrived at the Senate 
on November 2, 1983, Senate Majority Leader Howard Baker (R-TN) referred it to the 
Senate Foreign Relations Committee in an apparent move to stall the bill. Later the 
Majority Leader’s aide said that the full Senate was unlikely to act on H.J. Res. 402 
before adjourning for the year.
791
  Thus, the Republican-controlled Senate was able to 
block the Democrat-controlled House version of H.J. Res. 402 in a parliamentary 
procedural maneuver, which in turn was a reflection of partisan delaying tactics toward 
implementing the troop withdrawal clock under Section 4(a)(1) and enforcing Section 
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5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Expressing his frustration on the partisan dynamics in 
each chamber, Senate Minority Leader commented,  
….each House has produced legislation finding that the War Powers Act, 
Sections 4(a)(1) and 5(b), was triggered by events that occurred in 
Grenada. Both measures have identical language. But they were like two 
ships passing in the night. The Senate acted on one vehicle; the House of 
Representatives acted on another.
792
    
 
Partisan dynamics were also observable with regard to different decision outcomes on the 
issue of sending a bipartisan fact-finding mission to Grenada. In the wake of President 
Reagan’s non-consultation with Congress before deploying U.S. troops in the theatre, 
House Speaker O’Neill used his power to quickly dispatch a bipartisan delegation of 
House members on a fact-finding mission from November 4-7, 1983, to “investigate 
publicly the causes and consequences of the American invasion, and the House Foreign 
Affairs Committee commenced its own inquiry into the administration’s policy in 
Grenada.”793 Even though the administration resisted a fact-finding mission appointed by 
the Democrat-controlled House on the issues of logistical problems and short-term 
military commitment, in the end the House demand prevailed.
794
 However, in the 
Republican-controlled Senate, Senate Majority Leader Baker (R-TN) twice blocked a 
similar proposal to appoint a bipartisan Senate delegation on a fact-finding mission put 
forward by Senate Minority Leader Byrd (D-W.V.). While “one version of Byrd's 
resolution, S Res 256, was referred to the Senate Rules Committee upon its introduction 
Oct. 31, Byrd asked for immediate consideration of a second, identical version, S Res 
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257, and Baker objected to the unanimous consent necessary to approve the request.”795 
Here too, parliamentary procedural dynamics were affected by partisan dimensions. The 
Republican-controlled Senate was reluctant to act on a proposal by Senate Democrats, 
which might undermine the military policy of a Republican administration in Grenada.  
From the analysis, it is clear that there was bipartisan consensus on record (roll 
call vote) in the House of Representatives (even though the House Democrats were 
internally divided on the issue) when it passed H.J. Res. 402 in order to invoke the War 
Powers Resolution in the Grenada situation. However, there was intense interparty 
dissension in the Senate when Senate Majority Leader Baker blocked the House version 
of H.J. Res. 402 before the adjournment of Congress for the year. Such political 
dynamics displayed flickers of consensus and dissension in congressional legislative 
actions between the House and the Senate on the War Powers issue on partisan and 
ideological dimensions, which in turn influenced the administration’s decision to 
withdraw troops within a time limit of 60 to 90 days. Therefore, conclusion can be drawn 
that the given hypothesis is accepted in the case of the Grenada intervention. Partisan and 
ideological dimensions significantly influenced the political process, and they were quite 
dominant in influencing the political process on war-making decisions in Grenada. 
Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. In this case, the main issue centered on the institutional prerogatives, in 
accordance with the War Powers Resolution. Also, the military intervention was too short 
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to be affected by the ensuing election cycle scheduled for the fall of 1984. Therefore, the 
given hypothesis is not applicable for the Grenada intervention.  
Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. After the nationally 
televised speech by President Reagan on October 27, 1983 there was a temporary bump 
in public support for the Grenada military operations. Despite such temporary rise in 
public support there was no consensus in the Democrat-controlled House of 
Representatives which adopted H.J. Res. 402 by a vote of 403-23. However, the 
Republican-controlled Senate was influenced by the rise in public support. Thus public 
opinion had mixed influence on the political process of legislative action in Congress. 
This was reflected by the outcome of flickers of consensus and dissension in 
congressional-presidential interactions. On the whole brief surge of favorable public 
opinion after Reagan’s television address failed to forge legislative-executive consensus. 
Evidence does not support the given hypothesis in case of Grenada military intervention. 
Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. When troops were deployed in 
Grenada by the Reagan administration, a majority of the congressional Democrats were 
critical of the administration, while the Republicans supported Reagan in his Grenada 
mission.
796
 The Democrat-controlled House was more proactive in initiating legislation to 
invoke the War Powers Resolution; the Republican-controlled Senate showed a relatively 
cautious approach in the decision-making process. Empirical investigation showed that 
some of the pivotal Democrats who wanted to invoke Section 4(a)(1) of the WPR were 
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House Speaker O’Neill  and House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman  Zablocki. On 
the Republican side, the pivotal player who wanted to block any legislation favoring 
invocation of WPR was Senate Majority Leader Baker. Members of Congress from each 
political party greatly supported their respective political leadership. The dynamics that 
members of Congress in each chamber instituted played an important role in the 
congressional proceedings on the issue of the war powers institutional prerogatives, 
which in turn influenced the decision-making process on the mission. Therefore, 
conclusions can be drawn that the given hypothesis is true for the case of the Grenada 
intervention. 
Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. The first 
week of the Grenada intervention, precisely from October 26 to November 2, 1983, 
received substantial media coverage as compared to the remaining period, despite the 
prohibition imposed on media coverage by the administration for the first hours of the 
operation. Many of the articles were critical of the administration’s military intervention 
in Grenada.
797
 The New York Times published a total of 252 reports, including 202 
articles, 38 front-page articles, 10 editorials, and 2 letters to the editor.
798
 During the same 
time period, the Washington Post published a total of 237 reports, including 190 articles, 
45 front-page articles, 9 editorials, and 2 letters to the editor.
799
 Daily breakup of the 
Times and the Post coverage showed fairly substantial reporting from October 26 to 
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October 30, 1983, with October 27 (when the House Foreign Affairs Committee 
approved H.J. Res. 402) showing the maximum number of reports.
800
 Since this was also 
the week when intense deliberations took place in Congress to invoke the War Powers 
Resolution, any critical content of the coverage of the Times and Post surely encouraged 
congressional Democrats, particularly the Democrat-controlled House of Representatives, 
to introduce legislation in order to obligate the administration to meet the requirements of 
Section 4(a)(1), which in turn would trigger Section 5(b) of the WPR. For instance, 
Steven V. Roberts’ articles in the New York Times articulated general discontent among 
the congressional Democrats over the administration’s actions by citing an influential 
Democratic Senator, Daniel Patrick Moynihan (D-N.Y.).  Moynihan called the invasion 
“an act of war” and added, “I don’t know that you restore democracy at the point of a 
bayonet.”801 Stuart Taylor’s article in the Times was critically important for the debate on 
the War Powers Resolution in the Grenada situation. Taylor commented, “Mr. Reagan 
did not report that the troops had been introduced ‘into hostilities or into situations where 
imminent involvement in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances,’ as the War 
Powers Resolution requires him to do when that is the case.”802 On October 27, 1983,  
Roberts of the Times  reported widespread anger on the part of congressional Democrats 
on the Grenada intervention and commented, “In both houses, these Democrats said they 
would push for legislation declaring that the War Powers Resolution now covers events 
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in the Caribbean island [Grenada].”803 Also on October 27, 1983, the Times published a 
big story on a midtown Manhattan protest march against the Grenada intervention,
804
 
while Taylor again brought the legality aspect of the invasion into question.
805
 The 
Washington Post editorial piece of October 28, 1983, by Robert J. McCloskey criticized 
the administration on the prohibition of media and noted, “Another denial that created 
needless controversy was the administration’s prohibition against reporters’ going to 
Grenada.”806 The October 30 outlook piece by Robert G. Kaiser in the Post was very 
critical of Reagan’s foreign policy, particularly with regard to Grenada.807 Television 
news organizations made the Grenada intervention a subject of instant foreign policy 
analysis.
808
 Network television, consisting of ABC, CBS, and NBC, produced 70 
programs from October 26 to November 2, 1983. ABC presented 29 stories, CBS 
reported 19 stories, and NBC aired 22 stories.
809
 Participants in the Grenada situation on 
television network programs “were firmer and more ideological in their positions.”810 
Such a tone in media coverage significantly influenced congressional deliberations on the 
issue of the War Powers Resolution. However, over time, the media coverage became 
less critical in its approach because the military operation itself was for a short duration 
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and the Reagan administration had assured Congress that it would wind up the 
intervention long before the time limit of 60 days, in compliance with the requirements of 
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. The Washington Post highlighted the sudden 
increase in public support for the Grenada intervention after Reagan delivered his 
televised address on the issue.
811
  Henceforward, media coverage became less hostile in 
its analysis and covered the administration’s position as a single voice representing U.S. 
foreign policy. Such a shift of content in media coverage toned down the congressional 
Democrats considerably and emboldened the Republicans, particularly in the Senate 
(which was controlled by the Republican Party), in supporting the administration’s 
Grenada military policy. This was evident from House Speaker O’Neill’s reversal from 
his initial position as he said, “The overwhelming consensus of the members of the 
delegation was that a real potential threat to the American citizens existed in Grenada. 
Since this was the case, I believe that sending American forces into combat was justified 
under these particular circumstances.”812 The House Democrats were even willing to 
extend their support for a longer stay of troops in Grenada if necessary.
813
 Clearly this 
was a sign of flexibility by members of Congress, as part of congressional authorization 
for extension of a time limit for military presence on the ground, if need be, in conformity 
to Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. 
 Empirical investigation indicates that earlier in the intervention extensive 
nature of negative media coverage of administration’s Grenada policy resulted in 
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congressional-presidential dissension. In the end when the administration declared its 
intentions to wind up military intervention before 60 days, as required by the War Powers 
Resolution, media coverage became less hostile of the Reagan’s policy. This helped to 
greatly reduce ongoing legislative-executive tension and consensus was forged on the 
termination of the military mission. Therefore, it can be asserted that evidence supports 
the given hypothesis for Grenada case study.      
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war. Grenada was a 
short military intervention. It started on October 25, 1983 and ended on December 23, 
1983. The Reagan administration assured the Capitol that it had plans to withdraw troops 
from Grenada by December 23, 1983, which was earlier than 60 days from the date of 
intervention, as required by Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution.
814
 
Subsequently, complications with regard to a long-lasting military campaign did not arise 
for the Grenada intervention. As a result, it can be concluded that the given hypothesis is 
not applicable for the case of the Grenada intervention. 
Bosnia-Herzegovina Intervention (1992-95) 
Background: U.S. participation in Bosnia-Herzegovina was confined primarily to 
limited airstrikes against Bosnian Serb targets to protect the capital Sarajevo from 
Serbian military aggression from 1992 to 1994. This was later followed by ground 
deployment of troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1995, in response to the UN Security 
Council Resolution and joint NATO operations.
815
 On August 13, 1992, the UN Security 
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Council Resolution 770 called on nations to take “all measures necessary” to make sure 
that much-needed humanitarian assistance was delivered to Sarajevo.
816
 In response, the 
U.S. participated in “airlifts into Sarajevo, naval monitoring of sanctions, aerial 
enforcement of a ‘no-fly zone,’ and aerial enforcement of safe havens.”817 The situation 
in the Balkan region was dire, and according to a Senate Foreign Relations Committee 
report, the Bosnian Serbs were on a spree of ethnic cleansing in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
818
 
Three years of conflict came to an end with the signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in 
December 1995, under which Bosnia-Herzegovina would remain an internationally 
recognized state within its prewar borders.
819
 The issue of the War Powers Resolution 
came to the forefront in U.S. domestic politics, thereby resulting in congressional-
presidential tension with regard to the U.S. participation in airstrikes and ground 
deployment of troops. Legislative-executive confrontation related to the constitutional 
provisions of the resolution was largely responsible for keeping the Clinton 
administration confined to limited airstrikes, with no boots on the ground for most of the 
conflict.
820
 The complex nature of the legislative-executive struggle became more intense 
with the sweeping victory of the Republicans in the 1994 congressional midterm 
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elections, resulting in the Republican Party’s gaining a majority in both the House of 
Representatives and the Senate in Congress.
821
  
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus. From the 
perspective of interbranch competition on war power prerogatives, the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict was unique because of the presence of divided and unified 
governments at various stages of the war. These shifts in political composition in 
Washington were one of the primary reasons that resulted in flickers of consensus and 
dissension between the legislative and executive branches at various points in time. Such 
variations in the decision outcome due to variations in government typology at various 
stages of the long-drawn-out Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict were significant.  
From 1992 to 1994, a period marked by transition from the administration of 
George H.W. Bush  (divided government) to that of Bill Clinton (unified government), 
Congress remained strongly opposed to U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia, despite 
Clinton’s repeated calls for congressional approval on his military policy.822 At the same 
time, Congress was supportive of the administration’s taking all necessary steps to 
provide humanitarian assistance in Bosnia to comply with UN Security Council 
Resolution 770. Reflections of consensus and dissension between Capitol Hill and the 
White House were seen in such actions, which kept the Clinton administration from any 
ground deployment of troops in the foreseeable future. Also, members of Congress on a 
bipartisan basis in both chambers wanted President Clinton to lift the arms embargo as 
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authorized by the UN Security Council Resolution 713, so that the Bosnian Serbs did not 
get any undue advantage from such a controversial weapons ban.
823
 Thus, while Congress 
disapproved of any additional deployment of troops as requested by Clinton to operate 
under the auspices of the UN peacekeeping operations, the administration did not relent 
under the congressional demand to lift the arms embargo.
824
 It was a tit-for-tat situation, 
in which the legislative-executive rift continued to grow regarding institutional 
prerogatives on war powers during the period of 1992 to 1994.  Congress denied the 
Clinton administration authorization for any ground deployment of U.S. troops in Bosnia.  
With the Republican Party’s sweeping victory in the fall 1994 congressional 
elections and the party’s eventual majority in both the House of Representatives and the 
Senate, an escalation of legislative-executive tension with regard to intervention in 
Bosnia could be expected. Under the new Republican leadership of Senate Majority 
Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) and House Speaker Newt Gingrich (R-GA), and further with 
the implementation of the Contract with America, Republican Congress members began 
to seek a more assertive role in every aspect of foreign policy, including U.S. military 
operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
825
 In March 1995, Dole and some senior Senate 
Republicans, including Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Strom Thurmond 
(R-S.C.), Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Jesse Helms (R- N.C.), John 
McCain (R-AZ), and Richard Lugar (R-IN), wrote a letter to Clinton laying out strict 
conditions before any U.S. troop deployment could take place as part of assisting UN 
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peacekeeping operations.
826
 Thereafter, Congress in a divided government arrangement 
further intensified its assertive role by initiating major legislative actions with regard to 
the Bosnia conflict. As a prelude to the larger, contentious debate on congressional 
authorization for U.S. troop deployment as required by Section 5(b) of the War Powers 
Resolution (1973) that was about to come up in the fall of 1995, the House of 
Representatives on June 8 voted overwhelmingly by 318 to 99 in favor of an amendment, 
as a rider to a foreign aid bill HR 1561, to require that the president unilaterally lift the 
arms embargo on Bosnia.
827
 Such a legislative measure was in direct opposition to what 
Clinton desired; he had earlier pledged to veto such a measure. Notwithstanding the 
administration’s objection, the Senate on July 26, 1995, passed the bill S 21 by a margin 
of 69-29, requiring the administration to end the arms embargo on Bosnia.
828
 Later, on 
August 1, 1995, the House cleared the Senate Bill S 21 by a large margin of 298-128.
829
 
Such congressional measures contradicted Clinton’s war plans in Bosnia and in turn 
created roadblocks to the president’s troop deployment endeavors. Implications of 
divided government were clearly observable in the realm of congressional-presidential 
relations on the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict.  
As expected, in the fall of 1995, deliberations on Capitol Hill regarding 
deployment of troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina in accordance with the provisions of the 
War Powers Resolution became increasingly heated and complicated. On September 29, 
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1995, the Senate adopted overwhelmingly,  by a vote of 94-2, the “sense of the Senate” 
resolution, sponsored by Senator Judd Gregg (R-N.H.) as an amendment to the State 
Department appropriations bill (HR 2076), which prohibited any ground deployment of 
U.S. troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina unless authorized by Congress.
830
 With that, the U.S. 
Senate showed its commitment to enforce Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. 
Such Senate action was in response to the confirmation hearing of General John 
Shalikashvilli before the Senate Armed Services Committee on September 21, 1995, as a 
second-time nominee for the Chairman of Joint Chiefs of Staff, when he described the 
Clinton administration’s intention to send 25,000 troops to participate as part of a NATO-
led force for maintaining peace and security in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
831
 Congressional-
presidential dissension was clearly observable, regarding the institutional prerogatives of 
the War Powers Resolution under the political arrangement of divided government.  
On October 30, 1995, the House of Representatives adopted, by a significant 
margin of 315-103, a nonbinding resolution that imposed restrictions on the 
administration by saying, “U.S. troops should not be deployed without congressional 
approval.”832 On November 17, 1995, the House passed a bill, HR 2606, originally 
sponsored by Joel Hefley (R-CO) to bar the Clinton administration from sending troops 
to Bosnia-Herzegovina unless approved by Congress.
833
 The legislation also sought to 
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prohibit funds for deployment in Bosnia of U.S. peacekeeping forces.
834
 The aggressive 
nature of the House of Representatives in its denial of any ground troop deployment as 
requested by the White House was a reflection of the implications of divided government 
on congressional-presidential relations with regard to troop deployment in Bosnia. That 
said, it was also a political reality that the long and complex nature of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict was responsible for a great deal of ambivalence in the decision-
making process, both on Capitol Hill and in the White House. Such ambivalence at times 
led to mixed responses, which were eventually reflected by flickers of dissension and 
consensus inside the Beltway.
835
 The Senate’s rejection of the House bill, HR 2606, by 
22-77
836
 was a clear reflection of such flickers of consensus and dissension at various 
stages of the decision-making process as to how to conduct the Bosnia war. 
Congressional ambivalence also made the administration vulnerable in its decision-
making process regarding troop deployment, because Clinton wanted to get approval 
from Capitol Hill in order to avoid any domestic political cost in the wake of the 
Republican Party’s sweeping victory in the recently conducted midterm elections. That 
said, the president also made explicit to congressional lawmakers his intention to act as 
commander-in-chief with any troop deployment decisions. Thus, there was a mixed 
response from each side of Pennsylvania Avenue as to how to conduct the Bosnia war in 
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a divided government arrangement, thereby escalating tension in congressional-
presidential relations during most of 1995.  
December 1995 marked the tipping point for the decision-making process and 
legislative activities influencing relations between Congress and the president on 
deployment of troops in Bosnia.  On December 13, 1995, the House approved a 
bipartisan resolution, HR 302, sponsored by Representatives Steve Buyer (R-IN) and Ike 
Skelton (D-MO) by a margin of 287-141, thereby authorizing the administration to send 
U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of the NATO-led peacekeeping operation.
837
 With such an 
authorization for troop deployment, the House of Representatives met the requirements of 
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.  HR 302 also insisted that the United States 
remained totally neutral among the warring parties in Bosnia.
838
 To express solidarity 
with the U.S. troops, the same day the House rejected the bill HR 2770 by a close margin 
of 210-218, skirting any denial of funds for the ongoing mission.
839
 In continuation of the 
political stand to support the troops on the ground and criticize Clinton’s Bosnia policy, 
the Senate rejected S Con. Res. 35 (that would have denied troop deployment) sponsored 
by Kay Bailey Hutchison (R-TX) by a close margin of 47-52.
840
 As a follow-up to HR 
302 passed in the House authorizing troop deployment, the Senate on December 13, 
1995, adopted S.J. Res. 44, engineered by Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole in a 
bipartisan manner by a vote of 69-30 to meet the requirements of Section 5(b) of the War 
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Powers Resolution.
841
 S.J. Res. 44 allowed Clinton to “fulfill his commitment to send 
troops, provided that he also promised to begin beefing up the armed forces of Bosnia’s 
Muslim-led government.”842 Although the complex nature of the Bosnia conflict was 
responsible for the congressional final authorization for troop deployment, Capitol Hill 
did that to support the troops, while severely criticizing the administration’s overall 
military strategy. Even then, the aggressive nature of the House of Representatives under 
a divided-government setting was clear until the concluding days of legislative activities, 
consistent with the general expectation of the hypothesis. On December 14, 1995, the 
House rejected the resolution H Res. 306, sponsored by Lee Hamilton (D-IN) by a 
convincing margin of 190-237.
843
 Because the bill intended to declare support for the 
troops without slamming Clinton’s military policy in Bosnia, the House rejected it, 
maintaining its aggressive stance on matters of war powers in a divided-government 
setting.   
Empirical evidence shows that formation of divided government in the wake of 
the Republican Party gaining a majority in both chambers of Congress led to 
congressional-presidential dissension for most of the period of the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
conflict. This was consistent with the expectations of the given hypothesis. Even though 
there were flickers of consensus and dissension at some points in discussion of the war, 
such variations were because of the long and complicated nature of the conditions on the 
ground. In the end, even when Congress reluctantly granted approval to President Clinton 
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for troop deployment, it did so laying out strict conditions for the administration, largely 
to support the troops already on the ground, while severely criticizing the president’s 
overall Bosnia military policy. Evidence shows that while throughout the entire period of 
the Bosnia intervention, President Clinton remained mindful of the war powers 
constitutional prerogatives of Capitol Hill regarding troop deployment, yet he maintained 
his constitutional role of commander-in-chief. Congress repudiated in principle Clinton’s 
military policy while showing support to the troops already deployed previously as part 
of maintaining peace and security in the region. Based on such observations, it can be 
concluded that the expectations of the given hypothesis were generally met with regard to 
the conduct of the Bosnia war, in accordance with the provisions of the War Powers 
Resolution.            
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. Intense legislative-executive 
confrontation on partisan and ideological dimensions began with the formation of the 
104
th
 Congress in January 1995, after the Republican Party gained a majority in the 
House of Representatives as well as in the Senate. Until then, the nature of congressional-
presidential contestation centered on institutional war powers prerogatives.  With the shift 
in nature of governmental composition in 1995, the interbranch conflict took a sharp turn 
toward partisan and ideological elements in the decision-making process in the conduct 
of foreign policy, including military interventions abroad.
844
 Incidentally, this was also 
the year that witnessed the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict becoming all the more complex 
in nature. Subsequently, the Clinton administration stepped up its rhetoric in favor of 
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ground troops in Bosnia as part of an international peacekeeping force, under the control 
of first the United Nations and later NATO. The response of the Republican Congress 
was prompt and decisive in checking Clinton’s military plans. The first taste of the 
partisan and ideological rift came in the form of the passage of the Republican Party-
sponsored National Security Revitalization Act (HR 7) on February 16, 1995, by the 
House of Representatives, following “two days of bitterly partisan floor debate.”845 The 
bill was passed by 241-181 and would cut funding for UN peacekeeping operations 
including that in Bosnia, where U.S. troops would be deployed.
846
 The bill was passed 
with near-full support by the House Republicans.
847
 Apart from being able to frustrate the 
president’s Bosnia war plans, the passage of HR 7 was a clear sign of congressional 
ascendency in foreign and military policy, purely on partisan and ideological dimensions. 
Senior administration officials and many Democrats contended that the measure was “an 
important test case pitting advocates of internationalism against a growing tide of 
isolationists in Congress.”848 In the Senate, too, Republican resurgence was observable 
when the Senate Majority Leader and presidential hopeful Bob Dole, along with nine 
cosponsors, introduced the Peace Powers Act (S 5) on the first day of the 104
th
 
Congress.
849
 The legislation was intended to “clarify the war powers of Congress and the 
president in the post-cold war period.”850 The legislation made provisions “to make it 
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more difficult [for the president] to place American troops under UN command in 
peacekeeping operations” and also included “new limitations on command and funding 
arrangements for United Nations peacekeeping activities.”851 Legislations such as the 
Peace Powers Act (S 5) in the Senate and the National Security Revitalization Act (HR 7) 
in the House were consistent with the ideological orientation of the Republican Party’s 
“Contract with America.” Thus, the 104th Congress clearly set the tone for an intense 
confrontation between the Republican Congress and the Democratic White House.          
From the beginning, Clinton was mindful of congressional resistance to ground 
troop deployment and was apprehensive about the potential political cost of going against 
the 104
th
 Congress that had come to power with a sweeping Republican victory in the 
recently concluded elections. Consequently, prior to the peace talks in Dayton, the 
Clinton administration started its efforts to appease Congress by reiterating the 
constitutional importance of Capitol Hill in any decision regarding future deployment of 
troops.
852
 In a major policy address on October 6, 1995, Clinton said that he “would want 
and welcome congressional support [on future troop deployment].”853 Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher, while indicating the administration’s intentions to seek approval 
from Congress regarding troop deployment in Bosnia, said, “We want Congress’ 
approval, we’ll consult very closely with them.”854 But key congressional leaders of the 
Republican Party were skeptical with the administration’s intentions and plan for troop 
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deployment. The partisan and ideological differences were evident when Senate Majority 
Leader Dole on October 6, 1995, commented that “Clinton has yet to make his case for 
the mission and should seek Congress’ approval. I think he should have congressional 
authorization.”855  
With the administration’s increasing determination to send U.S. troops to Bosnia-
Herzegovina as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping force once the Dayton Peace Accords 
were successfully completed, partisan and ideological divisions at the congressional-
presidential level widened further. Even as the Dayton peace talks were at a crucial stage, 
the House of Representatives approved a bill sponsored by Joel Hefley (R-CO) by a 
largely party-line vote of 243-171.
856
 The vote represented “the strongest action” taken 
by the Republican Congress so far “to challenge Clinton’s Bosnia policy.”857 The 
legislation barred Clinton from sending troops without congressional authorization and 
also made provisions to cut funding for troop deployment.
858
  In order to gain support 
from the Republican members of Congress while the peace talks were in progress, Vice 
President Al Gore in a separate meeting assured key House members, “The 
administration was fully committed to a fair, full debate and vote [in Congress], 
conducted in a timely manner, after the conclusion of the peace agreement.”859  In a letter 
to House Speaker Gingrich, President Clinton assured him that Congress would be 
consulted by his administration before any ground deployment of troops and wrote, “I 
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will submit a request for a Congressional expression of support for U.S. participation in a 
NATO-led implementation force in Bosnia promptly” once the peace negotiations were 
over and that support from Congress was “important and desirable.”860 However, the 
aggressive nature of the House on partisan dimensions to exercise its war powers was 
plain in Speaker Gingrich’s skeptical response to Clinton’s military endeavors.  Gingrich 
said, “We should not automatically say no, nor should we automatically say yes.”861 
However, after the successful conclusion of the Dayton peace negotiations, when Clinton 
addressed the nation by a televised speech, it was quite evident that the administration 
had already made a call to deploy U.S. troops in Bosnia-Herzegovina as part of the 
NATO-led peacekeeping force. Consequently, in order to express solidarity with the 
troops already deployed previously, Congress reluctantly supported such an arrangement. 
From the findings, it is clear that all through the decision-making process on troop 
deployment, the Republican Congress created significant roadblocks for a Democratic 
administration to pursue its Bosnia military policy. Rhetoric on each side of Pennsylvania 
Avenue was running high, based on partisan and ideological dimensions, when it came to 
troop deployment and conduct of the war in Bosnia. The constitutional provisions of the 
War Powers Resolution and the institutional prerogatives of war powers were at the heart 
of the contentious relations between Congress and the president. In consideration of the 
findings, conclusions can be drawn that the given hypothesis is true for U.S. military 
intervention in Bosnia.  
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Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. During the second half of 1992 and before the fall presidential elections, the 
George H. W. Bush administration was fairly cautious, at times ambivalent, and in turn 
avoided escalation of military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
862
 With the revelation 
of “ethnic cleansing” and television-run media images in August 1992 of deplorable 
human conditions as a result of Serbian atrocities in Bosnia, public support in the U.S. 
increased dramatically in favor of military intervention. It was also the time when the 
incumbent Bush administration, facing a serious Democratic challenger in Bill Clinton 
with the slogan “It’s the economy, stupid!”, mobilized most of its resources to fix the 
dwindling economy.
863
 
Keeping the upcoming presidential elections in mind, Democratic presidential 
candidate Bill Clinton severely criticized the Republican White House for inaction, and 
in turn he promised action if voted into power.
864
 Eventually, Bush lost and Clinton won 
the White House. The Democrats also gained a majority in each house of Congress. Thus, 
the 1992 presidential election influenced the decision-making process in the Bosnia 
intervention, primarily based on partisan dimensions. After assuming office in January 
1993, consistent with his election campaign promises, President Clinton in coordination 
with the Democratic Congress increased military operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 
terms of participation in NATO-led airstrikes and imposing an arms embargo. With 
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Congress strongly opposing ground troop deployment, particularly from his Republican 
opponents, Clinton resisted such a move without congressional approval. With the 1994 
midterm elections coming up and with the situation on the ground fast deteriorating, the 
Clinton administration’s foreign policy approval rating dropped significantly.865  This 
was also the period when the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
legislation was the primary foreign policy issue in U.S. politics. In consequence, the 
attention of electorates was diverted from the Bosnia war to the contentious conflict 
between Congress and the president on NAFTA. Nonetheless, evidence shows that the 
majority of the American people were opposed to the Clinton administration’s plan to 
send troops to Bosnia. During the spring and summer of 1994, one poll showed that only 
26 percent of the public supported military action against Bosnia.
866
 After the Republican 
Party’s sweeping victory and the Democratic Party’s defeat in the 1994 congressional 
elections, Clinton’s attention turned to the 1996 presidential election cycle. The fall 1994 
elections were in a way a turning point in Clinton’s Bosnia military plans, as the 
president became concerned about his reelection and also gaining his party’s seats in 
Congress.  In order to improve his image in the foreign policy sphere and keeping in 
mind the 1996 presidential election, the Dayton peace negotiations in the fall of 1995 to 
end the Bosnia conflict was carefully crafted by the Clinton White House during the 
Democratic primary season.
867
 Assistant Secretary of State Richard Holbrooke, Clinton’s 
point person at the Dayton, Ohio, talks, stated that the situation in Bosnia already put 
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Clinton right into the ballpark of the 1996 presidential election, and the decisive positive 
outcome of the talks was highly expected to boost Clinton’s prospects.868 Eventually, 
successful conclusion of the Dayton peace negotiations was a major foreign policy 
victory which contributed to Clinton’s second term. In addition, the 1996 presidential 
election was important for Senate Majority Leader Bob Dole, who was a presidential 
aspirant from the Republican Party. With an eye to the presidential election and in order 
to mobilize support from the Republican base, Dole introduced the Peace Powers Act (S 
7) in January 1995, consistent with the ideological agenda of the Republican Party’s 
Contract with America. It also appears that the strong opposition to any ground troop 
deployment in Bosnia by Senate Republicans under the stewardship of Dole for most of 
1995 was directed to the prospects in the upcoming presidential election. Clinton’s 
deference to congressional opposition to troop deployment was partly because of the 
Republican Party gaining public legitimacy from the big victory in the 1994 midterm 
elections and also partly because he was averse to taking any action without support from 
Congress. This was true especially prior to the 1996 presidential election, in 
consideration of the low public approval for troop deployment.
869
 Later, in December 
1995, with the Dayton peace agreement ready for signature in Paris, Dole compromised 
with his hardline position, and thereafter the Republican Senate finally passed a carefully 
worded resolution that allowed for troop deployment to express support for the troops 
already on the ground but doubted whether it was prudent to send them.  At the same 
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time, the resolution severely criticized Clinton’s Bosnia military policy.870 Dole’s action 
was an apparent bid to garner support from the moderates in the electoral process without 
much angering the conservative base of the Republican Party, keeping an eye on the 1996 
presidential election as a Republican challenger to the incumbent Democratic president.  
From the analysis, it is clear that the long and complicated nature of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict spanned two presidential elections and one crucial midterm 
congressional elections. Electoral imperatives and reelection concerns in each of the 
elections influenced the trajectory of dissension and consensus between Congress and the 
president as to how to conduct the war in Bosnia. Based on the findings it can be 
concluded that the given hypothesis is true for the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina 
intervention.                         
Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. U.S. military 
intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina was a complex political maneuver between Congress 
and the Clinton administration because of the ups and downs in public opinion during the 
long-drawn-out period of the conflict. In the spring and summer of the presidential 
election year 1992, public opinion showed fluctuations and mixed results. In May 1992, 
55 percent of the people and 61 percent of women opposed U.S. airstrikes against the 
Bosnian Serbs.
871
 Subsequently, the Bush administration was reluctant to go for full-scale 
military intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Presidential candidate Clinton also opposed 
major U.S. military intervention. By August 1992, public opinion reversed and started to 
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rise, with 53 percent of registered voters in favor of U.S. military engagement under the 
auspices of the UN-led intervention for either airstrikes or some kind of ground 
operations.
872
 Although the incumbent Bush administration (41) ignored Bosnia-
Herzegovina as an immediate action plan and concentrated on fixing the domestic 
economy despite a rise in public support of intervention, both Congress and Democratic 
presidential candidate Clinton pressed for tougher measures to deal with the crisis in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina.
873
 In response to the rise in public support, the U.S. Senate passed a 
resolution, S Res. 330, by a bipartisan vote of 74-22, calling Bush 41 to work with the 
United Nations to use “all means necessary, including use of military force” in Bosnia-
Herzegovina as part of humanitarian aid.
874
 Thus, there was a moment when President 
Bush could have capitalized on support from Congress and Clinton for military 
intervention, but he failed to act. 
After Clinton took office in January 1993, public opinion was still in favor of 
sending troops to restore peace in Bosnia, with 57 percent supporting the proposition.
875
 
During that time, in compliance with public opinion, Congress was generally supportive 
of military intervention in Bosnia. But Clinton softened his stance on his Bosnia military 
policy in a stunning reversal from his campaign rhetoric on the use of airstrikes, let alone 
troop deployment. Once again, the executive branch failed to act, despite some consensus 
from the legislative branch to extend support for military intervention. Thereafter, the 
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trajectory of public opinion became divided, making it more difficult to reach a 
congressional-presidential consensus. Members of Congress also showed ambivalence 
about the right course of military intervention that needed to be taken in Bosnia-
Herzegovina. Halfway through the year 1993, public opinion became murky, which led 
to a difficult relationship between Capitol Hill and the Clinton White House. According 
to a USA Today/CNN/Gallup poll conducted on May 6, 1993, 55 percent of the 
respondents were opposed to U.S. airstrikes against Serbian artillery in Bosnia-
Herzegovina.
876
 The CBS News poll conducted on May 4-5, 1993, found that 52 percent 
of respondents did not believe that the United States had responsibility in Bosnia. The 
same poll also found that an overwhelming 77 percent of the American people considered 
the Bosnia war to be the responsibility of Europeans.
877
 In the ABC poll, while 65 
percent of the respondents supported airstrikes against Bosnian artillery installations and 
supply lines, nearly 9 in 10 respondents insisted upon European participation in any use 
of ground force.
878
 Capitol Hill and the White House closely followed such divided 
public opinion in 1993, which in turn led to greater ambivalence among policymakers in 
Washington. Depending on the situation on the ground, the trajectory of legislative-
executive relations experienced flickers of consensus and dissension at various stages of 
the ongoing crisis. Throughout this period, Congress wanted Clinton to continue with 
airstrikes, which the president did. But when Clinton wanted to mobilize support for 
ground troop deployment, the Hill denied authorization to send troops to Bosnia-
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Herzegovina. The editorial board of the Christian Science Monitor commented, 
“Confusion and cross-purposes about intervening in Bosnia have caused President 
Clinton to delay approval of military action there. Congress isn’t settled.”879 The New 
York Times commented, “Bosnia is as vexing a foreign policy question as any that has 
faced an American president since World War II. There are conflicting moral imperatives 
and no good options.”880 In 1994, Clinton’s approval rating reached its lowest level. 
Inaction in Bosnia was one of the primary reasons for such a low public perception about 
his handling of foreign policy.
881
  That cost Clinton dearly in the 1994 midterm elections 
when his party suffered electoral defeat and the Republican Party’s eventual ascendancy 
in Congress.  
In order to alter his foreign policy image among the public to jump-start the 1996 
presidential election cycle, Clinton took a more aggressive stance in his Bosnia military 
policy during 1995. As the Dayton peace talks mediated by Richard Holbrooke 
progressed to end the Bosnia war, Clinton pushed for greater U.S. military involvement 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. However, throughout 1995, public opinion was opposed to any 
ground troop deployment and Congress, sailing with the wind of such public opinion, 
strongly opposed the Clinton White House’s military plan. However, both Congress and 
the administration were in favor of greater military airstrikes against Bosnian Serbs. As a 
result, while there was congressional-presidential dissension in a divided-government 
setting on ground troop deployment, there was consensus on the issue of airstrikes. Such 
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findings corroborate that the mixed response in terms of public opinion was greatly 
responsible for the flickers of consensus and dissension in legislative-executive 
relations.
882
  A Washington Post-ABC News poll, conducted in July 1995, showed that 
58 percent of respondents were opposed to “sending in ground forces to try to stop the 
fighting in Bosnia,” while 56 percent said that “they generally disapprove of the way 
Clinton is handling Bosnia.”883 Resonating with similar public perception, a CBS 
News/New York Times poll conducted in July 1995 showed that most Americans did not 
believe that the United States had a responsibility to end fighting in Bosnia, while 61 
percent of those polled said they favored lifting the arms embargo on Bosnia.
884
 In tune 
with the public opinion, the Senate had already passed a bipartisan legislation, S 21, on 
July 26, 1995, by 69-22, asking Clinton to lift the arms embargo in Bosnia so that 
Bosnian Serbs did not get an undue advantage from such a military policy.
885
 Later, on 
August 1, 1995, the House passed the Senate bill S 21 by an overwhelmingly bipartisan 
margin of 298-128.
886
 Such a bipartisan measure by Capitol Hill was a sign of “a political 
rebuke of the [Clinton] administration” for what many members of Congress regarded as 
“an inconsistent and failed policy.” This shows that public opinion significantly 
influenced the trajectory of congressional-presidential consensus/dissension and the 
political process in the conduct of the Bosnia war. As the Dayton talks reached their 
climax in October 1995, an October 1995 opinion poll conducted by CBS News and the 
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New York Times showed that 57 percent of the public were opposed to sending U.S. 
ground troops to participate in a NATO-led peacekeeping force, while only 37 percent 
supported it.
887
 In response, Congress continued strong opposition to any ground troop 
deployment, despite Clinton’s renewed push for such approval from Capitol Hill. The 
latest Gallup poll, conducted in November 1995, showed that 47 percent of the American 
people were in favor of sending U.S. troops to Bosnia, while 49 percent opposed it.
888
  A 
CBS News/New York Times poll conducted in December 1995, after the successful 
completion of the United States-mediated Dayton peace negotiations between Bosnia, 
Serbia, and Croatia, found that 64 percent of the respondents were in favor of sending 
U.S. troops to Bosnia for the purpose of “stopping more people from being killed in this 
war.”889 Therefore, on the basis of moral responsibility to stop killings of innocent people 
in Bosnia, there was sufficient public support for sending troops. At the same time, a 
December 1995 CBS News/New York Times poll also showed that Clinton’s overall job 
approval rating had risen to over 50 percent in two years, while that of the Republicans in 
Congress declined.
890
 This was a sufficient red-flag warning for the Republicans in 
Congress to start making a viable compromise in their position on sending U.S. troops 
abroad, especially after the successful conclusion of the Dayton peace agreement to end 
the conflict in Bosnia. Subsequently, the Republican Congress was quick to respond and 
authorized the Clinton administration to send U.S. troops to Bosnia as part of the NATO-
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led peacekeeping operation. On December 13, 1995, the House approved a bipartisan 
resolution, HR 302, by a margin of 287-141 and authorized troop deployment.
891
 The 
Senate too on December 13, 1995, adopted S.J. Res. 44 engineered by Senate Majority 
Leader Dole by a vote of 69-30 as part of congressional authorization to send troops to 
Bosnia.
892
 The implications of public opinion were clearly observable on congressional 
authorization that was required by the War Powers Resolution. Importantly Capitol Hill 
made it clear that such authorization was to express support and solidarity with the troops 
already present on the ground and those who were about to be deployed soon,  while it 
severely criticized Clinton’s overall military policy in Bosnia.893 With congressional 
authorization, the conditions of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution were met. 
Although the complex nature of the Bosnia conflict was responsible for congressional 
final authorization for troop deployment, Congress did that to support the troops, while 
severely criticizing the administration’s overall military strategy.  
From the empirical investigations done in this section, it was clear that there were 
ups and downs in public opinion during the long and complicated nature of the conflict in 
Bosnia- Herzegovina. Divided public opinion was greatly responsible in shaping the 
trajectory of congressional-presidential consensus/dissension as to how to conduct the 
Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention. From the findings, it was clear that for most of the time 
period during the course of the conflict, public opinion was averse to troop deployment 
on the ground while supportive of airstrikes. This led to on one hand congressional-
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presidential dissension on the issue of ground troop deployment, while on the other hand 
there was consensus on the issue of military airstrikes without actual boots on the ground. 
However, after successful completion of the Dayton Peace Accord and repeated appeals 
by President Clinton to garner public support,
894
 public opinion became more favorable 
toward sending troops on a high moral ground to stop killings in Bosnia.
895
 It was only 
then that Congress changed its policy position and authorized troop deployment in 
compliance with the requirements of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. 
Congressional authorization marked legislative-executive consensus in the conduct of 
war. Therefore, conclusions can be drawn that evidence supports the given hypothesis 
with regard to Bosnia-Herzegovina military intervention.  
Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. From the very beginning of U.S. 
intervention in Bosnia-Herzegovina, members of Congress were generally opposed to 
actual troop deployment on the ground. However, most of the congressional lawmakers, 
in a bipartisan manner, were supportive of airstrikes under the United Nations and NATO 
to cripple the military strongholds of Bosnian Serbs. Thus, members of Congress 
influenced the Clinton administration’s Bosnia military policy in a significant manner 
during the prolonged course of the conflict. The fact that a majority of the congressional 
lawmakers were opposed to any ground troop deployment, as discussed in detail in 
hypotheses 2, 3, and 4, was by itself a major factor in restricting the administration from 
sending troops to Bosnia during most of the conflict. Such congressional resistance 
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became a partisan issue after the 1994 midterm elections, when the Republican Party 
gained the majority in both houses of Congress. Pivotal players in Congress were greatly 
influential in engineering and determining the fate of legislations which would directly 
affect the decision process on deployment of troops, as analyzed in detail in hypotheses 1 
and 2.
896
 It was also seen that throughout the long and complicated course of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict, members of Congress were ambivalent on several occasions based 
on exigencies of impending elections, thereby resulting in cross-party alliance in passing 
legislations which would affect the decision-making process of military deployment.
897
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the given hypothesis is true for the case of the Bosnia-
Herzegovina intervention. 
 Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. War in 
Bosnia- Herzegovina was covered extensively by media. In addition to the traditional 
print media, this was a case in which television news coverage played a significant role in 
showing the images of horrible atrocities and human rights violations that were taking 
place in the region. In reality, U.S. intervention in Bosnia was preceded by a high level of 
television news coverage. The “CNN effect” regarding the horrible atrocities in Serb 
detention camps caught the attention of the U.S. public and policymakers so much so that 
it brought the issue of U.S. military intervention to the center stage of political 
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deliberations.
898
 Vivid images of atrocities were showed extensively by network 
television such as ABC, CBS, and NBC.
899
 Collectively, U.S. media made the Bosnia-
Herzegovina conflict a major story in their foreign policy agenda, forcing Congress and 
the White House “to devote more attention to the conflict than they otherwise would 
have” on how to deal with the ongoing humanitarian crisis in the region.900  
By the middle of May 1992, Bosnia became a major story in the U.S. foreign 
policy arena, mainly because of the high level of media exposure. The New York Times 
had 82 stories just in May 1992, 90 in June 1992, and from May to December of 1992, 
there were 880 news items.
901
 News items in this study comprise Article; Editorial; Front-
page Article; and Letter to Editor. The dramatic increase in Times coverage from May 
1992 onwards was consistent with that of television coverage, which presented images of 
horrible atrocities by Bosnian Serbs in the region.
 902
   From January 1 to December 31, 
1993, the New York Times had 1740 news items on Bosnia; there were 1329 news items 
from January 1 to December 31, 1994; and there were 1554 news items from January 1 to 
December 31, 1995.
903
 Such extensive news coverage by the New York Times not only 
increased public awareness but also made Bosnia-Herzegovina a contentious foreign 
                                                          
898
 Carey, Henry F. 2001. 
899
 Mermin, Jonathan. 1999. 
900
 Edwards, Lee. 2001. p. 96. 
901
 ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009); Available at 
http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ - See Appendix J. 
 
902
 Mermin, Jonathan. 1999. 
 
903
 ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009); Available at 
http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ - See Appendix J. 
 
295 
 
policy issue in congressional-presidential relations, thereby influencing the decision-
making process on U.S. military intervention.  
For most of 1992, the media coverage was critical of the Bush administration’s 
relative ambivalence and hesitation to act to resolve the Bosnia crisis. The New York 
Times published a powerful editorial written by former British Prime Minister Margaret 
Thatcher. Thatcher commented, “Hesitation has already proved costly. The matter is 
urgent.”904  Time’s cover photo of August 17, 1992 and Newsweek’s photo, published on 
January 4, 1993, were extremely powerful in stimulating the military policy debate at the 
congressional-presidential level.
905
  During 1993 and 1994, print media coverage 
provided a holistic picture of the Bosnian war and kept interviewing the U.S. public to 
state their opinion on the issue of U.S. troop deployment. The media coverage pointed 
out that people were predominantly against boots on the ground, while generally 
supportive of airstrikes on Bosnian Serbs’ military installations. It was evident that 
Congress also supported the Clinton administration to continue with the airstrikes but 
strongly opposed any authorization on the issue of troop deployment, as required by 
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. Also, the TV networks continued to show 
horrible images to put pressure on the public. Network television tried to impress upon 
Washington policymakers to act in a decisive manner, stressing the point that the Western 
nations had a moral and social responsibility to try to end the Bosnian conflict. Hence, 
with regard to congressional-presidential relations, there was dissension on actual boots 
on the ground, while there was consensus on military airstrikes.  
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By the middle of 1995, the Bosnian Serbs’ retaliation against NATO forces and 
UN peacekeeping operations intensified. Deterioration of the situation on the ground led 
NATO to draw up a tougher policy.
906
 Media covered the fallout of the Serbs’ full-scale 
retaliation. Television networks constantly brought the graphic images of human 
atrocities, death, and destruction. Such extensive and vivid media coverage influenced 
public perception in terms of U.S. intervention of some nature to meet a social and moral 
responsibility. But still the public was strongly opposed to troop deployment. In response, 
the Republican-controlled Congress started to put enormous pressure on the Clinton 
administration and passed resolutions to lift the arms embargo on Bosnia so that the Serbs 
were not able to take advantage of this policy. The Senate on July 26, 1995, passed the 
bill S 21 by a margin of 69-29, requiring the administration to end the arms embargo on 
Bosnia.
907
 Later, on August 1, 1995, the House cleared the Senate bill S 21 by a big 
margin of 298-128.
908
 Such measures by Capitol Hill were in direct opposition to 
Clinton’s policy. Legislative-executive dissension on the arms embargo issue and troop 
deployment as required by Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution continued. In the 
fall of 1995, after the successful completion of the Dayton Peace Accord, President 
Clinton used U.S. media effectively to garner public support for ground troop deployment 
and put pressure on Congress to authorize such a military plan. He gave a major televised 
speech on November 27 to address the American people on the need for ground troop 
deployment in Bosnia. The Secretary of State, Secretary of Defense, and Richard 
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Holbrooke, who brokered the Dayton Peace Accord, went on various Sunday talk shows 
to convey the president’s message to the American people. Gradually, public perception 
started to change very modestly. In December 1995, the American public’s tacit 
acceptance of U.S. troop deployment in Bosnia under NATO-led peacekeeping 
operations was attributed in a great extent to the media’s relentless coverage of the 
bloody conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. When media were able to change people’s 
perception about some kind of ground troop deployment, Congress acted accordingly. 
Capitol Hill shifted its position from strongly opposing any troop deployment to reluctant 
approval for such a move. On December 13, 1995, the House approved a bipartisan 
resolution, HR 302, by a margin of 287-141 and authorized troop deployment.
909
 The 
Senate, too, on December 13, 1995, adopted S.J. Res. 44 engineered by Senate Majority 
Leader Dole by a vote of 69-30 as part of congressional authorization to send troops to 
Bosnia.
910
 Without such extensive media coverage and “graphic pictures of death, 
destruction, and despair in Sarajevo and elsewhere, Americans and a skeptical Congress 
would have rejected any significant U.S. part in keeping the peace in Bosnia.”911 Media 
coverage, in the end, was able to influence congressional-presidential consensus on troop 
deployment. That said, Congress also severely rebuked the Clinton administration on its 
Bosnia military policy before giving such an authorization, which was primarily given in 
support of the troops already present in the region and those who were to be deployed 
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soon. From the analysis, it can be concluded that the given hypothesis is true and highly 
relevant for the case of the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict.               
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war. The long and 
complicated nature of the Bosnian war affected the trajectory of the decision-making 
process. There was ambivalence among policymakers regarding the timing and nature of 
military intervention. For most of 1992 through 1995 there was dissension between 
Congress and the executive branch on the contentious issue of U.S. troop deployment and 
arms embargo in the region. At the same time there was consensus on airstrikes and 
enforcement of no-fly zones. Public opinion showed ups and downs throughout the long 
period of time making it difficult for Washington policymakers to make decisions on 
military operations. However, with the successful completion of the Dayton Peace 
Accord and extensive media coverage of horrible humanitarian conditions on the ground 
there was grudging acceptance by American people for the need to send troops to Bosnia 
if Congress authorized such a measure primarily from the standpoint of moral and social 
responsibility to end the conflict in the region. Finally consensus was reached between 
Capitol Hill and the White House on the contentious issue of sending U.S. troops to 
Bosnia as part of a NATO-led peacekeeping operation despite war-weariness from long 
duration of the conflict.  Evidence therefore does not support the given hypothesis in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina intervention. 
Kosovo Intervention (1999) 
Background: U.S. military intervention in Kosovo in 1999, as part of NATO-led 
airstrikes and commitment to deploy troops as part of NATO-led peacekeeping forces, 
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brought the issue of the War Powers Resolution to the center stage of legislative-
executive prerogatives on matters related to war powers. Kosovo was a Serbian province 
with a population of more than 2 million people, the vast majority of whom were ethnic 
Albanians. Conflict in the Serbian province of Kosovo erupted in the spring of 1998, 
when the Serbian army shelled areas around the Kosovan capital of Pristina and killed a 
large number of civilians.
912
 That incident provoked the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) 
to attack Serbian forces, which in turn transpired into full-scale sectarian violence and a 
massive humanitarian crisis. Eventually the United States and its NATO allies intervened 
to end the Kosovo conflict. This resulted in a 78-day NATO bombing against the Serbian 
military from March to June 1999.
913
 Thereafter, Yugoslav leader Slobodan Milosevic 
consented to withdraw Serbian police and military forces from the province of Kosovo, 
thereby paving the way for a NATO-led peacekeeping force of 28,000 troops, in which 
the United States would participate with the deployment of 4,000 U.S. troops.
914
  
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus. During the 
U.S. military intervention in Kosovo, there was the presence of divided government in 
Washington. Congress, both the House of Representatives and the Senate, was controlled 
by the Republican Party, while the White House was controlled by the Democratic Party. 
All through the course of the Kosovo intervention, Congress declined to give President 
Bill Clinton a free hand on the issue of conducting the war. In particular, Congress 
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expressed serious reservations on the issue of ground troop deployment, as required by 
the War Powers Resolution.
915
 These were clear signs of legislative-executive dissension 
on the conduct of the Kosovo war.  
 With regard to legislative action, on March 11, 1999, the House of 
Representatives adopted a resolution, H. Con. Res. 42, by 219-191, authorizing Clinton to 
send troops to participate in a NATO-led peacekeeping operation if the ongoing 
Rambouillet Accords were successful in ending conflict between the Kosovo Liberation 
Army and the Serbian military forces.
916
 The resolution met the requirement of Section 
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution and was passed with the cooperation of the leadership 
of the Republican House. On March 23, 1999, the Senate adopted a bipartisan, 
nonbinding resolution, S. Con. Res. 21, by 58-41, authorizing President Clinton “to 
conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with the NATO allies 
against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro)”.917 NATO 
airstrikes eventually began on March 24, 1999, against the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia and were intended to force Serbian military withdrawal from Kosovo.
918
 On 
March 26, 1999, President Clinton reported to Capitol Hill, consistent with the War 
Powers Resolution, about U.S. participation in NATO airstrikes.
919
 These legislative 
measures adopted by Congress thus far were signs of legislative-executive consensus, in 
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an effort to finding long-lasting peace in Kosovo. But the trajectory of congressional-
presidential relations quickly changed into all-out confrontation, as expected under the 
conditions of divided government. On April 28, 1999, as the airstrikes continued 
unabated and there were talks calling for greater military action, the House of 
Representatives rejected the Senate resolution S. Con. Res. 21 (earlier passed in the 
Senate on March 23, 1999), by a tie vote of 213-213.
920
 The same day, the House passed 
a resolution (HR 1569) by a healthy margin of 249-180 prohibiting the use of funds by 
the Department of Defense for the deployment of ground forces in Kosovo unless such 
deployment was authorized by Congress.
921
 On April 28, 1999 the House also rejected 
H.J. Res. 44 by an overwhelming margin of 2-427, because this bill would have declared 
a state of war between the United States and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.
922
 Such 
legislative action in turn showed the aggressive nature of the House on the issue of war 
powers under the conditions of divided government, marking legislative-executive 
dissension. Consistent with expectations of interbranch dissension in a divided 
government setting, the Senate on May 4, 1999, tabled (killed) a resolution, S.J. Res. 20, 
by 78-22.  This was intended to authorize the president to use “all necessary force” in 
Kosovo.
923
  
 Findings from legislative action in Congress and its broader implications 
on the Kosovo war shows that expectations for divided government were generally met in 
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terms of the outcome of the decision-making process. In most instances Capitol Hill 
declined authorization for ground troop deployment to the Clinton administration. 
Evidence shows that by and large, legislative-executive dissension prevailed in the 
conduct of the war. Therefore, conclusions can be drawn that the given hypothesis is true 
and accepted for the Kosovo intervention. 
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. The Kosovo war and the issue of 
U.S. military intervention came up soon after the House impeachment and Senate trial of 
President Clinton. As a result, partisan and ideological differences in Washington were at 
their highest level, and the Republican-controlled Congress showed deep distrust of the 
president.
924
 The New York Times commented, “Many in the White House and the 
Capitol said the bad blood was so pervasive, the ideological divisions so vast and the 
political interests so disparate that they doubted productive bridges could be built 
between Mr. Clinton and the Republican majority in the Congress.”925 Legislative-
executive relations regarding Kosovo set off on a bumpy road, when President Clinton on 
a weekly radio address on February 13, 1999, pushed for military involvement, including 
the possible use of U.S. troops as part of a NATO-led peace implementation force to 
restore peace in the region.
926
 The GOP reaction was quick and explicit in criticizing 
Clinton’s Kosovo military plans. Republican lawmakers in both houses of Congress 
showed skepticism and concern about the wisdom of such a military plan. Representative 
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John R. Kasich (R-OH) called Clinton’s weekend announcement about U.S. troop 
deployment in Kosovo as part of an international peacekeeping operation a “terrible 
decision.”927 Senator John McCain (R-AZ), while comparing the proposed Kosovo 
mission to that of Bosnia, commented, “We have no exit strategy. We have no concept of 
how we want to settle this situation. The American people and the Congress deserve to 
know that.”928 Both McCain and Kasich were planning to run in the 2000 presidential 
election.   
House Speaker J. Dennis Hastert (R-IL) told President Clinton in a White House 
meeting on February 23, 1999, that he would like the House of Representatives to have 
sufficient time to debate and vote on troop deployment as part of the congressional 
authorization required by the provisions of the War Powers Resolution.
929
 Later, the 
House GOP leaders pushed ahead with their plan to debate ground troop deployment in 
Kosovo, “turning aside warnings from the White House that they could undermine peace 
talks in the Balkans.”930   In a hearing at the Senate Armed Services Committee on 
February 25, 1999, Senator Olympia J. Snowe (R-ME) said while asking a question of 
Thomas Pickering (Assistant Secretary of State for Political Affairs), “I think we 
understand the constitutional challenges between the two branches, and the War Powers 
Act, but frankly what we are dealing with here is another open-ended commitment….and 
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I think you have heard a lot of expressions of concern here.”931 While talking to reporters 
on March 30, 1999, Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman John W. Warner (R-
VA) did not agree that the use of ground troops should be considered so early.
932
 Such 
issues were pertinent to congressional debate on troop deployment as required by Section 
5 (b) of the War Powers Resolution.  As Senate GOP opposition against the deployment 
of U.S. troops in Kosovo kept growing Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) in a letter to 
the president raised several questions about the viability and effectiveness of Clinton’s 
proposed Kosovo military policy.
933
 GOP opposition on Kosovo intervention was 
considered as a precursor of the tough partisan conflict that was expected later in fall 
when the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) would come up for Senate 
consideration.
934
 In a hearing at the House Committee on International Relations former 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger argued that the Kosovo military intervention was 
dangerous and imprudent.
935
 Along similar lines Senate Majority Whip Don Nickles (R-
OK) commented that the U.S. military operation against the Serbs was “a debacle in the 
making.” Nickles and some other conservatives in Congress began to see parallels in the 
Kosovo intervention to the Vietnam War.
936
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Partisan wrangling was clear when on April 28, 1999, the Republican-controlled 
House passed a resolution HR 1569 by a healthy margin of 249-180 prohibiting the use 
of funds by the Department of Defense for the deployment of ground forces in Kosovo 
unless such deployment was authorized by Congress, while rejecting the Senate 
resolution S. Con. Res. 21 (earlier passed in the Senate on March 23, 1999) by a tie vote 
of 213-213.
937
 The aggressive action by the House was an indication of this legislative 
body’s denial of authorization for troop deployment in Kosovo, as required by the War 
Powers Resolution. Passage of HR 1569 by a vote of 249-180 was primarily a party line 
vote, in which 203 Republicans were joined by 45 Democrats and 1 independent to 
support the measure, while 16 Republicans joined 164 Democrats to oppose the 
legislation.
938
 The House rejection of Senate resolution S. Con. Res. 21 was also a 
partisan vote, in which 181 Republicans rejected troop deployment while only 31 
supported the measure. On the other hand, 181 Democrats supported the measure, while 
only 26 opposed it.
939
 The House Republicans mostly rallied behind the House Majority 
Whip Tom DeLay (R-TX), who vehemently opposed S. Con. Res. 21 and urged his 
fellow Republican members, “not to take ownership of an incompetent administration’s 
policy.”940  On another occasion, evidence shows that as the U.S. airstrikes over the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) were going on as part of the NATO mission, 
Representative Thomas Campbell (R-CA) on April 12, 1999, challenged the Clinton 
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administration on the issue of violating the War Powers Resolution. Campbell introduced 
two resolutions – (i) H. Con. Res. 82 that intended to direct the president, pursuant to 
Section 5 (c) of the War Powers Resolution, “to remove United States Armed Forces 
from their positions in connection with the present operations against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia”941; and (ii) H.J. Res. 44, that intended to declare war against 
Yugoslavia.
942
 Later, on April 28, 1999 the House of Representative rejected both H. 
Con. Res. 82 by a margin of 139-290 and H.J. Res. 44 by a vote of 2-427.
943
 The House 
rejection of these two legislations was intended to show unity with the Clinton 
administration, the NATO allies, and international partners as the situation on the ground 
warranted.
944
 While doing so, the House rejected Clinton’s call for a new batch of troop 
deployments, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.  In response, 
Campbell and 17 other House members “filed suit in federal District Court for the 
District of Columbia seeking a ruling requiring the president to obtain authorization from 
Congress before continuing the air war, or taking other military action against 
Yugoslavia.”945 Therefore, it is obvious that even if there was fundamental partisan 
disagreement between the Republican Congress and the Clinton White House on future 
strategy on the Kosovo war there were occasions when there were flickers of consensus 
and dissension, attributed to an intraparty ideological rift in both political parties. The 
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issue of intra-GOP ideological division came into the limelight once more on May 4, 
1999, when the Senate tabled (killed) a resolution S.J. Res. 20, sponsored by Senator 
McCain, by a margin of 78-22.
946
 The bill, if adopted, would have authorized Clinton “to 
use all necessary force to prevail in the war over Kosovo.”947 The Wall Street Journal 
reported that “conservative GOP voters, the party’s base support, accounted for the 
strongest resistance to any plan to send U.S. infantry into Kosovo to drive out Serb 
forces. 54 percent of the conservatives polled strongly opposed the use of U.S. ground 
troops, compared with 34 percent among swing voters and 27 percent among liberal 
Democratic-base voters.”948 The Republican-controlled Senate’s rejection of S.J. Res. 20 
reiterated deep-rooted partisan wrangling at the legislative-executive level leading to 
interbranch dissension, while also exposing the issue of ideological rift in intraparty-level 
politics.   
Overall findings corroborate that congressional-presidential relations on the issue 
of   congressional authorization for troop deployment in Kosovo, pursuant to Section 5(b) 
of the War Powers Resolution, were driven by partisan and ideological forces between 
the Republican Congress and the Clinton White House. Such partisan wrangling led to 
legislative-executive dissension and greatly impacted the political process in the conduct 
of the Kosovo war. At the same time it was also evident that there was a constant 
ideological tension going on at the intra-party level both inside the Republican and the 
Democratic Party.  This in turn complicated the political process resulting in turning-
point moments in decision outcomes at various stages of the political process. On the 
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whole evidence indicates that partisan divisions and ideological differences were greatly 
responsible for legislative-executive dissension in decision-making process on the 
conduct of Kosovo war. Therefore, conclusions can be drawn that the given hypothesis is 
true and significantly relevant for the case of the Kosovo intervention.  
Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. Congressional proceedings on military intervention and troop deployment, 
pursuant to Sections 5(b) and 5(c) of the War Powers Resolution, took place in the spring 
of 1999. This was immediately after the November 1998 midterm elections, and the next 
election cycle was almost two years away. Also, the actual duration of airstrikes in 
Kosovo was limited to only 78 days (March 24, 1999 to June 10, 1999).
949
 Moreover, the 
deliberations on Capitol Hill and the resultant congressional-presidential interactions 
were primarily confined to the institutional prerogatives regarding war powers. Because 
of all these reasons, electoral imperatives and concerns did not affect congressional 
debate and legislative action. Therefore, it can be concluded that the given hypothesis is 
not applicable in the case of the Kosovo war.  
Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. The Kosovo conflict 
witnessed divided public opinion similar to that regarding Bosnia four years earlier. The 
diversity of public opinion complicated legislative-executive relations and influenced the 
political process in the conduct of the Kosovo intervention. A Gallup poll/CNN/USA 
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Today poll, conducted on March 25, 1999, showed that 50 percent of the public 
supported U.S. participation in NATO airstrikes against the Serbian military, whereas 39 
percent opposed it. This was a 4 percent increase in favorability in less than a week’s 
time, when compared to the previous Gallup poll/CNN/USA Today poll, conducted on 
19-21 March, 1999, when 46 percent favored such airstrikes and 43 percent were 
opposed.
950
  Showing a similar trend, a Washington Post/ABC News poll, conducted on 
26-29 March, 1999, found that 55 percent of respondents supported U.S. participation in 
NATO airstrikes against Serbia, while 33 percent opposed it.
951
 Similarly, a Harris poll 
conducted on the eve of the NATO bombings (March 23, 1999), found that 52 percent of 
the respondents favored such airstrikes against Serbian targets, whereas 42 were against 
them.
952
 Reflecting the general trend of favorable public opinion, the New York Times 
reported that while in the first week of NATO bombings (i.e. the last week of March 
1999), public support “varied from very slim – 44 percent in favor, 40 percent opposed in 
a Time/CNN poll – to quite broad – 60 percent to 30 percent in a Pew Research Center 
poll,” in the second week of the airstrikes (i.e. first week of April 1999) “a CBS poll 
showed no change; a Newsweek poll showed a modest increase in support, to 58 percent 
from 53; but two polls done Monday night – ABC/Washington Post and NBC/The Wall 
Street Journal – showed big jumps.”953  Gallup News Service reported that from the 
middle of March 1999 to the middle of April 1999, public support for U.S. airstrikes and 
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troop deployment showed a rising trend.
954
 Capitol Hill was mindful of this trend of 
favorable public opinion for U.S. participation in NATO airstrikes. The Republican-
controlled Senate on March 23, 1999 passed a non-binding resolution, S. Con. Res. 21, 
by 58-41, authorizing President Clinton “to conduct military air operations and missile 
strikes in cooperation with the NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro).”955 Subsequently, NATO airstrikes eventually began on March 
24, 1999, against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and were intended to force Serbian 
military withdrawal from Kosovo.
956
 On March 26, 1999, President Clinton reported to 
Capitol Hill, consistent with the War Powers Resolution, about U.S. participation in 
NATO airstrikes.
957
 A modest increase in favorable public opinion for such airstrikes led 
the Republican-controlled Congress and the Clinton White House to forge consensus 
about conducting airstrikes as an immediate response.  
However, such legislative-executive consensus was short lived, as very soon 
public support declined steadily on the issue of U.S. military involvement in Kosovo. 
Gallup News Service in April 1999 reported that from the middle of April, there was a 
significant drop in public support for U.S. participation in NATO airstrikes, as well as 
with regard to any future deployment of troops. In a Gallup poll conducted on April 26-
27, 1999, 56 percent of the respondents supported the current U.S. and NATO air attacks, 
down from 61 percent on April 13-14, 1999. More importantly, on the issue of sending 
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U.S. troops to the region in the event of airstrikes not being successful, the same Gallup 
poll showed that public approval was just 40 percent, while 56 percent were opposed. 
This was a significant drop from the previous approval rating of 52 percent in the middle 
of April.
958
 On April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives responded by adopting a 
resolution, HR 1569, by a healthy margin of 249-180, thereby prohibiting the use of 
funds by the Department of Defense for the deployment of ground forces in Kosovo 
unless such deployment was authorized by Congress, while rejecting the Senate 
resolution S. Con. Res. 21 (earlier passed in the Senate on March 23, 1999 and which 
authorized U.S. participation in NATO airstrikes) by a tie vote of 213-213.
959
 The House 
decisions on April 28, 1999, to block Clinton’s military plans in Kosovo were clear signs 
of legislative-executive dissension. The Senate further intensified the trend of interbranch 
dissension by rejecting a resolution, S.J. Res. 20 (intended to authorize Clinton to use all 
necessary forces in Kosovo), by a margin of 78-22.
960
   
In May 1999, public support on the issue of U.S. military participation in Kosovo 
further declined. The New York Times reported that there were signs of public weariness 
with the Kosovo war, as the Clinton administration felt growing public pressure to 
resolve the conflict as early as possible.
961
 The Washington Post on May 24, 1999 
reported that while public support for the NATO air campaign dropped from 65 percent 
to 59 percent in the latest ABC News/Washington Post poll, more importantly a clear 
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majority of the American people – 56 percent – were opposed to sending U.S. ground 
troops into Kosovo.
962
 In response to such a drop in favorable public opinion, Congress 
remained indecisive and refused to authorize President Clinton to deploy ground troops 
as part of a NATO-led Kosovo peacekeeping force (KFOR). Hence, legislative-executive 
dissension on fresh deployment of troops continued to persist. 
Overall, the trend of public opinion regarding the Kosovo conflict showed ups 
and downs as it remained divided. Such oscillation influenced the trajectory of 
congressional-presidential relations in the decision-making process on the conduct of the 
Kosovo war. Findings show that in the initial phase of congressional proceedings, when 
public opinion was favorable for U.S. and NATO airstrikes, Congress authorized the 
Clinton administration to proceed, resulting in legislative-executive consensus. In the 
later phase of congressional proceedings, as favorable public opinion diminished on the 
issues of continued air campaigns and, more importantly, on troop deployment Congress 
took stringent legislative measures to block the executive branch from sending troops into 
Kosovo, resulting in legislative-executive dissension. Therefore, in conclusion it can be 
asserted that evidence supports the given hypothesis on Kosovo war.  
Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. In the case of Kosovo intervention 
opposition members of Congress belonging to the Republican Party played a significant 
role in the decision-making process. In a divided-government setting, there was a deep, 
underlying partisan divide between the GOP-controlled Congress and the Clinton White 
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House. Since the early days of the Kosovo conflict, influential Republican leaders like 
Representative Kasich, Senator Snowe, Senator McCain, Senate Majority Leader Lott, 
House Majority Whip Representative DeLay, and Representative Campbell tried to create 
roadblocks for the administration in conducting the Kosovo war. The deep partisan divide 
and distrust between the Congress Republicans and President Clinton in the wake of 
Clinton’s impeachment and trial spilled over into the decision-making process concerning 
the Kosovo conflict. The difficult political climate in Washington also made the GOP 
members of Congress, particularly in the House of Representative, more aggressive in 
blocking Clinton’s Kosovo war plans, as explained in detail in hypotheses 1 and 2. Based 
on all such analyses, conclusions can be drawn that the given hypothesis is true for the 
Kosovo case. 
Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. Kosovo 
intervention attracted extensive media coverage. The influence of media in the political 
and social domain in the United States was significant. Media coverage framed U.S. 
military intervention in Kosovo, both in the form of air campaigns and possible troop 
deployment, as highly necessary operations in order to provide humanitarian aid and 
security to Kosovo Albanians, who were subjected to brutal ethnic cleansing initiated by 
the Serbs.
963
 In March 1999, the New York Times ran a powerful editorial (with a 
captivating headline) that said, “We [United States] do have a strategic and humanitarian 
interest in not allowing this Kosovo-Albanian conflict to get out of control….You cannot 
care about the future of NATO, and the stability of Southern Europe, and then say we 
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have no interest in Kosovo.”964 Network television, through ABC, CBS, NBC, and cable 
television channels such as CNN, brought images of horrible atrocities and fleeing 
Kosovo refugees to the TV screens in America night after night.
965
 Extensive media 
coverage in turn influenced the decision-making process in Washington in favor of 
military action, not only to provide much-needed humanitarian aid to the Kosovo 
Albanians, but also to preserve the U.S. national interest. 
 The sheer magnitude of media coverage speaks for itself. Over a four-
month period during March to June 1999 (when congressional proceedings took place on 
the issue of  authorization in the use of force, pursuant to the 1973 War Powers 
Resolution), the New York Times ran 1,657 news items in total, consisting of 1,000 
articles, 303 front-page articles, 191 editorials, and 163 letters to the editor .
966
 Consistent 
with the pattern of congressional debate, the Times ran 602 items just in April 1999.
967
 
During the same time, the Washington Post ran 920 articles, 61 editorials, and 273 op-ed 
items.
968
 Similar to the pattern of the Times coverage, the Post reported a maximum of 
312 articles in April 1999.
969
 Network and cable television coverage was also 
astonishingly high from March to June 1999. ABC ran 222 stories, CBS aired 167 stories, 
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NBC aired 142, and CNN ran 248 stories in total.
970
 ABC peaked with 76 stories in April 
1999, while the number for CBS was 55, for NBC 51, and for CNN 69.
971
 Television 
coverage painted a vivid picture of the miserable conditions that the Kosovo Albanians 
were going through and framed the U.S. military intervention as a just cause. Premier 
U.S. newspapers such as the Times and Post maintained a similar tone by running stories 
which were constantly pushing for U.S. military action in Kosovo. For instance, the 
Times ran stories like “Is Kosovo worth it?”972 – (Editorial); “In Kosovo, War is 
Peace”973 – (OPED); “The Kosovo Refugee Emergency”974 – (Editorial); “Tales from 
Kosovo Villages: Thousands Expelled by Serbs”975 – (Article); “Stop the Music: Give the 
air war a chance”976 – (Editorial); “Congress and Kosovo”977 – (Editorial); and “A 
Refugee River, Dammed at the Border: Macedonia.”978 – (Article). The Post ran stories 
like “Be Serious”979 - (Editorial); “Fleeing Misery, Finding More: Survivors from 
Kosovo town are seared by Flames and Fear”980   - (Article); “New Waves of Kosovo 
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Exiles Tells of Atrocities by Serbs”981 – (Article).  Such news stories reflected the overall 
tone of media coverage that intended to put pressure on Washington policymakers to act 
toward resolving the crisis in Kosovo. Extensive newspaper coverage, including powerful 
articles, editorials, and op-ed items, coupled with television footage of shocking images 
and evening news analysis, had a significant influence on foreign policy debate and 
public consensus in favor of U.S. military action.
982
 The positive influence of media 
coverage on public opinion was significantly noticeable, starting from the middle of 
March to the middle of April 1999. During this period, even the public support for the 
controversial ground troop deployment also registered a substantial increase, from 31 
percent to 47 percent.
983
  In response, both the Republican-controlled House of 
Representatives and the Senate acted and passed legislations in support of airstrikes and 
even future ground troop deployment, pursuant to the requirement of Section 5(b) of the 
War Powers Resolution. On March 11, 1999, the House of Representatives adopted a 
resolution, H. Con. Res., 42 by 219-191, authorizing Clinton to send troops to participate 
in a NATO-led peacekeeping mission to end conflict between the Kosovo Liberation 
Army and Serbian military forces.
984
  The Senate on March 23, 1999, adopted a 
bipartisan, non-binding resolution, S. Con. Res. 21, by 58-41, authorizing President 
Clinton “to conduct military air operations and missile strikes in cooperation with the 
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NATO allies against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro).”985 
Thereafter, the U.S. air campaign started on March 24, 1999 to destroy Serbian military 
positions. Such congressional measures symbolized legislative-executive consensus in 
the first phase of the Kosovo intervention. 
That said, from the middle of April 1999 until June 1999, the American people 
were growing less optimistic about the Kosovo air campaign and the conflict as a whole. 
During this time, media coverage became much more objective in its analysis. Media 
coverage, apart from extensively portraying the miserable conditions in Kosovo, also 
highlighted the growing dilemma of the NATO countries about the future prospects of 
military action and the public perception about the war. On May 24, 1999, the 
Washington Post reported, “Americans have grown weary of a war that seems to be 
going nowhere…. Americans apparently are no longer quite so captivated by pictures of 
laser-guided missiles and smart bombs.”986 The New York Times, while referring to the 
remarks of Andrew Kohut, Director of the Pew Research Center for the People and the 
Press, reported that the public was skeptical about the prospects of peaceful resolution of 
the conflict because the ground results thus far had been messy and confusing.
987
 
Subsequently, the Republican-controlled House and Senate reversed their earlier, 
somewhat compromising position into a more aggressive posture in the conduct of war. 
By reversing the earlier approval of troop deployment, Congress checked Clinton’s 
military plans. On April 28, 1999, the House of Representatives responded by adopting a 
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resolution, HR 1569, by a healthy margin of 249-180, thereby prohibiting the use of 
funds by the Department of Defense for the deployment of ground forces in Kosovo 
unless such deployment was authorized by Congress, while rejecting the Senate 
resolution S. Con. Res. 21 (earlier passed in the Senate on March 23, 1999 and which 
authorized U.S. participation in NATO airstrikes) by a tie vote of 213-213.
988
 The Senate 
further intensified the trend of legislative-executive dissension by rejecting a resolution, 
S.J. Res. 20 (intended to authorize Clinton to use all necessary forces in Kosovo), by a 
margin of 78-22.
989
 Thus the second phase of the war showed legislative-executive 
dissension. 
On the whole, it is evident that extensive media coverage played a vital role in 
influencing public opinion and pushing Washington policymakers to intervene militarily 
in Kosovo. On the issue of U.S. airstrikes for 78 days extensive media coverage had a 
significant contribution toward reaching congressional-presidential consensus. Therefore, 
it can be concluded that the given hypothesis is true for the case of the Kosovo 
intervention. 
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war. Congressional 
deliberations, pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, were centered on a 78-day air 
campaign and a possible future U.S. ground troop deployment as part of a NATO-led 
Kosovo Peacekeeping Force (KFOR), whose nature and extent were largely uncertain. 
Legislative-executive relations were focused on the institutional war powers prerogatives 
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basically for a short-term military intervention. Complications from a long-term military 
intervention based on speculations were mostly downplayed. Therefore, the given 
hypothesis does not hold merit for the Kosovo case. 
Somalia Intervention (1992-94) 
Background:  Political unrest in Somalia started in January 1991, when Somali 
strongman Mohammad Said Barre was ousted after 22 years in power.
990
 Immediately 
thereafter, civil war among various clans broke out. With the threat of severe drought 
looming large, widespread starvation, hunger, and poverty became a reality. Out of the 
chaos, Mohammad Aidid emerged as the strongest clan leader.
991
 Along with political 
instability, a massive humanitarian crisis was unfolding. On December 3, 1992, the 
United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 794, authorizing member states to 
“use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for 
humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”992  On December 4, 1992, President George 
H. W. Bush announced U.S. troop deployment to join a UN peacekeeping force to 
provide humanitarian assistance in compliance with Security Council Resolution 794.
993
 
Thereafter, an advance deployment of 1,700 U.S. Marines arrived at the capital city, 
Mogadishu, under Operation Restore Hope.
994
 Over time, U.S. military intervention in 
Somalia became increasingly controversial, as troops were involved in hostilities, 
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increased fighting, and in turn suffered casualties.
995
 Under increased congressional 
pressure for early troop withdrawal, the Clinton administration pulled the troops out of 
Somalia on March 31, 1994.
996
      
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus. When on 
December 4, 1992, the outgoing Bush administration announced deployment of U.S. 
troops to Somalia, it had already obtained congressional approval as both the Senate and 
the House passed S. Con. Res. 132 by voice vote earlier in August 1992.
997
 When 
President Bill Clinton took office on January 20, 1993, he continued with the troop 
deployment, and there was unified government in Washington. Consistent with the 
expectations of the given hypothesis, the Democrat-controlled Congress supported the 
Clinton administration’s Somalia military plan. On February 4, 1993, the Senate 
approved with a voice vote S. J. Res. 45, authorizing the administration’s use of U.S. 
armed forces to support the UN Resolution to establish a “secure environment” in 
Somalia.
998
 The Senate resolution also expressed the belief of the Senate that President 
Clinton should consult with the U.N. Secretary General “to ensure that the United 
Nations can swiftly assume primary responsibility for the operation in Somalia.”999 The 
House of Representatives on May 25, 1993, passed its own version of S. J. Res. 45 by a 
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margin of 243-179.
1000
 The House version of S. J. Res. 45 authorized U.S. troop 
deployment in the U.N. peacekeeping operation for a period of one year, pursuant to 
Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
1001
 By August 1993, 4028 U.S. troops were 
deployed in Somalia, and on August 8, four American troops were killed by a Somali 
landmine.
1002
 This incident energized Capitol Hill to take a fresh look at the continued 
U.S. military mission in Somalia. In a clear effort to check the administration’s Somalia 
military policy, the Senate on September 9, 1993, adopted an amendment to the Senate 
defense authorization bill, S 1298, that was earlier introduced by Chairman of the Senate 
Appropriations Committee Robert C. Byrd (D-W.V.), by an overwhelming vote of 90-7, 
requiring Clinton to report to Congress on the troop deployment in Somalia by October 
15, 1993, and also to seek congressional authorization for the military mission by 
November 15, 1993.
1003
 With that measure, Byrd wanted to assert the role of Congress in 
the Somalia case in a substantial manner.  Subsequently on September 28, 1993, the 
House, while expressing widespread concern about the continued U.S. military mission in 
Somalia, endorsed the Senate measure and adopted an identical amendment by a huge 
margin of 406-26 to pass the fiscal 1994 defense authorization bill, HR 2401.
1004
 Hence, 
by and large, until the end of September 1993 there was legislative-executive consensus, 
consistent with the expectation of the given hypothesis with regard to unified 
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government, despite signs of growing frustration with the mission on Capitol Hill. The 
next phase of the congressional-presidential showdown was about to come up in October. 
Congressional outrage reached its peak when 18 U.S. troops were killed and 
nearly 80 wounded on October 3, 1993, in dangerous fighting with the forces of the local 
warlord General Mohammad Farah Aidid.
1005
 Capitol Hill publicly rebuked the president 
and put intense pressure on Clinton to withdraw the troops at an early opportunity. 
President Clinton complied and on October 7, 1993, he announced that “All American 
troops will be out of Somalia no later than March the 31st, except for a few hundred 
support personnel in noncombat roles.”1006 President Clinton complied with the Senate’s 
demand and sent the administration’s Somalia military policy report two days before the 
prescribed deadline. On October 15, 1993 the Senate endorsed Clinton’s new plan to 
“sharply narrow the mission of U.S. forces in Somalia and to remove them from that 
country by March 31” by voting in an amendment to the defense appropriations bill (HR 
3116) by a margin of 76-23.
1007
 In an apparent show of resentment in the House, the 
ranking Republican on the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Benjamin A. Gilman of 
New York, introduced a nonbinding resolution, H. Con. Res. 170, to invoke Section 5(c) 
of the War Powers Resolution, calling on Clinton to pull out all U.S. troops from Somalia 
by January 31, 1994, which would be two months before the deadline that the president 
accepted under congressional pressure.
1008
 After contentious debate, the Democrat-
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controlled House on November 9, 1993 in a unified government structure overturned 
Gilman’s measure and adopted an amendment by a margin of 226-201, supporting 
Clinton’s previously announced troop withdrawal deadline of March 31, 1994.1009 The 
House also included the March 31 deadline in the final version of H. Con. Res. 170, 
which was later on adopted in the House on November 10, 1993.
1010
   
From the empirical investigation, it is clear that the Democrat-controlled 
Congress was able to reverse any dissent that the opposition party was trying to introduce 
by legislative action. The final glaring example of this trend was the passage of H. Con. 
Res. 170, despite an effort by the Republicans to put pressure on the administration for an 
early withdrawal by January 31, instead of March 31, 1993. Hence, Democrat-controlled 
unified government was able to forge legislative-executive consensus consistent with the 
expectations of the given hypothesis, despite some flickers of dissension at times in the 
decision-making process on the use of force in Somalia.
1011
 Therefore, it can be 
concluded that evidence supports the given hypothesis for the case of the Somalia 
intervention.  
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. The first signs of partisan and 
ideological divisions were observable on May 25, 1993, when the House version of S. J. 
Res. 45, adopted primarily on partisan lines by a margin of 243-179, authorized U.S. 
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troop deployment in the U.N. peacekeeping operation with a time limitation of one year, 
pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
1012
 Conservatives, who earlier 
supported President Bush’s decision to begin military intervention in December 1992, 
changed their position once President Clinton came to office in January 1993. Now they 
expressed skepticism about the ongoing military mission under a liberal administration, 
and they repeatedly tried to curtail the time limit for the Somalia intervention by 
introducing legislations and/or amendments to that effect. The first signs of such liberal-
conservative dissension were shown on May 25, 1993, when House Foreign Affairs 
Committee ranking member Benjamin A. Gilman (R-N.Y.)’s amendment to limit 
authorization of troops for six months instead of one year was rejected by a margin of 
179-248 by the Democrat-controlled House.
1013
 Partisan differences clearly flared up 
when the Democrat-controlled House rejected by 127-299 an amendment by Toby Roth 
(R- WI) that would “have cut off the troop authorization and funding for the Somalia 
mission by June 30.”1014 Republican opposition continued to grow throughout the second 
half of 1993 on the issue of U.S. troop deployment under the command of the United 
Nations Operations in Somalia II (UNISOM II).
1015
 Congressional Republicans expressed 
their frustration with the continued deployment of U.S. troops in Somalia under 
UNISOM II at the time of adopting the fiscal year 1994 defense authorization bill, HR 
2401, requiring the president to report to Congress on the military deployment in Somalia 
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by October 15, 1993, and also to seek congressional authorization for the mission by 
November 15, 1993. The House Republicans “bashed Clinton for committing the nation 
to an open-ended mission in Somalia - and the Democratic leadership for preventing a 
tougher version from coming to a vote.”1016 Clearly partisan and ideological fissures were 
widening with the expanded role of U.S. troops under UNISOM II.   
The October 3, 1993 incident, in which eighteen U.S. Army Rangers were killed 
on the streets of Mogadishu, was a turning point. Partisan wrangling reached its peak. 
The GOP outrage, especially in the House, was distinctly widespread and intense, even 
though Clinton faced some opposition from his own party members such as Senator 
Byrd, Senator Russ Feingold (D-WI), and Representative Peter DeFazio (D-OR).
1017
 A 
group of 142 House Republicans sent a letter to President Clinton, calling for immediate 
withdrawal of U.S. forces from Somalia, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the War Powers 
Resolution. The letter said, “The United States could not afford an indecisive and naive 
foreign policy.”1018 Under intense congressional pressure, Clinton was compelled to 
change the Somalia military plans. On October 7, 1993, in a nationally televised speech, 
Clinton announced that most of the U.S. troops would be pulled out of Somalia by March 
31, 1994.
1019
 Even after the president’s announcement of an early pullout deadline, 
Republicans continued to push the issue hard. Senator John McCain (R-AZ) said, “If 
Senators are hearing the same things…..there is incredibly strong sentiment to bring the 
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troops home as soon as possible.”1020  Hence, it was clear that in the wake of the October 
3, 1993 incident, overwhelming opposition from conservatives and some liberals in 
Congress changed the course of military action in Somalia. 
The third phase of GOP opposition flared up when the minority party tried to 
aggressively pursue a policy for prompt and faster troop withdrawal, long before 
Clinton’s announced deadline of March 31, 1994. On October 15, 1993, by a comfortable 
margin of 61-38, the Senate tabled (killed) an amendment, introduced by Senator 
McCain, which would have repudiated Clinton’s Somalia policy and called for “prompt 
withdrawal” of U.S. troops. The same day, the Democrat-controlled Senate endorsed 
Clinton’s new plan to “sharply narrow the mission of U.S. forces in Somalia and to 
remove them from that country by March 31” by adopting an amendment to the defense 
appropriations bill (HR 3116) by a margin of 76-23.
1021
 In the House, Representative 
Gilman, the ranking member of the Foreign Affairs Committee, introduced a nonbinding 
resolution, H. Con. Res. 170, on October 22, 1993, calling on President Clinton to 
withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia by January 31, 1994, pursuant to Section 5(c) of the 
War Powers Resolution, that would be two months before Clinton’s announced deadline 
of March 31, 1994.
1022
 On November 3, 1993 both Gilman and House Foreign Affairs 
Committee Chairman Lee Hamilton (D-IN) “played hardball” in order to garner more 
votes at the House Committee level.
1023
 Partisan dynamics on the war powers issue were 
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distinctly observable when the House panel narrowly defeated the GOP challenge by a 
margin of 22-21, in order to endorse Clinton’s March 31, 1994, deadline. Earlier the 
House Committee defeated by voice vote an amendment sponsored by Bill Goodling (R-
PA), “calling on the president to withdraw U.S. forces within 30 days of the resolution's 
(H. Con. Res. 170) adoption.”1024 Thereafter, on November 9, 1993, the House of 
Representatives adopted an amendment supporting Clinton’s March 31, 1994, pullout 
deadline by a party line vote of 226-201. Under the “king of the hill” procedures that the 
House Rules Committee set for the congressional debate, the amendment prevailed.
1025
 
GOP lawmakers expressed frustration with the Democrat-controlled House defeating 
Republican opposition by a narrow margin and thereby reinforcing Clinton’s March 31, 
1994 pullout deadline. Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA) said, “It is a signal that 
says to the president there is not support in this Congress for a muddled, confused and 
unexplained policy which risks the lives of Americans for no purpose.” House Speaker 
Thomas S. Foley (D-WA) and other leading Democrats pointed out, “wrong signal would 
be sent if the House went on record in opposition to the president's support for an orderly 
withdrawal from Somalia.”1026 
From the empirical investigation it is evident that with regard to Somalia 
intervention congressional proceedings on the issue of invoking Sections 5 (b) and 5 (c) 
of the War Powers Resolution were dominated by partisan and ideological dimensions. 
Conservative GOP lawmakers were reluctant to support President Clinton’s military 
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policy in Somalia. Time and again, they criticized the president’s policy as muddled and 
confusing. In fact, after the October 3, 1993 incident, congressional pressure and rebuke 
forced Clinton to revise his military strategy and announce the new troop pullout deadline 
of March 31, 1994. Flickers of dissension were narrowly overturned by reaching 
consensus on several occasions. In the end partisan and ideological dimensions especially 
from the GOP initiative led to interbranch dissension. As a consequence President 
Clinton was forced to change the original timeline of the Somalia military intervention. 
GOP leadership was able to constraint Clinton’s ability to conduct the military mission in 
the remaining six months. Overall evidence supports the given hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. In 1992 President George H.W. Bush delayed sending U.S. troops to Somalia 
because “he was in the middle of a reelection campaign” for the fall 1992 presidential 
election and “feared he would be accused of playing politics if he acted” in favor of a 
military intervention.
1027
 After the election, Bush sent troops to Somalia, in compliance 
with the U.N. Security Council Resolution 794 and congressional authorization. When 
President Clinton took office in 1993, he continued with the deployment without any 
immediate electoral concerns. With Clinton’s announcement of troop withdrawal by 
March 31, 1994, any potential electoral imperatives/concerns of the fall 1994 midterm 
election cycle were greatly mitigated. Therefore, it can be concluded that except for the 
Bush administration’s initial decision to delay sending troops, on the whole there was no 
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significant evidence of electoral imperatives influencing the decision-making process of 
military deployment in the case of the Somalia intervention. 
Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. After President 
Clinton came to office in January 1993, public opinion was very much in favor of U.S. 
troop deployment in Somalia. A New York Times/CBS poll conducted in January 1993 
showed that 69 percent of the public favored the ongoing U.S. military intervention in 
Somalia.
1028
 A Roper poll, conducted on March 23 - April 4, 1993, showed that 56 
percent of the American people approved the use of U.S. military force in Somalia 
primarily for humanitarian reasons.
1029
 A Gallup poll, conducted on June 18 – 21, 1993, 
showed that 65 percent of the American public supported the United States’ participation 
in a recent military operation with the United Nations (UNISOM II) against one of the 
warlords in Somalia.
1030
 In response to such high public approval, Congress continued to 
authorize U.S. troop deployment, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution. 
Subsequently, the Clinton administration continued with the military intervention in 
Somalia as part of UNISOM II. The situation, however, changed dramatically after 
October 3, 1993 when 18 U.S. Army Rangers were killed in Somalia. In the wake of the 
incident, a Gallup poll conducted on October 5, 1993 (two days after the killing of U.S. 
soldiers) showed that 43 percent of the American public wanted immediate withdrawal of 
all U.S. troops from Somalia while 26 percent supported gradual withdrawal, with only 8 
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percent of the public supporting continuation of current military policy.
1031
 An ABC poll, 
conducted on October 5, 1993, found that 53 percent of the public did not approve of 
U.S. military intervention in Somalia. Citing the ABC poll, the New York Times reported 
that a majority of the American people had doubts about U.S. military involvement in 
Somalia and President Clinton’s handling of foreign policy.1032  A survey taken for NBC 
News on October 6, 1993, showed that the public favored speedy withdrawal of all U.S. 
troops from Somalia.
1033
 A Gallup poll, conducted on October 8 – 10, 1993,  showed that 
only 40 percent of the public approved Clinton’s handling of foreign policy, down 15 
points from two weeks earlier, while 52 percent disapproved, a jump of 20 points over 
the same two-week period.
1034
 Public outcry for U.S. troop withdrawal resulted in intense 
congressional pressure to curtail the military intervention in Somalia. Such a huge 
plummet in public approval resulted in contentious debate in Congress to pull out troops 
by January 31, 1994, which would have been two months before Clinton’s pullout 
deadline. In the end, the administration’s revised deadline of March 31, 1994, prevailed 
because of an intense partisan fight in a unified government. However, extreme outrage 
on Capitol Hill over the whole Somalia military intervention was obvious. A huge decline 
in public support and increased pressure from Congress led to congressional-presidential 
dissension on the administration’s original military policy. Such dissension in turn forced 
President Clinton to change his original military strategy in Somalia as he announced 
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U.S. troop withdrawal from Somalia by March 31, 1994.
1035
 From the above analysis it 
can be inferred that evidence supports the given hypothesis.  
 Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. For the case of Somalia, the reaction 
from members of Congress was vivid in the fall of 1993. After the October 3, 1993, 
incident when 18 U.S. soldiers were killed, members of Congress on both sides of the 
aisle raised concerns about the ongoing mission. However, during this phase of 
congressional reaction, partisan-ideological conflict was especially visible. The GOP 
lawmakers in Congress, especially in the House, took a lead role in introducing 
legislations to invoke Section 5 (b) of the War Powers Resolution, when they pressed to 
pull out troops by January 31, 1994, which was two months before the Clinton 
administration’s announced deadline. House GOP leadership comprising Representative 
Gingrich, Representative Gilman, and ranking member of the House Armed Services 
Committee Floyd Spence (R-S.C.), were vocal in criticizing the president’s military 
policy in Somalia. In the wake of the October 3, 1993 tragedy, members of Congress 
such as Senator Jesse Helms (R-N.C.) expressed increasing concern about the issue of 
command and control of U.S. forces. Helms said, “I do not want to play any more U.N. 
games. I do not want any more of our people under the thumb of any U.N. commander – 
none.”1036 On the Democratic side, Senator Byrd was active in asserting the role of 
Congress in the wake of U.S. soldiers suffering casualties. During this time, the political 
climate in Washington was tense. Members of Congress were also dealing with other 
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contentious foreign policy issues such as the Bosnia intervention (discussed elsewhere in 
this chapter) and the North America Free Trade Agreement NAFTA (discussed in chapter 
IV). By and large investigation shows that actions of GOP members of Congress, either 
individually or in coalition, took lead role in creating institutional roadblocks to Clinton’s 
ability to conduct the Somalia conflict, even after he was forced to trim down the mission 
to March 31, 1994. Therefore, the given hypothesis is accepted for the case of Somalia 
intervention.     
Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. For the 
case of the intervention in Somalia, media coverage was extensive and played a 
significant role in influencing the decision process in two ways: (1) to stage intervention 
by the Bush administration in December 1992 by forging legislative-executive consensus 
and; (2) to pull out most of the U.S. troops by the Clinton administration in the wake of 
the October 3, 1993, deaths of troops because of interbranch dissension. Media coverage 
on congressional proceedings, especially the partisan debate in October 1993 influenced 
the dynamics of congressional-presidential interactions with regard to early troop 
withdrawal. Analysts argue that next to Vietnam, Somalia might be the “most often cited 
case of media influence on American foreign policy.”1037  During the 16-month duration 
of military intervention – December 1992 through March 1994 – the New York Times ran 
a total of 1160 stories, including 759 articles, 195 front-page articles, 136 editorials, and 
70 letters to editor.
1038
 Two critical months in particular impacted decision-making 
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process in Washington. First, December 1992 when U.S. troops were deployed by 
President Bush 41. The other one was October 1993 when intense congressional pressure 
forced President Clinton to announce early troop withdrawal. Monthly data for the New 
York Times shows highest coverage for these two months – December 1992 had 211 
stories and October 1993 had 188 stories.
1039
 Coverage by the Washington Post showed a 
similar trend. For the entire 16-month period, the Post ran a total of 1445 stories, 
including 1155 articles, 32 editorial articles, 208 front-page articles, and 50 letters to 
editor.
1040
 Similar to the New York Times pattern, Washington Post also registered its 
highest number of stories for the months of December 1992 and October 1993, with 244 
and 211 stories respectively.
1041
  
The U.S. broadcast television networks (ABC, CBS, and NBC) played a dominant 
role in the case of the Somalia intervention. By focusing on starving children in Somalia 
on a daily basis, “TV mobilized the conscience of the nation’s public institutions, 
compelling the government into a policy of intervention for humanitarian reasons.”1042 
For instance, in order to mobilize political action in Washington in favor of humanitarian 
intervention, while Time magazine printed on its cover a “haunting picture of a skeletal 
child,” CBS’s “60 Minutes” devoted a news segment to the humanitarian tragedy taking 
place on a regular basis in Somalia, where “corpses were buried under mounds of sand 
                                                          
1039
 See Appendix L 
 
1040
 The Washington Post Archive; Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost 
historical/results.htm 
 
1041
 See Appendix L 
  
1042
 Cohen, Bernard C. 1994. 
334 
 
and emaciated adults received one 600-calorie bowl of gruel a day.”1043  During the 16-
month period, ABC ran 190 stories, CBS ran 211 stories, and NBC ran 176 stories.
1044
 
Also for the months of December 1992 and October 1993 television coverage was the 
highest.
1045
 By and large from December 1992 until September 1993 both electronic and 
print media portrayed a positive picture of the benefits from military action as part of 
humanitarian assistance in Somalia. Such media coverage helped to reach sustained 
congressional-presidential consensus.  
After the October 3, 1993 tragedy, when broadcast television networks and CNN 
showed graphic pictures of American soldiers killed in Somalia, public opinion took a 
nosedive. Members of Congress unanimously voiced their strong opposition, calling on 
Clinton to withdraw U.S. troops from Somalia at the earliest possible time period. The 
New York Times promptly reported congressional outrage and noted, “Congressional 
anxiety, already high, has been fueled by a wave of constituents’ telephone calls 
reflecting outrage over the prospects of a new hostage crisis, and television pictures of 
Somali crowds dragging a dead American serviceman through the streets.”1046 In a 
powerful editorial, the Washington Post commented, “It's time to get out of Somalia. It 
has been time, for a long time…. Somalia, and places like it, deserves not a penny of U.S. 
money or a drop of American blood.”1047 In the wake of the tragedy, media not only 
presented graphic images of soldier casualties but also extensively reflected strong 
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congressional opposition in both print and electronic coverage. In the wake of October 
incident the negative tone of media played a major role in fomenting legislative-executive 
dissension. In the end President Clinton was forced to make changes in his original 
military strategy and subsequently announced early pull out of U.S. troops from Somalia. 
Therefore, conclusions can be drawn that evidence supports the fundamental logic of 
media hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war. U.S. intervention 
in Somalia lasted for 16 months (December 9, 1992 to March 31, 1994). From December 
1992 to September 1993, the intervention was perceived as a humanitarian mission to 
maintain a “secure environment” and distribution of food.1048 In the wake of October 3 
tragedy continuation of military presence on the ground became an extremely 
controversial foreign policy issue in Washington. Before it got worse President Clinton 
announced the U.S. troop pullout deadline of March 31, 1994, under intense 
congressional pressure. The administration’s efforts to trim down its previous long-term 
military strategy significantly lowered the complications related to duration of war. 
Although GOP lawmakers introduced legislations to bring back the troops by January 31, 
1994, two months before the administration’s deadline, such measures were by nature 
reflections of partisan politics.  Therefore, it can be concluded that evidence does not 
support the potential implications of the given hypothesis especially in the context of 
early troop withdrawal.  
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Haiti Intervention (1993-1994) 
Background: Haiti became a U.S. foreign policy issue in 1991 when a military 
coup led by Lt. General Raoul Cedras deposed the democratically elected President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide from power.
1049
 After President Bill Clinton came to office, he focused 
his attention on reinstating the Aristide government in Haiti. Although for most of 1993 
and 1994, Clinton relied more on U.N. economic sanctions and an international oil 
embargo on Haiti, he also kept the option of use of force open.
1050
 Subsequently the issue 
of the War Powers Resolution came to the forefront in legislative-executive relations. 
After former President Jimmy Carter had negotiated an agreement with military leaders 
in Haiti to peacefully transfer power to the Aristide government, U.S. troops landed at the 
capital city, Port-au-Prince, under Operation Uphold Democracy to oversee a peaceful 
transition of power and to maintain stability in the country.
1051
 
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus.  The 
dynamics of the Haiti intervention took place when unified government was present, with 
the Democratic Party controlling both the Capitol Hill and the White House. After his 
inauguration, President Clinton came under increasing pressure from a group of liberal 
Democrats who advocated tougher measures to restore the democratically elected Jean-
Bertrand Aristide government in Haiti and to dislodge the military junta under Lt. 
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General Raoul Cedras.
1052
 The Clinton administration kept the option of use of force open 
throughout 1993 and 1994.
1053
 However, before deciding on troop deployment, Clinton 
attempted to dislodge the military junta through economic sanctions and an international 
oil embargo approved by the United Nations.
1054
 The administration, by supporting the 
UN Security Council Resolution 841, indicated a possible use of force in the near 
future.
1055
 After the October 11, 1993, incident when the USS Harlan County, carrying 
U.S. engineers and medical specialists, was turned away from a Port-au-Prince dock by 
hostile Haitian militia, Capitol Hill took preemptive measures, pursuant to the War 
Powers Resolution, to prevent Clinton from deploying U.S. troops in Haiti. The first 
signs of congressional action were observed when on October 18, 1993, Senator Don 
Nickles (R-OK) introduced an amendment to the fiscal 1994 defense appropriations bill 
(HR 3116) to “disallow the participation of U.S. combat forces of any part of any 
prospective standing U.N. international army” without congressional authorization.1056  
Thereafter, on October 21, 1993, the Democrat-controlled Senate adopted a nonbinding 
“sense of Congress” amendment to HR 3116, sponsored by Senate Majority Leader 
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George J. Mitchell (D-ME) and Senate Minority Leader Bob Dole (R-KS) by an 
overwhelming margin of 98-2.
1057
 The “sense of Congress” amendment stated that “the 
U.S. military should not operate in Haiti unless Congress granted prior approval or the 
president sent Congress a detailed report before the deployment.”1058 Clearly the 
legislation was adopted as required by the constitutional provisions of the War Powers 
Resolution. On November 10, 1993, after the Democrat-controlled House accepted the 
nonbinding Haiti amendment voice vote, the Senate cleared the bill by a margin of 88-
9.
1059
 Such a nonbinding resolution, adopted with the advantage of a Democratic 
majority, had hardly any effect on limiting Clinton’s ability to conduct military affairs in 
Haiti.  It was clear that for the entire year of 1993, the Democrat-controlled Congress 
aligned with the Clinton administration and supported his Haiti policy by not constraining 
his military powers on the issue, disregarding Republican opposition. Such 
congressional-presidential consensus was consistent with the expectations of the given 
hypothesis.  
 While the administration’s policy of enforcement of UN economic 
sanctions and the international oil embargo continued during 1994, congressional 
pressure to quickly resolve the Haiti situation and reinstate the deposed Aristide 
government also increased. Congressional scrutiny on the issue of U.S. military 
deployment and the lack of the Clinton administration’s consultation with Capitol Hill, 
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pursuant to the War Powers Resolution, also increased in 1994.
1060
 On June 9, 1994, the 
Democrat-controlled House rejected the Goss amendment, earlier sponsored by 
Representative Porter Goss (R-FL) by a margin of 195-226, which would have required 
prior congressional authorization for U.S. troop deployment in Haiti.
1061
  On July 14, 
1994, the Democrat-controlled Senate tabled (killed) by a vote of 57-42 an amendment 
introduced by Senate Minority Leader Robert Dole (R-KS) to the fiscal 1995 foreign 
operations spending bill, HR 4426.
1062
 The Dole amendment offered creation of a 
congressional commission of senior lawmakers to assess and report to Congress the 
conditions in Haiti within 45 days to explore the possibilities of slowing down the 
momentum of troop deployment.
1063
 With the ground troop invasion becoming a definite 
reality, the Senate on August 5, 1994, tabled (killed) by a vote of 63-31 an amendment 
sponsored by Senator Arlen Specter (R-PA), which would have required the Clinton 
administration to get congressional approval before sending U.S. troops to Haiti.
1064
 
These were clear signs that under the conditions of unified government, the Democrat-
controlled Congress (both the Senate and the House of Representatives) continued to 
extend support to Clinton’s Haiti military strategy. Legislative-executive consensus 
prevailed for the most part, consistent with the expectations of legislative-executive 
relations under a unified government, despite opposition from many GOP lawmakers. 
With President Clinton’s televised Oval Office address on September 15, 1994, it was 
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almost certain that U.S. troops would be landing in Haiti in just a few days.
1065
 With the 
Carter delegation’s successful conclusion of an agreement with the Cedras regime (the 
military junta) to step down by October 15, the first deployment of U.S. troops arrived at 
Port-au-Prince on September 19, 1994, as part of an international coalition force to 
oversee a peaceful transfer of power from the military regime to the deposed but 
democratically elected Aristide government.
1066
  
On the eve of the arrival of the U.S. armed forces in Haiti, on September 18, 
1994, in an Oval Office televised address, President Clinton announced he had directed 
“the United States forces to begin deployment into Haiti as part of the U.N. coalition.”1067 
On September 21, 1994, Clinton reported to Congress on troop deployment, consistent 
with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution. In a letter to congressional leaders, 
Clinton justified the deployment of the U.S. troops “as part of the multinational coalition 
provided by the U.N. Security Council Resolution 940 of July 31, 1994.”1068 Lack of 
consultation with the congressional leaders sparked outrage among many lawmakers, 
especially on the GOP side. Earlier, on September 19, 1994, the House adopted a 
resolution, H. Con. Res. 290, commending the U.S. troops and praising President Carter 
for concluding an agreement with the military junta.
1069
 On October 3, 1994, the House 
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Foreign Affairs Committee reported H. J. Res. 416 to the full House, authorizing the 
forces in Haiti until March 1, 1995, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War Powers 
Resolution.
1070
 As adopted in the House Committee, H. J. Res. 416 stated that the 
president should have sought congressional approval before deploying U.S. forces to 
Haiti, called for prompt and orderly withdrawal as soon as possible, and required 
executive branch reports on the scope and duration of the U.S. mission in Haiti. The same 
language was also adopted by the Senate on October 6, 1994, in a resolution, S. J. Res. 
229, that was adopted by a vote of 91-8.
1071
 Later on the same day, the House passed S. J. 
Res. 229 by a comfortable margin of 236-182.
1072
 Here too we can see that there was 
mild reaction from members of the Democrat-controlled Senate and House, who were 
generally supportive of the Clinton administration’s Haiti intervention with an 
authorization for troop deployment until March 1, 1995, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the 
War Powers Resolution.  
 Congressional proceedings showed that the Democrat-controlled Congress 
mostly aligned with the Clinton administration’s Haiti military policy. Even though the 
GOP lawmakers on several occasions put up strong opposition, such flickers of 
dissension were mostly defeated by the Democrat-controlled House and Senate by sheer 
numbers at the time of roll call votes. In the midst of this, Capitol Hill was successful in 
imposing a firm deadline for troop withdrawal, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War 
                                                          
1070
Committee on Foreign Affairs, House. “Limited Authorization for the U.S.-Led Force in Haiti 
Resolution.” H. Rpt. 103-819, pt.1. October 1, 1995.   
 
1071
 Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 1994. p.56-S. 
1072
 Congressional Record – House. October 6, 1994. p. 28609. 
 
342 
 
Powers Resolution. On the whole, the unified government was able to forge legislative-
executive consensus. Therefore, it can be concluded that evidence supports the given 
hypothesis for the case of intervention in Haiti. 
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. Congressional deliberations 
reflected partisan animosity and ideological divisions on several occasions, even though a 
unified government structure was present in Washington. Time and again, GOP 
lawmakers in both chambers introduced resolutions/amendments to put pressure on the 
Clinton administration to seek congressional approval before any troop deployment. 
Almost every time, the Democrats who controlled the Capitol overcame GOP obstacles 
by sheer numerical strength at the time of roll call votes.  
Initial signs of partisan animosity were observed on October 18, 1993, when 
Senator Don Nickles (R-OK) introduced an amendment to the fiscal 1994 defense 
appropriations bill (HR 3116) to “disallow the participation of U.S. combat forces of any 
part of any prospective standing U.N. international army” without congressional 
authorization.
1073
 Clinton reacted sharply against the GOP’s partisan move by reiterating 
that he fundamentally opposed such amendments because they limit the president’s 
constitutional authority to act as commander-in-chief.
1074
 Initial partisan and ideological 
confrontation between GOP lawmakers and the majority Democrats set the tone for 
future deliberations. Clinton’s naval deployment to enforce the UN Resolution 794 
embargo and the October 11, 1993 forced retreat of USS Harlan County from Port-au-
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Prince angered Republicans in Congress. This was also the time when the Somalia 
intervention suffered a tragedy with the killing of U.S. soldiers on October 3, 1993 
(discussed elsewhere in this chapter). At the same time, contentious debate was going on, 
regarding the North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA (discussed in chapter IV). 
As a result, the political environment on Pennsylvania Avenue was tense. Conservatives 
who in earlier years supported Reagan and Bush 41 military missions were now trying to 
limit Clinton’s policy in the Haitian intervention, similar to their actions regarding 
Somalia and other missions. Senator Phil Gramm (R-TX) said on CNN on October 14, 
1993, “I don't understand why the president seems determined to use American military 
power in regions where it is not clearly applicable.”1075 House Minority Whip Newt 
Gingrich (D-GA) reflected the discontent among the GOP lawmakers and said,  
Frankly we in Congress have an obligation to send a signal to the 
president. I think the signal we have to send is that we are not satisfied 
with the way this foreign policy is being run…..I think it is very important 
for this president to understand that he has a deep, serious foreign policy 
crisis and that he needs to thoroughly over haul his defense and foreign 
policy establishment and he needs to find a way to calmly and consistently 
lead Americans in a way that we can support and follow.
1076
       
Reflections of partisan wrangling were again observed when on October 21, 1993, the 
Democrat-controlled Senate rejected by 19-81 an amendment introduced by the ranking 
member of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Jesse Helms (R-N.C.), that would 
require prior authorization by Congress to send U.S. forces into Haiti. The Senate 
thereafter on the same day adopted a nonbinding “sense of Congress” amendment to HR 
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3116 by an overwhelming margin of 98-2.
1077
 Anger was building up among the GOP 
lawmakers. In early November 1993, Senator Helms once again openly challenged 
Clinton’s policy of Haitian intervention. In a heated exchange with Secretary of State 
Warren Christopher at a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, Christopher 
“reacted strongly to Helms’ criticisms of the administration’s efforts to bring democracy 
to Haiti by returning to power ousted President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.”1078Ideological 
division during 1993-94 was also a serious factor affecting decision-making on military 
intervention in Haiti. Conservatives who earlier supported the Reagan and Bush 41 
administrations on military interventions were greatly opposed to the Clinton 
administration’s Haiti military policy. On the other hand, Clinton was overwhelmingly 
supported by the Congressional Black Caucus and liberal Democrats, who earlier were 
critical of Republican administrations’ military policy.1079 Prominent Congressional 
Black Caucus lawmakers such as caucus chairman Kweisi Mfume (D-MD) and 
Representative Major Owens (D-N.Y.) were vocal advocates of Clinton’s Haiti military 
strategy.
1080
 The dynamics of liberal-conservative divide were distinctly observed in the 
decision-making process on Haiti mission.  
Along with ideological divisions, heightened partisan animosity was also 
observable throughout 1994. During May 1994 partisan wrangling reached fever pitch. 
On May 24, 1994, the House adopted the Goss amendment to the House fiscal 1995 
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defense authorization bill (HR 4301) by a vote of 223-201.
1081
 The amendment, 
sponsored by Representative Goss, expressed the “sense of Congress” that no U.S. 
military action should be undertaken in Haiti without prior authorization of Congress, 
pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, and also unless the president 
“first certified to Congress that clear and present danger to U.S. citizens or interests 
required such action.”1082 Later, on June 9, 1994, the Democrat-controlled House rejected 
the Goss amendment by a margin of 195-226.
1083
 The overturning of a Republican-
sponsored amendment by the Democratic majority was a reflection of the aggressive 
partisan divide in the House. The Senate followed such House action. On July 14, 1994, 
the Democrat-controlled Senate tabled (killed) by a vote of 57-42 an amendment 
introduced by Senate Minority Leader Dole to the fiscal 1995 foreign operations 
spending bill, HR 4426.
1084
 The Dole amendment offered creation of a congressional 
commission of senior lawmakers to assess and report to Congress the conditions in Haiti 
within 45 days, to explore the possibilities of slowing down the momentum of troop 
deployment.
1085
 The ranking member of the House Foreign Affairs Committee, Benjamin 
Gilman (R-N.Y.), sent a letter to Clinton with signatures from 102 House members, 
asking the president to seek congressional authorization prior to any troop deployment in 
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Haiti.
1086
  With the ground troop invasion becoming a definite reality, the Senate on 
August 5, 1994, tabled (killed) by a vote of 63-31 an amendment sponsored by Senator 
Specter, which would have required the Clinton administration to get congressional 
approval before sending U.S. troops to Haiti.
1087
 All through 1994, President Clinton was 
mindful of significant flickers of dissension in Congress, especially from the GOP 
lawmakers, on the contentious issue of U.S. troop deployment. In response, on September 
16, 1994, in a last-minute effort to avert U.S. military invasion, Clinton dispatched a 
delegation including former President Jimmy Carter, former Joint Chiefs of Staff 
Chairman General Colin L. Powell, and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman 
Sam Nunn (D-GA) to resolve the Haiti problem peacefully.
1088
  
After the deployment of U.S. troops in Haiti, when President Clinton reported to 
Congress and justified his actions based on U.N. Security Council Resolution 940, there 
was widespread outrage on Capitol Hill, mainly from GOP lawmakers. However, some 
Democratic members also showed concerns. Such glimmers of bipartisanship in 
criticizing the administration were, however, short-lived. Republicans complained about 
the lack of consultation with congressional lawmakers and “accused the administration of 
seeking to occupy Haiti for an indefinite period,” while Democrats described such GOP 
criticism as “election-year politics.”1089 During this time, partisan animosity in the House 
was more aggressive in nature. On October 6, 1994, while debating H.J. Res. 416 for 
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authorization of troop deployment until March 1, 1995, the Democrat-controlled House 
rejected by a primarily party line vote of 205-225 a GOP amendment sponsored by House 
Minority Leader Robert H. Michel (R-IL) and Representative Gilman, which would have 
criticized and embarrassed the administration regarding the Haiti intervention.
1090
 Later 
on the same day, in a glaring display of partisan dynamics, the House handily approved, 
258-167, an amendment that was identical to the Senate resolution S. J. Res. 229 by a 
comfortable margin of 236-182.
1091
     
Findings demonstrate that throughout U.S. intervention in Haiti the Democratic 
majority in Congress was able to overcome GOP obstacles affecting Clinton’s ability to 
conduct military policy. Partisan conflict between the Republicans and Democrats 
centered on the constitutional provisions of Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution 
that requires congressional authorization on the use of force. Investigation indicates that 
even when congressional Democrats had an advantage in the passage of legislations in 
support of the administration’s Haiti military policy opposition from GOP lawmakers 
was serious roadblock in the decision-making process. Intense Republican opposition 
was responsible for legislative-executive dissension and forced Clinton to delay 
deploying troops in Haiti for a long time. Evidence therefore supports the given 
hypothesis in the case of U.S. intervention in Haiti. 
Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. Congressional debate on the Haiti intervention was taking place during the 
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1994 midterm election cycle. Members of Congress were positioning themselves in the 
context of electoral imperatives in the ensuing elections. Public opinion all through the 
period was pretty much against any military intervention (discussed in hypothesis 4). 
Conservative Republicans, especially in the House, constantly challenged Clinton’s Haiti 
policy to gain an advantage in the election cycle. Liberal Democrats, while generally 
supportive of the president’s position, criticized the House GOP lawmakers’ aggressive 
nature as an election-year gimmick.
1092
 Thus, in the House, there was partisan animosity 
all around in the context of the congressional election cycle. By contrast, the response in 
the Senate was much more restrained. Some influential Republicans in the Senate such as 
Senators Dole, Richard Lugar (R-IN), Specter, and Gramm were planning for the 1996 
presidential election campaign and therefore preferred not to be too extreme in their 
policy position.
1093
 On the whole electoral imperatives influenced the decision-making 
process on troop deployment in Haiti. The hypothesis is therefore accepted.       
Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. For most of 1993 
and 1994 public opinion was against any troop deployment in Haiti. The American 
people were already weary of the ongoing wars in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia 
(discussed elsewhere in this chapter). The trajectory of legislative-executive relations on 
the issue of Haiti military intervention was greatly influenced by public opinion. A 
Gallup poll, conducted in August 1993, found that 67 percent of the respondents were 
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opposed to U.S. troop deployment in Haiti while just 27 percent were in favor.
1094
 A CBS 
News poll, taken on October 18-19, 1993 showed that a majority of 69 percent of the 
American people opposed U.S. troop deployment in Haiti to restore deposed President 
Aristide to power while by “more than two-to-one, Americans say they trust Congress 
more than the presidency and the Clinton administration to deal with the rest of the 
world.”1095 In an October 21, 1993, Time/CNN/Yankelovich poll quoted by the Roper 
Center for Public Opinion Research, 66 percent of respondents opposed sending U.S. 
troops to Haiti to reinstate the ousted democratically elected Aristide government to 
power, while just 22 percent were in favor of such a move.
1096
 A Los Angeles Times poll 
conducted during December 4-7, 1993, and quoted by the Roper Center for Public 
Opinion Research found that 54 percent of the American people opposed deployment of 
U.S. troops in Haiti, while 29 percent favored such a move.
1097
 The trend of unfavorable 
public opinion with regard to military intervention in Haiti continued unabated in 1994.  
On May 8, 1994, CNN reported that a new CNN/TIME poll found that “the U.S. public 
has little appetite for military action. Just one-quarter of the respondents favored sending 
U.S. troops, and 55 percent opposed it.”1098 On the issue of the administration seeking 
congressional authorization before any kind of troop deployment in Haiti, a Gallup poll 
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conducted on August 8-9, 1994 found that 74 percent of the American people favored 
seeking congressional authorization while 23 percent opposed it.
1099
 Another survey 
conducted by Gallup on September 23-25, 1994 showed that respondents wanted the 
administration to seek congressional authorization before sending U.S. troops to Haiti.
1100
 
Such public sentiment emboldened lawmakers in Congress, especially on the GOP side, 
to repeatedly introduce legislations to force President Clinton to seek congressional 
authorization before sending U.S. troops to Haiti, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War 
Powers Resolution. Because the American people were primarily opposed to U.S. 
military intervention in Haiti and trusted Capitol Hill more than the Clinton 
administration on foreign policy matters, members of Congress, especially GOP 
lawmakers, offered strong opposition to Clinton’s policy of troop deployment at any 
time. Partisan animosity and dissension was widespread on this issue. In consideration of 
the negative public opinion coupled with strong Republican opposition in Congress 
President Clinton kept delaying his plans for troop deployment while relying more on 
U.N. economic sanctions. 
 After the televised speech on September 15, 1994 when President Clinton 
presented his case for sending U.S. troops to Haiti to oust the military leaders there there 
was a temporary bump in public opinion in favor of such intervention. According to a 
Gallup poll, “that interviewed Americans the night before he delivered his address and 
re-interviewed the same people immediately after the speech was over,” support for 
sending troops to Haiti jumped from 40 percent before the speech to 56 percent after the 
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speech, a rise of 16 points.
1101
 Favorable public opinion motivated Clinton to deploy U.S. 
troops to Haiti. The Democratic majority in both chambers of Congress were able to 
adopt legislations supporting such troop deployment. Also GOP lawmakers were able to 
successfully impose Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution when the legislation 
regarding congressional authorization for troop deployment until March 1, 1995 (S.J. 
Res. 229; H.J. Res. 416) was adopted on October 6, 1994.
1102
  
Overall investigation shows that during 1993 and most of 1994 negative public 
opinion was responsible for serious opposition from GOP lawmakers and some 
Democrats in Congress on use of force. Congressional opposition resulted in legislative-
executive dissension and kept President Clinton from ground troop deployment. In the 
wake of Clinton’s September 15 televised speech public opinion shifted in favor of troop 
deployment.  Subsequently troops were sent to Port-au-Prince on September 19, 1994 and 
congressional-presidential consensus was reached on the use of force. Congress 
authorized a time limit for such deployment until March 1, 1995 as required by Section 
5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.  Therefore, it can be inferred that evidence supports 
public opinion hypothesis in the case of U.S. intervention in Haiti. 
Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. Members of Congress had varied 
motivations and interests while making decisions on troop deployment in Haiti. House 
GOP leadership led by Minority Whip Newt Gingrich (R-GA) and ranking member of 
the House Foreign Affairs Committee Benjamin Gilman (R-N.Y.) were aware of negative 
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public opinion regarding sending troops to Haiti (discussed in hypothesis 4). The 
combination of negative public opinion, electoral imperatives of the fall 1994 midterm 
election cycle and negative tone of media (discussed in hypothesis 6) motivated 
Republican lawmakers in Congress to challenge Clinton’s military policy in Haiti. Strong 
GOP opposition in Congress in turn constrained President Clinton in acquiring domestic 
legitimacy for any troop deployment strategy. On the other hand liberal Democrats 
spearheaded by a group of Congressional Black Caucus members wholeheartedly 
supported Clinton on his Haiti intervention policy. They called for decisive action to 
resolve the problem. Prominent Black Caucus members such as Chairman Kweisi Mfume 
(D-MD) and Representative Major Owens (D-N.Y.) were vocal advocates of Clinton’s 
Haiti military strategy.
1103
 However, President Clinton was more concerned about the 
persistently strong opposition from GOP lawmakers because of potential political cost his 
party might face in fall 1994 midterm elections. As a result he kept delaying use of force. 
On the basis of such political considerations, and as also explained in hypotheses 2, 3, 
and 4, it can be argued that evidence supports the given hypothesis when it came to 
drawing an exact timeline on the use of force in Haiti.  
Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. During 
U.S. intervention in Haiti the tone of media coverage was by and large critical of use of 
force. Media devoted more time to congressional deliberations that showed significant 
opposition on the issue of sending troops to Haiti. In contrast media focus was less on the 
Clinton administration’s assertion of the need to use force and reinstate the deposed 
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Aristide government.
1104
 All through the decision-making process media also highlighted 
the negative public opinion about troop deployment. Media projected the Haiti 
intervention as unnecessary, especially in the wake of the ongoing Bosnia-Herzegovina 
and Somalia interventions. Critical nature of media reflections had an effect in making 
President Clinton delay military deployment in Haiti.  
Media coverage was extensive for the crucial year of 1994 when congressional-
presidential interactions became intense and a decision to intervene was implemented in 
the fall of that year. From January 1, 1994 to December 31, 1994 the New York Times ran 
1070 stories that consisted of 669 articles, 187 front-page articles, 150 editorial articles, 
and 64 letters to editor.
1105
 The Times coverage reached its peak in September-October 
1994 when Clinton actually sent troops to Haiti, followed by rancorous congressional 
deliberations leading to subsequent authorization of troop deployment until March 1, 
1995.
1106
 A similar trend was shown by the Washington Post, which for the entire year of 
1994 ran 1214 stories, consisting of 950 articles, 51 editorial articles, 171 front-page 
articles, and 42 letters to editor.
1107
 Much like the Times coverage the Post also 
extensively covered the dynamics of political action in September-October 1994 that was 
consistent with the significance of congressional-presidential relations during those two 
months in particular.
1108
 Broadcast networks such as ABC, CBS, and NBC also displayed 
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similar trends in covering the stories on the Haiti intervention. For the time period of 
January 1 – December 31, 1994, ABC ran 162 stories, CBS ran 158 stories, and NBC ran 
125 stories.
1109
 Much like newspaper coverage, network television also registered 
maximum coverage in September-October 1994.
1110
  Unlike the cases of Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Somalia (discussed elsewhere in this chapter) the critical tone 
of media coverage for the Haiti intervention dampened the Clinton administration’s 
original aggressive military posture, while simultaneously bolstering the momentum on 
Capitol Hill to challenge Clinton on his “confused and muddled” foreign policy.1111 
Partisan dissension between GOP lawmakers in Congress and the Clinton White House 
was well covered by the media, decreasing the public legitimacy for troop deployment. 
On the whole, the mainstream media through its coverage discouraged any attempts to 
send troops to Haiti. It restrained the president’s Haiti military strategy. From the above 
analysis it can be claimed that extensive media coverage generally encouraged 
congressional opposition and discouraged the administration’s troop deployment plans 
for most of the legislative-executive political process. Hence evidence does not support 
media hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war. Even though 
congressional-presidential interactions for the Haiti intervention were going on during 
1993 and 1994 the actual duration of troop deployment was for about six months 
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spanning from September 1994 to March 1995. Also because troops were deployed 
within the contours of a peace agreement forged by the Jimmy Carter delegation and the 
Haitian military junta, U.S. soldiers did not have to face any imminent hostilities. The 
duration of actual troop deployment in Haiti therefore did not affect the direction of 
military operations, unlike Lebanon-MNF and Bosnia-Herzegovina interventions. 
Libya Intervention (1986) 
Background:  President Ronald Reagan ordered U.S. military actions in the form 
of missile strikes against Libya on March 24-25, 1986, in response to Libyan missile 
attacks on U.S. Navy in the Gulf of Sidra.
1112
 Subsequently, on April 5, 1986, a terrorist 
bombing at a West Berlin disco, LaBelle, killed one American soldier and injured 50 
American servicemen.
1113
 In response, the United States launched massive airstrikes 
against Libya on April 14, 1986. President Reagan claimed that there was unequivocal 
evidence that Libyan leader Muammar Qaddafi sponsored such attacks as a retaliation 
against U.S. Navy’s missile strikes on March 24-25, 1986.1114 U.S. bombing on Libyan 
targets once again brought issues related to the War Powers Resolution into focus, 
especially in the context of combating international terrorism.   
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus.  When the 
Libya intervention took place in March-April 1986, divided government was present in 
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Washington.
1115
 In the wake of U.S. airstrikes over Libya in March-April 1986, 
congressional reaction was quick, and there was outrage, especially among Democrats, 
about the administration’s lack of consultation with Congress before the use of force. For 
each incident of U.S. airstrikes (March 24-25, 1986 and April 14, 1986), President 
Reagan reported to Congress about the use of military force, although he never cited 
Section 4(a)(1) in his reports, and the Gulf of Sidra report did not mention the War 
Powers Resolution.
1116
   
Even if the Libya intervention was for a short duration, there was dissension and 
outrage between  Capitol Hill and the White House, in a divided government setting, as 
to the constitutional provisions of the War Powers Resolution and the institutional 
prerogatives. On April 17, 1986, Senator Robert Dole (R-KS) introduced Anti-Terrorism 
Act (S. 2335)
1117
 and on the same day in the House, Representative Joe Burton (R-TX) 
introduced the same Act (H.R. 4611) to strengthen the presidential military power to 
combat terrorism.
1118
  But in the Senate, as a mark of outrage about the administration’s 
lack of consultation with congressional leaders prior to U.S. missile strikes, a joint 
resolution, S.J. Res. 340, was introduced by Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) on May 8, 
1986, to “amend the War Powers Resolution to establish a permanent body for the 
purpose of consultation as required by Section 3 of the Resolution.”1119  No further 
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actions were taken on these legislations. Because of the very short nature of the U.S. 
military intervention in Libya, legislative-executive dissension in a divided government 
setting was only limited to fixing the loopholes in the consultation requirements as 
enshrined in Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution. In that context evidence supports 
the given hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. Although U.S. military 
intervention in Libya was for a short duration, there were reflections of partisan 
animosity and ideological differences in the political dynamics. Conservative 
Republicans in Congress supported President Reagan in his use of force. Several 
conservative GOP leaders in the House sought to give him more freedom to combat 
international terrorism. In the Senate, Majority Leader Senator Dole introduced S. 2335, 
and on the same day in the House, Representatives Joe Burton, Duncan L. Hunter R-CA), 
and Bob Livingston (R-LA) sponsored its counterpart H.R. 4611 to “exempt 
counterterrorist military action from the requirements of the War Powers Act.”1120 But as 
a mark of outrage about the administration’s lack of consultation with congressional 
leaders prior to U.S. missile strikes, Senate Minority Leader Byrd introduced a joint 
resolution, S.J. Res. 340, on May 8, 1986, to “amend the War Powers Resolution to 
establish a permanent body for the purpose of consultation as required by Section 3 of the 
Resolution.”1121 Byrd criticized the White House consultation meeting, and in a letter to 
Reagan, Byrd and other Senate Democratic leaders noted that “the raid had been the 
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subject of intense press speculation for days before April 14, fueled by leaks and public 
statements from administration officials.” In that context, they complained that inviting 
members of Congress to the White House shortly before the raid “amounts to a 
notification of your actions rather than the consultation required by law [War Powers 
Resolution].”1122 Echoing the same sentiment, influential senior Senate Democrat and 
member of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn (D-GA) characterized the 
White House meeting by stating, “True consultation would allow congressional leaders to 
review options facing the president, rather than simply supporting or opposing a planned 
attack.”1123 Earlier, on March 24, 1986 (the day the Gulf of Sidra bombing started), 
House Foreign Affairs Committee Chairman Dante B. Fascell (D-FL) wrote a letter to 
Reagan, raising concern that the administration failed to comply with the War Powers 
Resolution’s requirement of prior consultation with Congress.1124 President Reagan 
complied with the Congressional Democrats’ demand and on March 26, 1986, he sent 
letters to House Speaker Thomas P. O’Neill (D-MA) and Senate president pro tempore 
Strom Thurmond (R-S.C.), detailing all the information as required by the War Powers 
Resolution.
1125
 In the wake of such criticism from congressional Democrats Reagan 
reported to Congress about the second raid (April 14, 1986), consistent with the 
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requirement of the War Powers Resolution, but he did not cite specifically Section 
4(a)(1).
1126
  
 From the analysis made so far, we can see clear reflections of partisan and 
ideological differences in congressional measures to make the executive branch more 
accountable on the issue of the Libya intervention. Partisan criticism from congressional 
Democrats especially on the issue of lack of consultation, as required by Section 3 of the 
War Powers Resolution, appears to keep the Reagan administration under constant 
pressure with regard to limiting the dynamics of the Libya intervention to two events of 
airstrikes. Therefore, it can be concluded that the given hypothesis is true and accepted 
for the case of Libya intervention.  
Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. The Libya intervention took place in the spring of 1986. It was too short and 
too far away from the 1986 fall midterm elections to have any influence on them. 
Therefore, electoral imperatives did not influence the decision-making process on 
airstrikes. The hypothesis is not applicable for the case of U.S. intervention in Libya. 
 Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. At the time of the 
Libya intervention, public opinion was overwhelmingly in favor of U.S. military action. 
A Gallup poll, conducted on April 17 – 18, 1986, found that 71 percent of the American 
people approved the April 14 U.S. raids on Libya, while 21 percent disapproved.
1127
 A 
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concurrent Gallup poll showed that 80 percent of Americans were willing to support 
similar future U.S. raids, while only 10 percent disapproved.
1128
 Another question in the 
Gallup survey found that 68 percent of respondents believed that the “U.S. should have 
conducted the bombing raid against Libya even if it turned out that such action did not 
reduce future terrorism,” while 23 percent were against such a move.1129  A New York 
Times poll, conducted on April 29 – May 1, 1986, found that 65 percent of respondents 
approved the April 14 U.S. bombing on Libya, while 24 percent opposed it.
1130
 Another 
survey by NBC News and the Wall Street Journal, conducted on April 28 – 29, 1986, 
found that 67 percent of the American people favored the April 14 bombing on Libyan 
targets, while 25 percent opposed it.
1131
 Another opinion poll, conducted by ABC News 
and the Washington Post on April 24 – 28, 1986, found that 77 percent of Americans 
approved (56 percent  “approve strongly,” while 21 percent  “approve somewhat”) the 
April 14 U.S. bombing in Libya, while 22 percent disapproved of it (14 percent  
“disapprove strongly,” while 8 percent “disapprove somewhat”).1132 A USA Today poll, 
conducted by the Gordon S. Black Corporation on April 30 – May 1, 1986, found that 73 
percent of respondents approved the U.S. air attack on Libyan targets, while 21 percent 
disapproved.
1133
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Because of such overwhelming public support for U.S. air attacks on Libya, the 
Reagan administration was all the more emboldened to initiate such military intervention 
without adequate consultation with Capitol Hill. Also, congressional leaders, especially 
on the Democratic side, were dampened in raising strong opposition to Reagan’s Libya 
policy. The Democrats mainly raised their concern on the issue of lack of consultation, 
pursuant to Section 3 of the War Powers Resolution. On the whole favorable public 
opinion definitely gave an edge to the administration with regard to its Libya policy. 
Therefore, evidence supports the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. Members of Congress had diverse 
motivations, based on their partisan and ideological dispositions. Congressional leaders 
from both sides of the aisle introduced legislations for diverse political reasons. GOP 
lawmakers such as Senate Majority Leader Dole and other conservatives like 
Representatives Burton, Hunter, and Livingston in the House wanted to strengthen 
President Reagan’s military powers and give him more freedom from the constraints of 
the War Powers Resolution.
1134
 On the other hand, liberal Democrats such as Senate 
Minority Leader Byrd, senior Democrat and member of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee Nunn, and House Foreign Relations Committee Chairman Fascell (D-FL) 
raised concerns about the Reagan administration’s failure to consult with congressional 
lawmakers prior to U.S. bombings on Libyan targets.
1135
 These congressional leaders 
were also strongly supported by their respective partisan base. Congressional Democrats’ 
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criticism kept President Reagan constantly under pressure to end the intervention quickly 
and to retain the legitimacy of military action among American people. Hence, evidence 
supports the given hypothesis as GOP lawmakers supported Reagan while Democrats 
raised concerns on the conduct of war in Libya. 
Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. The 
media extensively covered U.S. air attacks on Libyan targets during March-April 1986. 
Both the print and electronic media made the Libya intervention an important news item. 
In the U.S., the tone of mainstream media coverage was basically critical about the 
Reagan administration’s hardline policy. This was similar to the tone of media coverage 
during the Grenada intervention (1983) and to an extent during the Haiti intervention 
(1994), as discussed elsewhere in this chapter.  Analysis of the statistical data presented 
later in the hypothesis makes it clear that the mainstream media, apart from narrating the 
day-to-day situation on the ground, also criticized the administration on three fronts: (1) 
Lack of consultation with Congress before making decision about air attacks; (2) Wisdom 
behind such intervention in terms of long-term national security consequences; and (3) 
Image and moral standing of the United States in the world because of such bombings. It 
appears that the media were more sympathetic to the demands of congressional leaders, 
especially the Democrats, who expressed dissatisfaction and raised concerns about the 
administration’s violating the provision of consultation, required by Section 3 of the War 
Powers Resolution.  
 From March 1, 1986 to April 30, 1986 (which constituted the two months 
of U.S. bombings on Libya), the New York Times ran a total of 497 stories, which 
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included 353 articles, 91 front-page articles, 43 editorial articles, and 10 letters to 
editor.
1136
 In March, there were 106 stories, while the Times ran a whopping 391 stories 
in April.
1137
 Displaying a similar trend during March-April 1986, the Washington Post 
ran a total of 461 stories, which included 365 articles, 86 front-page articles, 8 editorial 
articles, and 10 letters to editor.
1138
 In March, the Post ran 96 stories, while the number 
for April significantly rose to 365.
1139
 An analysis of the editorial articles and other 
articles from both the New York Times and Washington Post reflected the critical tone of 
the coverage. Some of these stories are mentioned: “Officials Certain Libya Fired 
Missiles, but Details Are Unclear” (Washington Post, March 25, 1986)1140; 
 “The Sidra Account” (New York Times, March 26, 1986)1141; “The Reagan Doctrine” 
(New York Times, March 28, 1986)
1142; “Moscow Says It Urged Against U.S. 
Aggression” (Washington Post, April 15, 1986)1143; “Unanswered Questions: How wise 
was the raid on Libya?” (New York Times, April 16, 1986)1144; “Where will Reagan’s 
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Libyan Battle Plan Lead?” (New York Times, April 20, 1986)1145; “Views of the Strike 
against Libya: Consult Congress” (New York Times, April 23, 1986)1146; “Civilian Deaths 
in Libya” (Washington Post, April 24, 1986)1147. The critical tone of mainstream 
newspaper coverage was also reflected on network television. From March 31 to April 
30, 1986, ABC ran 76 stories, CBS ran 83 stories, and NBC ran 77 stories.
1148
 
 The media’s generally critical tone of the Reagan administration’s Libya 
military policy emboldened Democrats in the Capitol to criticize the administration on its 
reckless foreign policy and lack of consultation, pursuant to Section 3 of the War Powers 
Resolution. Such media coverage also discouraged the Reagan administration to continue 
the intervention for long fearing potential domestic political cost in terms of legitimacy of 
military action. Extensive and critical nature of media coverage helped widening 
congressional-presidential dissension. Therefore, evidence does not support the given 
hypothesis for the Libya case.                   
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war. U.S. intervention 
in Libya was for a very short duration. The first phase of U.S. bombings took place on 
March 24-25, 1986 while the second phase occurred on April 14, 1986.
1149
 Unlike 
Lebanon (1982-84) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95) the short duration of the Libya 
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intervention did not affect the decision-making process on military operations. Therefore, 
the hypothesis is rejected for the Libya case study.  
Iraq Intervention I  (1990-91)    
Background: On August 2, 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait, sparking widespread 
international condemnation. The United Nations Security Council acted quickly and 
unanimously passed Resolution 660 that called for “Iraq’s unconditional withdrawal from 
Kuwait.”1150 President George H.W. Bush reported to Congress on August 9, 1990, 
consistent with the War Powers Resolution, about deployment of U.S troops to Saudi 
Arabia to prevent Iraqi invasion of that country under Operation Desert Shield.
1151
 U.N. 
Security Council Resolution 678 was passed on November 29, 1990, authorizing member 
states to use “all means necessary” to remove Iraq from Kuwait if it did not withdraw by 
January 15, 1991.
1152
 Iraq violated U.N. Resolution 678. After getting congressional 
authorization, as required by Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, President Bush 
ordered military action against Iraq on January 16, 1991, under Operation Desert Storm. 
This intervention was over on February 28, 1991, when Iraq withdrew its military forces 
from Kuwait.
1153
     
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus. U.S. 
intervention in Iraq in 1990-91 took place in a divided government setting. While 
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Congress was controlled by Democrats the White House was under GOP control. On 
August 2, 1990, after Iraq invaded Kuwait, there was widespread outrage on Capitol Hill 
and in the White House. Congress acted swiftly and decisively to expand the president’s 
military role in the Persian Gulf region. The same day, the U.S. Senate adopted a 
resolution, S. Res. 318, by a unanimous vote of 97-0, authorizing President Bush “to act 
immediately, using unilateral and multilateral measures, to seek the full and 
unconditional withdrawal of all Iraqi forces from Kuwaiti territory.”1154 Later on August 
2, 1990, the House adopted H.R. 5431 unanimously by a vote of 416-0, to endorse the 
Senate resolution, condemn the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, and impose economic sanctions 
on Iraq.
1155
 There was consensus between Congress and the president on the evolving 
crisis. 
  On August 9, 1990, President Bush reported to Congress about troop 
deployment to the region under Operation Desert Shield, consistent with the requirements 
of the War Powers Resolution. But the president did not cite Section 4(a)(1) by stating, “I 
do not believe involvement in hostilities is imminent.”1156 Most lawmakers supported 
Bush, in consideration of the sensitivity of the situation in the region. On October 1, 
1990, the House passed H.J. Res. 658 by an overwhelming vote of 380-29, supporting 
U.S. military deployment in the Persian Gulf region.
1157
 The following day, the Senate 
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voted overwhelmingly by 96-3 to approve a similar resolution, S. Con. Res. 147.
1158
 
Legislative-executive consensus continued to determine the military policy in the region. 
On October 23, 1990, Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell (D-ME) and House 
Speaker Thomas Foley (D-WA) proposed a bipartisan leadership committee to facilitate 
proper consultation between congressional leaders and the administration.
1159
 Such a 
proposal showed the level of confidence regarding ongoing consensus between Capitol 
Hill and the White House. After the 102
nd
 Congress convened on January 4, 1991, still as 
a divided government in Washington, both the House and the Senate decided to debate on 
the situation in the Gulf. On January 8, 1991, President Bush sent a letter to congressional 
leaders, requesting them to pass legislations that would approve U.S. troop deployment in 
compliance with the directives of the U.N. Security Council Resolution 678.
1160
 U.N. 
Resolution 678 authorized member states to use “all means necessary” to remove Iraqi 
forces from Kuwait by January 15, 1991.
1161
 In response, on January 12, 1991, the U.S. 
Senate adopted a resolution, S.J. Res. 2, by a vote of 52-47, authorizing the president to 
use military force against Iraqi forces occupying Kuwait.
1162
 The same day, the House 
approved a similar resolution, H.J. Res. 77, by a margin of 250-183.
1163
 Passage of S.J. 
Res. 2 and H.J. Res. 77 led to congressional approval of the legislation “Authorization for 
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Use of Military Force against Iraq Resolution,” pursuant to Section 5 (b) of the War 
Powers Resolution.
1164
 Hence, legislative-executive consensus prevailed until the end of 
congressional proceedings on the issue of authorization of use of force. 
 Iraq intervention (1990-91) is one of the rare cases of consensus, 
consistent with the Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart (Figure 5.1), in which 
congressional-presidential consensus prevailed despite the presence of divided 
government during the 101
st
 and 102
nd
 Congress. Outcome in the form of consensus was 
primarily because of the sensitivity of the issue especially with regard to national 
security. During such times traditionally Capitol Hill supports presidential military 
endeavors to initiate quick action. Even though the decision outcome here does not 
support the normal expectations of the given hypothesis, the fact is that backers of the 
Iraq intervention case perceived an extraordinary national security threat from the Iraqi 
leader, Saddam Hussein. This trumped the dynamics of divided government in 
Washington, leading to a rare display of congressional-presidential unity in foreign 
policy. Despite the presence of divided government Capitol Hill and the White House 
acted in a unified manner because there was “nearly universal agreement on the 
fundamentals that Saddam is a dangerous enemy of U.S. interests and that strong action 
had to be taken to counter his invasion of Kuwait.”1165 On the whole even though 
evidence in Iraq I case study does not support normal expectations of the given 
hypothesis such variations in outcome is consistent with the framework of continuum of 
legislative-executive consensus and dissension in a divided government setting.     
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Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. Iraq intervention I is one of the 
rare cases when strong bipartisan support for use of military force existed from the very 
beginning. Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle realized the real danger that 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait posed for the United States and agreed with the Bush 
administration’s military policy in the Persian Gulf. Support from the Democratic Party 
was overwhelming, and that significantly diminished the domestic political hurdles for 
the Bush administration for making decisions on the Iraq intervention. Responding to 
President Bush’s August 2, 1990, comments regarding the possibility of military 
intervention in Iraq, one of the most liberal Democrats, Christopher J. Dodd (D-CT), said, 
“My own view is that at some point military action is probably going to be 
necessary.”1166 Influential Democrat Senator Sam Nunn (D-GA), Chairman of the Senate 
Armed Services Committee, supported the probability for a long-term military 
intervention and said, “I’d say we’re going to be there several months with whatever 
ground forces we have and we’re going to be there a long time with our Air Force.”1167 
President Bush’s Democratic challenger in the 1988 presidential election, Michael 
Dukakis of Massachusetts, endorsed the administration’s Iraq military policy when he 
said, “I think he’s [President Bush] doing exactly the right thing.”1168 The Reverend Jesse 
Jackson, another Democratic contender in the 1988 presidential election, also endorsed 
Bush’s military plan in Iraq when he said, “He [Saddam Hussein] must be driven back to 
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the borders and the United States must be prepared to use military force, either 
multilaterally or unilaterally.”1169 Hence, it was evident that U.S. intervention in Iraq was 
really unique because unlike the Vietnam War debate, in this case “there were not simply 
hawks who supported U.S. intervention and doves who opposed it. Instead, there was 
nearly universal agreement on the fundamentals that Saddam was a dangerous enemy of 
U.S. interests and that strong action had to be taken to counter his invasion of 
Kuwait.”1170 From the overall analysis, it is clear that in the case of Iraq intervention I 
strong bipartisan consensus was the hallmark of congressional-presidential interactions. 
Evidence therefore does not support the hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. Congressional debate occurred during the 1990 fall midterm elections. 
Overwhelming political and public support nationwide for President Bush’s Iraq military 
policy gave congressional lawmakers, especially on the Democratic side, an impression 
about negative electoral consequences had they not supported the administration. 
Therefore, one can argue that prospects for getting reelected by lawmakers seemed to be 
much greater if they extended their bipartisan support to the Bush administration, since 
the issue had national security ramifications. It can be inferred that electoral imperatives 
did influence the decision-making process on U.S. intervention in Iraq. The hypothesis is 
accepted.    
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Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. During Iraq 
intervention I, President Bush enjoyed strong and steady public support for his military 
policy. A Gallup poll, conducted on August 3-4, 1990, just three days after the Iraqi 
invasion of Kuwait, found that 60 percent of the American people were in favor of direct 
U.S. military action against Iraq, if Saddam Hussein were to invade Saudi Arabia in 
addition to Kuwait. Only 26 percent opposed it.
1171
 A week after the deployment, a 
Gallup poll, conducted on August 16-19, 1990, found that 79 percent of respondents 
approved Bush’s “handling of the situation in the Middle East involving Iraq and 
Kuwait,” while 76 percent of the public approved “U.S. decision to Saudi Arabia as a 
defense against Iraq.”1172 Similarly, a CBS News/New York Times poll, conducted on 
August 16 - 19, 1990, showed that 76 percent of the respondents approved (50 percent 
“strongly approved”; 26 percent “somewhat approved”) the way President Bush was 
handling Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, while only 14 percent disapproved.1173 Interestingly, 
high public approval continued. According to a ABC News/Washington Post poll, 
conducted on October 10, 1990 (about two months after U.S. troop deployment in the 
region), 70 percent of the public agreed that the United States should “take all action 
necessary, including the use of military force, to make sure that Iraq withdraws its forces 
from Kuwait,” while only 27 percent disagreed.1174 A Gallup poll, conducted on 
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November 1-4, 1990 (three months after the deployment) found that 69 percent of 
respondents “felt that U.S. had a clear idea of the military goal in the Persian Gulf.”1175 
An ABC News/Washington Post poll, conducted on January 9, 1991 (just three days prior 
to the congressional authorization vote), found that 75 percent of the public agreed that 
the United States should “take all action necessary, including the use of military force, to 
make sure that Iraq withdraws its forces from Kuwait,” while only 23 percent 
disagreed.
1176
 After President Bush’s nationally televised address for military action 
against Iraq upon getting congressional authorization, a Gallup survey, conducted 
January 16, 1991 between 9:25 PM and 11:30 PM EST, found that 81 percent of the 
American people approved the way the president was handling the current situation in the 
Persian Gulf.
1177
  
 Such overwhelmingly favorable public support consistently played a 
dominant role in the decision-making process on intervention in Iraq. Congress was 
clearly mindful of such strong public support for military action against Iraq. Under such 
circumstances, members of Congress had little incentive to oppose the Bush 
administration’s commitment for use of U.S. forces against Iraq. Subsequently, on 
January 12, 1991, Congress adopted legislations (S.J. Res. 2 and H.J. Res. 77), 
authorizing President Bush to use U.S. military force against Iraq to liberate Kuwait from 
Iraqi occupation.
1178
 Empirical investigation and follow-up analysis help to conclude that 
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public opinion was a dominant factor for congressional-presidential consensus in the use 
of U.S. forces against Iraq. The hypothesis is accepted for the Iraq I intervention.           
Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. The Bush White House’s commitment 
to liberate Kuwait from Iraqi occupation and concerns for U.S. national security if 
Saddam Hussein was not checked significantly influenced members of Congress from 
both sides of the aisle. Moreover, favorable public opinion (hypothesis 4), supportive 
media coverage (hypothesis 6), and international pressure (U.N. Resolution 678 “which 
authorized member states of the United Nations to use all necessary means, after January 
15, 1991, to uphold and implement all relevant Security Council resolutions and to 
restore international peace and security in the area”) were important factors behind strong 
unanimity of support among congressional lawmakers.
1179
 Once U.S. troops were 
deployed in the region, members of Congress “acknowledged their reluctance to take any 
action that might place the nation’s armed forces in even greater danger.”1180 From time 
to time, members of Congress expressed the prevailing consensual mindset. Influential 
lawmakers, even from the Democratic Party, openly expressed their support for the Bush 
administration’s Iraq military policy. A frequent critic of the president, Representative 
Stephen Solarz (D-N.Y.), noted that Bush could bank on congressional support in his 
firm determination to stand against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait.
1181
 House Speaker Foley 
assessed the general mood of the members of Congress as one of cooperation with the 
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Bush administration in both the House and the Senate deliberations.
1182
 However, in the 
run-up to war, some Democrats in Congress expressed concern on December 3, 1990, 
about Bush not seeking congressional authorization before committing U.S. troops to 
war, as required by Section 5 (b) of the War Powers Resolution.
1183
 In response, on 
January 8, 1991, President Bush formally requested Congress to authorize use of armed 
forces against Iraq to liberate Kuwait.
1184
 Once Bush sought congressional approval, 
members of Congress were quick to give it on January 12, 1991. The overall 
collaboration between members of Congress and the Bush White House at various stages 
of congressional deliberations on the use of U.S. forces against Iraq resulted in 
lawmakers’ reluctance to take any action that would fundamentally jeopardize Bush’s 
military policy.
1185
  
Therefore, it can be concluded that opposition members of Congress were 
generally inclined toward working with the Bush administration and did not tend to 
fundamentally disagree with Bush’s military policy in Iraq. Such a consensual attitude 
from opposition lawmakers in the Capitol was highly effective in the decision-making 
process in staging a united stance regarding U.S. military deployment and eventual 
successful military intervention in Iraq. Hence, evidence does not support the given 
hypothesis in the case of Iraq intervention I.            
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Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. When 
Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait it set in motion some of the most prolific 
news coverage in U.S. media history. Media coverage throughout Gulf War I was 
uninterrupted involving the entire U.S. intervention – the military buildup, followed by 
the launching of Operation Desert Storm and the eventual liberation of Kuwait.
1186
 
Importantly, evidence shows that the Iraq intervention I was not only the most dominant 
media topic of the day in foreign policy, but it also received a tremendous amount of 
public attention, both in terms of readership and viewership.
1187
 According to a Gallup 
survey, conducted on January 3 - 6, 1991, a total of 87 percent of the public closely 
followed “news about the situation involving the invasion of Kuwait by Iraq.”1188 
Therefore, media coverage had a significant effect in generating public 
awareness/opinion and political momentum in the decision-making process in 
Washington regarding military intervention. 
 By and large, the tone of media coverage right from the beginning was 
supportive of the Bush administration’s military policy in the Persian Gulf. Extensive 
media coverage which was essentially favorable to Bush’s action plan was also fairly 
successful in creating in Saddam Hussein a perfect enemy who needed to be checked.
1189
 
Such a trend in news coverage was evident from the analysis of the editorial pages of 
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some of the leading U.S. newspapers, such as the New York Times and Washington 
Post.
1190
 In a powerful editorial piece the day after President Bush announced 
deployment of U.S. ground troops in the region, the Times commented, “President Bush 
has drawn a line in the sand, committing U.S. forces to face down Saddam Hussein. The 
costs and risks are enormous …… on balance, he has made the right choice in the right 
way.”1191 Media content that projected a real threat to national security and an imminent 
full-scale war between the United States and Iraq generated huge public support in the 
form of rallying behind the administration.
1192
 The Washington Post narrated the Gulf 
crisis: “Forces are gathered under many flags, and President Bush is leading this gigantic 
enterprise with skill.”1193 The aspects of agenda setting, framing, and priming of news 
coverage from the beginning to the end of the U.S. intervention were generally favorable 
for the Bush White House to initiate military action.
1194
 Media coverage was trying to 
build a case for an urgent need of international [military] intervention against Iraq. The 
New York Times on August 3, 1990, ran a provocative editorial with the captivating 
headline “Iraq’s Naked Aggression,” whose first sentence said, “Without warrant or 
warning, Iraq has struck brutally at tiny Kuwait, a brazen challenge to world law.”1195 
Another example was the September 15, 1990, Times editorial that read “Iraq Swings 
Wild, and Low” which pointed out repeated violation of international laws and 
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humanitarian norms by Iraq.
1196
 Analysts argue that a careful analysis of all the New York 
Times editorials and op-ed columns during congressional deliberations from November 
1990 to January 15, 1991 (the U.N. Resolution 678 deadline for Iraqi forces to withdraw 
from Kuwait) found that the coverage was generally supportive of the Bush 
administration’s military policy. Although there were criticisms, most of the critical 
comments “tended to be displayed less saliently than supportive information, and much 
of the reported criticism was procedural rather than substantive.”1197      
The sheer volume of news stories speaks about the extensive nature of media 
coverage. During the seven-month period from August 1, 1990, to February 28, 1991, 
that began with U.S. military buildup in the region and ended with the successful 
completion of Operation Desert Storm, resulting in the liberation of Kuwait from Iraqi 
forces, the New York Times ran a total of 4166 stories that consisted of 3303 articles, 583 
front-page articles, 144 editorials, and 136 letters to editor.
1198
 The Times coverage was 
maximum in August 1990, which marked the momentum- building phase of the Persian 
Gulf crisis, and January 1991, when congressional debate reached its highest intensity, 
leading to the authorization of troop deployment as required by Section 5 (b) of the War 
Powers Resolution.
1199
 Displaying a similar trend for the same time period, the 
Washington Post ran a total of 3777 stories that consisted of 3039 articles, 529 front-page 
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articles, 102 editorial articles, and 107 letters to editor.
1200
 The Post also ran the highest 
number of stories in August 1990 and January 1991, as did the Times, because of the 
significance of those two months from the vantage point of legislative-executive political 
dynamics.
1201
 Network television news coverage was immensely significant in generating 
public opinion and political momentum, since people at that time watched late-night 
television news coverage to get a first-hand idea of the situation on the ground. For the 
period from August 1, 1990 to February 28, 1991, ABC ran 633 stories, CBS ran 439 
stories, NBC ran 419 stories, and CNN ran a total of 441 stories.
1202
 Network television 
also registered robust monthly coverage of news stories during the Iraq intervention.
1203
                         
         On the basis of empirical investigation it can be asserted that a combination 
of favorable and high-volume media coverage painted an image of a dire situation in the 
Persian Gulf region, which in turn generated favorable public opinion toward military 
action to stop the evolving crisis. Members of Congress from both sides of the aisle were 
also influenced by the growing political momentum in favor of military intervention.  
Congress adopted legislations (S.J. Res. 2 and H.J. Res. 77) on January 12, 1991, 
authorizing President Bush to deploy U.S. troops in the region against Iraq and to force 
the Iraqi military to withdraw from Kuwait.
1204
 The analysis made above leads us to the 
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conclusion that media coverage greatly influenced the decision-making process during 
Iraq intervention I. Therefore, the hypothesis is accepted. 
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war. On getting 
congressional authorization for military intervention on January 12, 1991, and in 
compliance with U.N. resolution 678, President Bush ordered military action against Iraq 
on January 16, 1991.
1205
 The Iraq war continued until February 28, 1991, when Kuwait 
was liberated. Therefore, the actual duration of Gulf War I was less than 60 days. Once 
the war was over, U.S. forces were pulled out of Iraq. Hence, the duration of war did not 
affect legislative-executive relations, unlike more complicated cases such as Lebanon 
MNF (1982-84) and Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95). Therefore, the given hypothesis 
does not apply in the case of Iraq I intervention. 
Iraq Intervention II (2003) 
Background: In the summer of 2002, President George W. Bush described the 
grave national security danger for the United States from the Saddam Hussein regime in 
Iraq, because of stockpiling of weapons of mass destruction (WMD hereafter).
1206
 On 
September 12, 2002, while addressing the United Nations General Assembly, President 
Bush stated that the United States would resort to military action against Iraq if it 
continued to violate U.N. resolutions and if the United Nation did not disarm Iraq.
1207
 In 
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October 2002, Congress passed a joint resolution, H.J. Res. 114, authorizing Bush to use 
U.S. force if necessary to eliminate the threat posed by the Saddam Hussein regime, as 
required by Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.
1208
 Thereafter, on March 19, 
2003, the United States and its allies launched Operation Iraqi Freedom to disarm Iraq 
and topple the Saddam Hussein regime, which eventually fell on April 9, 2003.
1209
         
Hypothesis 1: Divided government leads to congressional-presidential 
dissension in war-making, while unified government facilitates consensus. 
Congressional-presidential interactions on the issue of authorization for troop deployment 
against Iraq, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution, took place in the 
presence of divided government in Washington.
1210
 In the fall of 2002, congressional 
deliberations occurred, and “the nation was fixated with the prospects of war against 
Iraq.”1211 On September 4, 2002, President Bush invited congressional leaders from both 
parties to a meeting at the White House, where he announced that he would seek 
congressional authorization before going to war against Iraq.
1212
 On September 26, 2002, 
Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle (D-S.D.) and Senate Minority Leader Trent Lott 
(R-MS) introduced a joint resolution, S.J. Res. 45 (initially drafted by the Bush White 
House), to authorize the president to use U.S. armed forces against Iraq.
1213
 The Senate 
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used this bill as a focus for extensive debate, which continued from October 4 to October 
11, 2002.
1214
 In the end, the Senate adopted H.J. Res. 114, which was introduced by 
House Speaker Dennis Hastert (R-IL) and House Minority Leader Richard Gephardt (D-
MO).
1215
 The provisions of H.J. Res. 114 were agreeable to most of the congressional 
lawmakers, as a mark of the consensual sentiment that was prevalent on Capitol Hill. 
Such provisions were also acceptable to the Bush White House. The House of 
Representatives, after debating the bill extensively, ultimately adopted H.J. Res. 114 on 
October 10, 2002, by an overwhelming margin of 296-133.
1216
 The following day, on 
October 11, 2002, the Senate passed the House resolution, H.J. Res. 114, by a vote of 77-
23.
1217
 Congressional authorization of the use of troops met the requirements of Section 5 
(b) of the War Powers Resolution. With that, legislative-executive consensus prevailed 
on the use of U.S. armed forces against Iraq. 
Empirical evidence shows that in the run-up to congressional authorization for the 
use of U.S. Armed Forces against Iraq, the majority of lawmakers were on board with the 
Bush administration’s military strategy. Although party loyalty from the GOP side was 
expected, a solid number of centrist Democrats also supported the legislation. 
Subsequently, there was legislative-executive consensus despite the presence of divided 
government. Therefore, evidence does not support the normal expectations of the given 
hypothesis. However, the dependent variable in this case is consistent with the theoretical 
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foundation of continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension, as 
illustrated in the “Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart” (Figure 5.1). Also in play 
was the political climate prevalent in Washington in the fall of 2002, which was 
“decidedly stacked against any overt challenge to Bush in the military arena,” especially 
in the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attack.
1218
 In the end concern for 
national security trumped political arrangement in Washington. 
Hypothesis 2: Ideological divisions and partisan differences result in greater 
dissension in the decision process on conduct of war. Partisan and ideological elements 
were in play, especially in the form of party loyalty among conservative GOP lawmakers 
and liberal Democrats. As congressional debate proceeded, the Bush White House, fully 
aware of the partisan dynamics on Capitol Hill, was able to garner support from an 
adequate number of centrist Democrats to overcome opposition mounted by the liberal 
wing of the Democratic Party. In the Republican-controlled House, 215 out of a total 221 
Republicans supported H.J Res. 114, while only 81 out of 207 Democrats supported it. In 
the Democrat-controlled Senate, while 48 out of 49 Republicans voted in favor of H.J. 
Res. 114, only 29 out of 50 Democrats supported the bill.
1219
 
 On September 4, 2002, when Bush met with bipartisan congressional 
leaders to inform them that he would seek congressional support before launching 
military attacks on Iraq, he also asked for quick bipartisan support from Congress. On 
September 12, 2002, President Bush, while addressing the United Nations General 
Assembly, insisted that the United States would hold Iraqi President Saddam Hussein 
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accountable, with or without U.N. support, for violation of previous U.N. resolutions and 
also for the threat that Hussein posed from WMD.
1220
 Congress reacted quickly to Bush’s 
military plans in Iraq. Republicans almost uniformly supported Bush’s initiative. An 
“intensely loyal and ideologically polarized” GOP controlled the House of 
Representatives, and Speaker Hastert (R-IL) described “his job as that of being the 
president’s field marshal in the legislature.”1221  The Democrats were divided, and many 
raised concerns about a hasty action. Senate Majority Leader Daschle contended that in 
order to get congressional authorization, the president needed to convince Congress that a 
national security threat from Iraq was imminent.
1222
   
To speed up congressional proceedings, on September 19, 2002, the Bush White 
House submitted a draft resolution to Congress in order to gain speedy authorization for 
the use of force against Iraq.
1223
 In order to deal with partisan dynamics, the White House 
initially focused on negotiations with the Democrat-controlled Senate, as many senators 
wanted considerable changes in the language of the draft resolution. The Senate also 
sought more clarity about what other options were available to the administration before 
President Bush were to launch a unilateral pre-emptive military action.
1224
 When 
negotiations with the Senate showed no signs of quick progress, the White House got 
frustrated with Majority Leader Daschle and other influential Senate Democrats, such as 
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Robert Byrd (D-WV) and Senate Armed Services Committee Chairman Carl Levin (D-
MI).
1225
 Not comfortable with the partisan delay in the Senate the White House aides 
“tried to cut a separate deal” with House Minority Leader Gephardt, who was a centrist 
Democrat and showed a hawkish disposition on military interventions.
1226
 Here Bush was 
successful in exploiting the intra-party squabble inside the Democratic Party. With the 
help of House Speaker Hastert and Chairman of the House International Relations 
Committee Henry J. Hyde (R-IL), the Bush White House was able to forge a compromise 
deal with Gephardt.
1227
 By striking the compromise deal, Bush was able to garner 
bipartisan support and greater military flexibility to deal with Saddam Hussein. On 
October 2, 2002, President Bush announced the compromise deal (H.J. Res. 114) in a 
Rose Garden ceremony in a rare display of bipartisan support, as dozens of lawmakers 
from both parties stood by the president.
1228
 The New York Times noted, “Mr. Gephardt, 
the House Democratic leader from Missouri, gave the White House some cherished high-
level Democratic support in its drive to move against Iraq.”1229  Conspicuously absent 
from the gathering was Daschle, who was isolated in the whole process by the House-
White House compromise deal. At Gephardt’s insistence, the Bush administration agreed 
to report to Congress within 60 days of the start of hostilities, pursuant to Section 4(a)(1) 
of the War Powers Resolution, instead of 90 days, as proposed earlier by Bush. Also, the 
compromise deal required Bush to report to Congress within 48 hours of launching any 
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military action about why diplomacy was no longer sufficient to enforce previous UN 
resolutions.
1230
 In the end, Daschle had no other option but to support the compromise 
deal. 
 Empirical evidence showed that President Bush was able to exploit the 
internal partisan and ideological divisions inside the Democratic Party successfully.  We 
can see that while there was high party unity among the GOP lawmakers, the Democratic 
camp was divided between the centrist wing and the more liberal wing of the party. The 
support from Gephardt and other centrist Democrats strengthened significantly the 
bipartisan consensus that was overwhelmingly in favor of congressional approval for 
military action against Iraq. Although some partisan delay, especially from Senate 
Democrats, threatened to slow approval, congressional approval in the end trumped 
strong bipartisan support because of the internal ideological split inside the Democratic 
Party. On the basis of above analysis conclusions can be drawn that evidence does not 
support the given hypothesis. Overwhelming concern for national security trumped 
partisan and ideological differences in the case of Iraq II intervention.  
Hypothesis 3: Electoral imperatives of opposing congressional leaders to get 
reelected in the ensuing elections increase the propensity of legislative-executive 
dissension. Congressional-presidential interactions took place in the thick of the 2002 
midterm election cycle. During that time, President Bush enjoyed high public approval. 
Republicans took full advantage of Bush’s approval rating and wholeheartedly supported 
the president to increase the prospects of getting reelected.
1231
 Democrats faced the 
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dilemma and were largely divided on the Iraq issue. President Bush also played the 
elections card successfully when he urged members of Congress to give him war 
authorization before November 5, 2002.
1232
 As a result, liberal Democrats in particular 
faced a great dilemma in the decision-making process on whether to oppose Bush’s 
military policy and face public backlash in the elections. According to a 2002 
Washington Post/ABC News survey, 45 percent of Republicans considered Iraq as an 
issue crucial to their voting decision in the midterm elections, compared with 33 percent 
of Democrats and 28 percent of independents.
1233
 That showed that Iraq was a fairly 
important issue for the ensuing midterm elections in the fall of 2002. In that context, 
efforts by House Minority Leader Gephardt to strike a deal with Bush were considered to 
be an election-year imperative, especially when Gephardt “already was known to be more 
hawkish on the issue — and more specifically, a hawk with presidential ambitions.”1234 
Senate Majority Leader Daschle was also in a dilemma as to how to retain his cherished 
political position while taking a stand on the Iraq debate, which was “so dominating the 
political landscape that it was hard for his party’s candidates to be heard on bread-and 
butter issues that worked to their advantage.”1235 Speculation was present that Daschle’s 
eleventh-hour decision to support the Gephardt-White House compromise deal was an 
imperative forced upon him by the 2002 midterm elections, in a tough situation of 
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leading “a Senate with a one-seat majority.”1236 Based on the empirical investigation it 
can be concluded that evidence supports the given hypothesis.        
Hypothesis 4: If there is favorable public opinion for military intervention, 
there is likely to be legislative-executive consensus, and vice versa. When 
congressional-presidential negotiations were taking place in September-October 2002 
public opinion overwhelmingly was in favor of U.S. military intervention in Iraq to dispel 
threats from Saddam Hussein. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, conducted on September 
20-22, 2002, found that 57 percent of the American people favored “invading Iraq with 
U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove Saddam Hussein from power,” with 38 
percent opposed. The same poll also showed that 64 percent of respondents approved of 
Bush’s “handling the situation with Iraq,” with 34 percent opposed.1237 Another survey, 
conducted by NBC News/Wall Street Journal on September 3-5, 2002, showed that 58 
percent of the public favored the United States to “take military action to remove Saddam 
Hussein from power,” with 30 percent opposed.1238 Toward the end of September, an 
ABC News/Washington Post poll, conducted on September 3-6, 2002, showed that 64 
percent of respondents supported the United States to “take military action against Iraq to 
force Saddam Hussein from power,” with 33 percent opposed.1239 President Bush was 
also mindful of the fact that the public supported congressional approval before troops 
were deployed. A CNN/USA Today/Gallup poll, conducted on September 2-4, 2002, 
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found that 69 percent of American people favored a “resolution of support from 
Congress,” with 29 percent opposed.1240 Bush acted according to such public desires 
when on September 4, 2002, he called a meeting with congressional leaders from both 
political parties to announce that he would seek support from Congress before launching 
military attacks against Iraq.
1241
 
In the first week of October 2002, when the authorization debate took place on 
Capitol Hill, poll numbers stayed high in favor of military intervention. In a CNN/USA 
Today/Gallup poll, conducted on October 3-6, 2002, it was found that 53 percent of the 
American people favored “invading Iraq with U.S. ground troops in an attempt to remove 
Saddam Hussein from power,” with 40 percent opposed. The same poll also showed that 
64 percent of respondents favored Bush’s “handling the situation with Iraq,” with 34 
percent opposed.
1242
  In a related vein, a CBS News/New York Times poll, conducted on 
October 3-5, 2002, showed that 67 percent of respondents approved of the United States 
“taking military action against Iraq to try to remove Saddam Hussein from power,” while 
27 percent disapproved.
1243
  
Empirical investigation shows that throughout the duration of congressional-
presidential negotiations and congressional debate on authorization of war, public support 
for military action consistently remained high. Such favorable public opinion 
significantly influenced the dynamics of congressional-presidential interactions and 
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helped to reach a compromise deal with strong bipartisan support. Therefore, evidence 
supports the given hypothesis. 
Hypothesis 5: Opposition members of Congress disagree with president’s 
decision on military intervention, and vice-versa. At the time of congressional 
deliberations on Iraq, the military intervention positions taken by some influential 
members of Congress were important. As discussed in hypotheses 2 and 3, House 
Minority Leader Gephardt’s (D-MO) initial compromise deal and Senate Majority Leader 
Daschle’s final support were significant breaks for the Bush administration.1244 Much like 
Gephardt in the House, in the Senate, Joseph Lieberman (D-CT) and Evan Bayh (D-IN) 
were “willing to grant Bush broad latitude to decide whether and when to invade 
Iraq.”1245 House Speaker Hastert’s (R-IL) open support for President Bush was 
significant in mobilizing rank-and-file votes from House GOP lawmakers.
1246
 However, 
in the Senate, Robert Byrd (D-WV), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee 
Carl Levin (D-MI), and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Joseph 
Biden (D-DE) raised numerous concerns about the Bush administration’s Iraq policy.1247 
As a steward for maintaining congressional war powers prerogatives, Byrd in fact 
mounted a valiant “one-man campaign to persuade his Senate colleagues to flex 
constitutional muscle and slow the march toward war.”1248 Liberal Senate Democrats 
moved amendments (which were defeated) to check presidential power regarding the Iraq 
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intervention.
1249
 Actions taken by some opposition members of Congress proved to be 
just temporary delaying tactics. In the final decision-making process on the Iraq military 
intervention, a majority coalition of bipartisan lawmakers overcame the opposition of the 
minority coalition. Therefore, findings do not support the given hypothesis.  
Hypothesis 6: Extensive media coverage increases the propensity of legislative-
executive consensus in the decision-making process on military intervention. Media 
coverage was extensive during the Iraq intervention congressional-presidential 
interactions and congressional debate on authorization for military action. Most of the 
media coverage – newspaper and television – highlighted in detail congressional debate 
in the run-up to authorization. During the eight-month time period from May 1 to 
December 31, 2002, the New York Times ran a total of 2221 stories, consisting of 1531 
articles, 312 front-page articles, 195 editorials, and 183 letters to editor.
1250
 Displaying a 
similar trend during the same time, the Washington Post ran a total of 1730 stories, 
consisting of 1232 articles (A Section) and 498 editorial articles.
1251
 Both the Times and 
Post coverage peaked in October 2002, when the authorization debate occurred on 
Capitol Hill.
1252
 Network television coverage was also significant. From May 1 to 
December 31, 2002, ABC ran 195 stories, CBS ran 130 stories, NBC ran 187 stories, and 
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CNN ran 221 stories.
1253
 Much like print coverage, network television coverage peaked 
in September-October 2002, when congressional-presidential negotiations occurred.
1254
  
 During the run-up to the authorization for use of military force, the general 
tone of media coverage was sympathetic to the cause of dispelling the imminent threat 
perceived from Saddam Hussein. Both the New York Times and Washington Post, in their 
respective editorial pieces, wrote about the need for prudent action, including diplomatic 
initiatives to effectively deal with Iraq. While they covered congressional debate more 
extensively, liberal-leaning media called on the members of Congress to take appropriate 
action and explore all options, including military intervention. For example, the New 
York Times editorial on October 3, 2002, noted that while there was no dispute that 
Saddam Hussein was an “evil dictator [framing the “axis of evil” typology], whose 
continued effort to build unconventional weapons in defiance of clear United Nations 
prohibitions” was a real threat, “the issue is how Washington and the international 
community can best eliminate or reduce this danger.”1255 The Washington Post editorial 
on October 10, 2002 stated, “If Saddam Hussein is dangerous now, he will grow only 
more so as he rearms without the restraint of international inspectors or meaningful trade 
sanctions. And if the threat is so great as to justify a war, can it really be safe not to act 
just because U.S. allies won't go along?”1256 Such favorable media coverage for some 
immediate action just before the congressional vote on authorization influenced the 
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lawmakers in their decision-making process. Also, both national and local television 
channels granted members of Congress significant exposure to speak out on their policy 
position. Media coverage also highlighted public opinion, which was favorable toward 
military intervention. From the above analysis conclusions can be drawn that evidence 
supports the media hypothesis in the case of Iraq II intervention.  
Hypothesis 7: The longer the duration of military intervention the greater the 
propensity of legislative-executive dissension on the conduct of war. During the 
decision-making process in Washington in September-October 2002 regarding Iraq 
intervention II, the Bush administration projected expectations of a short military 
operation. As a result, during congressional debate on authorization for use of armed 
forces, duration of war was not a consideration, unlike the Lebanon-MNF case (1982-84), 
the Bosnia-Herzegovina case (1992-95), and potentially the Somalia case (1992-94) and 
the Haiti case (1993-94), discussed elsewhere in this chapter.
1257
 Therefore, the given 
hypothesis does not apply for Iraq II intervention. Although Iraq War 2003 in due course 
of time became a very long and complex military intervention and was eventually ended 
by the Obama administration in 2011, analysis of such complications is beyond the scope 
of this research. It does not relate to the October 2002 congressional debate and 
authorization, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War Powers Resolution.  
Conclusion and Summary of Empirical Findings 
Detailed empirical investigation of all the cases presented in this chapter shows 
that since the inception of the War Powers Resolution a more assertive Congress has led 
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393 
 
to its having a greater role in checking presidential war powers.
1258
 Each military 
intervention accounted for sharing of power between Congress and the president in the 
decision-making process on the use of U.S. armed forces into hostilities in a foreign 
land.
1259
  In turn, these interventions displayed “collective judgment” by Congress and 
the president prior to the deployment of U.S. troops into hostilities and military 
operations abroad.
1260
  
From the analysis made in this chapter, we can see that greater involvement of 
Congress in the conduct of war led to scaling down the duration and scope of military 
interventions such as in the cases of Somalia (1992-94), Haiti (1993-95), and Libya 
(1986). For the case of Lebanon-MNF (1982-84), a classic example when the War 
Powers Resolution was formally invoked, greater involvement of Congress in the 
decision-making process compelled President Reagan to make compromises and concede 
to the constitutional provisions of the Resolution, especially with regard to Section 5(b). 
In the Grenada (1983) situation, congressional influence was felt in the executive branch 
when the president declared on his own that the intervention would be completed before 
the expiry of 60 days, as required by Section 4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. 
Libya (1986) also shows similar war dynamics when the intervention was confined to 
only two events of U.S. bombings. In other cases like Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95) and 
Kosovo (1999) a larger discretionary role by Capitol Hill in war-making process 
restricted President Clinton to military airstrikes only and later peacekeeping mission as 
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part of NATO-led operations respectively. Finally in the cases of Iraq I (Persian Gulf 
War – 1990-91) and Iraq II (2003) interventions, Presidents George H. W. Bush and 
George W. Bush respectively put U.S. armed forces into full-scale military action only 
after getting authorization from Capitol Hill, as required by the War Powers Resolution. 
On the whole empirical investigation of all the case studies clearly reflects the notion that 
the War Powers Resolution has played a significant role in portraying a trajectory of 
continuum of consensus and dissension legislative-executive relations in war powers, 
as shown in the “Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart” (Figure 5.1). 
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Figure 5.1: War Powers Resolution: Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart 
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The extreme ends of the continuum bar in Figure 5.1 represent dissension case study 
(Lebanon-MNF) and consensus case studies (Iraq I and II). The central portion of the 
continuum bar represents the so-called middle range cases that represent flickers of 
consensus and dissension. In such cases at least one branch of Congress initiated 
legislative action to invoke the War Powers Resolution. The related case studies are 
Grenada, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, Somalia and Haiti. Empirical findings on 
war powers case studies corroborate to the Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart 
presented in Figure 5.1. In each case study of military interventions there were critical 
moments in the decision-making process that shaped future course of political process 
and ultimately influenced final outcome. Nonetheless, each case study is unique in the 
analysis of operationalization of the variables.  
During Lebanon-MNF intervention presence of divided government resulted in 
legislative-executive dissension and Congress invoked the War Powers Resolution. 
Partisan animosity and ideological differences were at the highest level and had 
significant effect on dissension. Electoral imperatives for reelection motivated opposition 
lawmakers in Congress to challenge President Reagan’s Lebanon policy and exacerbate 
legislative-executive dissension. Divided public opinion all through the Lebanon 
intervention kept the Capitol and White House on collision course. In early January 1984 
with drastic fall in public opinion congressional-presidential dissension worsened and 
troops were pulled out almost immediately thereafter. While media coverage was more 
sympathetic to congressional opposition for prolonged military intervention in Lebanon it 
was equally critical of the administration’s extensive plans. Such media dynamics further 
intensified legislative-executive dissension. Prolonged duration of the war coupled with 
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deteriorating ground conditions also aggravated legislative-executive dissension. 
Lebanon-MNF intervention represents the dissension case in this study.  
For each of the two consensus case studies (Iraq I & II) even with the presence of 
divided government in Washington legislative-executive consensus was reached on the 
issue of military intervention. In the Iraq I case study there was broad bipartisan support 
and ideological intersection leading to legislative-executive consensus despite split party 
control on Capitol Hill. In Iraq II case study there was intra-party split inside the 
Democratic Party, especially in the House of Representatives, and that was well exploited 
by the Bush 43 administration to reach a rare viable congressional-presidential consensus. 
For both Iraq I and II interventions electoral imperatives for the ensuing congressional 
elections coupled with favorable public opinion for military action resulted in forging 
viable legislative-executive consensus despite the presence of divided government. 
Opposition members of Congress were more cooperative in finding common ground with 
regard to military action. Extensive media coverage supportive of military intervention 
mobilized public support and influenced congressional leaders on both sides of the aisle 
to authorize military action.  
With regard to the middle-range case studies where at least one branch of 
Congress contemplated legislative action to invoke the War Powers Resolution variations 
in decision outcome reflect flickers of consensus and dissension in the decision-making 
process. Consensus–Dissension Continuum Chart (Figure 5.1) identifies such cases as 
middle range cases. Each case study in this group too demonstrates critical moments 
representing variations in outcome at different stages of the decision-making process as 
part of shaping the final process outcome. Empirical findings on operationalization of 
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variables for all the related case studies - Grenada, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, 
Somalia and Haiti – demonstrate that final decision outcome in general was significantly 
influenced by independent variables like divided/unified government, partisanship, 
ideology, electoral imperatives, public opinion, media, and duration of war. Summary of 
empirical findings is presented in Table 5.1. 
Table 5.1: Summary of Empirical Findings for Middle-Range Case Studies 
Hypotheses 
↓ 
Grenada 
(DG) 
Bosnia-
Herzegovina 
(D/U/D G) 
Kosovo 
(DG) 
Libya 
(DG) 
Somalia 
(UG) 
Haiti 
(UG) 
Divided/ 
Unified 
Gov. 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Ideology- 
Partisan 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Electoral 
Imperatives 
Not 
Applicable 
√ Not 
Significant 
Not 
Applicable 
Not 
significant 
√ 
Public 
Opinion 
x √ √ √ √ √ 
Opposition 
Members of 
Congress 
√ √ √ √ √ √ 
Media 
Coverage 
√ √ √ x √ x 
Duration of 
War 
Not 
Applicable 
x √ Not 
significant 
√ x 
 
Finally like many other laws, the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148) is also not 
perfect. There are areas especially with regard to consulting, reporting and authorization 
requirements, pursuant to Sections 3, 4, and 5 respectively, where legislative 
improvements can and should be made in order to make the executive branch more 
accountable to the legislative branch. Also it is absolutely important to enforce the War 
Powers Resolution in letter and intent in order to ensure that constitutional balance of 
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power is maintained. A set of recommendations regarding such improvements are 
presented in chapter VI. 
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CHAPTER VI 
 
CONCLUSION: CONTINUUM OF LEGISLATIVE-EXECUTIVE CONSENSUS 
AND DISSENSION IN U.S. FOREIGN POLICY -- AN IRREVERSIBLE TREND 
  
Contemporary Political Reality – An Overview 
 
During the last four decades, U.S. foreign policy has played a dominant role in the 
U.S. political landscape. This has also been a period when a resurgent Congress 
increasingly displayed greater assertiveness and acted as a consequential player in the 
making of foreign policy.
1261
 The passage of the War Powers Resolution in 1973 by 
Congress, overriding a presidential veto, was a pivotal moment that permanently 
transformed the future road map of congressional-presidential relations. Since then, the 
U.S. political system has been relentlessly experiencing an institutional power struggle in 
the foreign policy domain, thereby establishing a continuum of legislative-executive 
consensus and dissension. Moreover, in the recent period, the foreign policy arena in 
particular has become highly contentious, having far-reaching ramifications on 
congressional-presidential relations. In this dissertation, an attempt has been made to 
illustrate the contours of the institutional relationship between Congress and the president 
in two high-profile foreign-policy issue areas: (1) Treaty consent and ratification; and (2) 
The War Powers Resolution and U.S. military interventions. The period of study is 1970- 
2010.  This period represents a tumultuous era in world politics, characterized by a 
transition from Cold War to post-Cold War dynamics.  
                                                          
1261
 Sundquist, James L. 1981. 
401 
 
Empirical investigation in this study identifies a distinct trajectory of the 
continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension in the decision-making 
process. Findings confirm that greater congressional activism during the period 1970 – 
2010 significantly checked presidential freedom in determining foreign policy. 
Interbranch competition to dominate the political process often led to “an invitation to 
struggle” in foreign policymaking.1262 Subsequent efforts from time to time to resolve 
such institutional conflict for the purpose of effective policymaking compelled Congress 
and the president to adopt “power sharing between separated institutions.”1263 Empirical 
investigation also suggests that greater congressional involvement in foreign 
policymaking is an irreversible fact that the executive branch has come to terms with. 
While doing so congressional-presidential foreign policy prerogatives depend on how 
each branch perceives “legitimacy and competency of the other” based on constitutional 
principles.
1264
 Because of the constitutional “ambiguities, omissions and overlapping 
grants of authority” that have generated the so-called “twilight zone” in foreign policy 
domain, especially with regard to deployment of troops, treaty ratification, and executive 
agreements among others, both the legislative and executive branches have often been in 
conflict with each other to dominate the political process.
1265
 That said, this study shows 
that during the time period of 1970-2010, a greater frequency in the formation of divided 
government and higher levels of polarized politics has enhanced the propensity of 
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legislative-executive struggle. Other major factors, such as public opinion, electoral 
imperatives, and media salience, further complicate the foreign policy process. 
Interactions between a resurgent Congress and a unitary president under the prevailing 
conditions have become more contentious. The act of balancing institutional powers 
amidst constant legislative-executive competition has become an increasingly difficult 
task to accomplish. Such a complex institutional dynamic in turn is responsible for the 
trajectory of the continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension. This 
dissertation investigates the nature of legislative-executive consensus/dissension 
dynamics in contemporary foreign policymaking.    
Institutional Struggle for Constitutional Balance of Power 
The U.S. constitutional framework of “separation of powers,” with checks and 
balances between coequal branches, is designed to make policymaking a complex 
exercise.
1266
 The system is intended to make the legislative and executive branches fully 
engaged in policy decisions, while it prevents one branch from dominating the other in 
making strategic political decisions. Debates surrounding the Constitutional Convention 
in Philadelphia make it pretty clear that foreign policy had a special position in the mind 
of the Framers, who in turn “intended to create two vigorous, active and combative 
branches [Congress and the president] with significant overlapping roles in foreign 
policy.”1267 Therefore, it can be argued that the way the blueprint of constitutional 
framework was designed more than 200 years ago deliberately facilitates interbranch 
competition in the foreign policy process. The implications of such a constitutional 
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construct were never observed as vividly as they have been in recent times. In the wake 
of the Vietnam War and the Watergate burglary, Congress in 1973 adopted the War 
Powers Resolution, ushering in a new era of institutional contests in the U.S. political 
system.
1268
 Since then, a resurgent Congress started to assert a greater and more 
consequential role in foreign policymaking, vis-à-vis an invigorated president. As a 
result, for the most part during the last four decades, the two branches have been in an 
intense power struggle, especially in the foreign policy process.  
The increasingly adversarial relationship between Congress and the president 
since the early 1970s has once again brought the balance of power debate onto the center 
stage of U.S. political dialogue. Empirical evidence in this dissertation supports 
heightened levels of legislative-executive competition, with each branch trying to 
dominate the decision-making process in high-profile issue areas such as treaty consent 
and war powers. Observations made here also suggest that repercussions of interbranch 
struggle, arising out of the current political environment of frequently divided 
government and heightened polarized politics have enhanced the opportunity for effective 
partnership and bargaining between Capitol Hill and the White House. However, 
increasingly it appears that under the prevailing context of an institutional balance of 
power, the principle of “separation of powers” often creates great political constraints and 
obstacles which in turn have become untenable for effective foreign policymaking. As a 
result, it is important to revisit the efficacy of the constitutional principle of “separation 
of powers” in the contemporary political scenario. Is it still working as originally 
                                                          
1268
 Sundquist, James L. 1981; Lindsay, James and Randall Ripley 1993; Meernik, James 1993; 
Lindsay,James 1994. 
 
404 
 
intended, or does it need reinterpretation in proper perspective to fit the requirements of 
the current political scenario?  Such a theoretical premise allows for making a just and 
logical interpretation of the concept of “separation of powers,” in terms of a more 
powerful and appropriate concept of “sharing of powers between separated 
institutions.”1269 Because there is no clear winner in interbranch competition under the 
current political environment, there is also no substitute for the “power sharing” premise, 
especially when there are constitutional ambiguities in the foreign policy sphere. The 
consequence of “sharing of power between separated institutions” under a mutually 
intertwined institutional framework has in turn firmly established the trajectory of the 
continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension in modern times in the 
U.S. foreign policy process.
1270
 Empirical observations from the two high-profile foreign-
policy issue areas of treaty powers and war powers are consistent with such a theoretical 
foundation.  
Reflections from Empirical Investigation - Major Considerations 
Institutional Politics:
1271
 In this study, evidence demonstrates that institutions 
(Congress and the presidency) act as primary driving agents in the foreign policy process. 
While doing so, institutional dynamics are affected by the political composition across 
Pennsylvania Avenue. Empirical investigation shows that legislative-executive 
interactions and partisan/ideological composition are inextricably blended in the making 
of contemporary foreign policy. This is all the more significant for the two high-profile 
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foreign-policy issue areas considered in this dissertation, because they necessarily require 
Congress and the president to work together and exercise joint institutional 
responsibilities. For the treaty consent process, the constitutional blueprint mandates a 
requirement for the United States Senate’s “advice and consent” by a two-thirds majority 
of all senators present and voting before proposed international treaties can be ratified 
and enter into force.
1272
 For the war powers issue area, the War Powers Resolution (P.L. 
93-148) requires “collective judgment” by Congress and the president prior to the 
deployment of U.S. troops into hostilities and military operations abroad.
1273
 The 
principle of “collective judgment” is ensured by consultation and reporting by the 
president to Capitol Hill and authorization or denial by Congress regarding use of 
military force.
1274
  
Findings from this study demonstrate that the presence of divided and/or unified 
government influences the dynamics of legislative-executive interactions in diverse 
manners. When divided government is formed, the normal expectation is legislative-
executive dissension. Similarly, we expect consensus in the presence of unified 
government. Evidence from chapters IV and V supports such claim in general. However, 
there are outstanding cases in the treaty process, such as SALT II and INF, and in war 
powers decisions, such as Iraq Intervention I & II, when consensus/dissension outcomes 
are seen to be different from what is generally expected in the government typology 
hypothesis. Empirical investigation to a large extent attributes such outcome variations to 
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the partisan and ideological dimensions within the existing political 
composition/arrangement at the institutional level. Moreover, partisan-ideological 
divisions of pivotal lawmakers on Capitol Hill are especially significant in determining 
variations in outcome. In the wake of the Vietnam and Watergate backlash, individual 
members of Congress have become more proactive political entrepreneurs who are 
committed to participate in foreign policymaking. While doing so, Congressional 
lawmakers advance their political interests, which more often than not are in conflict with 
the president.
1275
 The implications from lawmakers’ active participation are seen in the 
form of legislative-executive consensus/dissension in the policy process. Observations 
from the case analyses also reveal the critical significance of intraparty cleavages that 
often create disruptions at various stages of the decision-making process. In the treaty 
politics issue area, cases such as SALT II (intra-Democratic Party cleavage in Democrat-
controlled unified government), INF (bipartisan consensus in divided government), 
NAFTA (intraparty and interparty consensus/dissension and unusual coalition in unified 
government), and CTBT (interparty dissension in divided government) provide us with 
ample reflections of institutional dynamics on policy outcome. In war powers, cases like 
Lebanon-MNF (interparty dissension and intra-Democratic party cleavage until Beirut 
bombing episode in divided government), Grenada (interparty dissension and intra-
Democratic party rift in divided government), Bosnia-Herzegovina (interparty dissension 
in divided government), Kosovo (interparty dissension in divided government), Somalia 
(interparty dissension/consensus and divided government), Haiti (interparty dissension in 
divided government), Iraq I (bipartisan consensus in divided government) and Iraq II 
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(bipartisan consensus and inter-Democratic party cleavage in divided government) come 
to mind while illustrating reflections of the role of institutions. Moreover, evidence 
demonstrates that Grenada, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti are those 
war power cases when there were flickers of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension in the decision-making process. Observations also reveal that the nature and 
extensiveness of congressional deliberations are crucial in determining legislative-
executive consensus/dissension. The more extensive the debate, the more there is a 
propensity to make compromises.  In this context, NAFTA and CTBT are important 
contrasting cases.
1276
  
Reflections from cases across the two issue areas assert that in an era of 
congressional resurgence, the institutional political dynamic, as affected by partisan-
ideological dimensions, constitutes the basic underpinning in the determination of 
foreign-policy outcomes.  Empirical investigation also shows that at various stages in the 
decision-making process, there are turning-point moments that define institutional action, 
which in turn shapes the course of the political process. In the ultimate analysis, 
contemporary foreign policymaking represents institutional competition for exercising 
constitutional prerogatives in a manner that is consistent with the theoretical framework 
of the continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension. 
Public Opinion: Findings from this study show that public opinion is another 
major factor influencing the foreign policy process. Cases from each of the issue areas 
reflect plenty of evidence supporting the role of public opinion in determining not only 
                                                          
1276
 In NAFTA case extensive debate in Congress played crucial role in making compromises among 
diverse factions of the Democratic and Republican Party thereby helping to forge unusual bipartisan 
coalition. For CTBT inadequate debate in Congress widened the partisan divisions and deprived the 
chances of any kind of compromises. 
  
408 
 
the president’s policy position, but also that of pivotal congressional leaders. Evidence 
demonstrates that changes in public opinion from time to time determine the various 
turning-point moments in a long-drawn-out and complicated process in determining 
policy outcome. This in turn influenced the dynamics of congressional-presidential 
politics.  
For the treaty process issue area, public opinion plays a significant role in 
determining policy outcome. In SALT II, we see that decline in favorable public opinion 
throughout the course of the decision-making process ultimately led to the treaty’s 
demise in the Senate. In contrast, for the INF treaty case, public opinion was highly in 
favor of the treaty throughout the political process. Also, the favorable approval rating of 
President Ronald Reagan helped in forging rare bipartisan support in the Senate, despite 
the presence of divided government. In the NAFTA case, public opinion was divided, and 
that further complicated congressional deliberations. It also made the trade policy highly 
contentious in terms of legislative-executive interactions. In the end, a narrow edge in 
favorability of public opinion, along with regional electoral imperatives, helped in 
forging a nonconventional bipartisan coalition, thereby getting congressional approval. In 
the CTBT case, evidence shows that public opinion gave incentive to Democratic and 
GOP members in diverse manners, leading to legislative-executive dissension and the 
Senate’s rejection of the treaty.  
For the war powers issue area, public opinion played a critical role across the 
board. In the Lebanon-MNF case, for most of the time during the course of military 
intervention, public opinion was divided. While the Reagan administration had a slender 
edge in favorable public opinion, in liberal states, opinion was highly against military 
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action. Divided public opinion led to persistent legislative-executive dissension in a 
divided government setting. In January 1984, with the situation on the ground fast 
deteriorating, public opinion slipped away from the Reagan administration. In the wake 
of a drastic reversal in public opinion and a demand for immediate troop withdrawal, 
congressional-presidential dissension intensified. Ultimately Congress invoked the War 
Powers Resolution. For the Bosnia-Herzegovina case, evidence shows that public opinion 
was against the Clinton administration’s intention to deploy troops for most of the 
political process. This resulted in strong opposition from Congress on use of force, 
resulting in denial of congressional authorization for troop deployment. In the end, in the 
wake of a humanitarian crisis in the region and the successful Dayton peace negotiations, 
public opinion reversed course and became favorable for U.S. troop deployment, as part 
of a NATO-led coalition force. It was then only that the Clinton administration got 
authorization from Capitol Hill for military intervention. Thus, the Bosnia-Herzegovina 
case clearly shows the role played by public opinion in legislative-executive 
consensus/dissension. For the Somalia case, public opinion initially played a prominent 
role in favor of military intervention. However, after October 1993, when 18 U.S. troops 
were killed, public support for military action declined. This led to strong congressional 
opposition that forced the Clinton administration to pull out troops in a six-month period. 
Here too, public opinion influenced the trajectory of legislative-executive 
consensus/dissension.  Kosovo is another case when public opinion was a major factor.  
During the initial half of the 78-day U.S. airstrikes on Serbia, public opinion was in favor 
of such military exercises. This resulted in legislative-executive consensus. However, in 
the second half of the airstrike campaign, public support declined, leading to Congress 
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denying authorizing troop deployment and resultant legislative-executive dissension.
1277
 
In the Libya case, favorable public opinion gave an upper edge to the Reagan 
administration in conducting bombing operations on Libyan military targets. Finally, Iraq 
I & II are cases when public opinion in favor of military intervention ultimately led to 
legislative-executive consensus on use of force. In general, empirical investigation of the 
cases across the two issue areas demonstrates that ups and downs in public opinion at 
various stages of the decision-making process generated turning-point moments in a 
manner that conforms to the continuum of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension. 
Electoral Imperatives: These are political contingencies faced by congressional 
lawmakers and first-term presidents to get reelected in the ensuing election cycles. 
Empirical investigation demonstrates that congressional deliberations and subsequent 
legislative-executive interactions are affected by the prospects of future election cycles, 
midterm as well as presidential. As a result, electoral imperatives significantly affect 
politicians’ position-taking, which in turn has a spiral effect on the overall policy 
decision-making process. SALT II, INF, and NAFTA are prominent cases in treaty 
process. In SALT II, the sudden attack of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union was the 
escalatory factor for lawmakers from the two parties to unanimously disagree with the 
Carter administration’s treaty endeavor, because of the possible dire consequences in the 
ensuing fall 1980 election cycle. In the INF case, the high approval rating of President 
Reagan and confidence of the people on a conservative president’s foreign policy 
initiative against the Soviet Union gave the GOP lawmakers in general and many 
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Democrats incentive to support the treaty, keeping in mind the possible electoral benefits 
in the ensuing fall 1988 election cycle by supporting a popular president. For the NAFTA 
case, the intraparty split inside the Democratic Party and the resultant unconventional 
bipartisan consensus were largely affected by the constituent pressure arising out of the 
ensuing fall 1994 election cycle imperatives. Much like treaty cases, the war powers 
cases of Lebanon-MNF, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Haiti, Iraq I & II are prominent 
ones that support the influence of electoral imperatives on policy outcome. In the 
Lebanon-MNF case, evidence shows that the Reagan administration’s efforts toward 
speedy withdrawal of U.S. troops deployed in Beirut after Congress invoked the War 
Powers Resolution was largely influenced by the possible political cost that the 
Republican Party might have paid in the ensuing fall 1984 presidential election cycle. In 
the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, observations made in this study show that for most of 
the political process, electoral imperatives arising out of the fall 1994 presidential 
election cycle kept President Bill Clinton from ground deployment of troops in the 
region. In the Somalia case, strong congressional pressure for speedy withdrawal of U.S. 
troops after 18 soldiers were killed led President Clinton to troop withdrawal in six 
months. While doing so, lawmakers from both parties in Congress, as well as Clinton, 
were mindful of the electoral imperatives in the ensuing fall 1994 presidential election 
cycle. In a related vein, empirical investigation reveals that during the Iraq II case, the 
Bush (43) administration was able to get adequate support from the Democratic Party 
because of the intraparty split among House Democrats, largely because of the electoral 
imperatives arising out of the ensuing fall 2002 midterm elections. Observations from 
other cases also reveal that electoral imperatives influenced the political process in a 
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manner that conforms to the theoretical framework of the continuum of legislative-
executive consensus and dissension. 
Media Salience: Empirical investigation for treaty process and war powers cases 
overwhelmingly demonstrates the influence of media on legislative-executive 
consensus/dissension in foreign policymaking. Findings show that media attention and 
news coverage affected public opinion and influenced political action in Washington.
1278
 
For the war powers cases, such as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, and Somalia, evidence 
shows that in addition to print coverage by the New York Times and Washington Post, 
television images of grave humanitarian crises and atrocities in the region were crucial in 
generating favorable public opinion toward military intervention (airstrikes and/or ground 
deployment of troops). Media put considerable pressure on Capitol Hill and the White 
House to take military action. In the Kosovo case, we see that media coverage framed 
U.S. military intervention, particularly in the form of air campaigns, as a highly necessary 
operation in order to maintain security and provide humanitarian aid to Kosovo 
Albanians, who were subjected to brutal ethnic cleansing initiated by the Serbs.
1279
 In the 
Somalia intervention after the U.S. troops were killed in October 1993, media not only 
presented graphic images of soldier casualties but also extensively reflected strong 
congressional opposition in print and electronic coverage. Such media attention was 
effective in forcing President Clinton to make changes in his military strategy and 
eventual early withdrawal of U.S. troops in just six months. In the Lebanon-MNF 
situation, empirical investigation shows that media coverage was generally more 
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sympathetic toward congressional opposition of Reagan’s military intervention and less 
favorable to the administration. In the wake of the terrorist attack on U.S. Marines in 
Beirut, media coverage became more critical of the administration’s military policy and 
generally supported strong action by Congress to check presidential power. Moreover, 
television reporting straight from the war zone described the difficulties that U.S. soldiers 
were facing on the ground. Such media coverage greatly influenced Congress to invoke 
the War Powers Resolution and force President Reagan to pull out troops long before the 
authorized withdrawal deadline. For the Iraq I case, findings show that media coverage 
virtually built a case for an urgent need for international [military] intervention against 
Iraq and was able to garner widespread public support in favor of military intervention. 
Such media coverage helped forge legislative-executive consensus on military 
intervention, despite the presence of divided government. In the Iraq II case, evidence 
shows that during the run-up to the congressional authorization for use of force, the 
general tone of media coverage was sympathetic to the cause of dispelling the imminent 
threat perceived from Saddam Hussein.  In the Grenada case despite prohibition of media 
coverage by the Reagan administration in the initial days of the mission, sheer media 
power and critical coverage spurred strong congressional opposition. Media was a critical 
factor in forcing President Reagan to end military action in Grenada in less than 60 days, 
in compliance with the War Powers Resolution. Other case studies in the war powers 
issue area also provide explicit evidence of media power in influencing legislative-
executive politics regarding military intervention.  
 In treaty process, all case studies illustrate the crucial role of media salience on 
legislative-executive consensus/dissension. In the SALT II case, members of Congress 
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strategically used media and news conferences against the weak media strategy of the 
Carter administration. Moreover, media attention was prominent during the Iranian 
hostage crisis and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and that in turn hurt the 
administration’s credibility on SALT II. To a great extent, the skeptical tone in media 
coverage about the treaty was responsible for legislative-executive dissension and the 
eventual demise of SALT II in a unified government setting. However, in the INF treaty 
case, we see the opposite dynamic, when press coverage was generally supportive of the 
pro-arms-control agenda that the Reagan administration was pursuing. From the findings, 
it is clear that media by and large did not dispute the position of a hardline conservative 
president while dealing with the Soviet Union during the height of the Cold War. Positive 
media coverage was an important factor in forging a rare legislative-executive consensus 
in a divided government setting. In the NAFTA case, empirical investigation shows that 
the general positive tone and high level of media coverage influenced the congressional 
approval process.
1280
  Media acted as an important enabling factor for members of 
Congress and the president to seek common ground and forge nonconventional bipartisan 
consensus, despite internal dissension within the Democratic Party. In the CTBT case, the 
mainstream media’s campaign in support of the treaty prompted action from Senate 
Majority Leader Trent Lott (R-MS) for an early vote on the Senate floor. However, such 
action proved to be a double-edged sword which hardly pleased CTBT supporters (Senate 
Democrats), while it simultaneously satisfied treaty opponents (mainly the Republican 
base). This was followed by a poor media strategy by the Clinton administration, as 
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compared to GOP lawmakers. Thus, interestingly for the CTBT case, media attention 
backfired for the Democrats and proved to create greater partisan conflict between the 
Republican-controlled Senate and the Clinton White House. The outcome was 
legislative-executive dissension and the Senate’s rejection of CTBT. Overall reflections 
from empirical investigation on media salience highlight its role on variations in policy 
outcome and portraying a trajectory of the continuum of legislative-executive consensus 
and dissension.  
Treaty Consent and Ratification Process – Evidence and Implications 
U.S. constitutional framework of fragmentation of power has major implications 
on the treaty consent and ratification process, in terms of legislative-executive 
competition over the last four decades. The political process of treaty consent and 
ratification focuses into the core constitutional principle, addressing effective balance in 
the interaction between Congress and the president within the broader context of 
institutional checks and balances. The provisions of Article II, Section 2 that require all 
treaties to receive Senate “advice and consent” from a two-thirds majority of all senators 
present and voting make treaty process a joint institutional responsibility between 
Congress and the president.
1281
 This in turn clarifies that the intent of the U.S. 
Constitution is to make treaty consent process a “strategic” foreign policy issue, where 
power is shared between the legislative and executive branches.
1282
 In essence, the 
purpose of the two-thirds majority to get Senate consent is to make sure that treaties 
reflect national consensus because of their profound ramifications on the international 
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arena.
1283
 In the current political environment, characterized primarily by divided 
government and polarized politics, such constitutional requirements have made the treaty 
consent process all the more contentious between Capitol Hill and the White House. 
Observations made from the cases investigated in this study support this assertion.  
Evidence demonstrates that in a system of shared power, the Senate has been 
highly assertive in influencing foreign policy and in turn not allowing the president “to 
unilaterally usurp its advice role.”1284 In reality, the Senate actively uses the “advice and 
consent” process to intervene and make changes in foreign policymaking.1285 For 
example, in the SALT II and INF treaties, the Senate restrained the president in the 
“advice and consent” process by imposing amendments, reservations, understandings, 
and policy declarations to the treaty’s document of ratification.1286 Once treaty 
modifications were inserted by the Senate as part of advice, it became very difficult for 
the president to reject them.
1287
 Here it is important to notice that during the INF treaty 
approval process, the Democrat-controlled Senate and the Reagan White House were in 
contradiction on the aspect of treaty interpretation and common understanding. The 
criterion of “common understanding” was a powerful tool in the hand of the Senate to 
assert its role in the overall treaty consent process. This amendment was also intended to 
prevent Reagan from reinterpreting the treaty in a way that might have distorted its 
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essential provisions and destroyed the “mutuality of obligations” aspect in international 
agreements.
1288
 For the CTBT case, implications of divided government and partisan 
divisions are observed when the Republican-controlled Senate delayed the consideration 
of the treaty. Thereafter, inadequate congressional debate and a unanimous consent 
agreement (UCA) proposal further complicated the decision-making process. NAFTA is 
a classic case of a congressional-presidential trade agreement in which intraparty 
dissension and interparty collaboration occurred simultaneously in order to garner 
unconventional bipartisan consensus, amidst constant opposition from prominent 
Democratic House leaders.
1289
 President Clinton had to lobby members of Congress of 
both parties in order to generate bipartisan consensus, amidst widespread dissension 
inside the Democratic Party.
1290
 
Findings from Chapter IV demonstrate that the treaty consent process is complex 
and often produces mixed results in terms of treaty policy outcome. The four case studies 
analyzed here bear such characterization under the conditions of unified and divided 
government situations. For the SALT II and NAFTA cases, there was the presence of 
unified government with a Democratic Congress and White House. SALT II failed to get 
ratified because of legislative-executive dissension. In contrast, NAFTA was successful 
in obtaining congressional approval and represented a classic case of legislative-
executive consensus. For the INF treaty, there was divided government present, with a 
Democrat-controlled Senate and a Republican White House. INF was eventually 
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successful in obtaining Senate consent because of legislative-executive consensus. In the 
CTBT case, there was the presence of divided government with a Republican-controlled 
Senate and a Democratic White House. In contrast to the successful outcome during the 
INF treaty process, CTBT was rejected by the Senate and in turn represented legislative-
executive dissension. Variations in treaty process outcome observed in this study reflect a 
trajectory of the continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension.  
Importantly, empirical observations in this study indicate something very unique 
that makes treaty politics different from other foreign policy issues. The distinctive nature 
of the treaty process lies in the constitutional requirement of Senate “advice and consent” 
and the subsequent two-thirds majority support necessary for approval. No other foreign 
policy issue area has such strict requirements. The provisions for treaty consent 
necessarily require the legislative and executive branches to work as “tandem 
institutions.”1291 Evidence shows that obtaining the mandated two-thirds majority support 
in the Senate has proved to be an uphill task for the president. As a consequence, the 
treaty consent process has become highly contentious over the years. In the present-day 
political environment, Congress uses the “advice and consent” prerogative to actively 
intervene in foreign policymaking and significantly alter presidential endeavors. Findings 
in this study indicate that under conditions of divided government and heightened 
polarization of politics, congressional-presidential interfaces more often turn out to be 
confrontational, where each branch tries to exercise respective constitutional 
prerogatives. Because of far-reaching implications of treaty commitments in the 
international domain, coupled with the strict constitutional provisions at the interbranch 
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level, over the years the treaty consent process has become all the more contentious. 
Evidence from the case studies demonstrate that congressional-presidential confrontation 
takes place in similar intensity for both arms control and trade issues which are 
considered to be “high politics”1292 foreign policy matters. It is equally difficult to garner 
two-thirds majority support in the Senate for the passage of arms control treaties such as 
SALT II, INF, and CTBT as it is to generate a majority in each house of Congress for 
approval of important trade agreements such as NAFTA. For arms control treaties in 
general, deep concerns about national security dominate the political process and 
complicate the prospects of obtaining two-thirds majority support in the Senate. For 
trade-related agreements in general, ramifications on domestic economy and employment 
opportunities dominate the political process and complicate the prospects of getting 
majority support in Congress. On the whole, the four case studies, belonging to diverse 
administrations and issue types, illustrate the general framework of the political process 
that influences the dynamics of congressional-presidential entanglements with regard to 
international treaties and agreements. Evidence from the case studies reveals that at 
various stages of the political process, regardless of issue types, there are turning-point 
moments that define the fundamental logic of subsequent action and determine the fate of 
the treaty/agreement. Variations in treaty policy outcome in turn reflect a trajectory of the 
continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension. 
War Powers Resolution and U.S. Military Interventions 
Congress enacted the War Powers Resolution (PL 93-148) in 1973 by overriding 
a presidential veto. The resolution is regarded as a major foreign policy intervention 
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which has profound implications on the legislative-executive balance of power in the 
conduct of war. It is intended to “rein in a presidency run amok and to reassert 
congressional prerogatives over foreign policy making.”1293 The War Powers Resolution 
empowered Congress in the area of foreign policymaking by breaking the tradition of 
legislative-executive consensus in the 1950s and 1960s.
1294
 The resolution directs the 
president to consult with, report to, and seek authorization from Congress for military 
interventions into hostilities abroad.
1295
 Clearly the purpose of the War Powers 
Resolution is to ensure sharing of power between Congress and the president in decision-
making on the use of force in a foreign land.
1296
 In essence, the constitutional statute calls 
for “collective judgment” by Capitol Hill and the White House prior to the deployment of 
U.S. troops into hostilities and military operations abroad.
1297
  In turn it has established 
“parameters for desired presidential behavior and subsequent congressional [retaliatory] 
action. With a few exceptions, presidents have significantly limited the duration of 
foreign interventions to conform to the limits set forth in the Act.”1298 This dissertation 
illustrates the dynamics of congressional-presidential relations for nine different U.S. 
military interventions, when Congress took significant legislative actions in order to 
invoke the War Powers Resolution. These case studies portray a trajectory of the 
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continuum of consensus and dissension legislative-executive relations in war powers, 
as shown in the “Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart” (Figure 5.1). Evidence from 
all the case studies presented in Chapter V shows that because of the War Powers 
Resolution, Congress is more assertive in checking presidential war powers.
1299
 The case 
studies demonstrate that the resolution has strongly emboldened Congress to actively 
engage in the conduct of war. Findings indicate that Congress affects and alters the 
president’s military plans with regard to the nature of military interventions (Lebanon-
MNF, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo), and timing of troop deployment (Bosnia-
Herzegovina, Kosovo, Somalia, and Haiti interventions). Capitol Hill also actively 
engages in determining the scope and duration of military ventures abroad.
1300
 Prominent 
examples for this are Lebanon-MNF, Grenada, Libya, and Iraq Interventions I & II.  
During the Lebanon-MNF intervention (1982-84), Capitol Hill altered the 
president’s original strategy and duration of the military mission. From the very 
beginning, Congress showed serious apprehensions about the military policy in Lebanon. 
When the situation on the ground deteriorated, congressional engagement increased 
exponentially and the War Powers Resolution was invoked. Such drastic action 
compelled President Reagan to make compromises and consult with Congress while 
conceding to the constitutional provisions of the War Powers Resolution, especially 
Section 5(b). In the wake of the Beirut bombing event, when 241 U.S. Marines were 
killed, Congress again actively intervened in altering the course of military engagement.  
Strong congressional pressure for immediate troop withdrawal forced Reagan to pull U.S. 
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troops out of Lebanon by the end of February 1984, which was long before the authorized 
deadline. Evidence demonstrates that Grenada (1983), Bosnia-Herzegovina (1992-95), 
Somalia (1992-94), Haiti (1993-95), and Kosovo (1999) are other interventions when 
Congress weighed in to alter the president’s original military strategy in terms of its 
timing, scope, and duration. For the Grenada situation, congressional pressure was felt by 
the Reagan administration from the inception of the intervention. Strong opposition from 
the House of Representatives forced the president to declare on his own that the 
intervention would be completed before the expiry of 60 days, as required by Section 
4(a)(1) of the War Powers Resolution. The Bosnia-Herzegovina case study demonstrates 
that strong opposition from Capitol Hill regarding ground troop deployment forced 
President Clinton to conduct airstrikes only for years. Congressional opposition delayed 
ground troop deployment for almost three years. Also, the Bosnia-Herzegovina case 
study shows the influence of an assertive Congress in the form of the president consulting 
with congressional leaders from time to time and sharing information about the military 
mission.  In the Kosovo situation, we again see the discretionary role of Capitol Hill, 
especially the House of Representatives, in determining the nature and scope of U.S. 
military action. Congressional engagement declined any ground troop deployment and 
constrained Clinton to conduct airstrikes only for 78 days (March 24, 1999 to June 10, 
1999). During the Libya intervention, strong reaction from members of Congress 
restricted President Reagan to only two phases of U.S. bombings (March 24-25, 1986 and 
April 14, 1986), and the military mission was over long before the expiry of 60 days. The 
Somalia case study demonstrates how Congress influenced the timing and duration of 
military intervention. The outgoing President George Bush (41) deployed U.S. troops 
423 
 
(December 1992) only after obtaining authorization from Congress (August 1992). 
President Clinton continued with the military policy. Congressional assertiveness in the 
Somalia intervention is explicitly observed when after the October 1993 killing of U.S. 
soldiers, strong opposition from Capitol Hill forced Clinton to change his original 
military strategy and eventual withdrawal of troops within a period of six months (March 
31, 1994). The Haiti situation reveals that strong opposition to and denial of authorization 
of the use of force by Capitol Hill forced the Clinton administration to delay U.S. troop 
deployment for almost a year until after the successful agreement that the Carter 
delegation was able to forge with the Haiti military leader Cedras. The Iraq intervention I 
(Persian Gulf War) and Iraq War II are two classic cases of legislative-executive 
consensus. Presidents George H. W. Bush and George W. Bush respectively engaged 
U.S. armed forces into full-scale military action only after getting authorization from 
Capitol Hill, as required by the War Powers Resolution. 
Evidence from case studies demonstrates the profound implications of the War 
Powers Resolution on legislative-executive relations. What is indicative from empirical 
investigation is the significant enhancement of congressional involvement in determining 
the course of military interventions abroad. In contemporary U.S. foreign policy, 
Congress constantly monitors prospects of use of force in a foreign theater and actively 
influences the decision-making process. Because of the War Powers Resolution, 
legislative-executive entanglement on military action has become a normal expectation in 
the U.S. political system. The case studies reveal that Congress, empowered by the War 
Powers Resolution, actively intervenes in military decision-making and more often 
successfully frustrates the president’s original strategy. Implications of congressional 
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engagement are often made explicit by the constraints that the executive branch faces, 
especially when Congress either blocks or alters the timing, scale, and duration of use of 
force.
1301
 From the case study analyses we can interpret that because of the War Powers 
Resolution military decision-making has become increasingly contentious frequently 
resulting in congressional-presidential contestation. Efforts on the part of Capitol Hill and 
the White House to exercise their respective constitutional prerogatives on the conduct of 
war have displayed a trajectory of a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and 
dissension, as illustrated by the “Consensus-Dissension Continuum Chart” (Figure 5.1). 
Recommendations for Foreign Policymaking 
The War Powers Resolution: Empirical analyses of the War Powers Resolution 
demonstrate that the Act has significantly influenced the conduct of war and restrained 
the presidential war powers. However, there are some deficiencies that need to be 
corrected in order strengthen the Act and streamline legislative-executive relations in 
foreign policy-making. Following are some recommendations that may be useful based 
on the evidence from the case study investigation: 
Enforcement: It is highly recommended that the constitutional provisions of the 
War Powers Resolution are fully upheld and enforced unless they are duly revised or 
amended. Enforcement of the Resolution in its intent is expected to reduce legislative-
executive competition as evident.  
Consultation: The consultation provision, pursuant to Section 3 of the War 
Powers Resolution, may be revamped and made statutorily binding for the president to 
initiate consultation no less than fifteen days prior to any possible military intervention. 
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The purpose is to make the president more accountable to Congress and allow sufficient 
time for congressional deliberations. Non-compliance of this statutory binding provision 
may result in the Capitol’s denying appropriation of funds for the possible military 
intervention. Also to streamline the consultation process a high powered Congressional 
War Consultancy Committee may be formed that will comprise twenty-three members: 
Speaker of the House, House Majority Leader, House Minority Leader, President Pro 
Tempore of the Senate, Senate Majority Leader, Senate Minority Leader, Chairman and 
Ranking Members of nine committees: Senate Foreign Relations, House Foreign Affairs, 
House Homeland Security, the Senate and House Armed Services Committees, the 
Senate and House Intelligence Committees, the Senate and House Appropriations 
Committees. 
Reporting: The reporting provision, pursuant to Section 4 of the War Powers 
Resolution, may be made more specific and statutorily binding. In an emergency situation 
of troop deployment prior to congressional authorization the president may report to the 
Speaker of the House and the President Pro Tempore of the Senate on the purpose of such 
military intervention within twenty-four hours. The president may specifically mention 
“imminent hostilities,” pursuant to Section 4(a)(1) or “equipped for combat,” pursuant to 
Section 4(a)(2) of the War Powers Resolution. If the reporting relates to Section 4(a)(1) 
then the president may seek provisional authorization from Congress within ten days of 
initial deployment. The president may seek continuing authorization for extension of time 
limit for troop deployment after sixty days of initial deployment. If the reporting relates 
to Section 4(a)(2) then the president may seek provisional authorization from Congress 
within fifteen days of initial deployment. The president may seek continuing 
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authorization for extension of time limit for troop deployment after sixty days of initial 
deployment. Non-compliance of such statutory binding conditions may result in the 
Capitol’s non-appropriation of funds. This recommendation is expected to correct the 
president’s frequent non-citing of “imminent hostilities” while reporting to Congress and 
resultant confusion and discontentment in the legislative branch as observed in the case 
study analyses. Also such recommendation is expected remove the deficiencies related to 
the president’s citing of “equipped for combat” that in the current format does not need 
authorization from Congress. 
Authorization: The authorization provision, pursuant to Section 5 of the War 
Powers Resolution, may be made statutorily mandatory prior to use of force. Non-
compliance of prior congressional authorization provision may lead to denial of funds by 
Congress for such military action. The initial authorization granted by Congress prior to 
military action may be renewed after sixty days as part of making “collective judgment” 
on the conduct of military intervention.     
United Nations Resolutions: If there is U.N. Security Council Resolution 
authorizing military intervention, then the president may order troop deployment only 
with congressional authorization. If for emergency purpose military deployment has to be 
immediate, then the recommended provisions of Section 4(a)(1) need to be fulfilled. 
Treaty Advice and Consent Process: Following are some recommendations 
based on evidence:  
Advice: It is highly recommended that the president consults with and seeks 
necessary advice from a bipartisan select group of pivotal senators before negotiating a 
treaty. Such a select group may comprise the President Pro Tempore of the Senate, 
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Senate Majority Leader, Senate Minority Leader, Chairman and Ranking Member of the 
concerned Senate committee(s) based on the issue type of the treaty. If the president is 
aware of the sense of the Senate before negotiating the terms of an international treaty it 
may significantly reduce subsequent political tension when the Senate formally considers 
the treaty document for its consent. Case study investigation indicates that in majority 
instances there is an apparent disconnect/communication gap between the Senate 
members and the president on the details of the treaty originally negotiated.  
Treaties versus Executive Agreements: International treaties are considered far 
more superior, well acclaimed, and preferred by the international community as 
compared to executive agreements. Therefore, it is recommended with high priority that 
efforts should be made jointly by the Senate and the White House to reduce the use of 
executive agreements as much as possible. As explained in chapter I there is an 
increasingly compelling argument that presidential behavior to sign executive 
agreements, especially in a divided government setting, is contingent upon discretion 
granted by the U.S. Senate to the administration from time to time as warranted by 
swifter diplomatic action because of certain defeat that the administration is likely suffer 
in the Senate approval process. Expectation is that if the recommendation made in the 
preceding point with regard to “advice” is followed in good spirit it may lead to 
interbranch consensus on the proposed treaty and significantly reduce the use of 
executive agreements in the long run. 
The Way Forward 
Contemporary U.S. foreign policymaking is dominated by legislative-executive 
entanglement in every step of the way. In the wake of the Vietnam War backlash and 
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eventual adoption of the War Powers Resolution in 1973, a new era of a resurgent 
Congress and an invigorated presidency has begun, the implications of which are widely 
evident in the making of present-day U.S. foreign policy. The era of legislative-executive 
consensus of the 1950s and 1960s has long been replaced by a climate of widespread 
interbranch dissension. This dissertation attempts to position itself in this newly evolving 
congressional-presidential political turf, which is increasingly confrontational. In this 
study, efforts have been made to investigate the dynamics of legislative-executive 
relations with regard to two strategic foreign policy issue areas, treaty process and war 
powers, which constitute the elite club of the “so called high politics of foreign 
policy.”1302 Empirical investigation demonstrates that since the 1970s, the U.S. political 
system has been routinely experiencing a consistent pattern of a continuum of 
legislative-executive consensus and dissension. Such pattern consistency in interbranch 
entanglement provides fertile ground for investigation on the nature of legislative-
executive relations, especially in the context of the current environment of divided 
government and polarized politics.  
However, it is important to reflect upon the efficacy and effectiveness of the 
constitutional principle of “separation of powers” in the present-day political context. 
Findings in this study reveal that there is an intense legislative-executive power struggle 
in the making of contemporary foreign policy as Congress and the president try to 
exercise their respective constitutional prerogatives. Article II, Section 2 of the 
Constitution regarding treaty process and the War Powers Resolution regarding war 
powers categorically direct Capitol Hill and the president to share power and work 
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together.
1303
 Evidence shows that in the current environment of confrontational politics 
between the two coequal branches, the constitutional principle of “separation of powers” 
with checks and balances has become an increasingly difficult proposition to accomplish 
and perhaps a political liability in some cases. Because of the mutually intertwined 
institutional relationship,
1304
 especially in the foreign policy domain, basic fulfillment of 
the principle of “separation of powers” is difficult to accomplish unless there is some 
level of cooperation between Congress and the president. Such a premise allows for 
making a just and logical interpretation of the concept of “separation of powers” in terms 
of a more powerful and appropriate concept of “sharing of power between separated 
institutions.”1305 Under the current political norm of divided government and polarized 
politics in Washington it is absolutely imperative for Congress the president to operate as 
“tandem institutions” to find common ground and make compromises for the purpose of 
prudent foreign policymaking.
1306
 This is all the more crucial in the present-day context, 
when the dynamics of legislative-executive relations operate under the constant influence 
of fluctuating public opinion, 24-hour media attention, and competitive electoral 
contingencies.  
Case study investigation for each of the issue areas demonstrates that evidence 
generally supports the prediction of the research hypotheses. However, at times there are 
also significant variations in outcome and such variations in turn further reinforce the 
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theoretical foundation of continuum of consensus and dissension. In treaty consent 
process evidence related to hypotheses on divided/unified government, partisan and 
ideology, intraparty cleavage, congressional debate, media coverage, public opinion and 
electoral imperatives generally supports the prediction for NAFTA, INF and CTBT case 
studies. For INF case study outcome variation is observed in divided government 
hypothesis while for CTBT case study such variations are observed in media and public 
opinion hypotheses. SALT II case study is unique by itself because here final decision 
outcome shows outcome variations in majority of the hypotheses prediction because of 
precipitating international events occurred during the closing days of the decision-making 
process. In war powers issue area for Lebanon-MNF case study evidence supports the 
predictions of all hypotheses such as divided/unified government, partisan and ideology, 
electoral imperatives, public opinion, opposition members of Congress, duration of war 
with the exception of media coverage which fomented greater interbranch dissension. On 
the whole during Lebanon-MNF intervention dynamics of decision-making process with 
regard to all explanatory variables resulted in overarching legislative-executive 
dissension. For Iraq I and II case studies evidence shows outcome variations in 
divided/unified government, partisan and ideology, opposition members of Congress 
whereas evidence supports electoral imperatives, public opinion, and media coverage 
hypotheses. For such two case studies overall dynamics of decision-making process with 
regard to all explanatory variables reinforce overarching legislative-executive consensus. 
For the middle-range case studies - Grenada, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Libya, 
Somalia, and Haiti - that reflect flickers of consensus and dissension evidence generally 
support most of the hypotheses with some variations in each case study as illustrated in 
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the empirical chapter. Analysis of hypotheses demonstrates that there are times when it is 
possible to overcome legislative-executive dissension/gridlock under divided 
government. If members of Congress and the president have genuine willingness and 
amicable political opportunity to cooperate on strategic foreign policy matters, 
legislative-executive consensus is possible in a divided-government setting. For this to 
happen, there have to be viable ideological intersection, favorable public opinion, 
positive media attention, and electoral incentives in cooperation. Also, the executive 
branch has come to terms with the irreversible trend of congressional resurgence in 
contemporary U.S. foreign policy. Under the prevailing conditions of a resurgent 
Congress and divided government case study analyses across the two issue areas indicate 
that in a majority of cases there is greater effort on the part of Congress and the White 
House to forge consensus especially in strategic foreign policy matters. Such efforts are 
welcome in current dynamics and even have the potential to achieve tangible consensus 
in some cases. Also, there are situations when flickers of consensus and dissension 
transpire at various stages of the political process. Findings in this study suggest that 
political conditions such as divided government and partisan and ideological divisions 
facilitate dissension.  These conditions can be further influenced by the existing trends in 
public opinion, nature of media coverage, and electoral consequences. It appears from the 
case study analyses that even if these conditions are case specific in their implications, on 
a long-term perspective one can draw some generalizations. Empirical analysis 
overwhelmingly indicates that presence of divided and/or unified government in an era of 
polarized politics has cascading effect on interbranch competition that in turn portrays a 
trajectory of continuum of consensus and dissension in legislative-executive relations.  
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As I write the closing remarks of this dissertation, the possibility of U.S. military 
intervention in Syria looms large. President Barack Obama’s decision to seek 
authorization from Congress for use of force in Syria is a bold and appropriate move that 
complies with the requirements of the War Powers Resolution. Presidential decision like 
this is unprecedented and it has once again brought back the contentious debate on 
legislative-executive constitutional prerogatives at the center stage. Obama’s intention to 
seek congressional authorization for use of force has upheld constitutional provisions of 
the War Powers Resolution. The president’s decision has substantially reinforced the 
argument that there is no substitute but to share power between the legislative and 
executive branches, in order to make “collective judgment” on military interventions. If 
and when Congress will vote on the force authorization resolution, the outcome will 
make a new precedent and in turn strengthen the theoretical foundation of a continuum 
of legislative-executive consensus and dissension. It appears that in contemporary U.S. 
foreign policymaking the trajectory of a continuum of legislative-executive consensus 
and dissension is a new normal and potentially irreversible, as Congress and the 
president try ardently to preserve their respective constitutional prerogatives. 
Perspectives for Future Research 
In this dissertation efforts have been made to analyze the theoretical foundation of 
a continuum of legislative-executive consensus and dissension in high profile foreign 
policy issue areas such as treaty consent process and war powers. The theoretical 
framework of this inductive study explores major variables which are critically important 
in U.S. foreign policymaking. In the light of the nature of the investigation done in this 
study some new perspectives for future research are proposed below:  
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1) The research framework adopted in this study is to be used in future to explore 
other contentious foreign policy issue areas such as environment, global trade and 
economy, human rights, and non-proliferation regime with an aim to identifying the 
trajectory of legislative-executive relations. The agenda here is to investigate and extend 
the base of the theoretical foundation of this study to other potential issue areas in foreign 
policy arena.  
2) Diversification of the research framework to examine domestic policy measures is 
to be considered to extend the dimensions of the theoretical foundation of this study. 
Some prospective domestic policy issue areas are tax reforms, energy, immigration, and 
financial sector reforms. The idea is to investigate whether similar decision-making 
dynamics prevail in domestic policy.    
3) Another area for future research is to explore the role of special interests in policy 
process. In this study there has been relatively limited scope for detailed investigation of 
the implications of special interests because of the nature of the issue areas. However, for 
some of the above-mentioned foreign and domestic policy issues special interests might 
be crucial in the decision-making process. 
4) Further research is possible in exploring ramifications of regional politics at the 
national level especially in Congress. This is because of the rapidly changing profile of 
the growing electorate with significant regional affiliations. Resurgence of Congress and 
increasingly more active role played by the House of Representatives make a compelling 
case for greater analysis of regional complexities in national policymaking.  
5) A massive long term agenda for future research is to compare efficacy in 
policymaking process between presidential and parliamentary systems. The purpose here 
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is to investigate pattern consistency in policymaking at the national level between the two 
models. Such research agenda would facilitate comparing political complexities 
embedded in decision-making process for the two models and the feasibility of 
identifying systemic convergences/divergences. Expectation is that this long term 
research plan would be innovative and potentially significant for theory advancement in 
the discipline.                      
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APPENDIX B 
 
LIST OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES: 1950-2010  
 
(Chronological order based on the year signed)   
 
Treaty Name Year Signed Year Voted Senate Approval 
Govt. Structure 
(Voting year) 
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 1986 Yes Divided Government 
Convention establishing a Customs Cooperation Council 1950 1968 Yes Unified Government 
Treaty of Peace with Japan 1951 1952 Yes Unified Government 
International Telecommunications Convention 1952 1955 Yes Divided Government 
Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and South Korea 1953 1954 Yes Unified Government 
     International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution of the Sea by Oil 1954 1961 Yes Unified Government 
The Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict 1954 2008 Yes Divided Government 
The Antarctic Treaty 1959 1960 Yes  Divided Government 
Convention on the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 1960 1961 Yes Unified Government 
International Convention for Safety of Life at Sea 1960 1962 Yes Unified Government 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations 1961 1965 Yes Unified Government 
Single Convention on Narcotic Drugs 1961 1967 Yes Unified Government 
International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants 1961 1998 Yes Divided Government 
Limited Test Ban Treaty (LTBT) 1963 1963 Yes  Unified Government 
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations 1963 1969 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on Offenses and Certain other acts committed on board aircraft 1963 1969 Yes Divided Government 
Sea Exploration Treaty 1964 1967 Yes Unified Government 
Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees 1966 1968 Yes Unified Government 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (U.S. signing in 1977) 1966 Action pending No Unified Government 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination 1966 1994 Yes Unified Government 
Outer Space Treaty 1967 1967 Yes Unified Government 
Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America 1967 1971 Yes Divided Government 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 1968 1969 Yes  Divided Government 
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Convention establishing the World Intellectual Property Organization 1969 1970 Yes Divided Government 
          International Convention Relating to Intervention on the High Seas  1969 1971 Yes Divided Government 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 1969 Action pending No Divided Government 
Patent Cooperation Treaty (PCT) 1970 1973 Yes Divided Government 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful seizure of Aircraft 1971 1971 Yes Divided Government 
Seabed Arms Control Treaty 1971 1972 Yes  Divided Government 
Convention on Psychotropic Substances 1971 1980 Yes Unified Government 
Convention on Wetlands of International Importance 1971 1986 Yes Divided Government 
Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM Treaty) 1972 1972 Yes  Divided Government 
Convention for the suppression of Unlawful Acts against the safety of Civil Aviation 1972 1972 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on International Liability for Damage caused by Space Objects 1972 1972 Yes Divided Government 
Universal Copyright Convention, as revised, with Protocols 1972 1972 Yes Divided Government 
Convention concerning the protection of the world cultural and natural heritage 1972 1973 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution 1972 1973 Yes Divided Government 
Biological Weapons Convention 1972 1974 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea 1972 1975 Yes Divided Government 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 1972 1976 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on international trade in endangered species of wild fauna and flora 1973 1973 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on the prevention  crimes against internationally protected persons 1973 1975 Yes Divided Government 
International Telecommunications Convention 1973 1976 Yes Divided Government 
Polar Bear Treaty 1973 1976 Yes Divided Government 
International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973 1979 Yes Unified Government 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT I) 1974 1975 Yes Divided Government 
International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea 1974 1978 Yes Unified Government 
Convention on Programme-Carrying Satellites 1974 1984 Yes Divided Government 
Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) 1974 1990 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on Registration of Objects Launched into Outer Space 1975 1976 Yes Divided Government 
Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty (PNE Treaty) 1976 1990 Yes Divided Government 
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American Convention on Human Rights 1977 Action pending No Divided Government 
Panama Canal Treaty 1977 1978 Yes Unified Government 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 1977 1992 Yes Divided Government 
International Convention on Standards of Training, and Watchkeeping for Seafarers 1978 1991 Yes Divided Government 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) 1979 Not debated No Unified Government 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (U.S. 1980) 1979 Action pending No Unified Government 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 1980 Yes Unified Government 
International Convention against the taking of Hostages 1979 1981 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on the physical protection of Nuclear Material (U.S. signed in 1980) 1979 1981 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980 1981 Yes Divided Government 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 1986 Yes Divided Government 
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 1981 1983 Yes Divided Government 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 Action pending No Divided Government 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Treatment or Punishment (U.S. signed in 1988) 1984 1990 Yes Divided Government 
Vienna Convention for the protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 1986 Yes Divided Government 
Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1986 1988 Yes Divided Government 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) 1987 1988 Yes Divided Government 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 1988 Yes Divided Government 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 1989 Yes Divided Government 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 1989 Yes Divided Government 
Regional Agreement on Broadcasting Service Expansion in the Western Hemisphere 1988 1992 Yes Divided Government 
International Convention on Salvage (U.S. signed in 1990) 1989 1991 Yes Divided Government 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes  1989 1992 Yes Divided Government 
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany 1990 1990 Yes Divided Government 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 1990 1991 Yes Divided Government 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 1991 Yes Divided Government 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) 1991 1992 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 1991 1993 Yes Unified Government 
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United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) 1992 1992 Yes Divided Government 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1992 1993 Yes Unified Government 
Treaty on Open Skies 1992 1993 Yes Unified Government 
Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 Action pending No Divided Government 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 1993 1997 Yes Divided Government 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) 1993 1996 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 1994 1995 Yes Divided Government 
Trademark Law Treaty 1994 1998 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1994 1999 Yes Divided Government 
Convention on Safety of UN and Associated Personnel 1994 Action pending No Unified Government 
Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1995 2000 Yes Divided Government 
Flank Document Agreement to the CFE Treaty 1996 1997 Yes Divided Government 
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (U.S. signed in 1997) 1996 1998 Yes Divided Government 
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty (U.S. 1997) 1996 1998 Yes Divided Government 
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996 1999 No Divided Government 
Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles 1996 2000 Yes Divided Government 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 1996 2000 Yes Divided Government 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (U.S. in 1998) 1997 Not debated No Divided Government 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) 1997 2000 Yes Divided Government 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (U.S. signed in 1998) 1997 2001 Yes Unified Government 
Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management 1997 2003 Yes Unified Government 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation on Nuclear Damage 1997 2006 Yes Unified Government 
Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms  1997 Action pending No Divided Government 
Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 1998 Action pending No Divided Government 
Food Aid Convention  1999 2000 Yes Divided Government 
Convention for International Carriage by Air 1999 2003 Yes Unified Government 
International Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism (U.S. signed in 2000) 1999 2001 Yes Unified Government 
Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial Designs 1999 2007 Yes Divided Government 
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U.N. Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime 2000 2005 Yes Unified Government 
Patent Law Treaty 2000 2007 Yes Divided Government 
Stockholm Convention on Persistent Organic Pollutants 2001 Action pending No Unified Government 
International Treaty on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture 2001 Action pending No Unified Government 
Cybercrime Convention 2001 2006 Yes Unified Government 
The Moscow Treaty (Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty) 2002 2003 Yes Unified Government 
Inter-American Convention Against Terrorism  2002 2005 Yes Unified Government 
U. N. Convention Against Corruption 2003 2006 Yes Unified Government 
Extradition Agreement with the European Union 2003 2008 Yes Divided Government 
Mutual Legal Assistance Agreement with the European Union 2003 2008 Yes Divided Government 
International Convention for Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism 2005 2008 Yes Divided Government 
CCW Protocol on Explosive Remnants of War 2006 2008 Yes Divided Government 
New START Treaty 2010 2010 Yes Unified Government 
     
     Note: 
    
Year Signed: Year when the treaty was signed by the International Community 
    
Year Voted: Year when the treaty was voted in the U.S. Senate for approval  
    
Govt. Structure (Voting Year): Divided or Unified govt. on the year of Senate approval or disapproval 
   
     
Source of data collection: 
    
U.S. Senate website (Treaties): http://www.senate.gov/reference/reference_index_subjects/Treaties_vrd.htm 
   
U.S. Senate website (Votes): http://www.senate.gov/reference/Index/Votes.htm 
    
U.S. Senate website (Art and History): http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/common/briefing/Treaties.htm#5  
  
The Library of Congress Thomas: http://thomas.loc.gov/ 
    
Office of the Clerk – U.S. House of Representatives website: http://artandhistory.house.gov/house_history/partyDiv.aspx  
  
U.S. State Department website (Treaty Affairs): http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/ 
    
U.S. State Department website (Treaty Pending): http://www.state.gov/s/l/treaty/pending/  
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Wikipedia website: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_United_States_treaties 
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APPENDIX C 
 
MEDIA ATTENTION OF MAJOR INTERNATIONAL TREATIES  
 
(From the New York Times) 
 
Treaty Name 
Year 
Signed 
Year 
Voted 
Senate 
Approval 
Govt. Structure 
(Voting Year) 
Total  
Front-
page 
Editorial 
Strategic Arms Limitation Treaty (SALT II) 1979 
Not 
debated No Unified Government 1164 75 150 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (U.S. 1980) 1979 
Action 
pending No Unified Government 13 0 0 
International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue 1979 1980 Yes Unified Government 0 0 0 
International Convention against the taking of Hostages 1979 1981 Yes Divided Government 10 1 1 
Convention on the physical protection of Nuclear Material (U.S. signed in 1980) 1979 1981 Yes Divided Government 1 0 0 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 1980 1981 Yes Divided Government 5 1 1 
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods 1980 1986 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
Constitution of the United Nations Industrial Development Organization 1981 1983 Yes Divided Government 1 0 0 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 1982 
Action 
pending No Divided Government 46 3 4 
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Treatment or Punishment (U.S. signed in 1988) 1984 1990 Yes Divided Government 18 0 6 
Vienna Convention for the protection of the Ozone Layer 1985 1986 Yes Divided Government 9 1 0 
Convention of Early Notification of a Nuclear Accident 1986 1988 Yes Divided Government 2 0 0 
Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty (INF) 1987 1988 Yes Divided Government 497 65 56 
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer 1987 1988 Yes Divided Government 3 1 0 
United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances 1988 1989 Yes Divided Government 1 0 0 
Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation 1988 1989 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
Regional Agreement on Broadcasting Service Expansion in the Western Hemisphere 1988 1992 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
International Convention on Salvage (U.S. signed in 1990) 1989 1991 Yes Divided Government 3 0 0 
Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes  1989 1992 Yes Divided Government 1 1 0 
Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to Germany 1990 1990 Yes Divided Government 3 2 0 
Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe (CFE) 1990 1991 Yes Divided Government 60 12 5 
International Convention on Oil Pollution Preparedness, Response and Co-operation 1990 1991 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) 1991 1992 Yes Divided Government 762 118 52 
Convention on the Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection 1991 1993 Yes Unified Government 0 0 0 
United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (Earth Summit) 1992 1992 Yes Divided Government 395 33 25 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 1992 1993 Yes Unified Government 2193 292 165 
Treaty on Open Skies 1992 1993 Yes Unified Government 43 5 6 
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Convention on Biological Diversity 1992 
Action 
pending No Divided Government 29 6 1 
Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) 1993 1997 Yes Divided Government 263 44 32 
Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START II) 1993 1996 Yes Divided Government 261 33 32 
Convention on Prohibitions or Restrictions on the Use of Certain Conventional Weapons 1994 1995 Yes Divided Government 127 12 9 
Trademark Law Treaty 1994 1998 Yes Divided Government 22 2 1 
Convention on Nuclear Safety 1994 1999 Yes Divided Government 22 1 3 
Convention on Safety of UN and Associated Personnel 1994 
Action 
pending No Unified Government 0 0 0 
Inter-American Convention on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters 1995 2000 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
Flank Document Agreement to the CFE Treaty 1996 1997 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
World Intellectual Property Organization Copyright Treaty (U.S. signed in 1997) 1996 1998 Yes Divided Government 17 2 0 
World Intellectual Property Organization Performances and Phonograms Treaty (U.S. 1997) 1996 1998 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
Comprehensive Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) 1996 1999 No Divided Government 545 81 57 
Inter-American Convention for the Protection and Conservation of Sea Turtles 1996 2000 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption 1996 2000 Yes Divided Government 1 0 0 
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (U.S. in 1998) 1997 
Not 
debated No Divided Government 35 6 1 
International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC) 1997 2000 Yes Divided Government 8 2 0 
International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings (U.S. signed in 1998) 1997 2001 Yes Unified Government 1 0 0 
Joint Convention on Safety of Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Management 1997 2003 Yes Unified Government 0 0 0 
Convention on Supplementary Compensation on Nuclear Damage 1997 2006 Yes Unified Government 0 0 0 
Inter-American Convention against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in Firearms  1997 
Action 
pending No Divided Government 0 0 0 
Rotterdam Convention on Hazardous Chemicals and Pesticides in International Trade 1998 
Action 
pending No Divided Government 0 0 0 
Food Aid Convention  1999 2000 Yes Divided Government 73 5 3 
Convention for International Carriage by Air 1999 2003 Yes Unified Government 5 0 0 
International Convention for Suppression of Financing Terrorism (U.S. signed in 2000) 1999 2001 Yes Unified Government 1 0 0 
Geneva Act of the Hague Agreement Concerning the International Registration of Industrial 
Designs 1999 2007 Yes Divided Government 0 0 0 
  Note: 
       Year Signed: Year when the treaty was signed by the International Community 
       Year Voted: Year when the treaty was voted in the U.S. Senate for approval  
       Govt. Structure (Voting Year): Divided or Unified govt. on the year of Senate approval or 
disapproval 
       
        Media Attention: 
       New York Times coverage for treaties signed between January 1, 1979 and December 31, 1999  
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        Media Attention (Classification): 
       Total number of any document type  
       Front-page story/coverage 
       Editorial article  
       
        Source: 
       ProQuest Historical Newspapers The New York Times (1851 – 2007). Available at 
http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu  
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APPENDIX D 
STRATGEIC ARMS LIMITATION TREATY (SALT II) 
Media Attention – The New York Times  
May 1979 – December 1979 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 445 
Articles: 337 
Front-page Article: 62 
Letter to Editor: 29 
Editorial: 17 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
May – 65 Records; June – 88 Records; July – 61 Records; August – 42 Records; 
September – 55 Records; October – 67 Records; November – 33 Records; December – 34 
Records. 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009). 
Available at  
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Gallup Public Opinion Survey  
Interviewing Date: March 16, 1979 to March 19, 1979; Survey # 124-G 
 
Q 1. Have you heard or read about SALT II, the proposed nuclear arms agreement 
between the United States and Russia? 
 
                 Yes: 58 percent                                                                No: 42 percent 
 
Q 2. Asked of those who replied in the affirmative: Everything considered would you like 
to see the United States Senate ratify (vote in favor of) this proposed treaty or not? 
  
Yes: 30 percent      No: 10 percent  No opinion: 18 percent Total: 58 percent 
 
 
Interviewing Date: June 22, 1979 to June 25, 1979; Survey # 131-G 
 
Q 1. Have you heard or read about SALT II, the proposed nuclear arms agreement 
between the United States and Russia? 
 
                 National ------------ Yes: 58 percent 
 
Q 2. Asked of those who replied in the affirmative: Everything considered would you like 
to see the United States Senate ratify (vote in favor of) this proposed treaty or not? 
 
Yes: 39 percent      No: 22 percent  No opinion: 21 percent Total: 82 percent 
 
 
Interviewing Date: September 28, 1979 to October 01, 1979; Survey # 139-G 
 
Q 1. Have you heard or read about SALT II, the proposed nuclear arms agreement 
between the United States and Russia? 
 
                 Yes: 81 percent                                                                No: 19 percent 
 
Q 2. Asked of the aware group [61 percent of the total sample]: Everything considered 
would you like to see the United States Senate ratify (vote in favor of) this proposed 
treaty or not? 
 
Would: 24 percent     Would Not: 26 percent     No opinion: 11 percent  
 
Total: 61 percent 
 
Source: The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion 1979. 
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Roper Public Opinion Poll  
Question: 
In June of 1979, President Carter for the United States and President Brezhnev for Russia 
signed a new SALT treaty. The treaty, which would last until 1985, limits each country to 
a maximum of 2,250 long-range nuclear missiles and bombers. As you know, there is a 
good deal of controversy about this proposed treaty. Do you think the US Senate should 
vote for this new SALT treaty or against it? 
Response (Figures in percent) 
    10/78    1/79    4/79    7/79    9/79   10/79    1/80    11/80 
For -----------------------------    42    40     33    31     30      30      22       26 
Against ------------------------   20    21     24    29     39      35        42       36 
Mixed feelings ---------------  17    19     20    21     15      19      17       20 
Don’t know -------------------  20    20     23    19     17      17      18       19 
  
Source: Schneider, William in (eds.) Flynn, Gregory and Hans Rattinger. 1985. 
 
 
 
 
448 
APPENDIX E 
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES TREATY (INF) 
Bill Summary & Status  
100th Congress (1987 - 1988)  
S.AMDT.2305 
 
S.AMDT.2305  
Amends: Treaty 100-11  
Sponsor: Sen Byrd, Robert C. [WV] (submitted 5/26/1988) (proposed 5/26/1988)  
PURPOSE: 
To provide that the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the INF Treaty is subject 
to the condition, based on the Treaty Clauses of the Constitution, that (1) the United 
States shall interpret the Treaty in accordance with the common understanding of the 
Treaty shared by the president and the Senate at the time the Senate gave its advice and 
consent to ratification; (2) such common understanding is based on (a) the text of the 
Treaty and the provisions of the resolution of ratification, and (b) the authoritative 
representations which were provided by the President and his representatives to the 
Senate and its Committees, in seeking Senate consent to ratification, insofar as such 
representations were directed to the meaning and legal effect of the text of the Treaty; (3) 
the United states shall not agree to or adopt an interpretation different from that common 
understanding except pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a subsequent treaty or 
protocol, or the enactment of a statute; and (4) if, subsequent to ratification of the Treaty, 
a question arises as to the interpretation of a provision of the Treaty on which no common 
understanding was reached in accordance with paragraph (2), that provision shall be 
interpreted in accordance with applicable United States law.  
TEXT OF AMENDMENT AS SUBMITTED: CR 100 
STATUS: 
5/26/1988: 
Proposed by Senator Byrd. 
  
5/26/1988: 
Byrd amendment SP2305 agreed to, (RC #158, Ex.) 72 yeas, 27 nays. 
 
 
Source: The Library of Congress Thomas. Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/bdquery/z?d100:SA02305: 
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Common Understanding Clause 
Treaties:   
100th Congress (1987 - 1988) 
100-11 
 
Treaty Number:   100-11  
Transmitted:   January 25, 1988  
Short Title:   TREATY BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THE 
UNION OF SOVIET SOCIALIST REPUBLICS ON THE ELIMINATION OF THEIR 
INTERMEDIATE-RANGE AND SHORTER-RANGE MISSILES  
Type:   Arms Control  
Countries:   Union of Soviet Socialist Republics  
TIAS Number:   12101  
Popular Title:   INF TREATY; INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR FORCES 
TREATY  
Formal Title:   The Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of 
Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-
Range Missiles, together with the Memorandum of Understanding and Two Protocols, 
signed at Washington on December 8, 1987.  
Text of Resolution of advice and consent to ratification:  Resolved, (two-thirds of the 
Senators present concurring therein), That the Senate advise and consent to ratification of 
the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics on the Elimination of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, 
together with the Memorandum of Understanding and the two Protocols thereto, 
collectively referred to as the INF Treaty, all signed at Washington on December 8, 1987 
(Treaty Doc. 100-11), provided that the Senate's advice and consent to ratification of the 
INF Treaty is subject to the following condition, which shall be binding on the Executive: 
 
That this Treaty shall be subject to the following principles, which derive, as a necessary 
implication, from the provisions of the Constitution (Article II, section 2, clause 2) for the 
making of treaties: 
 
(a) the United States shall interpret this Treaty in accordance with the 
understanding of the Treaty shared by the Executive and the Senate at the time of 
Senate consent to ratification; 
 
(b) such common understanding is: 
 
(i) based on the text of the Treaty; and 
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(ii) reflected in the authoritative representations provided by the Executive branch 
to the Senate and its committees in seeking Senate consent to ratification, insofar as 
such representations are directed to the meaning and legal effect of the text of the 
Treaty; 
 
(c) the United States shall not agree to or adopt an interpretation different from that 
common understanding except pursuant to Senate advice and consent to a 
subsequent treaty or protocol, or the enactment of a statute. 
 
This understanding shall not be incorporated in the instruments of ratification of 
this Treaty or otherwise officially conveyed to the other contracting Party. 
 
Source: The Library of Congress Thomas. Available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-
bin/ntquery/z?trtys:100TD00011: 
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Media Attention – The New York Times  
October 1987 – May 1988 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 154 
Articles: 95 
Front-page Article: 25 
Letter to Editor: 15 
Editorial: 7 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
October 1987 – 10 Records; November 1987 – 21 Records; December 1987 – 41 
Records; January 1988 – 23 Records; February 1988 – 20 Records; March 1988 – 9 
Records; April 1988 – 9 Records; May 1988 – 21 Records. 
 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851 – 2007). Available 
at http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – Cable TV Networks  
 
January 1988 – May 1988 
 
 
 
Total Number of Evening News Coverage (All Networks): 75 
ABC – 25 Items 
CBS – 27 Items 
NBC – 23 Items 
 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive. Available at 
http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu.libproxy.uoregon.edu/tvn-processquery.pl 
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Media Attention – Cable TV Networks  
 
January 1988 – May 1988 
 
 
Total Number of Evening News Coverage (All Networks): 75 
Monthly Statistics 
 
January – 10 Records; February – 10 Records; March – 7 Records; April – 4 Records; 
May – 44 Records. 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive. Available at 
http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu.libproxy.uoregon.edu/tvn-processquery.pl 
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Public Opinion Poll 
Survey A 
Survey Conducted by the Gallup Organization  
Interviewing Date: January 4 – 11, 1988 
 
Question: 
Do you favor or oppose the ratification of the INF Treaty between the United States and 
the Soviet Union to eliminate their inter-mediate range nuclear weapons? 
 
Response:   
 Favor ratification of the Treaty               -  77 percent 
 Oppose ratification of the Treaty            - 11 percent 
 Don’t Know          - 12 percent 
 
 
Survey B 
Survey Conducted by Market Opinion Research  
Interviewing Date: January 7 – 14, 1988 
 
Question: 
The United States and the Soviet Union are talking about cutting their long-range nuclear 
forces in half. Do you approve or disapprove of this proposal? 
 
Response:   
 Approve   -----------  81 percent 
 Disapprove   ----------- 12 percent 
 Don’t Know/Refused  -----------  7 percent 
 
Source: Public Opinion. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Vol.10; No.6; March/April 1988. p. 27. 
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Public Opinion Poll 
Survey Conducted by CBS News/New York Times 
Interviewing Date: January 17-21, 1988 
 
Question: 
The United States and the Soviet Union have signed a treaty [INF] to eliminate all of 
their nuclear missiles which are based in Europe or the Soviet Union and can hit targets 
between 300 and 3,000 miles away. This treaty now goes before the United States Senate. 
Should the Senate approve this treaty, or not? 
 
Response: 
 The Senate should approve the treaty   ----------- 67 percent  
 The Senate should not approve the treaty   ----------- 23 percent  
 Don’t Know/No Answer     -----------  7 percent 
 Depends      -----------   3 percent 
 
 
 
Source: Public Opinion. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Vol.10; No.6; March/April 1988. p. 27. 
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APPENDIX F 
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT (NAFTA) 
Media Attention – The New York Times  
January  1979 – November 1979 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 467 
Monthly Statistics: 
January – 5 Records; February – 7 Records; March – 11 Records; April – 18 Records; 
May – 14 Records; June – 9 Records; July – 32 Records; August – 28 Records; 
September – 88 Records; October – 75 Records; November – 180 Records. 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009). Available 
at 
http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – Cable TV Networks  
July 01, 1993 – November 25, 1993 
 
 
Total Number of Evening News Coverage: 86 
ABC – 28 
CBS – 30 
NBC - 28 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive. Available at 
http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu.libproxy.uoregon.edu/tvn-processquery.pl 
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Gallup Public Opinion Survey  
Interviewing Date: November 02-04, 1993; Survey # GO422020 
 
Q. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement: NAFTA 
will expand U.S. exports to Mexico, creating more jobs in the United States? 
 
Agree   -------- 47 percent 
Disagree  -------- 46 percent 
No opinion  -------- 7 percent 
 
By Special Status (figures in percent): 
 
     Agree   Disagree  No 
opinion 
 
Pro-NAFTA ---------     77        20         3 
Anti-NAFTA ---------     26        72         2 
    
 
Source: The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion 1993. 
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APPENDIX G 
COMPREHENSIVE TEST BAN TREATY (CTBT) 
 
Media Attention – New York Times and Washington Post (Comparative) 
 
January – December 1999 
 
 
 
 
The New York Times (NYT) – 127 
Washington Post (WP) - 134 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851 – 2007). Available 
at http://proquest.umi.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu; The Washington Post Archival 
Website: http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost/advancedsearch.html 
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Television Interview of Secretary of State Madeleine Albright on CNN  
 
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF STATE 
Office of the Spokesman 
October 18, 1999 
 
Washington, D.C. 
 
October 17, 1999 
 
Excerpts of the Interview: 
BLITZER: But a lot of people say that there was some serious consideration, mostly the 
Republicans generating opposition over a long period of time; the White House, the 
Clinton Administration, by and large neglecting this treaty. It was signed by the President 
in '96 but only submitted to the Senate in '97; '98 the investigation of the President 
seemed to sort of dominate everything. It was neglected by the Administration, bad 
management, where the Republicans upstaged the President. 
 
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, the Republicans defeated a major landmark treaty 
that would really have helped generally in controlling nuclear weapons and our whole 
nonproliferation agenda. We have, obviously, negotiated this treaty. We are very proud of 
it. The President was the first world leader to sign it. We have all spoken about it at great 
length in speeches. We tried to have hearings on it. It was refused to have hearings on it. 
 
So I believe that what has to remain here as a point of fact, this treaty was defeated for no 
good reason after a very cursory look at it by the Senate. 
 
BLITZER: Well, Senator Trent Lott, the Majority Leader, says that is simply not the 
case. He says there were very substantive reasons why this treaty was rejected. In fact, 
listen to what Senator Lott said on Thursday on this specific issue: 
 
"To vote against ratification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was not a vote 
involving personalities. It was not about politics. It was about the substance of the treaty, 
and that's all it was." There were six former Defense Secretaries, and Henry Kissinger, a 
lot of serious foreign policy experts saying this treaty was flawed. 
 
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, look, I think every treaty that comes before the 
Senate there are questions about, and I have been involved in both sides of it when I was 
working on the Hill or other treaties that the White House has presented. The reason that 
you have hearings and that you have a debate on the floor is in order to be able to put in – 
if you want to call them improvements to the treaty that then secure it for each individual 
country. That is acceptable. That is what happened on the Panama Canal Treaty. It's 
happened on many, many treaties. 
 
What I'm saying is -- and I'm not going to get into the personalities or the motivations -- 
I'm just telling you that even if there were substantive problems, which there well may 
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have been from the perspective of some of the senators, there is a way to work it out. The 
President himself had put forward six kinds of ways to secure the treaty better that could 
have been part of an amendment process. They didn't allow any of that. The debate, 
which was very shortened, did not allow for any of that -- and that's what we're arguing 
about. 
 
QUESTION: So what happens right now? For all practical purposes, this treaty is dead 
until the President leaves office. 
 
SECRETARY ALBRIGHT: Well, let me just say this: The President has made very 
clear that we will continue to abide by it, that we will not be testing unilaterally. What 
we've lost for the time being is the real international leadership in terms of trying to make 
others live up to the CTBT. And I've gotten calls all week, Wolf, about countries trying to 
-- from my fellow foreign ministers -- trying to figure out what has happened here. 
 
 
 
Source: Distributed by the Office of International Information Programs, U.S. 
Department of State. Available at http://www.fas.org/nuke/control/abmt/news/991017-
dos-usia1.htm 
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Gallup Public Opinion Survey 
Interviewing Date: October 21-24, 1999  
Survey # GO907190 
 
Question 1: 
Regardless of what the Senate actually did, what do you think the Senate should have 
done – voted to ratify the treaty, or voted to defeat the treaty? 
 
Response: 
 Voted to ratify treaty             ------------------  59 percent 
 Voted to defeat treaty             ------------------ 29 percent 
 Other (Volunteered)   ------------------  1 percent 
 No Opinion    ------------------  11 percent 
 
 
Source: The Gallup Poll. Public Opinion 1999. p. 230. 
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APPENDIX H 
LEBANON MULTINATIONAL FORCE INTERVENTION (1982-84) 
Media Attention – The New York Times  
August 1982 – February 1984 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 514 
Articles: 322 
Front-page Article: 175 
Editorial: 13 
Letter to Editor: 4 
 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Aug’82 – 48 Stories; Sep’82 – 38 Stories; Oct’82 – 35 Stories; Nov’82 – 9 Stories; 
Dec’82 – 13 Stories; Jan’83 – 15 Stories; Feb’83 – 19 Stories; Mar’83 – 12 Stories; 
Apr’83 – 5 Stories; May’83 – 12 Stories; Jun’83 – 4 Stories; Jul’83 – 9 Stories; Aug’83 – 
11 Stories; Sep’83 – 59 Stories; Oct’83 – 53 Stories; Nov’83 – 22 Stories; Dec’83 – 44 
Stories; Jan’84 – 37 Stories; Feb’84 – 69 Stories. 
 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).  
Available at http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – Washington Post  
August 1982 – February 1984 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 433 
Articles: 225 
Front-page Article: 185 
Editorial: 18 
Letter to Editor: 5 
 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Aug’82 – 25 Stories; Sep’82 – 35 Stories; Oct’82 – 17 Stories; Nov’82 – 7 Stories; 
Dec’82 – 11 Stories; Jan’83 – 11 Stories; Feb’83 – 25 Stories; Mar’83 – 14 Stories; 
Apr’83 – 6 Stories; May’83 – 5 Stories; Jun’83 – 3 Stories; Jul’83 – 9 Stories; Aug’83 – 
6 Stories; Sep’83 – 44 Stories; Oct’83 – 43 Stories; Nov’82 – 14 Stories; Dec’83 –  
51Stories; Jan’84 – 31 Stories; Feb’84 – 57 Stories. 
 
Source: The Washington Post Archive; Available at 
http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost historical/results.htm 
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Media Attention – ABC, CBS, NBC  
August 1982 – February 1984 
 
 
 
Total – 308 Stories 
ABC – 95 Stories 
CBS – 114 Stories 
NBC – 99 Stories 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive.  
Available at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-processquery.pl 
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Media Attention – ABC, CBS, NBC  
August 1982 – February 1984 
 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 308 
Monthly Statistics: 
Aug’82 – 15 Stories; Sep’82 – 32 Stories; Oct’82 – 4 Stories; Nov’82 – 2 Stories; Dec’82 
– 6 Stories; Jan’83 – 5 Stories; Feb’83 – 6 Stories; Mar’83 – 4 Stories; Apr’83 – 4 
Stories; May’83 – 5 Stories; Jun’83 – 3 Stories; Jul’83 – 4 Stories; Aug’83 – 17 Stories; 
Sep’83 – 52 Stories; Oct’83 – 40 Stories; Nov’82 – 15 Stories; Dec’83 – 34 Stories; 
Jan’84 – 18 Stories; Feb’84 – 43 Stories. 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive.  
Available at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-processquery.pl 
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APPENDIX I 
GRENADA INTERVENTION (1983) 
Media Attention – The New York Times  
October 26, 1983 – November 02, 1983 
 
Total Number of News Items: 252 
Articles: 202 
Front-page Article: 38 
Editorial: 10 
Letter to Editor: 2 
 
Daily Statistics: 
October 26 – 36 Stories; October 27 – 42 Stories; October 28 – 35 Stories; October 29 – 
34 Stories; October 30 – 35 Stories; October 31 – 21 Stories; November 1 – 25 Stories; 
November 2 – 24 Stories  
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009). Available 
at http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – Washington Post  
October 26, 1983 – November 02, 1983 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 237 
Articles: 190 
Front-page Article: 45 
Editorial: 9 
Letter to Editor: 2 
 
Daily Statistics: 
October 26 – 35 Stories; October 27 – 38 Stories; October 28 – 43 Stories; October 29 – 
25 Stories; October 30 – 34 Stories; October 31 – 25 Stories; November 1 – 22 Stories; 
November 2 – 15 Stories  
 
Source: The Washington Post Archive  
Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost historical/results.htm 
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Media Attention – Network Television  
October 26, 1983 – November 02, 1983 
 
 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 70 
ABC – 29 
CBS – 19 
NBC – 22 
 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive.  
Available at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-processquery.pl 
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APPENDIX J 
BOSNIA-HERZEGOVINA INTERVENTION (1992-95) 
Media Attention – The New York Times  
January 01, 1992 – December 31, 1992 
 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 958 
Monthly Statistics: 
January – 13 Stories; February – 4 Stories; March – 15 Stories; April – 46 Stories; May – 
82 Stories; June – 90 Stories; July – 124 Stories; August – 168 Stories; September – 83 
Stories; October – 92 Stories; November – 93 Stories; December – 148 Stories 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).  
Available at http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – The New York Times  
January  – December 1993, 1994,1995 
 
 
 
Total Number of News Items 
1993 – 1740 Stories 
1994 – 1329 Stories 
1995 – 1554 Stories 
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APPENDIX K 
KOSOVO INTERVENTION (1999) 
Public Opinion on U.S. participation in NATO airstrikes against the Serbian 
military 
For results based on the March 25, 1999 sample of national adults (N=675) the margin 
of sampling error is ±4 percentage points. Polls conducted entirely in one day are subject 
to additional error or bias not found in polls conducted over several days. 
Q. “As you may know, yesterday the military alliance of Western countries called 
NATO, launched air and missile attacks against Serbian military targets in 
Yugoslavia. Do you favor or oppose the United States being a part of that military 
action?” 
  Favor Oppose No opinion 
99 Mar 25 50% 39% 11% 
99 Mar 19-21^ 46 43 11 
99 Feb 19-21^ 43 45 12 
98 Oct 9-12** 42 41 17 
 
^ Question Wording: “If a peace agreement is not reached between the Yugoslavian 
Serbs and Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, NATO has said it would carry out air and 
missile attacks against Serb military installations. Would you favor or oppose the U.S. 
being a part of that military action?”  
** Question Wording: “Based on what you have read or heard, do you think the United 
States and its Western European allies should or should not conduct military air strikes 
against the Serbian forces in Kosovo?” 
 
Source: Frank Newport. Gallup News Service, March 30, 1999. 
Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/3970/Public-Support-US-Involvement-
Yugoslavia-Lower-Than-Gulf.aspx 
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Public Opinion on U.S. Military Participation 
For results based on the sample of national adults (N=1,073) surveyed April 26-27, 
1999, the margin of sampling error is ±3 percentage points. 
Q. 1. “As you may know, the military alliance of Western countries called NATO, 
launched air and missile attacks against Serbian military targets in Yugoslavia. Do 
you favor or oppose the United States being a part of that military action?”       
  Favor Oppose No opinion 
99 Apr 26-27 56% 40% 4% 
99 Apr 21 51 39 10 
99 Apr 13-14 61 35 4 
99 Apr 6-7 58 36 6 
99 Mar 30-31 53 41 6 
99 Mar 25 50 39 11 
99 Mar 19-21^ 46 43 11 
99 Feb 19-21^ 43 45 12 
^ Question Wording: “If a peace agreement is not reached between the Yugoslavian 
Serbs and Kosovo's ethnic Albanian majority, NATO has said it would carry out air and 
missile attacks against Serb military installations. Would you favor or oppose the U.S. 
being a part of that military action?” 
Q. 2. “From what you have heard or read, do you think the Clinton Administration 
has a clear and well-thought-out policy on the Kosovo situation, or don't you think 
so?”  
  Clear and well-
thought-out policy 
Don't 
think so 
No 
opinion 
99 Apr 
26-27 
38% 54% 8% 
99 Apr 
13-14 
41 51 8 
 
 
99 Apr 6-
7 
39 50 11 
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99 Mar 
30-31 
46 47 7 
Q. 3. “If the current NATO air and missile strikes are not effective in achieving the 
United States' objectives in Kosovo, would you favor or oppose President Clinton 
sending U.S. ground troops into the region along with troops from other NATO 
countries?”      
  Favor Oppose No opinion 
99 Apr 26-27 40% 56% 4% 
99 Apr 13-14 52 45 3 
99 Apr 6-7 47 47 6 
99 Mar 30-31 39 57 4 
99 Mar 25^ 31 65 4 
94 Apr 16-18** 41 53 6 
^ Question Wording: “If the current NATO air and missile strikes are not effective in 
achieving the United States' objectives in Kosovo, would you favor or oppose President 
Clinton sending U.S. ground troops into the region to stop the Serbian attacks on 
Kosovo?” 
** Question Wording: “If the air strikes are not effective in stopping the Serbian attacks, 
would you favor or oppose President Clinton sending U.S. ground troops into Bosnia to 
join ground troops from other Western European countries?” 
Q. 4. “Now thinking about the current situation in Kosovo, would you favor or 
oppose sending U.S. ground troops, along with troops from other NATO countries, 
to serve in a combat situation in the region right now?” 
  Favor Oppose No opinion 
99 Apr 26-27 36% 60% 4% 
99 Apr 13-14 43 53 4 
99 Apr 6-7 41 54 5 
 
Q. 5. “From what you've heard and read, do you think the current NATO military 
action in Yugoslavia has been a success or a failure?” 
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  Success Failure TOO SOON TO 
TELL (vol.) 
No 
opinion 
99 Apr 
26-27 
35% 47% 9% 9% 
99 Apr 
13-14 
37 46 9 8 
99 Apr 
6-7 
37 41 15 7 
 
Source: Frank Newport. Gallup News Service, April 29, 1999. 
Available at: http://www.gallup.com/poll/3892/Public-Support-US-Involvement-Kosovo-
Diminishing.aspx 
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Media Attention – The New York Times  
March 01, 1999 – June 30, 1999 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 1657 
Articles: 1000 
Front-page Article: 303 
Editorial: 191 
Letter to Editor: 163 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
 
March – 241 Stories; April - 602 Stories; May - 402 Stories; June - 412 Stories 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009); Available 
at http://search.proquest.com/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – The Washington Post 
March 01, 1999 – June 30, 1999 
 
 
Total Number of Articles (A Section) - 920  
 
Monthly Statistics: 
 
March – 143 Stories; April - 312 Stories; May - 227 Stories; June - 238 Stories 
 
Source: The Washington Post Archive;  
Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost historical/results.htm 
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Media Attention – ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN  
March 1999 – June 1999 
 
 
 
Total Number of Stories 
ABC – 222 Stories 
CBS - 167 Stories 
NBC - 142 Stories 
CNN - 248 Stories 
 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
Available at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-processquery.pl 
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APPENDIX L 
SOMALIA INTERVENTION (1992-94) 
Media Attention – The New York Times  
December 01, 1992 – March 31, 1994 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 1160 
Articles: 759 
Front-page Article: 195 
Editorial: 136 
Letter to Editor: 70 
 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Dec’92 – 211 Stories; Jan’93 – 130 Stories; Feb’93 – 80 Stories; Mar’93 – 41 Stories; 
Apr’93 – 23 Stories; May’93 – 35 Stories; Jun’93 – 64 Stories; Jul’93 – 48 Stories; 
Aug’93 – 58 Stories; Sep’93 – 74 Stories; Oct’93 – 188 Stories; Nov’93 – 56 Stories; 
Dec’93 – 44 Stories; Jan’94 – 42 Stories; Feb’94 – 33 Stories; Mar’94 – 33 Stories 
 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).  
Available at http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – The Washington Post  
December 01, 1992 – March 31, 1994 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 1445 
Articles: 1155 
Front-page Article: 208 
Editorial: 32 
Letter to Editor: 50 
 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Dec’92 – 244 Stories; Jan’93 – 147 Stories; Feb’93 – 81 Stories; Mar’93 – 69 Stories; 
Apr’93 – 59 Stories; May’93 – 37 Stories; Jun’93 – 67 Stories; Jul’93 – 58 Stories; 
Aug’93 – 70 Stories; Sep’93 – 77 Stories; Oct’93 – 211 Stories; Nov’93 – 82 Stories; 
Dec’93 – 82 Stories; Jan’94 – 51 Stories; Feb’94 – 28 Stories; Mar’94 – 47 Stories 
 
Source: The Washington Post Archive; 
Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost historical/results.htm 
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Media Attention – Network Television (ABC, CBS, NBC) 
December 01, 1992 – March 31, 1994 
 
 
ABC – 190 Stories 
CBS - 211 Stories 
NBC - 176 Stories 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Dec’92 – 185 Stories; Jan’93 – 49 Stories; Feb’93 – 21 Stories; Mar’93 – 13 Stories; 
Apr’93 – 4 Stories; May’93 – 12 Stories; Jun’93 – 68 Stories; Jul’93 – 21 Stories; 
Aug’93 – 36 Stories; Sep’93 – 25 Stories; Oct’93 – 93 Stories; Nov’93 –12 Stories; 
Dec’93 – 21 Stories; Jan’94 – 5 Stories; Feb’94 – 2 Stories; Mar’94 – 23 Stories 
 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
Available at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-processquery.pl 
 
 
 
 
 
482 
 
APPENDIX M 
HAITI INTERVENTION (1993-94) 
Media Attention – The New York Times  
January 01, 1994  –  December 31, 1994 
 
Total Number of News Items: 1070 
Articles: 669 
Front-page Article: 187 
Editorial: 150 
Letter to Editor: 64 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Jan’94 – 59 Stories; Feb’94 – 38 Stories; Mar’94 – 28 Stories; Apr’94 – 42 Stories; 
May’94 – 89 Stories; Jun’94 – 83 Stories; Jul’94 – 109 Stories; Aug’94 – 86 Stories; 
Sep’94 – 232 Stories; Oct’94 – 183 Stories; Nov’94 – 69 Stories; Dec’94 – 52 Stories  
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).  
Available at: http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – The Washington Post  
January 01, 1994  –  December 31, 1994 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 1214 
Articles: 950 
Front-page Article: 171 
Editorial: 51 
Letter to Editor: 42 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Jan’94 – 44 Stories; Feb’94 – 37 Stories; Mar’94 – 27 Stories; Apr’94 – 53 Stories; 
May’94 – 106 Stories; Jun’94 – 79 Stories; Jul’94 – 111 Stories; Aug’94 – 110 Stories; 
Sep’94 – 268 Stories; Oct’94 – 178 Stories; Nov’94 – 94 Stories; Dec’94 – 56 Stories  
 
 
Source: The Washington Post Archive; 
Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost historical/results.htm 
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Media Attention – Network Television (ABC, CBS, NBC)  
January 01, 1994  –  December 31, 1994 
 
 
ABC – 162 Stories 
CBS - 158 Stories 
NBC - 125 Stories 
  
Monthly Statistics: 
Jan’94 – 2 Stories; Feb’94 – 1 Stories; Mar’94 – 3 Stories; Apr’94 – 14 Stories; May’94 
– 56 Stories; Jun’94 – 52 Stories; Jul’94 – 59 Stories; Aug’94 – 36 Stories; Sep’94 – 150 
Stories; Oct’94 – 72 Stories; Nov’94 – 9 Stories; Dec’94 – 8 Stories 
 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
Available at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-search-advanced.pl 
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APPENDIX N 
IRAQ INTERVENTION I (1990-91)  
Media Attention – The New York Times  
August 01, 1990  –  February 28, 1991 
 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 4166 
Articles: 3303 
Front-page Article: 583 
Editorial: 144 
Letter to Editor: 136 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Aug’90 – 750 Stories; Sep’90 – 592 Stories; Oct’90 – 394 Stories; Nov’90 – 414 Stories; 
Dec’90 – 432 Stories; Jan’91 – 886 Stories; Feb’91 – 698 Stories 
 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).  
Available at: http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – The Washington Post  
August 01, 1990  –  February 28, 1991 
 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 3777 
Articles: 3039 
Front-page Article: 529 
Editorial: 102 
Letter to Editor: 107 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
Aug’90 – 634 Stories; Sep’90 – 495 Stories; Oct’90 – 350 Stories; Nov’90 – 381 Stories; 
Dec’90 – 360 Stories; Jan’91 – 909 Stories; Feb’91 – 546 Stories 
 
 
Source: The Washington Post Archive; 
Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost historical/results.htm 
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Media Attention – Network Television (ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN)  
August 01, 1990  –  February 28, 1991 
 
 
 
ABC – 633 Stories 
CBS - 439 Stories 
NBC - 419 Stories 
CNN – 441 Stories 
 
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
Available at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-search-advanced.pl 
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APPENDIX O 
IRAQ INTERVENTION II (2003) 
Major Amendments Rejected by the U.S. Senate – Consensus Building 
1) On October 10, 2002 the Senate rejected by a margin of 14-86 votes an amendment 
introduced by senior Senator Robert Byrd (D-WV) that would have stated that the 
resolution H.J. Res. 114 would not “alter the constitutional authorities of the 
Congress to declare war.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 2002. S-48) 
2) On October 10, 2002 the Senate defeated by 31-66 an amendment, introduced by 
Senator Robert Byrd (W-VA), to “put a two-year limit on any congressional 
authorization of military action, pursuant to Section 5(b) of the War Powers 
Resolution.” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 2002. S-48) 
3) On October 10, 2002 the Senate defeated by a vote of 24-75 an amendment 
introduced by Senate Carl Levin (D-MI), Chairman of the Senate Armed Services 
Committee, that “would have allowed the use of force only if it had been authorized 
by the United Nations and only for the purpose of eliminating weapons of mass 
destruction in Iraq” (Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 2002. S-48) 
4) On October 10, 2002 the Senate rejected by 30-70 an amendment introduced by 
Senator Dick Durbin (D-IL) that would have authorized use of force to meet “an 
imminent threat posed by Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction,” a higher threshold 
than “continuing threat posed by Iraq” that was cited in the resolution H.J. Res. 114. 
(Congressional Quarterly Almanac, 2002. S-48) 
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Media Attention – The New York Times  
May 01, 2002  –  December 31, 2002 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 2221 
Articles: 1531 
Front-page Article: 583 
Editorial: 195 
Letter to Editor: 183 
 
Monthly Statistics: 
May’02 - 86 Stories; Jun’02- 66 Stories; Jul’02 - 84 Stories; Aug’02 – 209 Stories; 
Sep’02 – 455 Stories; Oct’02 – 538 Stories; Nov’02 – 344 Stories; Dec’02 – 439 Stories  
 
 
Source: ProQuest Historical Newspapers: The New York Times (1851-2009).  
Available at: http://search.proquest.com.libproxy.uoregon.edu/hnpnewyorktimes/results/ 
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Media Attention – The Washington Post  
May 01, 2002  –  December 31, 2002 
 
 
 
Total Number of News Items: 1730 
Articles (A Section): 1232 
Editorial: 498 
 
Monthly Statistics (A Section Articles): 
May’02 - 56 Stories; Jun’02- 52 Stories; Jul’02 - 49 Stories; Aug’02 – 107 Stories; 
Sep’02 – 244 Stories; Oct’02 – 272 Stories; Nov’02 – 223 Stories; Dec’02 – 229 Stories 
 
 
Source: The Washington Post Archive; 
Available at http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/washingtonpost historical/results.htm 
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Media Attention – Network Television (ABC, CBS, NBC, CNN)  
May 01, 2002  –  December 31, 2002 
 
 
ABC – 195 Stories 
CBS - 130 Stories 
NBC - 187 Stories 
CNN - 221 Stories  
 
Source: Vanderbilt Television News Archive. 
Available at http://tvnews.vanderbilt.edu/tvn-search-advanced.pl 
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